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Summary 
This thesis aims at a double deconstruction: of the applicability of the notion of middle 
class in the African context and the hopes for it to be a motor of democratization, that 
are sometimes attached. Choosing a good, but average economic performer like 
Uganda, allows us to examine the hype of “Africa rising” beyond the continent’s 
economic giants. Through a qualitative study of the lives, livelihoods and life 
trajectories of Ugandans who would economically belong to the middle class, 
according to the African Development Bank, we try to see whether we can single out 
specific middle class characteristics, that would allow us to better understand this 
stratum and determine whether we can speak of a class or mere income groups. We 
then proceed to analyze their political attitudes, voting behavior, participation and 
their point of view on protest in Uganda. Finding that they are rather critical of the 
current regime, but abstaining from political participation, we eventually turn to their 
leisure activities – an important vector that can feed into social mobilization once it 
takes place – to analyze the values negotiated, the attitudes expressed and the 
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preferences manifested, in order to find any evidence that will suggest that these 
groups will contribute positively to democratization, due to their middle class status 
Cette thèse vise à une double de-construction : celle de la notion « classe moyenne » 
dans un contexte africain et l’espoir énoncé qu’une telle classe serait un moteur de la 
démocratisation. Choisissant avec l’Ouganda une économie solide, mais pas non plus 
avancée, nous pouvons examiner la question de « Africa rising » loin de la 
médiatisation des grandes économies du continent. À l’aide d’une enquête qualitative 
nous étudions la vie, les conditions de vie et les trajectoires des individus qui 
appartient à ce que la banque africaine du développement décrit comme « classe 
moyenne ». Nous essayons de voir s’il est possible de déceler des traits 
caractéristiques « classe moyenne » qui pourront nous permettre de mieux 
comprendre ces groupes, et de parler des classes plutôt que des strates économiques. 
Dans une deuxième étape nous procéderons à analyser leurs attitudes politiques, leur 
comportement électoral, leur participation politique et leurs point de vue sur les 
protestations qui ont eu lieu dans le pays. Voyant qu’ils s’abstiennent politiquement 
alors qu’ils ont des attitudes très critiques envers le régime politique nous tournons 
vers leurs activités de loisir. La littérature sur les mobilisations sociales a montré que 
ces derniers sont des lieux importants pour créer des environnements de ce qui 
pourra déboucher sur des mobilisations politiques. Nous analysons les activités, les 
valeurs négociées, les attitudes exprimées et les préférences révélées pour tenter de 
trouver des preuves qui pourront suggérer que ces groupes s’investiront pour plus de 
démocratie, grâce à leur statut de « classe moyenne ».
  
1 Introduction 
Betty is a young woman in her twenties. She was born in Western Uganda. The 
memories of her early childhood are rather bright; she does not recall hard times. That 
changed when her father left to marry another woman. Her mother remained with her 
and her three younger siblings in their small house. Deprived of the primary income 
earner the economic situation at home deteriorated. To raise her children, the mother 
started selling second-hand clothes that she bought in bulk at the market in the city 
center. But shortly after Betty completed her primary school, the mother fell sick, and 
she and her sister had to take over to sustain the family. That time of her life Betty 
describes as one of “abduct poverty”. However, as fervent believers, they kept praying 
to God to change their lives. And one night her mother had a vision, of a stranger 
coming to save them. Shortly after the minister of her church told Betty that he found 
a sponsor from the Netherlands to take her and her sister back to school. With his 
support, Betty was able to start her O-Level. At about the same time her mother 
defeated her illness and returned to work. Things got easier, and after finishing 
secondary school, Betty went on to get a certificate in electrical engineering. Even 
though the pay was bad, she took a job with a security firm in Kampala, installing 
surveillance cameras all over the city. But after a while, some of her co-workers started 
making sexual advances, and she felt that she got disadvantaged in her job because she 
refused the propositions made. So, she decided to give up the security of her monthly 
salary to escape that situation. “It is better for you to work in an environment where you 
have peace of mind, even think clearly than working at a job where you are under 
pressure.” She had managed to save some money while working with the security 
company and on top of that convinced some relatives in the village to give her a loan. 
With that, she was able to start a small dairy business in Kawempe, a lower class 
Kampala neighborhood. That was a year ago. Business is picking up only slowly. So far, 
she was busy paying back her loan, but it is nearly cleared off, and she hopes that she 
will now be able to invest more in her venture.  
Betty is renting a room attached to her shop that she shares with one of her younger 
sisters. The sister studies in secondary school, and Betty is paying her school fees. This 
year she will complete her O-Level, but Betty thinks she will not support her any 
further than that. So far Betty has not been able to diversify her sources of income, to 
stabilize her financial situation. She is cognizant of her economic vulnerability. When 
asked about her financial safety nets, Betty answers: “My safety or my help is that one: 
to give a call to a friend or a relative, that is the security that I have when I am in hard 
conditions.” Well aware that her family is not better off than herself, she knows that 
these situations truly must be exceptional. On the contrary, more often it is her family 
asking her for some support. And while she feels that this hinders her from advancing, 
it is nearly impossible for her to refuse, as long as she has some money to give. For the 
little money she has left at the end of the month, she considers it is not worth 
4 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
maintaining a bank account, and so she rather puts her savings on mobile money. 
Knowing that money is tight, she seeks to limit the expenditures she has, by buying in 
bulk and in the morning at the local markets and limiting her mobility to save 
transport costs. Every once in a while, she treats herself with an outing, maybe going 
to one of the popular quarters with friends and eating roasted pork. But because she 
has her shop open from 8 am to 11 pm, free time is scarce. She barely has time to 
attend Sunday service at one of the local born-again churches, which is only possible 
if her sister watches over her shop during her absence. All in all, however, she remains 
rather positive about her financial situation. She considers herself to be middle class 
because she can afford the necessities, contrary to some of her rural family members. 
She is also confident that her business will pick up, allowing for higher revenues. 
Moreover, she knows that her economic conditions will improve once she gets 
married. That is why she is looking for a God-fearing man in sound economic 
conditions. “I need someone who is financially stable; I don’t want him to be a burden 
to me.” Her dream is to one day continue her education at the university and become 
a leader. She feels that this is necessary because even though she thinks the President 
himself is doing a good job, there is too much corruption and nepotism in society. In 
her view, jobs and scholarships are mainly attributed within a family. Despite all 
challenges Uganda and herself are facing, she remains positive about her future, and 
that of her country, both of whom she believes are developing.  
Like Betty, Martha, a 33-year-old woman, only has one source of income, too. However, 
she is not self-employed but receives a salary from a bank in Kampala that she can 
count on every month. She first started five years ago as a teller, but slowly worked 
her way up and is now employed in the headquarters. Other than Betty, Martha is 
already married and can hence rely on the financial support of her husband. They have 
two young kids together and rent a self-contained house about 20 kilometers outside 
of Kampala. The house has its kitchen inside and is part of a fenced compound. Even 
though they have a gas stove, they mainly use charcoal for cooking because it is 
cheaper. Two maids help out with housework and take care of the kids, nevertheless 
Martha finds it hard to reconcile family and work. She considers motherhood as one 
of the hardships in her life: “It has always been really hard to me to be a mother and 
at the same time, work.” Staying on the outskirts of Kampala was a conscious choice, 
to afford better housing. Since both partners work in Kampala, daily commuting is 
tedious because they do not have a car on their own. Her husband is employed by an 
international donor agency. With both earning a salary they manage to make their 
ends meet. Nevertheless, they remain conscious about their spending. To save on food, 
they have staple crops sent from the village where they can purchase them at a better 
price. Once a week they try to eat meat and once fish. All of their diet is local, for 
financial reasons, but also because of preference, not having developed a particular 
liking for imported foods like pizza or cheese. Their priorities lie in advancing their 
education and securing the future of their children. So right now, both pursue a 
master’s degree in evening classes, and they started putting aside some money for the 
time when their children will start schooling. All these activities leave little time for 
free time activities, apart from regular church attendance and a savings group, where 
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Martha contributes money fortnightly, knowing that every six months it is her turn to 
be on the receiving end. Besides, Martha and her husband are developing plans for 
further investment. With mobile money gaining popularity, they feel it is a safe venture 
to set up a booth, too. Right now, they are in the process of registering the booth with 
one of Uganda’s leading telephone companies and hope to start their business soon, as 
a means of securing their financial conditions through diversifying their income. When 
asked about her class position, she is not quite sure where to put herself, somewhere 
below middle class, but not poor either. 
Coming from the east of Uganda, Martha grew up in a village near the Kenyan border. 
Despite being polygamous with eleven wives, her father was always able to provide 
food, since he was an agricultural officer in Moroto district. When he died in 1990 – 
she was nine at that time – her relatives took over her education up to university. So 
now she considers it her responsibility to support some family members herself. 
Martha is well aware of the expectations of her family, yet she does not perceive it as 
pressure knowing she would not be where she is, if it was not for her family. On the 
other hand, she knows that she has hardly any financial security, as long as her 
business is not working because she is among the top earners of her family and could 
hence not turn to them for help. Martha believes that all Ugandans would be better off 
if politics would support the most vulnerable. Instead, corruption is being practiced 
on all levels, so that “now people at the lower level look at corruption as a way of life.” 
However, she credits to the government that it has brought peace, which for her is of 
utmost importance: “But anyway what I can say that there is peace. What has changed 
is that there is peace because the time I was growing up guns were in wrong hands; 
people were being killed.” 
Only a stone’s throw from Martha’s workplace is the office of Steve. Steve is a lecturer 
at a private university. His father was a veterinary surgeon, and his mother was 
working as a secretary to a minister. He did not recall any financial problems in his 
childhood. His sisters being married to affluent people equally helped to put Steve 
through secondary school – “one of the best schools in the country!” Steve pursued his 
bachelor at university with the help of a government scholarship and while still 
studying got employed with the tax authority. Having a stable salary did not stop him 
however from furthering his education, he continued with a master in a related field 
and several postgraduate courses. Right now, Steve is fostering plans to continue with 
a Ph.D. When his contract with the tax authority did not get renewed, he switched 
fields and became a lecturer at that university. However, he is not satisfied with his 
pay. His salary is barely enough to fuel his car, he argues. Luckily his wife is running a 
well-performing shop giving her a weekly profit, they are renting out two houses and 
have some hectares of land that they use for commercial agriculture. Moreover, he 
knows that his various assets protect him from “getting to the lowest level of the 
poverty line.” Still, expenses are high, so when asked about his financial situation, Steve 
laughs and says: “At least out of thirty days I can survive 26. And the last three days I am 
broke like a mouse.” For that reason, he is also hesitant to classify himself as middle 
class: “You are just at the boundary [...]. Some days you have money, you are middle class, 
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others you don’t, and you are poor.” Now in his forties, Steve lives in his own house a 
few kilometers north of the city center. The house is well-equipped with a gas stove 
(even though they use charcoal for cooking as well), a fridge, several TVs and laptops, 
a microwave and a sandwich toaster. Just when asked about a washing machine, he 
shrugs and says he does not know anyone who owns a washing machine. His diet 
consists mainly of local food, as he did not acquire a taste for those imported foods, 
which he also deems unhealthy. His spendings are not consistent; however, one thing 
that remains a priority for him and that he is budgeting for, is a regular vacation. Steve 
believes that everyone should take some vacation time and leave the country to 
change their mind and be exposed to new things. He has four children, between the 
ages of two and eight and several relatives who live with him and his family in the 
house. Right now, Steve estimates that about ten relatives depend on him for their 
school fees. And while he knows it is his turn now to support his family because others 
have supported him, he weighs how much money he gives to his relatives. Concerning 
his finances, he states: “I do as the bible says: from your income you should give some, 
spend some and save some.”  
Steve is also a paying member of the local golf club even though, he admits, he does 
not even know how to play golf. For him, this is just a way of “greeting the old men” 
and finding new ventures. Once a month he also meets with longtime friends, all 
coming from the same region and now living in the same area. They go out, have some 
drinks together and they also constitute a savings group. Everyone contributes $20 
monthly and in case of big expenditures they can borrow from the pool. Steve is also 
interested in politics and even harbored some intentions to participate, but he believes 
right now the environment is not conducive to become politically active. For him the 
government is not doing any good, there is one person who has been in power for too 
long and even though the country enjoys stability, there is no chance for institutions 
to develop. Participating in elections to him is just a waste of time since the votes will 
be rigged anyway. Unless Uganda reinstalls term limits, Ugandans are heading 
towards another Libya. Thus, he has a rather bleak picture of society whom he believes 
is deteriorating as people are becoming increasingly poor. On the contrary, about 
himself, Steve states positively: “I see myself as a young man that is out to achieve my 
potential to the fullest.”1 
At the beginning of the second decade of this millennium economists (Mahajan, 2009; 
McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Ncube et al., 2011) and journalists (Courrier 
international, 2013; Gaus, 2011; Perry, 2012; The Economist, 2011b) wrote 
increasingly about “Africa rising” and, closely linked, about the African middle class. 
This has become so popular, that it was even called “a meme2” by some observers 
(Jacobs, 2012). According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the three fictitious 
                                                 
1 This introduction is taken from a presentation I made at the SA UK conference 2016, “Uganda, vignettes 
to illuminate class categories” at Cambridge, 7-9th of September and inspired by the introduction in 
Ferreira, 2013. 
2 A meme is an idea or behavior that spreads rapidly, often with the help of the internet. 
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people in the example, but based on the stories of our respondents, are all part of the 
African middle class, because they can spend between $2-20 in purchasing power 
parity (ppp) per day (Ncube et al., 2011). Albeit their common class, their lives have 
not many points of contact. Their social circles, lifestyles, living places, and attitudes 
differ. And if they pass each other on the street, they will probably not consider 
themselves to be peers. Besides, their perception of class differs, Betty would describe 
herself as middle class, yet Steve feels he is just “oscillating.” Hence, this feeling is not 
tied to income, but in their case more to the context and their point of reference. If 
their subjective and objective life situation is so disparate, what then is the benefit of 
calling them all middle class? 
Closely related with the optimism about Africa’s future, derived from several years of 
economic growth and the postulated emergence of its middle class is the hope that this 
will equally support the democratic advancement of the continent (Birdsall, 2010; 
Easterly, Ritzan, & Woolcock, 2006). Already Aristotle highlighted the civic virtues of 
the middle class: 
“Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens 
of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well administered, 
in which the middle class is large […] And democracies are safer and more 
permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is 
more numerous and has a greater share in government; for when there is 
no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, 
and the state soon comes to an end.” (Aristotle cited in Lipset, 1960) 
The evidence that the middle class can have such a pro-democratic transformative role 
is, at least, questionable, and thorough empirical analysis of the relation remains 
scarce, particularly in an African context (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016, p. 6). 
This thesis aims therefore at a double deconstruction: for one the scrutiny of the 
applicability of the middle class concept in the context of an African country like 
Uganda. We will not concentrate the analysis on continental economic outliers, such 
as Kenya or South Africa, as the Africa Rising Narrative is often doing, but at a close to 
the average performer. Uganda has had steady growth over the last twenty years 
which has led to a reduction of people living below the poverty line, yet the country 
remains far from becoming a middle income country (World Bank, 2016b)3. A middle 
class definition like the one of the AfDB has increasingly been under attack, mainly for 
its low entry thresholds. With higher economic thresholds, in a country like Uganda 
the size of the middle class would drastically diminish, raising doubts whether Uganda 
has a “real” middle class, living a “middle class lifestyle” (Melber 2016, p. 2) as if this 
does not need further elaboration. However, there is no general agreement on what 
middle class is, as the many diverging definitions show. Rather, the term evokes 
mental images that are shaped by assumptions and experiences. Connected with the 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion see chapter 4.1. 
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living conditions in the respective African countries, those images cannot stand the 
test, because the biggest share of what has been defined as African middle class (using 
here the often cited definition of the AfDB) is the so-called floating class, living from 
$2-4 per day. Such a criticism, however, ignores the need for an analysis that is 
adapted to a particular historical and national context and it raises the question 
whether the way a “Western” middle class is understood can be easily transposed into 
an African context. Such a simple negation may blur the picture for the changes on how 
“Africa is rising”, who is touched, and who is not. So, there is a need to clarify the 
middle class concept regarding Africa: Are there proper, locally bound trajectories of 
emergence? In how far do they correspond to other understandings of middle class in 
vastly different contexts? By looking at personal trajectories of emergence, we can 
grasp a better understanding of what it means to be in an intermediate position, as 
neither rich nor poor, in many African societies. We can single out processes and 
patterns that are recurrent for economic emergence and we can link them to 
demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, religion or regional origin and wider 
behavior, such as consumption and leisure. This allows us to give a micro-sociological 
description, based on qualitative research of the everyday lives of Ugandans who do 
better than the large, mainly rural, majority, but who still feel they are “not there yet”. 
Besides, our analysis shows that it may be premature to speak of a class, as a class 
consciousness in the larger sense does not exist. To avoid the prejudices and because 
of the doubt concerning the “class” label, we, therefore, suggest framing these middle 
classes in terms of economic strata, and refer to them as middle income groups.  
The second deconstruction is linked to the normative concept of the middle classes’ 
implication in democratic development. The idea that the middle class is beneficial for 
democracy stems from the perceived correlation between economic development and 
democracy (Lipset, 1959b). In their review of studies on class theories that explain 
democratization, Kurzman & Leahey (2004) find that 
“Economic development also underlies all of the main class-based 
theories of democratization: it is associated with the rise of the 
bourgeoisie, the expansion of the working class, and the emergence of a 
middle class.” (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004, p. 945) 
The concept gains in importance when connected to the notion of social change, which 
is often related to instability. Thus, if we have a society that has been undergoing rapid 
social changes (for example, triggered by economic development), the risk of 
instability is increasing. If there is now equally a middle class emerging that fosters 
democratic values, a transition towards democracy would become likely.  
This argument has equally been challenged on several grounds. For one, some authors 
have pointed out that the middle class will not necessarily sideline with democracy, 
this will instead depend on specific local and historical context, and the alliances 
formed (Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens, 1997; Huntington, 1972). Also, a 
prevailing assumption considers the middle class to act coherently, driven by shared 
class interest. Third, most studies treating the relationship between middle class and 
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democracy do not specify how the middle class contributes to democracy: Through the 
overthrow of an undemocratic regime? The fostering of democratic values? However, 
this again raises two questions: First, what are democratic values? Is it enough to 
participate in elections? If elections are not free and fair, this can be seen precisely as 
an act of legitimizing an authoritarian regime (J. Chen, 2013, p. 113). Second, is it 
enough to adhere to certain principles, while not insisting that they shall be 
implemented on a society-wide scale? Some authors argue that by paying taxes, the 
middle class supports redistribution of wealth and feels entitled to demand 
accountability from the government. But what if the government can only hardly be 
held accountable and paying taxes is not a choice but a governmental decision that 
leaves little room for negotiation?  
“This macro-level conviction about the role of the middle class is derived 
from the micro-level observations and analyses mainly of the Western 
societies, most of which suggest that middle-class individuals think and 
act democratically [emphasis in original]: that is, they have attitudes in 
support of democratic principles, and engage in actions (non-actions) for 
the rise and/or maintenance of a democratic system and against a non-
democratic system.” (Lu, 2005, p. 160) 
However, empirical analysis shows that such an argument can be hardly upheld and 
that even in Western societies outcomes of middle class implications in democratic 
transformations have been very diverse (Huber et al., 1997). Very often, general 
arguments ignore particular historical and local contexts in which the societal 
transformation (if any) needs to take place. In the same vein, the argumentation for 
regime change is not the same if the starting and ending point change: in what kind of 
regime situation is the middle class and what is the likely outcome if they advocate 
change? Will the regime shift from a stable authoritarian regime to an unstable 
democracy? From an unstable authoritarian regime to an unstable democracy? From 
an unstable democracy to a stable one? We argue that to comprehend the link between 
middle class and their implication in democratic transformation; there is an urgent 
need, widely ignored in the literature of linking middle class discourses with the 
literature on social transformation and social mobilization theory and abstaining from 
gross generalizations. 
Our contribution here is not another systematic macroanalysis, correlating 
macroeconomic data with democracy levels, but a small, qualitative sample of those 
that could be considered middle class (according to the definition by the AfDB) and 
their activities. We try to shine light on the processes how exactly these groups can 
contribute to democracy, by analyzing their actions and attitudes through the lens of 
social mobilization. Reflecting on their views, participation or abstention in protests 
that have taken place in Uganda in the last decade, we are able to understand crucial 
categories relevant for collective action, such as the political opportunity structures, 
available repertoires of action, and prevailing collective identities (or the obstacles in 
creating them). While we find that most Ugandans have outspoken political opinions, 
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critical of the incumbent president or at least his government, few perceive 
themselves as actors to change the situation. Definitely not as collective actors on the 
grounds of class affiliation, but even as individuals they feel their hands are tied. Due 
to the combination of a repressive political environment, an increasingly authoritarian 
state, the bad reputation of politics, and the widespread view that political action 
threatens social harmony most people choose to refrain from political action 
(Fichtmüller, 2014b). Thus, we decide to push the analysis one step further. Social 
movement theory suggests that social movements draw on smaller, already existing 
structures of networks, associations or informal groups for their mobilization (Diani, 
2004; McAdam & Scott, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; Ohlemacher, 1996; Polletta, 1999; 
Taylor, 1989). In addition, the strand of literature subscribing to the “politics from 
below” (Bayart, 1992; Bayat, 2013a; D.-C. Martin, 1989; Scott, 1990) suggests that 
there is more to political action than mere demonstrations, petitions, campaigns or 
elections. Hence, we turn our attention to these existing structures and try to see how, 
within these groups, members of the so-called middle class negotiate meaning and 
identity. Do they politicize in these “free spaces” that are beyond state control or foster 
interests that relate to other areas? As a result, do they continue their withdrawal into 
the private from a political sphere that is not open to them for an exit in the sense of 
Hirschman (1970)? We draw on literature from leisure studies that has often put the 
structuring effect of leisure in terms of class, age, and gender in the forefront but has 
rarely made the connection between leisure activity and social or political 
mobilization. 
In summary, our double deconstruction aims at questioning the notion of middle class 
in the Ugandan context, and the idea that such a middle class per se is beneficial to 
democracy. Instead, we propose a closer look at the characteristics of these groups 
and the identities that shape them. We cannot confirm the commonly made 
assumption that social positions will structure interests because these social positions 
themselves are heterogeneous, and these differentiations impede the development of 
one clear-cut identity. It hinders them from acting collectively, and the question 
remains whether through their individual actions they could pave the way for a more 
democratic environment. 
In the first part, we will therefore critically examine and define the relevant concepts 
of middle class and social mobilization, in the Global North as well as Southern 
countries. We will justify our choice of Uganda as a relevant site of fieldwork and 
introduce our research questions, hypotheses, and methodology. In the second part, 
we thoroughly analyze the interviews to single out trajectories of emergence, the 
factors that contribute to it and the lifestyle and value changes that come with it. We 
then turn to the political activity in the country and the role the middle income groups 
play in political activism. To complement, in the fourth part we analyze social 
activities, to see what they can tell us about the shaping of new norms and identities, 
and the creation of dissent or consent.
  
Part I: 
 Theoretical Considerations 

  
2 Africa Rising – Africa Falling 
The Changing Discourse on the Emergence of 
an African Middle Class 
There had been a shift in the perception of the African continent between the 
beginning of the millennium and the end of the first decade (Nallet, 2015, p. 23). 
Whereas for a long time the continent had been perceived through bad news of war, 
famine, poverty, and AIDS, a wave of new literature jubilated the African emergence, 
which became known as the Africa Rising narrative (Jacobs, 2012). In this context, 
analysts, inspired by earlier works on Latin America and Asia, started mentioning the 
African middle class that would emerge with the economic development. The main 
thrust of the analyses was presented by economists and consultancies and thus 
referred only to economic definitions of middle class (Deloitte, 2012; McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2010; Ncube et al., 2011). It is only slowly and reluctantly that scholars on 
Africa have claimed ownership over the debate (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016). 
Simultaneously, with economic crises linked to falling oil prices and companies such 
as Barclays and Nestlé withdrawing from African countries, the continent’s emergence 
is put into question. Recent studies such as the by the Pew Research Center (Kochhar, 
2015) or The Global Wealth Databook (Shorrocks et al., 2015) assume that the size of 
the African middle class is smaller than thought and that the continent may not catch 
up so fast to developed countries as hoped. These completely diverging analyses are 
due to the very different definitions applied (see also Table 1 on p. 265). Here we argue 
that this back and forth is fueled by these definitional problems and contradicting 
views of what it means to be middle class in Africa. On the one hand, low statistical 
thresholds such as those of the AfDB, label everyone as middle class who is not poor 
and on the other glossy images of big cars and shopping malls portray a lifestyle that 
these income groups cannot have. As a result, the Global/Developing/African middle 
class becomes an overused concept, which has been stretched too far to maintain its 
analytic value. Though, it would be false to throw the baby out with the bath water and 
put the all postulated transformations into question. Enaudeau observes that “a 
growing number of Africans are indeed lifting themselves out of poverty but, contrary to 
the African economic revolution narrative, this is not happening overnight.” (Enaudeau, 
2013). Thus, we suggest instead of looking at clear-cut categories, we should rather 
consider the effects of a slow transformation of social structures in Africa, that take 
into account processes of intergenerational uplifting. To better shed light on this 
contested notion, we first look at the historical origins of the “class” and more precisely 
“middle class” concept and its transformations throughout history. In the second part, 
we trace the discourse that led to talking about the rise of the African middle class and 
how it is recently called into question. Finally, we question its applicability on the 
Ugandan context and suggest talking about economic emergence and vulnerability 
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instead, as it seems to better reflect the living conditions of most of the Ugandan 
middle class (in the AfDB sense) today. 
2.1 A Review of the Class Concept(s)  
Class is a particularly relevant concept in sociology, yet it remains highly contested as 
well. While there seems to be a general agreement that societies are stratified, there is 
little consensus on the lines according to which this stratification takes place. The 
concept is used in a wide range of contexts, as popular discourse, in a descriptive, or 
explanatory way. Thus, a changing context also requires changing concepts of class (E. 
O. Wright, 2008a, p. 2). And if there is no general agreement on what exactly 
constitutes a class, it becomes even more challenging to define the middle class. This 
chapter aims to give a short overview of the different theoretical origins of class 
concepts and their evolution, first of class in general and second, the specific concept 
of the middle class. The objective is to situate the current debate on the African middle 
class better, to see its continuities and ruptures with the past in the academic fields of 
sociology and economy. 
2.1.1 Marx, Weber, Bourdieu – Which Classes Are We Talking About?  
The idea to divide a society according to income lines can be traced far back in history. 
Maurice Halbwachs argues that already the ancient Romans have divided their people 
into five different categories, according to their wealth (Halbwachs, 2008, p. 24). Albeit 
a resurrection of class distinction through income strata, such a definition is not 
sufficient if the concept is approached from a sociological angle. Only in recent years 
and with the availability of more statistical data such numerical definitions have 
shifted back in to focus. It is, therefore, useful to distinguish between qualitative class 
analysis, that takes into account other aspects as well and quantitative class analysis, 
which operates by numbers. 
a) Qualitative Class Analysis 
Depending on the strand, the emphasis on other aspects, such as asset ownership, 
occupation, control over means of production, comes into focus of the sociological 
observation. In the 19th century, Karl Marx used class as a tool for analyzing social 
relations and explaining social change (E. O. Wright, 2008b, p. 5). The Marxist 
conceptualization takes as a starting point an antagonism between a superordinate 
and subordinate class. This opposition is at the core of social change and revolution 
(Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 107). The position within one of the two classes 
depends for Marx on the control over the means of productions, which lead to different 
power relations that in return yield into different capacities to accumulate means of 
production. With this Marx does not refer to the inequality as a mere inequality of 
income between capitalists and working class, but as a relation of exploitation, since 
“the surplus product of society is controlled by a group which effectively excludes the 
actual producers of that surplus.” (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 112) Thus, even if a 
capitalist pays an adequate wage to his laborer, by allocating the surplus, he would 
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enrich himself and thus impoverish the other. The exploitation lies within the unequal 
bargaining power between the worker and the capitalist; and by agreeing to the wage 
contract determined by the capitalist, the laboring class gives up control over the 
process of production and the product, as well as a claim on the added value of the 
product, which remains with the bourgeoisie (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 116). Yet, 
the dominant class, and this is distinctive for exploitation, also depends on the 
exploited class. Because there is a continuous need for interaction between the two 
classes, but on highly unequal terms, the class antagonism is turned into an “explosive 
form of social relation” (E. O. Wright, 2008b, p. 25). Herein lies the propensity for 
conflict and class struggle so inherent in the Marxian theory. Since the dependence 
equally gives bargaining power to the exploited class, they can alter their conditions 
by acting collectively. This, however, presumes that they take conscience of their 
shared (class) interests: to develop a class consciousness (E. O. Wright, 2008b, pp. 22–
25). Such a consciousness is often used to describe the difference between a class in 
itself and for itself whereby the former is defined through objective circumstances and 
the latter through a subjective understanding of its members to belong to this class – 
hence as having a class consciousness (Heinrich, 2004, p. 37). The shift from a class in 
itself to one with a shared consciousness is not an inevitability, but depends on 
historical circumstances, hence the objective class is always numerically more 
significant than the subjective one (Heinrich, 2004, p. 37; Vester, 2008, p. 736). Albeit 
often attributed to him, Marx himself never made a distinction between a class in and 
for itself, it was among subsequent Marxist scholars that the difference became an 
essential element of analysis (Andrew, 1983, p. 577; Vester, 2008, p. 736).  
Critics of the Marxian class analysis have – among others – pointed out that the 
dichotomy of two classes was too simplistic and failed to depict the empirical reality. 
Indeed, Heinrich points out that in Das Kapital, Marx did not even bother to define 
class (Heinrich, 2004, p. 36). However, neo-Marxists argue that this was not the point 
of the Marxian class conception, which should not be understood as a descriptive 
category of social reality, but an analytical one of social change (So, 1991, p. 39). This 
should not be equaled with stratification analyses, in which social behavior is 
attempted to be explained by “mapping out” certain attributes. Dahrendorf describes 
this as the difference between strata and classes: 
“Wherever classes are defined by factors which permit the construction 
of a hierarchical continuum, they are wrongly defined; i.e. the term has 
been applied wrongly. Status, ranking by others, self-ranking, style of life, 
similar economic conditions, and income level are all factors which define 
social strata but not social classes. However, one may interpret, extend, or 
improve Marx, classes in his sense are clearly not layers in a hierarchical 
system of strata differentiated by gradual distinctions. […] Class 
[emphasis in original] is always a category for purposes of the analysis of 
the dynamics of social conflict and its structural roots, and as such it has 
to be separated strictly from stratum [emphasis in original] as a category 
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for purposes of describing hierarchical systems at a given point in time.” 
(Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 76) 
Marx did not intend to describe an empirical stratification. Such approaches fail to 
explain how the social structure determines unequal life chances (Stolzman & 
Gamberg, 1973, p. 108). That distinction makes Marxian class analysis quite 
distinctive from subsequent class analyses4, which focus more on explaining social 
behavior rather than social change. 
Similar to Marx, Max Weber analyzes how inequality is structured and derives from 
there divers fault lines (Breen, 2008, p. 31). For Weber, however, the advantages of 
the one does not necessarily come at the expense of the other. Hence, the possibility 
of conflict is not among his preoccupations. He introduces the concept of life chances, 
that is the likelihood of a person determining the extent to which they have a part of 
the economic or cultural good of a society (Weber, 2002, p. 632). In capitalism, it is 
mainly the market who will determine these life chances; it will put people into 
different positions, according to their means of production, but also according to their 
skills. He distinguishes his social classes between those who own property and those 
who do not, which are then further divided into subcategories depending on the type 
of property (for the property owners) and their skill levels (for those who do not own 
any property). Hence, a four-tiered class structure arises: the entrepreneurial and 
property class, the petty bourgeoisie, workers with credentials and workers who only 
have their labor to offer (Breen, 2008, p. 32). This added a new dimension, that has 
remained prevalent in Weberian class analysis: the focus on profession. In his work, 
the relevance of profession is much more pronounced than with Marx, and he equally 
includes “residual” categories, that cannot be neatly divided into bourgeoisie or 
proletariat. Neo-Weberians such as Goldthorpe have turned their attention primarily 
to the labor market and how a certain position in the labor market turns into a certain 
class (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Goldthorpe adds, however, to the ownership of 
production also the relationship between the employee and employer (wage work vs. 
service relationship). In his most advanced version, Goldthorpe comes up with eleven 
different classes. The focus on profession has also been reflected among other 
scholars, such as Gustav Schmoller who supposes that the profession of a person 
determines his personality (Halbwachs, 2008, p. 64).  
For Weber, however, classes are only one aspect of social stratification. Power 
relations within society are equally shaped by parties and Stände (roughly translated 
as status groups). So, while classes are structured through their relation to the means 
of production, Stände are defined through their consumption and their particular 
lifestyles (Weber, 2002, p. 639). He believes they are more prone to collective action 
than the classes, as they are more likely to develop a shared consciousness. While he 
does not exclude the possibility for a class conscience to develop, he makes it 
dependent on other conditions, such as geographical proximity, a common enemy, and 
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the awareness of a similar class situation for a mass of people (Breen, 2008, p. 33). 
Thus, Weber does not aim at explaining social conflict through his class analysis, as for 
him power and thus power struggles instead fall into the realm of parties and Stände. 
His theory, therefore, provides no explanation, when and under which circumstances 
classes become essential in shaping political action (Sørensen, 2008, p. 120). 
This distinction between Stand and class is put into question by critics of Weber. 
Instead of seeing them as dichotomies, they should be considered as two different 
aspects of the same matter (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008, p. 17). The most renown 
sociologist who has developed a theory of class by merging the two was Bourdieu. 
Through his integration of the habitus, his analysis looks at economic aspects of class 
as well as at symbolic aspects (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 101 ff). Class affiliation is 
determined through the possession of economic (money, assets), social, cultural 
(education), and symbolic capital. Bourdieu also considers that not a common 
profession leads to a common class affiliation, but similar consumption patterns. 
Consumption functions as a way to convey a certain taste, or lifestyle, and is used as a 
distinction (this is what he refers to as symbolic capital) from other classes (Bourdieu, 
1986). However, his approach is different from others such as Veblen, as the 
consumption does not necessarily have to be conspicuous, to become a marker of 
distinction (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 6). 
“Toute consommation, et plus généralement, toute pratique est 
conspicuous, visible, qu'elle ait été ou non accomplie afin d'être vue ; elle 
est distinctive, qu'elle ait ou non été inspirée par l'intention de se faire 
remarquer, de se singulariser (to make oneself conspicuous), de se 
distinguer ou d'agir avec distinction.” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 7) 
The dominant class sets the measure for a “legitimate culture”, the working class 
serves as a negative reference point, and the petty bourgeoisie strives to distance itself 
from the working class by copying as much as possible the lifestyle of the dominant 
(Weininger, 2008, p. 95 ff). And even though Weininger uses these categories, 
Bourdieu himself opposed drawing boundaries between the classes, as it would run 
the risk to treat classes as preexisting, “self-subsistent entities” (Weininger, 2008, p. 
85). For him, social collectivities are created through symbolic practices, such as 
certain forms of consumption, that delimit regions of social space, but these 
collectivities are dynamic. 
“Sur la base de la connaissance de l'espace des positions, on peut découper 
des classes logiques ou théoriques composées de l'ensemble des agents 
occupant des positions semblables qui, placés dans des conditions 
semblables et soumis à des conditionnements semblables, ont toutes les 
chances d'avoir des dispositions et des intérêts semblables, donc de 
produire des pratiques, des comportements et aussi des opinions 
semblables. Ces classes ne sont pas des classes réelles, c'est-à-dire des 
groupes constitués d'individus unis par la conscience de leur identité 
commune et de leur appartenance à la même unité sociale ; il s'agit plutôt 
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de classes probables dont les éléments constitutifs sont mobilisables (et 
non nécessairement mobilisés pratiquement) sur la base de leurs 
similitudes, c'est-à-dire de leur appartenance à une même classe de 
positions, à une même région de l'espace social.” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 95) 
For them to become mobilized for collective action, discursive practices are needed, 
which itself contribute to the reshaping of the social space. 
“Furthermore, it is only with a discursive identity that is known and 
recognized by the members of the class (or fraction) that they become 
capable of acting in concert for a specified purpose – that is of mobilizing. 
Hence, ‘social classes,’ as they are typically envisioned in social theory – 
namely as groups entering into conflict for the sake of ‘class interests’ are 
profoundly discursive entities; and insofar as the preservation or 
transformation of the underlying distributions of economic and cultural 
capital in fact hinges on collective action, discourse contributes to the 
shaping and reshaping of social space itself.” (Weininger, 2008, p. 103) 
To sum up, in this very brief and incomplete sketch of class analysis, we can broadly 
distinguish between two approaches to class analysis: as relational categories or as 
primarily descriptive ones. The first approach, following Marx, sees classes as conflict 
groups born out of the antagonistic interests of exploitation and through the analysis 
of their relations to each other it becomes possible to comprehend social conflict and 
social change. The second approach, following the lines of Weber and Bourdieu, 
describes particular class attributes, like income, occupation, education, etc. which 
result in specific lifestyles associated with certain classes (Sørensen, 2008, p. 120 f). 
These analyses do not aim at explaining the production of social inequality, but rather 
depict as accurate as possible the stratification of a society at a given moment in time 
(Lentz, 2015, p. 18). Regarding the “middle class analysis”, the second approach had 
been the prevailing one, recently more often in a reductive form by focusing purely on 
quantitative indicators.  
b) Quantitative Class Analysis 
In recent years we have observed a shift from more qualitative accounts of class 
analysis to quantitative approaches. Ferreira et al. argue that today large amounts of 
available household data, aggregated by government bodies have given a preference 
to define class affiliation through income strata (Ferreira, 2013, p. 30 f). They do 
concede, however, that these thresholds are defined somewhat arbitrarily. Another 
approach with a focus on consumption can also be seen in more recent accounts of 
classness (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). Owning a particular set of assets becomes an 
indication of one’s class location. It is the consumption that defines class affiliation. 
And it remains its sole indicator, detached from other sociological aspects, such as 
habitus, or economic and cultural capital. Critics of such an approach argue that there 
is a need for a more holistic, sociological (instead of economic) class analysis, which 
brings back in Weberian or Bourdieu’s characteristics (Melber, 2016a). Both methods, 
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using household data or asset indexes are common in defining classes (and mainly 
middle classes) in the Global South. They will be taken up and elaborated further in 
chapter 2.2. But before, we shall look at the significance of the middle class within the 
various theories of classes, which sometimes are solely theories of middle classes. 
2.1.2 Positioning the Middle Class – the Muddle in the Middle 
If it is already hard to find an agreement on what constitutes a class (E. O. Wright, 
2008a, p. 2) it is even harder to do so for the term “middle class” (Raynaud, 2014, p. 
16). There had been considerable variation in what was considered to be a middle 
class over time, geographical location, and context, and with which categories they 
share the social stratum. Moreover, the definition has equally been linked to the 
particular historical and local context of a country and varied according to political 
circumstances, as the category has often been used to legitimize a certain political 
discourse (Kocka, 2004; Lentz, 2015; Nallet, 2015). Hence, the explanatory value of 
“the middle class” will very much depend on the definition used (Damon, 2013, p. 7). 
Here, a certain risk is inherent: if one author writes about middle class with a specific 
concept in mind, and another author uses this work, still writing about middle class, 
but with a different definition, the correlations established in the end may not be 
tenable (see also Kroeker & Voigt, 2017, p. 3). 
Aristotle, often cited as an early authority on the positive effects of the middle class for 
democracy, used the category to describe an income stratum5 (Lipset, 1959a). For 
Marx, the middle class did not play a decisive role, as they would be absorbed by the 
proletariat at one point. This assumption has for some been the proof that Marx is 
wrong, because they see that class striving (Goux & Maurin, 2012, p. 19) for others the 
disappearance seems real (Gaggi, 2006). Weber broke up the Marxian dichotomy by 
equally including education as a necessary asset, which does not lead to more 
significant capital or property ownership per se. It does, however, increase the life 
chances offered by the market. This turned him into a more popular reference for 
subsequent theories on middle class. In her historical overview of the middle class 
terminology, Nallet has shown how the phrase itself has experienced several 
epistemological shifts over the centuries (2015, p. 59 ff). Thus, the “bourgeois” initially 
designated a town dweller in medieval France, and only later was used in 
differentiation with other urban inhabitants to describe someone living from his 
investments, and after the French revolution was ascribed to industrialists, merchants 
and financiers (Seed, 2014, p. 114). At that time “middle class” was closely associated 
with the bourgeoisie, in opposition to the working class and aristocracy, or, in the case 
of Marx, the capitalists (Damon, 2013, p. 10f). Later on, in a semantic turn, petty 
bourgeoisie and small entrepreneurs were equally included (Lebon, 2014; Nallet, 
2015, p. 59). These middle classes were traditionally small and mainly constituted by 
a group of independents (Kocka, 2004, p. 16). The rise of similar social strata, be it 
bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie, middle class, middling sorts, or Bürgertum could 
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have been observed all over Europe, even though their constitution and role heavily 
varied from one context to another (Kocka, 2004). Through industrialization and 
urbanization, these classes were able to grow significantly in number, so that they 
occupied a much larger part of the societal structure by the end of the 19th century 
(Damon, 2013, p. 11). Authors date the “long nineteenth century” (Kocka, 2004, p. 16) 
with these evolutions as the time when “middle class” became a prominent category, 
also reflected in their understanding and political discourse (Seed, 2014). Their rise in 
numbers would give them more political clout, explaining their rise as a salient 
category (O’Boyle, 1966, p. 827). One example could be the speech giving by Gambetta 
in 1872, announcing the accession of a “new social stratum” (Gresle, 1993, p. 36). The 
question remains, however, whether the idea of the middle class, that developed out 
of the particular context of European industrialization can easily be applied elsewhere 
(Kroeker & Voigt, 2017, p. 5). 
In addition to the different historical trajectories, varying between countries, 
categories with whom the middle class, once defined, shares the social stratification 
differ as well. The easiest stratification might be of lower, middle, and upper class, but 
other categories such as proletariat, working class, bourgeoisie (Marx, see also Huber 
& Stephens, 1999), labor and capital (Mills, 1953), the poor, the elite, the military, the 
peasants (Huntington, 1972), the intellectuals (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004) might 
similarly be evoked. Since the terminology used and also the “significant others”, that 
would stand above or below the middle class would vary, the plural of the word has 
often become common (Lentz, 2015, p. 15). Over time, there have always been 
ascriptions to the characteristics of these middle classes. They allegedly shared a 
“bourgeois culture”, described by the value for education and an ethos that embraces 
hard work. They were also said to believe in individual achievement and meritocratic 
ideals, strive for independence, either individually or through gathering in 
associations and through insisting on the separation between the private and the 
public sphere (Glassman, 1995; Kocka, 2004; Seed, 2014). Their modest consumption 
would draw a boundary with the aristocracy and their preference for conspicuous 
behavior, and despite their diverging political views, they would agree on common 
values of civil society and freedom (Lentz, 2015, p. 21 f). The development of these 
characteristics was linked to the specific historical trajectories of the Western 
European countries and would change with shifting circumstances. After the two wars, 
with the decline of industry and the rise of the service sector, the composition of the 
middle class changed, with a decreasing number of self-employed workers, while a 
larger service sector gave rise to the “white collars” (Mills, 1953). Mills is much less 
positive about this group of white collars. They are commodity-minded and driven by 
self-interests, and, due to their heterogeneity, internally fragmented. This society is 
rendered political apathetic through consumption and mass media, self-alienation and 
social meaninglessness and driven by status panic (Mills, 1953, p. 342). In the 1970s 
the middle class again experiences a shift towards a more positive representation, 
through the literature on the “new class”. Roland Inglehart draws on the Maslowian 
pyramid of needs and argues that once the most basic needs are fulfilled, a society can 
pursue other goals than establishing economic security (Inglehart, 1971, p. 991). 
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While the generation that has experienced the scarcity of war and the post-war period 
is drawn to frugality, their children have grown up taking economic security for 
granted. This is particularly true for the “younger cohorts of the modern middle class” 
(Inglehart, 1971, p. 991). Inglehart predicts a change in values, drawing an increasing 
number of middle class members to vote for a left agenda, whereas the working class, 
having acquired a certain level of prosperity, will in return vote more conservatively. 
These post-materialists will be more affluent, informed, and educated and their 
demands will focus on greater social questions (Inglehart, 1977). The Green 
movement or the peace movement of the 1980s have been examples of these post-
materialist concerns and have given rise to their description as “new social 
movements” (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004). While this deserves to be discussed in 
relation to the social mobilization of the middle class, the ascription to values and their 
support for a higher societal aim, beyond their mere self-interest are relevant here. 
However, being bound to specific geographic and historical circumstances, in addition 
to the heterogeneous group of people commonly described as “middle class” make 
such generalizations at least risky and lead to sometimes opposing descriptions of 
middle class characteristics (such as them being frugal vs. conspicuous in their 
consumption). 
Finally, in the 1990s there has been a “cultural” turn in sociology, seeking to explain 
societal phenomenon through different markers of identity, such as race, gender, or 
ethnicity, rather than through redistribution (Lentz, 2015, p. 16). At the same time, the 
notion of civil society gained visibility. It carried a unified and positively oriented 
perspective of social organizations, that would supersede class and other divisive 
categories. This has led to a decline of the prominence of the class concept, which has 
only been revitalized in the 2000s, but this time on a global scale (for example World 
Bank, 2006). New approaches of middle class, however, have been primarily brought 
forward by “number crunchers”, focusing much on macroeconomic data, consumption 
and asset indexes to describe the middle class as those who are situated in the middle 
stratum of society (Bosc, 2014, p. 3). The availability of detailed household data and 
statistical methods has favored economic approaches of “middleclassness” over 
sociological ones (Ferreira, 2013). These numbers have led to the observation that the 
middle class in the Global North is declining, as the numerical middle seems to become 
smaller, while inequalities are growing (Gaggi, 2006; Lebon, 2014; Marguerit, 2016). 
And the same methods, but with different thresholds predict a rise of the middle 
classes in the South (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Ravallion, 2009). However, such 
methods ignore many of the factors highlighted by sociologists, such as their desire for 
distinction from other groups or the existence or not of a class conscience. 
*** 
To sum up, we have seen how the middle class has developed as an analytical category 
out of the awareness that the Marxian dichotomy between property owners and non-
propertied groups is not sufficient. Hence, they have developed as a category whose 
existence is bound to the opposition from its surrounding groups (Kocka, 2004, p. 18). 
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Due to their intermediary position, defining the boundaries of middle class has always 
been a challenge. Lentz remarks that: 
“Discussions of the question of who belongs to this fuzzy category and 
whether the middle class is not, after all, a ‘myth’ (Wahrman 1996, Maza 
2003), upheld by political discourse but not by social practice, are as old 
as the appearance of the term in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century.” (Lentz, 2015, p. 15) 
By allowing for a more nuanced distinction, including lifestyle and status, Max Weber 
was able to break up the Marxian dichotomy. Thus, most contemporary (sociological) 
middle class analysis can be traced back to the Weberian understanding (Lentz, 2015, 
p. 18). Similarly, Bourdieu’s focus on milieus and the different compositions of capital 
made it possible for him to acknowledge the complex and fractured nature of class 
consciousness. As a result, however, the definition of middle class becomes even more 
complex, regrouping a variety of occupations, lifestyle and consumption preferences. 
This leads various authors to underline their heterogeneity (Chauvel, 2006, p. 31) or 
to describe them as “occupational salad” (Mills, 1953, p. 291), “a chameleon among 
definitions” (Kocka, 2004, p. 15), or a residual category (Rocca, 2008, p. 129). Yet, 
despite these multiple approaches to middleclassness, authors frequently mention 
some recurrent values, closely associated with the class, regardless of its definition: 
their meritocratic ideals, their moderation, education and their value of it, their 
support for freedom, independence, and civil society, their fear of declassification, 
their ethos for hard work and concerns beyond their immediate financial well-being 
(Bosc, 2014; Deloitte, 2012; Inglehart, 1977; Lentz, 2015). Due to the heterogeneity of 
these classes, these appreciations are doubtful, yet they play an essential role in the 
assumptions stated by scholars that an existing middle class will bring democratic 
advancement in a society, as we shall discuss in chapter 3.1.1. The definition chosen 
will depend on the intention of the class analysis. Shall it be an explanatory category, 
that aims to show the production of social inequality through class affiliation, or a 
descriptive concept, that merely sorts members of society according to different 
criteria, such as income, education, or assets (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973)? While the 
former approach puts individuals in mutually exclusive categories, the latter opts for 
a more gradational ordering, which considers dividing lines to be mere constructions 
of the sociologist (Lentz, 2015, p. 19). Yet, it runs the risk of ignoring self-perception 
and ongoing boundary work done by the individuals to construct their appearance to 
a particular category. In recent literature, we witness an increase in use of a 
gradational approach, where class lines are more or less arbitrarily drawn income 
thresholds. This tendency is equally visible in the literature that argues for a decline 
of middle class in the Global North, as well as for the literature promoting the rise of 
middle classes in the Global South, as we shall see. 
2.1.3 Are We in a Middle Class Crisis? 
Today, in most Western countries, the majority of people consider themselves to 
belong to the middle class or above (Damon, 2013, p. 26). This evolution may be 
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somewhat paradoxical, because, as Henri Mendras observes: “en pure logique, si tout 
le monde est moyen, personne ne l’est” (Mendras, 1994, p. 60). Albeit constituting the 
majority in Europe and America, a strand of literature predicts the disappearance of 
the middle class in the Western world. This literature is by no means new. Bechofer 
and Elliot mention a newspaper article of 1975 who foresaw the end of the middle 
class in Great Britain (Bechofer & Elliot, 1978, p. 294), nevertheless the category 
remained salient, especially as a self-descriptive category up to today. More recent 
literature sees the increasing inequality as a sign that the middle class disappears, 
resulting in a more distinctive gap between the rich and the poor (Chauvel, 2014). 
However, the disappearance does not necessarily go along with a downgrading of the 
middle class, as growing inequality will lead to shrinking middle income strata, at the 
favor of lower, but equally upper classes (Pew Research Center, 2012). And Camille 
Peugny shows that the lower middle classes experience a degradation of their 
situation, while the upper middle classes can maintain their status. As a result, 
tensions arise among the middle class itself, even though they are close to each other 
in the social space (Peugny, 2014, p. 54). There also prevails a general sentiment that 
it is harder today for the middle class to maintain their standard of living than it was 
still a decade ago (Marguerit, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2012, p. 1). 
Others, however, insist on the expansion of the middle class, encompassing a growing 
fraction of society (Goux & Maurin, 2012). These contradicting observations can – 
once again – be traced back to conflicting definitions (Peugny, 2014, p. 51). Using 
profession as an indicator, as Goux & Maurin did, will, in the context of de-
industrialization, lead to the observation that the class is expanding, because an 
increasing percentage of the population is working in the salaried workforce (Goux & 
Maurin, 2012). Thus, there seems to be no agreement on whether the middle classes 
are in decline and the different conclusions derive from different definitions of middle 
class. However, Julien Damon points out that most of the authors, at least in France, 
agree that today’s middle class is not at all comparable to the one of the Trente 
Glorieuse, that period after the second world war up to the 1970s, which was marked 
by strong economic growth. Regarding cohesiveness, the middle class appears to be 
more splintered today. The increasing tendency towards a definition through self-
identification equally led to a decrease of the salience of the label (Peugny, 2014). So, 
at a time when the concept is losing analytical value in the Global North, we find its 
increasing use in the literature on the Global South (Neubert, 2014). 
2.2 The Translocation of the Middle Class to the Global South 
The continuous economic growth in a majority of countries in the Global South has led 
to a change of perceptions. An early precursor, from today’s viewpoint, was the 
appearance of the BRIC countries, an acronym signifying the main five emerging 
economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China. This acronym was first introduced by Jim 
O’Neill, a Goldman Sachs Manager in 2001 (O’Neill, 2001). It reflected the 
acknowledgment that the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) of these 
countries over the long term will exceed this of the G7, leading to their increasing 
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share of world GDP (O’Neill, 2001). In 2009 the leaders of these countries met on a 
common summit. In 2011, South Africa officially joined the group, adding an S to the 
acronym (“Information about BRICS,” n.d.). At a similar time, the Group of Twenty 
(G20) announced that it would replace the much more restricted Group of Eight6 (G8) 
as the primary economic forum for wealthy nations. This shift from a predominantly 
European and North American group (except for Russia and Japan) to a more global 
representation testifies the tribute paid to the responsibility and capacity of the 
emerging markets – especially around the concerted effort to mitigate the financial 
crisis of 2009 (Cardim de Carvalho, 2014). In that context, of economic boom in 
emerging markets, as well as the financial turbulence in the Global North, the World 
Bank, OECD and various consultancies released their reports of a prospering global 
middle class (Kharas, 2010; Ravallion, 2009; World Bank, 2006). 
2.2.1 The Global Middle Class 
In its 2007 global economic outlook, the World Bank predicts that the global middle 
class will grow from 7.6% in 2000 to 16.1% in 2030, accounting for more than one 
billion individuals (World Bank, 2006, p. 73). The definition of middle class, as many 
subsequent approaches, was entirely monetary, and somewhat arbitrary: it would 
include all individuals earning an income between the mean income of Brazil and Italy. 
Their approach referenced the work of Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) which aimed at 
measuring global inequality, as a reconciliation between international and 
intranational inequality (Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 155). Milanovic and Yitzhaki 
divided the world into the rich, the poor and the middle class. As a conclusion, they 
come up with a familiar tripartite distinction: the first world, middle income countries 
and the third world, comprised of the Least Developed Countries (LDC). The high 
inequality between nations explains to a large extent the global inequality, and their 
prospect is bleak: only 11% of the world population is middle class, another 11% is 
rich, and 78% is poor (Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 175). They conclude: 
“Thus, world seems—any way we consider it—to lack middle class. It 
looks like a proverbial hourglass: thick on the bottom, and very thin in the 
middle. Why does the world not have a middle class? First—an obvious 
answer—is that it is because world inequality is extremely high. When the 
Gini coefficient is 66, higher than the Gini coefficient of South Africa and 
Brazil, it is simply numerically impossible to have a middle class.” 
(Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 175) 
So, while Milanovic & Yitzhaki are rather skeptical about the state of the middle class, 
the World Bank turns it into a much more positive outcome. The authors of the World 
Bank outlook concede that the middle class share has hardly changed between 1993 
and 2000 but will now turn the global middle class into “the fastest-growing segment 
of the world population.” (World Bank, 2006, p. 73). Regardless of the different 
                                                 
6 Comprised of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia 
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interpretations, the middle class here is interpreted as the “neither-nor”, those that 
are neither rich nor poor. Some of these thresholds are based on percentiles of the 
income distribution, thus making them comparable across different nations, whereas 
others use absolute monetary boundaries. As a result, a multitude of middle class 
definitions exists, sometimes putting mutually exclusive categories under the same 
label (see table 1 below). The fact that all these income groups are united under the 
label middle class adds to the conceptual confusion, as the purchasing power, 
consumption behavior, and lifestyles differ starkly between a global, developing and 
African middle class, yet they tend to become blurred in the conventional discourse. 
Relative definitions of the middle 
class 
As percentiles of the income 
distribution 
Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato (2000) 0.75 – 1.25 of median income 
Blackburn and Bloom (1985) 0.60 – 2.25 of median income 
Davis and Huston (1992) 0.50 – 1.50 of median income 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) 40th - 80th percentile 
Barro (1999) and Easterly (2001) 20th - 80th percentile 
Partridge (1997) 40th - 60th percentile 
Solimano (2008) 20th - 90th percentile 
  
Absolute definitions of the middle 
class 
In US$ ppp per day 
Banerjee and Duflo (2008) $2-10 (Developing Countries) 
Ravallion (2010) $2-13 (Developing Countries) 
Asian Development Bank (2010) $2-20 (Asia) 
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African Development Bank (2011) $2-20 (Africa) 
International Labor Organisation (2013) $4-13 (Developing Countries) 
López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011) $10-50 (Latin America) 
Kharas (2010) $10-100 (Developing Countries) 
UNDP (2013) $10-100 (Global South) 
Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) $12-50 (Global) 
Table 1: Economic Definitions of Middle Class, composed from Ferreira et al. 
(2013, p.31) and Stoffel (2016, p.56) 
While the relative definitions have the advantage to be used across different countries, 
they ultimately state the existence of a middle income group, and – as in case of the 
percentiles – even its size. Thus, a question whether or not a middle class is emerging 
does not make any sense. In the Global South, absolute definitions have been adapted 
more often, even though the thresholds chosen are very often arbitrary (Ferreira, 
2013, p. 31). Ferreira argues that for example the $2 lower bound adopted by 
Ravallion, Banerjee & Duflo or the Development Banks of Asia and Africa is much too 
low, as this cut off is below the poverty line of most developing countries. The $2 
bound, taken from the poverty line of the World Bank (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) is 
significant, as it gives another, more qualitative definition of middle class: everyone, 
who is not poor anymore, becomes middle class. As we shall see, this group of the 
“non-poor” among the middle class often constitutes the biggest part, especially in 
Africa (Ncube et al., 2011). Thus, by putting the thresholds sufficiently low, a middle 
class can easily be defined into existence, and into a numerically important number. 
This exercise serves an important function: It paints a positive picture of global income 
growth and ultimately serves the neoliberal narrative of the positive effects of global 
capitalism. Thus, the World Bank foregrounds the prospect that higher income will 
increase demands for consumer goods: 
“The fact that the middle class will be growing twice as fast as the overall 
population implies that multinational enterprises will be able to market 
their products to a much larger audience in 2030 than they do today.” 
(World Bank, 2006, p. 75) 
The centrality of consumption is subsequently picked up by various authors, mainly 
in relation to the growing middle class in China and India, often reducing consumption 
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to the central feature, beyond a shared income stratum (Damon, 2013, p. 101). Jaffrelot 
& van der Veer even go as far as to argue that we can talk of the middle class in singular 
today because its common consumption patterns bestow them with homogeneity as a 
class (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008, pp. 12–15). A similar assumption accompanies 
middle class measurements through asset indexes. It assumes that a particular wealth 
will lead to a particular consumption behavior and the purchase of particular goods. 
The type of assets that can be used to affiliate members to a particular class will vary 
over time and geographic location (Haupt, 2005) and it conceals essential variation, 
such as the age of an asset, or its quality (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). Above all, Johnston 
& Abreu consider it to be an inadequate measurement of class because it only 
measures absolute wealth, but not social inequality, which is a decisive feature in class 
theories of authors like Marx or Weber (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 410). However, 
here again, the middle classes are described as not any kind of consumer, but as 
consumers that value quality and try to approach a Western lifestyle, as a means of 
distinction from their poorer counterparts (Jacquemot, 2014, p. 61). The car for 
example is, by some, suggested as the international marker for middleclassness 
(Damon, 2013, p. 121). Again, this puts us in front of the challenge of generalizations 
on a global scale: whereby the car has become ubiquitous in developed countries, 
regardless of the class of its owner, it remains a luxurious good in developing 
countries, reserved only for the elite. Hence, arguing about a global form of 
consumption borders on wishful thinking and ignores local contexts, and the income 
disparities between countries and within them, blurring the fact that the majority of 
the world population is still poor. This is due to the aforementioned confusion 
between local and global middle classes. So, while it may make sense to quantify all 
people of the world numerically into income categories, to give prospects about global 
inequality7, it conceals the local status of people sharing one global income group. 
Some authors have thus tried to be more specific, adapting the thresholds to 
developing countries or particular regions. Yet, their principal definition still relies on 
monetary thresholds and therefore puts the discussion mainly in the realm of 
economists. This marks a sharp distinction with the class definitions mentioned 
before. Sociologists will question the lack of class consciousness and doubt that 
economic thresholds are sufficient to speak of a “class” in the proper sense (Akinkugbe 
& Wohlmuth, 2016, p. 97; Damon, 2013; Darbon & Toulabor, 2011; Melber, 2013). The 
popularity of the middle class label on a global scale leads Göran Therborn to ask 
whether we are entering (at least rhetorically) a “middle class century”. He observes 
that “The workers of the last century are banished from memory; a project of universal 
emancipation led by the proletariat is replaced by universal aspiration to middle-class 
status.” (Therborn, 2014, p. 15). Thus, in a context where the working class has lost its 
explanatory power as a driver of political transformation, it may be not surprising that 
this role is now ascribed to these so-called middle classes. However, the aspirations of 
“middleclassness” might be primarily driven by political discourse, rather than 
                                                 
7 Even though the GINI approach is equally contested as an adequate measure of world inequality, but 
this not part of the debate here. See, for example, De Maio (2007). 
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objective changes, as it serves to conceal a growing inequality and increasing 
disparities between the few rich and the mass of subalterns. Therefore, Kalb (2014) 
suggests that “the informal slummified global working class” is more of a reality than 
the global middle class. It is in this context that the existence of the African middle 
class became popularized, however, the contradictions already inherent to the 
economic definitions brought the concept to its analytical limits in Africa. 
2.2.2 The African Middle Class 
Early class analyses in Africa in the post-independence era often took on a Marxian 
perspective, theorizing the rise of an African working class and class struggles (Darbon 
& Toulabor, 2011, p. 12). Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral have been among the 
leading indigenous thinkers on the topic, discussing the historical roots of class 
formation in Africa (Melber, 2016b, p. 6). Simultaneously, in the post-independence 
era, African nationalist have repeatedly referred to African societies as being classless 
(see Grundy, 1964). Kenneth Grundy refutes that assumption, describing it as a typical 
argument of elites to justify their domination. He concedes, though, that social 
stratification in Africa cannot be adequately captured with Marxian class analysis. 
Because their characteristics are so different from the European middle class, the 
social stratification is harder to discern for Western analysts (ibid.). Instead of 
property, education is a vital marker of social class, turning them into bearers of 
“traditional middle class functions” (though he does not specify what kind of functions 
these are). The centrality of education for the African middle classes has been 
maintained throughout the years. In the 1950-1970s the middle class label in scholarly 
literature on Africa often referred to the small group of the highly educated, which 
bore close resemblance to the core of the dominant group and had little in common 
with contemporary definitions axed on income and consumption (Darbon & Toulabor, 
2011, p. 11). This strand remained small and seemed to disappear in the 1980s when 
African countries were hit by economic decline (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 12). 
However, Lentz points out that the debate has equally been led in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) under the concept of “elite studies” in the post-independence era. Because this 
group was so few in numbers, the term “middle class” seemed inappropriate, yet their 
characteristics (highly educated, affluent) would have them labeled middle class in 
other contexts (Lentz, 2016, p. 17). In the 1980s and 1990s, the analysis of social 
stratification turned more to the prevalence of patronage and ethnicity, which were 
seen as hindrance to class formation (Lentz, 2016, p. 23) and it was widely believed 
that the interconnection between economic and political power did not allow 
perceiving African societies through a class lens (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 14). 
Even though that period (1980-1990s) covers the time of the democratic transitions 
in Africa, the middle class as analytical tool had been widely neglected in scholarly 
research, replaced by the categories of civil society and elite (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, 
p. 15; see Lentz, 2015). Thus, the decline of popularity of Marxian class analysis, 
coupled with the economic crisis in African countries and the high rates of poverty, 
the prevalence of communal ties such as kinship or ethnicity, and the emergence of 
other concepts such as elites and civil society make the middle class appear a category 
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of little salience in SSA. It is only through the economic analyses of a Global Middle 
Class, triggered by high growth rates (see 2.2.1) that the term returns to Africa. Even 
though, on a global scale, the middle class in Africa rather describes its elites and 
remains nearly non-existent. The World Bank puts its number at 2% of the GMC and 
considers it to be a rather marginal phenomenon. Subsequently, however, when 
economists turned their focus to Africa, they closely linked the concept to a different 
strand of literature, which focuses on the consumption possibilities of the “bottom of 
the pyramid”. Vijay Mahajan for example, sees Africa as “900 million consumers” 
(Mahajan, 2009) and defines the middle class mainly in terms of their potential for 
consumption. In a similar vein, McKinsey argues that economic growth, triggered by a 
higher demand for resources, but also better macro- and microeconomic 
environments, rapid urbanization and the “rise of the middle-class African consumer” 
(2010, p. 18) bears a potential that “global businesses cannot afford to ignore” 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2010, p. 2). They advertise foreign direct investment in 
Africa, because of its high returns and the possibility to create and shape new markets 
that are little explored so far. A middle-class household here is one that has an income 
of $20 000 and above per year, comprising 14% of African households (2010, p. 22). 
It remains unclear though, how this threshold has been established. However, these 
middle class consumers are said to drive economic growth throughout the continent 
(Deloitte, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010, p. 26). The AfDB has joined this 
chorus by publishing its development brief about the emerging African middle class 
(Ncube et al., 2011). In their choice of thresholds, they follow approaches like 
Ravallion or the Asian Development Bank. The lower bound of the middle class is the 
$2 poverty line, and its upper bound a $20 disposable income. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the African Population by Subclasses, 2010 
(Ncube et al. 2011, p. 4) 
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Because of the great disparity, the AfDB then differentiates between the floating class 
($2-4), the lower middle ($4-10) and the upper middle class ($10-20). The poor (<$2) 
is still the biggest group on the continent, comprising 61% of the population, followed 
by the floating class with 21%. The lower and upper middle class account only for 9 
and 5% respectively and equally the rich constitute only 5% of the population8. 
Such reports have come at a similar time as other statistics, referencing high growth 
rates, like accelerated urbanization and demographic shifts (Nallet, 2015, p. 24). These 
positive trends have been picked up by several media outlets as “Africa rising”, a 
catchword made famous through the title page of The Economist and Times Magazine 
(Jacobs, 2012; The Economist, 2011b). The contemporary approach to the middle 
class in Africa has mainly been driven by economic analysis: sustained growth rates 
and demographic shifts favor a new group that is defined through its capacity for 
consumption, which is then dubbed the African middle class (Nallet, 2015, p. 27). Such 
a definition is quite different from historical class analysis and still raises questions 
whether the approach can adequately reflect the economic and social realities on the 
continent. It may, therefore, seem not surprising that the whole narrative of Africa 
rising has been challenged of recent. 
2.2.3 Challenging Africa Rising 
The argument of an emerging African middle class can and has been challenged from 
various angles. Critics have questioned the validity of the data used, the arbitrariness 
of the thresholds established, the lack of structural transformation in the respective 
national economies, the significance of “class” as an analytical category in an African 
context, and the generalization of 54 African countries in one phenomenon of African 
emergence. These criticisms shall be looked at in more detail. 
a) The reliability of macroeconomic statistics 
For one, the robustness of the underlying data can be questioned. This tackles the 
whole phenomenon at a very early stage: the reliability of the GDP growth rates used 
to proclaim the African growth miracle. Already in 2011, the World Bank economist 
Shanta Devarajan cautions the use of statistical data from Africa, pointing to various 
shortcomings in the data sets (Devarajan, 2011). Morton Jerven has pointed out that 
the National Accounts in Africa are often in a dire state and ranking African economies 
through GDP growth would be misleading (Jerven, 2013, p. 5). Referring to the GDP 
re-estimations of Ghana and Nigeria, he argues:  
“The news of an ‘Africa Rising’ came hand in hand with the newly acquired 
knowledge that the GDPs of many countries were very soft estimates and 
                                                 
8 Numbers do not add up to 100 due to rounding errors. 
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that GDP per capita could double overnight because of accounting 
changes.” (Jerven, 2016, p. 347) 
Though he acknowledges that most African economies are doing better than reflected 
in their growth rates, he warns against using such numbers as an objective reality. 
Rather, they represent “a negotiated prognosis” (2013, p. 53) and are “a product of a 
process in which a range of arbitrary and controversial assumptions are made.” (Jerven, 
2013, p. 121) Statistical capacities have been eroded through the Structural 
Adjustment Programs and continuous budget cuts, and they are only of little priority 
to policy-makers today. The statistical problems he mentions concern outdated 
statistical methods, gaps in underlying statistics, the quality of the data gathered in the 
field, the use of outdated base years in GDP statistics, the use of forecasts instead of 
official estimates for announcing growth rates, and the neglect of sick, poor and 
nomadic populations, due to household survey designs (Jerven, 2016, pp. 345–353). 
Thus, he challenges the GDP growth of African countries that led to the proclamation 
of Africa Rising. For him, it is misleading to state that seven out of ten of the fastest 
growing countries are in Africa (cf. Deloitte, 2012). An adequate observation would 
state that “On average some African economies are expected to grow slightly faster than 
other non-OECD countries.” (Jerven, 2016, p. 347) He argues that wrong conclusions 
had been made: Africa’s wealth being greater than previously thought had been turned 
into Africa is growing faster than expected. But he also criticizes the proclaimed 
numbers of the African middle class directly: 
“The claim of a rising middle class in Africa between 1990 and 2011 has 
been made on the basis of data that contain only 84 observations from 35 
countries, and there are more than 1,000 gaps in the country time series.” 
(Jerven, 2016, p. 353) 
So, while neither Jerven nor Devarajan are against the use of statistics per se, they call 
for a critical investigation into how these numbers are produced and remind scholars 
that they are not objective, but always political (Devarajan, 2011; Jerven, 2016). 
b) The arbitrariness of monetary thresholds 
A second set of critiques concerns the thresholds established or the methods used 
(income or consumption expenditure). Thus, while a Standard Bank report of 2014 is 
still positive about the growth of the African middle class, it assumes that it is much 
smaller than the estimates given by the AfDB because it believes a middle class 
consumes between $15-115 per day (Awiti, 2014). Credit Suisse “just debunked a huge 
claim about the size of the African middle class”, according to the title of an article by 
Business Insider (Rosen, 2015). Yet, the only difference was that they set up higher 
thresholds than other work referenced. The Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 
uses assets instead of income as measurement and puts its threshold of having 
between $50 000 and $500 000 ppp as wealth in assets (Shorrocks et al., 2015, p. 114). 
Here the size of the African middle class is considered to be 3.3% (Shorrocks et al., 
2015, p. 115). Such criticism of the lower bound thresholds reveals an important 
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contradiction between the perception of a legitimate middle class lifestyle and the 
bulging group of non-poor, which constitute the majority of the African middle class 
according to the AfDB. Hence, Melber argues: 
“It requires substantial creativity to visualise how the defined minimum 
income or expenditure (be it a paltry two dollars a day or even the 
substantially higher ten) allows for a lifestyle and social status that 
qualifies as middle class, even in African societies.” (Melber, 2013, p. 116) 
Even though not explicitly, Melber describes a middle class lifestyle as one that reflects 
consumption patterns and living conditions similar to those in the North. Lemanski 
critiques such an assumption by noting that a “[…] class-based label carries normative 
expectations around lifestyle, education and income that are not easily transferred 
between countries and cultures.” (Lemanski, 2017, p. 101) In the African context, the 
young couple or family, with one, maximum two children, shopping in a supermarket 
is an emblem of this reflection, if one is to trust the results of the google image search 
“African middle class”9. Indeed, such a lifestyle requires a substantially higher amount 
of money, and therefore this vision of a middle class is not reconcilable with the $2-4 
category given by the economists. The latter instead reflects a phenomenon of a 
vulnerable, economic emergence, characterized by the prevailing risk to fall back into 
poverty (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 20). 
Reflecting a lifestyle similar to what could be considered middle class in the North is 
most common in recent work in anthropology on the middle class, and often the 
boundary with an upper class is either blurred or not given (Lentz, 2015; Mercer, 
2014; Spronk, 2012). Common descriptions such as urban, educated, with a stable 
income, exposed to ICT, etc. may delimit such a group from the poor, but apply to the 
middle as well as upper classes. Approaches, focusing on boundary work as 
substantial to middle class identity follow Bourdieu’s idea of the need for social 
distinction (Weininger, 2008). Obviously, it is easier to show the lower frontier for 
distinction, the one the middle class tries to distance itself from, then an upper line, 
towards the taste they make an effort to copy. That approach has its merits but will 
once again depend on the question to be asked. With such a definition though, the 
African middle class is much smaller than posited by the AfDB. It is possible that this 
contradiction, between expectations how a middle class consumes and lives, and the 
practice of surviving with $2 per day has contributed to questioning the Africa Rising 
narrative. Nestlé, Barclays, and Coca-Cola, for example, have all announced to 
downscale their activities in most SSA countries, precisely because their expectations 
were not met (Jackson, 2016; Pelz, 2016; The Economist, 2015). 
                                                 
9 https://www.google.de/search?q=Africa+middle+class&tbm=isch [checked on 20/04/2017] 
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c) The lack of structural transformation of the systems of production 
The economic growth of African countries has mainly been driven by an increased 
global demand for resources. Thus, it is likely that the middle class in Africa will not 
expand if the demand is halted. Currently, this seems to be the case, and growth in 
Africa is slowing down (Pelz, 2016). Economic growth driven by resource exports is 
not sustainable unless it entails an economic transformation into the manufacturing 
sector (Asche, 2015; Rodrik, 2013; Rowden, 2015). Yet, in recent years in most of 
Africa, the share of manufacturing in the GDP has either stagnated or declined, quite 
contrary to the East Asian experience (Melber, 2016b, p. 5). Inequality remains high 
and under- and unemployment is common (ibid.). If these trends are not reversed, the 
demographic growth, hailed by McKinsey and others (Deloitte, 2012; McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2010; World Bank, 2006) can turn into a severe threat to African 
governments. 
d) The generalization of all African countries 
The insufficient analysis of the structure of the national economies is further blurred 
by the fact that general claims about the African middle class talk about the continent 
as a whole and do not sufficiently pay attention to the wide disparities that exist 
among the countries. So, while there might be some countries which are experiencing 
growth, it is exacerbated by the generalizations of all African countries as “Africa 
rising”, whereas considerable disparities between the countries exist. In general, the 
much-heralded growth is often resumed to some few economic outliers, South African, 
the Northern African states, and countries like Kenya or Côte d’Ivoire (Darbon, 2014, 
p. 7). 
e) The appropriateness of “class” as an analytical category 
Several authors have questioned “class” as a significant level of analysis in Africa. 
Thomson argues that a Marxian class analysis reaches its limits in SSA because 
capitalism did not fully penetrate the continent. The high percentage of subsistence 
farmers present on the continent is not directly part of exploitative relationships 
because they work mainly for themselves. This independence leaves them with the 
possibility to opt out of the system, if it becomes unfavorable to them (Thomson, 2016, 
p. 90 ff). Even though they can be partially forced into the system, through taxation, 
their additional sources of subsistence put them in an in-between mode, of old and 
new modes of production. Besides, the proletariat is not at the bottom of the societal 
ladder, stable employment and higher income than peasants make them less inclined 
for revolution, as foreseen by Marx (Thomson, 2016, p. 91). Aspects, like the only 
partial penetration of capitalist modes of production, the absence of a bourgeoisie and 
the presence of a small and privileged proletariat due to low levels of industrialization 
raise doubts whether the idea of classes actually can be sustained in Africa (Akinkugbe 
& Wohlmuth, 2016; Darbon & Toulabor, 2011; Thomson, 2016). Instead, collective 
identities based on region and religion seem in many cases more salient. 
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f) The politicization of a constructed category 
Jean-Louis Rocca, in relation to the Chinese middle class, points out that very often 
researchers and intellectuals construct a category they are supposed to define (Rocca, 
2008, p. 127). He states 
“In brief, the ‘middle class’ problem cannot be analyzed in terms of an 
objective phenomenon to be described and to be understood but as the 
formation process of an imaginary stratum in a context of political 
struggles.” (Rocca, 2008, p. 128) 
The particular success of the Africa Rising meme can be seen through this light. The 
journalist John Gatsiounis argues that 
“New Africa [emphasis in orignal] is an attractive sell. As editors have told 
me over the years, readers are tired of hearing the same sad story coming 
out of Africa. New Africa is about a miraculous pass on the world's largest 
frontier, and that makes for vital reading.” (Gatsiounis, 2012, p. 10) 
Such good news about Africa’s growth fits well with the neoliberal discourse on the 
positive effects of globalization. It conveys a message about the benefits of a globalized 
world, in which even the most destitute regions profit. Moreover, the representation 
of a middle class, as portrayed by consultancies and international financial institutions 
is emblematic for positive capitalism: they embody modernity, liberal political values 
and cherish the opportunities of free markets (Joshi, 2014), and they give legitimacy 
to the Structural Adjustment Programs in the past. International donors can equally 
profit from that narrative, as proof of the efficiency of aid (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, 
p. 7). However, such a discourse masks the ever-present high inequality and can serve 
upper class elites to legitimize their superior position (see Lentz, 2015, p. 15). 
Hence, critically challenging the Africa rising narrative has been imperative. This is not 
to argue that we should return to the representation of Africa as a continent of doom 
and gloom but that we need a more balanced approach to comprehending the 
economic transformations in Africa. And a vague concept, impossible to define, that is 
“middle class” may rather be a projection for political ambitions or media outlets 
instead of a scientific term adding analytical value to the social stratification on the 
continent. 
2.3 Making Sense of a Problematic Concept 
Contemporary academic debates have challenged the legitimacy of the middle class 
concept for Africa. Even though the term has never been an easy one for social science 
to deal with, it is particularly under attack in relation to Africa. One conclusion drawn 
from these debates could be the recognition that we need a different approach. Which 
approach to choose, will – once again – depend on the question that is asked. It seems 
that “middle class” is too empty, and too easily filled with different content, that the 
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term loses its analytical value. One remedy is to replace middle class with more precise 
terms, that leave less room for interpretation. If one talks about the entrepreneurial 
middle class (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016), why not call them entrepreneurs? If one 
suggests merging the middle class with elites (Lentz, 2015), why not call them at least 
“upper ‘class’”? If the sole criterium is an economic indicator, why not talk about 
middle income strata? Why not use milieu, rather than class to describe a smaller 
subgroup, or chose a suitable name, as Rachel Spronk (2012) has done when 
designating the “young urban professionals” of Nairobi? That list could continue. 
Neubert points out that the class concept is increasingly losing validity in Western 
countries, yet at the same time it experiences an upsurge of attention in the Global 
South (Neubert, 2014). Darbon even doubts the academic gain that is made by using 
middle class as an analytical category, saying that it is just another social category and 
another effort to explain complexity in simple terms (“La « classe moyenne » en 
Afrique. Construction et usage d’une catégorisation sociale,” 2012). This is especially 
true in countries where the subjective perception as middle class is not guaranteed 
and where other identities, such as ethnicity, age, or religion, are predominant (E. O. 
Wright, 2008b, p. 22). Assumptions about the coherence of lifestyle and attitudes or 
even behavior are then hard to make because a similar income itself is not sufficient 
to explain the previous items. However, it leaves us with the question which term to 
use when talking about the transformations the African continent is undergoing? 
2.3.1 Moving out of Poverty 
The Pew Research Center (2015, p. 16) has pointed out, that while there may be some 
decline in poverty, the groups that are increasing in size are of low income (between 
$2-10 ppp). This is even more so true for Africa, where the floating class ($2-4) 
constitutes the most significant part of what they call middle class. It seems therefore 
reasonable to look at these lower ends when apprehending the growth of specific 
income groups. We caution to talk about an African Growth Miracle, but neither 
proclaim that it is business as usual on the continent. 
Young (2012) and Sahn & Stifel (2000) use asset indexes as measurement of economic 
well-being and conclude that the bleak picture of an impoverished continent was not 
accurate. Sahn & Stifel remark that poverty has been declining in the 1980s and 1990s 
and Young concludes that Africa is emerging since the beginning of the 1990s. Jerven 
makes a similar observation: 
“The debates on economic development in Africa are symptomatic of this 
problem [of critically questioning data]. It is particularly frustrating, and 
it surely stands in the way of objective evaluation, that the narratives in 
African economic development switch from one extreme to the other so 
swiftly. The truth lies somewhere between the ‘miracles’ and ‘tragedies’. 
[Emphasis added] It is the job of scholars to give tempered assessments 
that navigate between what is make-believe and what passes as plausible 
evidence.” (Jerven, 2016, p. 358) 
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Stoffel (2016) criticizes the AfDB for their reference to statistics that are used to 
underline the success of poverty alleviation when proclaiming the African middle 
class, despite well-known conceptual problems. While there is the need to keep the 
challenges of literature on poverty in mind, this argument reveals the close link 
between the emergence out of poverty and that newly acquired, still vulnerable, status 
of the floating class. In its longitudinal study on economic mobility, the World Bank 
aimed at understanding factors that contributed to moving out of poverty. It spans 
micro-data from fifteen different countries, to present a more nuanced picture on 
poverty and poverty alleviation than macroeconomic statistics usually do (Narayan & 
Petesch, 2007). Certainly, the caveats about statistical methods used pertain here as 
well. Ferreira et al. point out that economic mobility is a concept equally broad as 
middle class, because mobility can measure very different things and hence yield very 
different results (2013, p. 25f). We will not dwell on the abundant literature on 
economic mobility but synthesize key factors that these studies have found decisive 
for economic mobility out of poverty. And they bear a lot of resemblance to many 
characteristics used to describe the middle classes (see for example Banerjee & Duflo, 
2007). The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) of 
Uganda discerns seven criteria vital for poverty exit: 
 Having multiple sources of income 
 Education or a formal job, regular salary 
 Being Hardworking 
 Having productive assets and using them wisely (especially land) 
 Having hardworking spouse(s) and/or abundant family labour 
 Having a good saving culture 
 Being enterprising  
(Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2007, 
p. x) 
Other factors beneficial for escaping poverty include work in the non-farming sectors, 
house ownership and residence in an urban area or a regional capital, gender and 
household composition (Dercon & Shapiro, 2007, p. 90; Ferreira, 2013, p. 95). These 
factors are recurring in literature on intragenerational mobility and provide therefore 
a blueprint for decisive factors to look at when tackling individual economic 
emergence. Another important criterion equally recurring in poverty literature is the 
concept of vulnerability. Shocks, like sickness, or natural disasters keep households 
poor. Being resilient to shocks is thus crucial when leaving poverty and not falling 
back. The World Bank study highlights the high degree of mobility in and out of 
poverty. In other words, most households that have been described as poor at one 
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point, have not been poor at another point (Dercon & Shapiro, 2007, p. 80). The more 
data rounds are used, the more the likelihood rises that someone is at one point not 
poor. Dercon & Shapiro call this a “considerable degree of poverty mobility” (2007, p. 
81). Such an observation seems close to the floating class of the AfDB, or the vulnerable 
middle class of Ravallion (Ncube et al., 2011; Ravallion, 2009). Hence, vulnerability 
has equally entered the realm of the middle class debate. There are two diverging 
strands of thought though: whereas some authors link economic security (and thus 
the absence of vulnerability) with their definition of middle class (Ferreira, 2013; 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012), others see the 
vulnerability as a distinctive feature of the emerging middle class (Ncube et al., 2011; 
Ravallion, 2009). Regardless of the stance to take, these criteria equip us with the 
material to define the population we aim to study in Uganda. 
2.3.2 In Search of an Adequate Label 
We will not attempt yet another definition of middle class for our country of study, 
Uganda. As we have seen, class is a contested description for social stratification in 
Africa. Historical conditions that have given rise to the particularities of classes in 
Europe, such as massive industrialization, the delimitation from the aristocracy, or the 
relevance of socio-professional categories are not present in most of contemporary 
Africa. Uganda is no exception. We have seen the limits of Marxian class analysis in 
Africa (Grundy, 1964; Lentz, 2016; Neubert, 2016; Thomson, 2016). And in its 
contemporary meaning, class is preferably used to talk about income strata, ignoring 
class consciousness. We recall that middle class is too broad of a category and can often 
be replaced by more specific terms. 
Keeping in mind the call of analysts to make the definition depending on the question 
to explain, we elaborate our intentions as the quest to understand how income 
structures other aspects of life, such as education, professions, identity, consumption 
patterns, or political attitude. 
Taking different income groups as our starting point from which we try to understand 
the life choices made and without wanting to add yet another original label10, we 
describe our subjects of inquiry as middle income groups. Even though much criticized, 
we make use of the subgroups identified by the AfDB. They propose a first economic 
stratification of society, by differentiating between the poor, floating, lower middle, 
upper middle and upper class (Ncube et al., 2011). The bulk of interviewees are 
identified as loosely fitting into these categories of middle class. Because other work 
on Ugandan “middle classes” has suggested their urban nature (Ayoki, 2012; Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2014), we will add as another 
defining characteristic their urban residency. 
                                                 
10 Even though we admit to having thought about calling them “neither-nors”, as in neither rich nor poor. 
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In summary, we, therefore, define our middle income groups as those having an 
income between $2-$20 per day per capita and living in an urban setting – in our case 
Kampala. 
Our approach is mainly gradational (see Lentz, 2015, p. 19), that means we see class 
frontiers as constructions and consider them to be more fluid. As a consequence, we 
will also include people not fitting in our income groups, to see whether discrepancies 
from the lowest and highest strata become visible. 
From this minimalist definition, we then try to look at characteristics that could 
provide common grounds beyond income. These characteristics are not chosen 
aleatorily, but refer to indicators mentioned in the literature on economic mobility and 
middle class (see 2.2 and 2.3.1). Hence, we do not build an inductive theory of social 
differentiation in Uganda. Instead, we use pre-established categories comparing them 
with the living conditions of the individuals on the ground in relation to their income. 
The categories we will look at are: 
 Income 
 Profession 
 Source(s) of income, such as stable work, but also the diversification of income 
sources 
 Education 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Vulnerability to shocks or absence thereof 
 Consumption (including Housing, Food, Communication, Transport, and 
Savings) 
 Their integration into social networks 
Because of the intention to examine their relation to politics, we will equally look at 
 Their political attitudes and activities 
 And their free time activities in general. 
Such an approach bears a resemblance to Weber’s life chances: we examine how 
different dispositions give rise to different socio-economic positions and their 
likelihood to succeed in the market. But we also question whether similar socio-
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economic positions give rise to similar interests and behavior and if this does or not 
lead to a shared class conscience – thus whether we are talking about classes or Stände 
in the sense of Weber (Weber, 2002). Lentz (2015) or Rocca (2008) have both pointed 
out, that “middle class” is as much of a discursive practice as an objective reality. This 
allows us to confront our interviewees with the category, to see how much it speaks 
to them, compared to different descriptions. Therefore, we will equally inquire to 
which point other positions, namely religious, regional or of the life cycle play a role 
in developing common interests and behavior. Thus, socio-economic positions are 
described and put in relation to other relevant categories, often mentioned by the 
interviewees themselves. 
In a nutshell, this work aims to scrutinize the so-called “middle class” (in the AfDB 
sense). It is a deconstruction of an over-utilized term (done here in chapter 2) and a 
reconstruction of a new notion, by picking up some elements of the middle class 
discourse that seem relevant in the Ugandan context. We use these elements to paint 
a picture, as accurate as possible, of what it means to be among a middle income group 
in urban Uganda today (this is principally done in part II).

  
3 The Middle Class and 
Political Transformation 
A vast body of literature tries to explore the role of a middle class in the context of 
democratization (Mills, 1953). Some authors consider them drivers of political change 
and responsible for the advancement of democracy because they will demand 
accountability from their leaders (Birdsall, 2007; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; 
Easterly et al., 2006; Lipset, 1959b; Moore, 1966). Others describe them as the 
prolonged arm of the government, conservative and not willing to put their acquired 
benefits at stake (J. Chen, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2013). Finally, some find there is no kind 
of specific political behavior and action associated with the middle class (Jary, 1978, 
p. 134). While it is worthwhile to have a look at these studies, two problems arise: The 
definitions of middle class diverge from one study to another. As a result, the 
comparison between the various research becomes difficult. A second problem arises 
through the sometimes only implicit assumptions that are made with political 
participation: does this refer to voting, or other forms of political mobilization, or 
both? Is it bound to a democratic context? Is political participation good if it maintains 
stability or if it brings about regime change? Most of the work also neglects the starting 
point within a regime (democratic or authoritarian) and how it will affect the position 
taken by the citizens in case of mobilization (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). These 
interpretations vary from one author to the other, mainly depending on the political 
circumstances. Therefore, for a thorough analysis, it is necessary to link the discussion 
on the middle classes’ political behavior with the literature on social mobilization and 
theories of democratic transitions (Hellsten, 2016, p. 96). 
In this chapter, we will review the literature on the political role that has been ascribed 
to the middle class, either as a driver for democracy, or a guarantee of authoritarian 
stability. Subsequently, we look at the literature that has described the implication of 
African middle classes at independence, during the democratic transitions at the 
beginning of the 1990s and in more contemporary uprisings. We conclude this review 
by arguing that in most cases the statements on the implications had been made on 
very general assumptions. To overcome this, we suggest linking such an analysis with 
theories of social mobilization, and of individual contentious (or supportive) action. 
We conclude by suggesting a more nuanced picture when analyzing social 
mobilization, which looks at its institutionalized forms, but equally on the less visible 
activities that happen before. This framework will serve us in our analysis when 
understanding the forms of social mobilization of the middle income groups in Uganda 
and their interaction with the political sphere. 
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3.1 The Political Role Ascribed to The Middle Class 
The literature on middle class and politics subsumes a wide range of middle class 
definition and aspects of political activity. Maybe due to this reason existing theories 
on middle class and politics come to such diverse conclusions, either seeing the middle 
class as a stronghold of democracy, or a friend of authoritarian regimes. These 
different attitudes shall be looked at, in a brief literature review. 
3.1.1 The Middle Class as Agent of Democracy 
The tendency to attribute civic virtues to the middle class has a long tradition. Aristotle 
is one of the oldest sources often mentioned, to give weight to the argument that the 
middle class brings democracy (Lofchie, 2015, p. 34). Other prominent supporters of 
the positive effect on democracy are Georg Simmel (1896), or Martin Lipset (1959a, 
1959b). 
The work of Martin Lipset (1959, 1960) has laid the ground and has given rise to an 
abundance of literature linking economic development with establishing democracy 
and attributing a pivotal position to the newly emerging middle classes. The main 
argumentation chain can be resumed as such: Economic growth does change the social 
structure. In a regime where all wealth is concentrated in the hands of the state, access 
to state control becomes the only access to wealth, and, therefore, the political struggle 
is shaped by a winner-takes-all attitude, making it hard for democracy to be 
implemented (Lipset, 1994, p. 4). An emerging middle class is a sign that resources are 
distributed differently among the population, hence having access to the regime will 
not be the only access to wealth anymore. Similarly, economic development leads to 
higher education, which has been singled out as decisive for the consolidation of 
democracy (Lipset, 1959b; Lu, 2005; Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969a). As a result, the 
middle class will embrace individual values and civil liberties. Contrary to the upper 
classes, the middle class is not linked to the governing elite and, therefore, does not 
fear to demand political change, such as a more considerable share of political 
participation or a different distribution of resources (J. Chen, 2013, p. 4). On the other 
hand, they have the economic resources and the leisure time to engage in various kind 
of political mobilization, contrary to the lower class, who might be too busy to make 
ends meet (Huntington, 1972, p. 52) or has an inherent inclination towards 
authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959b). These argumentations lead to various recurrent 
hypotheses on the positive effects of the middle class on democracy: 
a) Keeping the state accountable 
The argument on state intervention brakes into three different strands, which can be 
combined but can also appear separately in the literature, depending on the author’s 
stance. First, for a middle class to prosper, there is a need for capitalist development, 
which controls state intervention and keeps it accountable. As a result, a bourgeoisie 
independent of the state develops and redistribution of assets among broader strata 
of the population becomes possible (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Unlike the upper 
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class, the middle class is not well-connected to the governing elite. As a result, they 
cannot count on favoritism on their part. Secondly, because of their frustration with 
corruption, over-regulation and state ownership in neopatrimonial regimes, a newly 
emerging middle class will pressure for democratic processes to gain control over 
state intervention. Barrington Moore resumes this need for transparent policymaking 
in his famous phrase: “No bourgeois, no democracy.” (Moore, 1966, p. 418) As such, to 
assure that their interests will be taken care of, they have to rely on due process, the 
rule of law, elections and other democratic procedures: 
“Thus middle-class members have to rely on such democratic institutions 
as the popular election of leaders, the limitation of state power, the 
constitutional protection of individual rights to protect their own rights 
and properties against any powerful intruders (e.g., the government and 
its officials.)” (Lu, 2005, p. 160) 
Thirdly, because the middle class is not affiliated with the regime, they have been 
attributed a go-between role, a mediating position between the upper class and the 
lower class. This position will attenuate conflicts and avoid a “clash of classes”, and, 
therefore, contribute to the stability of the regime (Gerteis, 1998; Lipset, 1959b). 
b) Availability of resources to mobilize 
Anthony Oberschall has been among the first to point out that not everyone has the 
potential to mobilize, but for a successful social mobilization resources are required. 
These can be in the form of financial assets, organizational skills (acquired through 
education), time, etc. (Oberschall, 1973). Authors such as Huntington consider the 
proletariat to be mainly occupied with survival on a day-to-day basis, who will, 
therefore, concentrate its energy on earning money (Herbst, 1990; Huntington, 1972, 
p. 289) Instead, the middle class has some time to spare and the money needed for the 
mobilization of a particular cause (Walsh, Jennings, & Stoker, 2004). Other authors 
concede that the working class may have an interest in democracy, they do lack, 
however, the resources to lead a sustained struggle (Huber & Stephens, 1999; Lu, 
2005; Oberschall, 1973) 
c) Democratic virtues of the middle class 
Education has been considered the most relevant asset available to the middle class in 
their strive for democracy. Lipset himself argues that education has been found to be 
stronger related to democracy than wealth (Lipset, 1959b, p. 79). Kurzman and Leahey 
even go as far as to introduce intellectuals as a new class and as principal agents for 
the development of democracy (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004). And for Nie, Verba, and 
Kim the difference in education is one of the leading factors explaining different levels 
of political participation (Nie, Verba, & Kim, 1974). Because they are politically more 
active, they feel that politics is more accessible to them and demand a greater say in 
politics (Lu, 2005, p. 169; Walsh et al., 2004). Higher education is inextricably linked 
to higher income (Strode, Crawfurd, Moratti, & Schmieding, 2015, p. 90); hence, the 
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likelihood rises for someone in the middle class to be better educated than someone 
in the lower class. And higher education is also linked to more liberalism and the 
respect of civil liberties, tolerance towards others, etc. From there, a shortcut is often 
made that the middle class, because they are higher educated, will also have a higher 
regard of democratic values (Huber & Stephens, 1999; Huntington, 1972; Lipset, 
1959b). Their thinking democratically will equally lead them to act democratically, i.e., 
contesting undemocratic regimes or supporting the maintenance of democratic ones 
(Lu, 2005, p. 160). 
As a result, it is assumed that the middle class will demand more accountability from 
the government (Birdsall, 2007; Easterly et al., 2006), insist on a society that is based 
on merit, or commit themselves to “higher” values because they have no more 
materialist worries (Inglehart, 1977). 
d) Discrediting of other classes 
Embracing the middle class as virtuous often goes along with the tendency to 
disparage other classes. Hence, the rich are portrayed as arrogant and egoistic and in 
alliance with the regime, and the working class as interested only in short-term 
economic gains (Lu, 2005, p. 159) and as political abstinent (Walsh et al., 2004) or 
even drawn to authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959b). The middle class, being more 
educated and affluent than the lower class, but not as corrupted as the upper, is, as a 
result, portrayed as free of these counter-democratic attitudes. 
Several conceptual problems guide these reasonings: for one, these works are fraught 
with favorable assumptions about the behavior of the middle class, and negative 
assumptions about the other classes (political inertia or tendency for non-democratic 
values of the lower classes, cooptation of higher classes into the political system). 
Secondly, the arguments are guided by the theoretical foundation of classical 
modernization theory, presenting the course economic development of the middle 
classes alongside democratization as inevitable. However, in recent literature, the 
teleological approach of classical modernization theory has been widely disputed and 
generally refuted. Nevertheless, it is still present as a latent assumption in a good deal 
of academic literature on the middle class (J. Chen, 2013, p. 5). 
Thirdly, the method most often used, linear regression analysis, usually considers 
either a single point in time or a cumulation of one period, such as a decade, and 
ignores variations within a given country within a given time (Arat, 1988). 
Finally, all of these works have used quantitative, macroeconomic data, and 
deductions were made from correlations. Apart from the misleading interpretation 
that correlation would mean causation, Kurzman and Leahey criticize this approach 
for using national wealth as a substitute for measuring social groups: 
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“Quantitative studies of democratization frequently theorize the 
importance of one or more classes but have not used direct measures to 
test their theories. [N]one of these studies measures the size, much less 
the strength or political attitudes or activism, of the social groups in 
question. Instead, these studies use national-level variables – primarily 
national wealth – as proxies for social classes.” (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004, 
p. 941) 
And while quantitative studies using macroeconomic data may show these 
correlations, qualitative research hardly confirms these linkages (J. Chen & Dickson, 
2008). It remains doubtful whether such generalizing statements about the middle 
class can be made, ignoring the specific circumstances of the various countries. 
3.1.2 A Contingent Approach to Middle Class and Democracy 
It has not been the intention of Martin Lipset to make the direct correlation between 
capitalism and democracy; he states himself that economic development is a requisite 
of the latter, but as such not sufficient (Lipset, 1994). Authors instead made this 
deduction following his hypothesis (Arat, 1988, p. 22) In his later work he emphasizes 
the need of not seeing capitalism as the single explanation of democracy: 
“Clearly, socioeconomic correlations are merely associational, and do not 
necessarily indicate cause. Other variables, such as the force of historical 
incidents in domestic politics, cultural factors, events in neighboring 
countries, diffusion effects from elsewhere, leadership and movement 
behavior can also affect the nature of the polity. […] The various factors I 
have reviewed here do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do 
not determine the outcomes. The record of social scientists as 
futurologists is not good. […] Whether democracy succeeds or fails 
continues to depend significantly on the choices, behaviors, and decisions 
of political leaders and groups.” (Lipset, 1994, p. 16ff) 
And Chen and Dickson have pointed out that even authoritarian regimes experience 
relative stability if they record a steady economic performance (J. Chen & Dickson, 
2008). In a more nuanced approach, a body of literature has been developed 
supporting the thesis that the relationship between economic development, the 
middle class and democracy might not be as straightforward. Instead, it hinges on 
various other factors such as their dependence on the state, affiliations with other 
classes or their perceived threat of them, their subjective perception of their well-
being and the current political system and the effectiveness of its policy 
implementations (J. Chen, 2013, p. 5). 
a) Dependence on the state 
Authors, who underline the independence of the middle class from the state argue that 
because they earn their income through working in a privatized sector, they do not 
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need the state for the distribution of resources because they secure their access. This 
point of view quickly reaches its limitations, especially in late-developing countries, 
where the state plays a much more active role in shaping policies and markets. For 
example, in countries with import substitution industry, entrepreneurs rely on 
protective laws for them not to compete with international products. In areas more 
focused on export, this dependence is considerably lower (J. Chen, 2013). Secondly, in 
many developing countries with a small private sector, those enjoying the benefits of 
a regular salary (one of the entries into a “middle class lifestyle”) are often civil 
servants. These dependencies may alter how the individual perceives even an 
undemocratic state, as long as the policies are beneficial to them, and they cast doubt 
on the argument that the middle class has no ties with the government anymore. 
b) Class alliances and the threat of other classes 
In a similar vein, the way class alliances are formed will determine whether or not the 
middle class is tied to the regime. For Samuel Huntington, the middle class gets the 
role of a “game changer”, deciding over the stability of a system depending on whether 
they ally with the military or with the peasants (Huntington, 1972, p. 78). Similarly, in 
their historical study of the role the bourgeoisie played for democracy, Huber and 
Stephens found that the bourgeoisie would take on a pro-democratic stance if it allied 
with the working class (Huber & Stephens, 1999). Whereas, if the working classes 
were organized independently, they would be perceived as a threat, challenging the 
bourgeois’ property rights (ibid). While some authors include the bourgeoisie as part 
of the middle class, Huber and Stephens treat them as a distinctive category. They also 
attribute the crucial role for democratization in Latin America to the middle class 
(ibid., p. 767), provided that they would not ally with the elite. 
“However, the middle classes needed allies, and depending on these 
alliances, democracy took limited or inclusive forms. Where sectors of the 
oligarchy or the military allied with the middle classes, the middle classes 
were content with their own inclusion and supported literacy 
qualifications for the franchise (e.g., Brazil in the 1930s). In contrast, 
where the middle classes were dependent on working class support in 
their push for democracy and the working class had an organizational 
presence, these class coalitions were more likely to push for full 
democracy (e.g., Venezuela in the 1940s, Bolivia in the 1950s).” (Huber & 
Stephens, 1999, p. 767) 
If, however, the middle class would perceive the working class as a threat, they would 
not mobilize for full-fledged democracy. In developing countries, where the middle 
class constitutes a minority, and the majority of the population is poor, middle class 
interests would be outnumbered in a democracy. Hence, under such circumstances, 
the middle class has little interest to promote the rule of the people. Kurlantzick 
analyses this pattern in various countries since the beginning of the millennium, such 
as Venezuela, Philippines, Thailand, and Egypt, and for him the middle class is a driving 
factor not for the promotion, but for the retreat of democracy (Kurlantzick, 2013). 
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c) Satisfaction with their situation 
Despite some hopes expressed, the Chinese middle class might not bring democracy 
to the country, for two reasons. First, their close ties to the state, as seen above, make 
them primary beneficiaries of the current political system, and second, they seek to 
preserve their interests and defend their social position against newcomers (Rocca, 
2008, p. 137). Moreover, they will attempt to maintain their status because they fear 
to lose what they have acquired. Especially the lower middle class is often considered 
to be the most conservative group in society. Bacqué and Vermeersch observe this for 
the French middle class after May 68 (Bacqué & Vermeersch, 2007), and Bechofer and 
Elliot find a similar positioning of the British middle class. Here, opportunism prevails, 
and the middle class's motivation for action stems from defending their capital against 
others (Bechofer & Elliot, 1978). Finally, it seems to be equally valid in China (Rocca, 
2008, p. 137). Hence, a person who is relatively well off in a given system has no 
incentives pushing for change. Rather, they are driven by egoism; thus, they decide to 
focus on their individual goals and depoliticize (Varma, 2009). And James Wright 
observes for the United States that 
“Of all groups considered thus far, surely the white, non-South upper 
middle class is best able to effect genuine political change, but at the same 
time, they have little reason to do so. Given the social, political, and 
economic benefits which the system has provided for them, one would be 
very surprised to find them distrustful of its representatives or skeptical 
of their ability to work within the system. Having distributed an unequal 
share of political power and material rewards to approximately the same 
persons, the system thus guards admirably against potential insurgency 
among those best able to carry it out.” (J. D. Wright, 1976, p. 141) 
In his statement, again the proximity to the political elite is linked to the general 
satisfaction, but also to the means one possesses for mobilization (with the middle 
class being the best endowed). As a result, the middle class is not guided by democratic 
virtues, which will allow them to push for more participation within a system, but 
rather by egoism and the effort to maintain what they have achieved so far. 
d) Satisfaction with the political system 
The fear of losing privileges and hence the decision not to push for change does not 
yet say anything about the middle class’s position towards the regime. If they feel that 
their achievements have come through own efforts, they might likely still take a critical 
stance towards the government. If, however they are satisfied with the policies 
implemented by their government and believe in its overall legitimacy, they are less 
inclined to demand more democracy. Chen has shown in his work that the regime 
support, for policies as well as for the general legitimacy, is higher among the middle 
class than among the lower class of society (J. Chen, 2013, p. 77). Similarly, Stephens 
et al. argue that the middle class has more widespread social networks and hence more 
clientelist ties with the regime. Thus, they will be more satisfied due to their accrued 
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ability to take influence in government, thanks to their connections (Stephens, 
Rueschemeyer, & Stephens, 1992). 
The contingent approach to analyzing the likelihood of democratic demands from the 
middle class does not assume linearity leading from economic development to an 
increased middle class and hence democracy; it looks more on the context 
surrounding the economic advancement. However, in these argumentations, too, are 
several flaws: 
For one, the fear of losing what one has acquired can be attributed to all strata of 
society. Huntington, for example, does not see the middle class, but the industrial 
proletariat as those who have too much at stake in the status quo that they could risk 
losing it (Huntington, 1972, p. 288). And inversely, a perceived high stake in society 
does not push for higher political participation either (Nie et al., 1969a). These 
arguments are by no means bound to one class, and even though they assume that the 
middle class is more likely to be satisfied with their personal economic and social 
position, this may also account for other classes as well. This criticism is similar to the 
one on Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1974): there is no commonly shared 
threshold when someone feels deprived, and neither is there one for satisfaction (see 
Daniel, 2016, p. 23). It might even be, in their strive for higher achievement, that the 
middle class is precisely not satisfied, but aspire for even more.  
Secondly, these arguments are still guided by the veiled assumption that there exists 
a common interest due to a common materialist position. In the contingent approach, 
these are sometimes divided into dichotomies (between those who are pleased with 
their situation and those who are not, those who have a link to with the state and those 
who have not, etc.) but it still assumes that the middle class will act in big 
homogeneous blocks. Already in 1953, C. W. Mills observed for the American white 
collars the lack of a common public position, and hence, rather than being organized, 
their individual positions will decide upon their political commitment. He states: 
“Internally, they [the middle classes] are split, fragmented; externally, 
they are dependent on larger forces. Even if they gained the will to act, 
their actions, being unorganized, would be less a movement than a tangle 
of unconnected contests.” (Mills, 1953, p. ix) 
Focusing on the inherent heterogeneity raises doubt about all work assuming that 
class position itself will affect political mobilization. Even though Mills concedes that 
there might be common interests, they will not lead the expression of common 
positions. The middle class itself is too heterogeneous as to make general deductions 
about their behavior. For precisely that reason, theories about middle classes’ political 
behavior are so manifold and come to very different conclusions. 
Thirdly, all theories adhere to the link between economic development, the rise of the 
middle class and, as a result, democratization. However, Kurzman & Leahey have 
pointed out that this is inherent to all theories explaining democratization through a 
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class angle. It is linked to the establishment of the bourgeoisie as well as to the increase 
of the working class, which both might similarly lead to democracy (Kurzman & 
Leahey, 2004). Hence, it raises the question how much explanatory power lies in the 
argument that a particular class will foster democracy. 
Lastly, all of these works, even those who have been carried out in an authoritarian 
context, assume that political participation comes at no cost. This is not true and has 
been one of the major shortcomings in social mobilization theory (Fillieule & Bennani-
Chraïbi, 2003). In most of the research on the middle classes’ role in bringing 
democracy, the democratic implication has been defined in very narrow terms, as 
participating in elections, petitioning and contacting government officials (J. Chen, 
2013; Kurlantzick, 2013). Some authors also included contentious actions which aim 
at the defense of common interests (Braud, 2011). Yet in an authoritarian context all 
these parameters might be modified. In his study on the Chinese middle class, Chen 
showed that those middle class members most inclined to democracy would not 
participate in elections, because they considered them as a mere pretense, in order to 
give legitimacy to an authoritarian regime (J. Chen, 2013, p. 123). Thus, considering 
voting as a pro-democratic behavior will not reflect the entire picture in a context 
where the elections themselves lack credibility. This is equally true for open 
contentious action: in a state where freedom of speech and assembly are not 
guaranteed, claiming these might involve high risk, such as violent repression of 
demonstrations, manhandling by the police, but also more subtle disadvantages, such 
as the impediment to perceive a desired career, due to a public positioning in 
opposition to the government. As a result, it might be that the members of the middle 
class, similar to the poor or the women in other analyses (Ferree Marx & McClurg 
Mueller, 2004) consider politics not available to them and decide, therefore, to either 
pursue political goals through other means or not to pursue them at all. 
So, at best, ideas of the political role of the middle class are contested, as different 
contexts and different definitions lead to very diverging outcomes. For some, there is 
even no link at all. For Rose, all these explanations of middle class implication in social 
movements fail because they do not rest in the framework of class interests. He 
believes that  
“[...] class is not correlated with any one set of ideas or politics, and efforts 
to identify the working or middle classes with particular political beliefs 
have proven to be of limited applicability.” (Rose, 1997, p. 475) 
Hence, any action is motivated out of individual interest, such as career advancement, 
and not to advance “middle class institutions or class interests.” (ibid., p.481) 
It becomes evident that there is a need for a more nuanced analysis, of the relation 
between economic emergence coupled with theories of social mobilization, to 
introduce some analytical rigor that goes beyond assumed links between a class and 
their attitudes. To fully acknowledge these types of social mobilization, it is inevitable 
to adapt them to the particular political and historical context of Uganda. But before 
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we will do so, we turn towards the African middle classes and the role that has been 
ascribed to them in the various political transformations. 
3.2 The Middle Class in African Political Transformations 
Melber reminds us that the power of influence mainly pertains to the top 10-5% of a 
society: “Pinning hopes for social advancement on the emerging middle classes, as 
Birdsall’s (2015) optimistic conclusion suggests, is like the trust that those who row 
the galley will decide its course.” (Melber, 2016a, p. 205) Such an observation, 
however, relies largely on behavior in routine action, in case of big transformations 
(what Melber refers to as mutiny) this is put into question. Indeed, the role of the 
middle class in Africa has been mentioned recurrently, concerning major political 
transitions that the continent, or sometimes only specific countries, have undergone. 
The most prominent would be the African independence from colonialism, the “third 
wave” of democratization in the early 1990s and the more recent uprisings, ignited by 
the Arab Spring. A short review of these transformations shall give some indication on 
how the role of the middle class has been described in these social movements, and 
we shall conclude whether this allows deducing a particular political stance of these 
middle classes. 
3.2.1 The African Middle Class and Independence – a Racially Defined Elite 
Minority 
At the time of independence in the African countries, “middle class” had been used as 
a precursor of a ruling elite, rather than for a class of small prosperity, and was far 
from being a commonly applied concept (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 12). In a similar 
vein, Lentz reveals the conceptual proximity between elite (used by those who found 
that a class label would not adequately reflect the social stratification in the African 
societies at the end of colonialism) and middle class (Lentz, 2015, p. 9). In general, the 
use of middle class was justified by describing an educated, urban stratum working in 
professional jobs, often as civil servants in the colonial administration (e.g., Sklar, 
1979, p. 533f). Thus, Amilcar Cabral sees the national petty bourgeoisie as “[…] the 
only social stratum capable both of having consciousness in the first place of the reality 
of imperialist domination and of handling the state apparatus inherited from that 
domination.” (Cabral 1980:134, cited in Mamdani, 1990a, p. 59) Such a middle class 
would be situated between the rural masses and the colonialists (Lentz, 2015, p. 10). 
Kilson (1958) for example argues that the African middle class in British West Africa 
has brought about nationalism because they felt their advancement was hindered 
under colonial rule, and that nationalism was foremost designed to serve their own 
middle class interests. Mamdani (1976) makes a similar conclusion for Uganda in the 
1940s: 
“Thus, all [emphasis in original] sections of the petty bourgeoisie found 
the path to further development blocked: traders were subordinate to 
Indian commercial capital, civil servants found themselves at the lower 
rung of a three-tiered, racially structured government service, and kulaks 
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[Baganda rich peasants] found themselves subject to the political rule of 
the Lukiko [parliament of Buganda] chiefs.” (Mamdani, 1976, p. 170) 
The violent incidents of the 1940s had a specific political agenda and led to a change 
in the relationship between the petty bourgeoisie and the colonial state, transferring 
power from the chiefs to the petty bourgeoisie. That petty bourgeoisie would 
eventually become the ruling class in post-independent Uganda (Mamdani, 1976, p. 
221). Michael West drives the conceptual proximity even further by using elite and 
middle class interchangeably in his account on colonial Zimbabwe (West, 2002). He 
shows, how the Zimbabwean middle class has first tried to enhance its social status 
while cooperating with the white settlers, claiming better treatment for “civilized” 
Africans than for the “raw natives”. The refusal of the white settlers to share their 
privileges led ultimately to a radicalization of the middle class and mobilization of 
peasants and workers to seize power and to construct a class agenda suitable for all, 
instead of just following their own (West, 2002, p. 121 ff). The work cited here, 
however, fails to be more specific about the actions of this so-called middle class. Often 
the statements remain unspecific, referring to the middle class occupation of 
leadership position in movements that had been decisive for the mobilization of 
nationalism and demand for independence. As mentioned before, it is questionable 
whether such a somewhat vague role is sufficient to deduce the political position of 
the middle class. As pointed out, the use of middle class is close to that of a post-
independent dominant elite; thus, one must keep in mind, that, if at all, it mainly refers 
to an upper middle class. But the characteristics used to describe this group are 
strikingly similar to those evoked in later accounts on who was active in other 
protests, such as the democratic transitions and contemporary uprising. 
3.2.2 The African Middle Class and the Third Wave – Replaced by Civil Society 
In the 1980s, there seemed to be little belief that African countries would transition 
towards democracy. Samuel Huntington argued that they are too impoverished, and 
their states too violent, for them to become democratic (Joseph, 1997, p. 363). Besides, 
the middle classes were seen as too weak and dependent on the state structures 
(because of their bureaucratic nature) as that they would oppose their regimes (ibid.). 
The middle class at that time was principally made by the state, through a conflated 
civil service sector, with an inherent interest in authoritarian stability (Lofchie, 2015, 
p. 40). Such analyses, though seem to have been proven wrong, after the fall of the 
Berlin wall and the end of the cold war, when the “third wave” of democracy reached 
Africa (Huntington, 1993). The principal drivers of these transitions have, however, 
often been analyzed through the lens of civil society, with a remarkable absence of the 
middle class in many accounts (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 14). Many of the 
transitions that have taken place were led by national conferences, institutions guided 
by well-educated professionals, such as advocates or the clergy (G. Martin, 1993). For 
example, Zeilig & Dawson (2008) have argued that university students had been 
drawn into activism due to the tension between their awareness of their higher 
educational status and the threat of facing poverty, as previously held assurances that 
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a good education leads to a good career began to erode11. Bratton & van de Walle 
(Bratton & van de Walle, 1992) describe students, civil servants, unions and churches 
as the main social groups involved in the protests in many African countries. For them, 
the protests were “an outlet for a coalition of diverse corporate interests. Students were 
joined by faculty and civil servants complaining about salary arrears, subsidy cuts, or […] 
the possibility of a salary reduction.” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992, p. 442) And for 
Herbst (1990, p. 200) the biggest threat to regime stability comes from student and 
labor movements. Albeit meeting middle class criteria, such as education and salary, 
these actors have often been described as elite or civil society instead (Darbon & 
Toulabor, 2011, p. 15), except for the two authors mentioned above. Bratton and Van 
de Walle believe that in neopatrimonial regimes the clientelistic nature of the economy 
hinders private capital accumulation. In addition to a continued financial crisis, the 
middle class is hindered in its advancement and will sideline with the opposition 
because “[...] would-be capitalists want to use a transition from neopatrimonialism as an 
opportunity to include them in the new rules of the political game.” (Bratton & van de 
Walle, 1994, p. 467) Thus, these political transitions are driven from below, and they 
are supported by the emerging middle class who can counterbalance the weakness of 
civil society and political organizations (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994, p. 485). Bratton 
even believes that “middle classes are likely to be the protagonists of civil society” 
(Bratton, 1994, p. 4). 
At the end of the 1990s, however, many analysts have been dampened about the 
prospects of the democratic transition due to subsequent democratic backlashes 
(Tshiyembe, 1998). It is only with the more recent uprisings that have taken place all 
over Africa since 2005 but gained prominence with the Arab Spring in 2011, that 
hopes of a new democratic shift in African countries were voiced. Occurring at the 
same time as the debate of an emerging global middle class, these protests were 
sometimes seen as a “middle class revolution” (Fukuyama, 2013). 
3.2.3 The African Middle Class and Contemporary Uprisings - and the 
Prominence of the Urban Poor 
In 2011, popular protests triggered a change in leadership in several North African 
and Arab countries. In the same year, the movement of 23rd June (M23) succeeded 
through their protests to have a law proposal withdrawn, that would have facilitated 
the re-election of President Abdoulaye Wade (Demarest, 2016, p. 64). They also played 
a vital role in rallying for the opposition candidate Macky Sall in national elections the 
year after, eventually ousting the incumbent president. In 2014, le balai citoyen led to 
the removal of Blaise Compaoré, Burkina Faso’s longstanding president (Bouquet, 
2017). And these are just the most successful ones. For the last decade, all over Africa, 
regimes have been faced with an increasing number of popular protests, often 
triggered by declining living conditions (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). Branch & 
                                                 
11 Note here the resemblance with arguments made about the implication of the youth in more 
contemporary protests across Africa. 
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Mampilly argue that recent protests all over the world, such as the Occupy Movement, 
the Arab Spring, the European indignados and the anti-corruption protests in Latin 
America and Asia have been interpreted as “the ultimate challenge to capitalism, a 
rejection of liberal democracy, an uprising by the ‘multitude’, the work of social-media-
savvy youth, or an outburst by a frustrated middle class.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 
2) They point out, though, that such analyses ignore local and historical conditions. 
Thus, the protests in Africa that have been increasing since 2005 (Branch & Mampilly, 
2015, p. 63) build on a history of dissent that can be traced back to the anti-colonial 
struggle. They see the roots of today’s contention in the urban underclass which had 
always been confronted with state violence. Because, contrary to civil society, they 
lack institutional representation, their only option to be heard is through directly 
relating with the state (ibid. p. 20f). Goodfellow (2013) makes a similar observation 
for Kampala, where urban informal groups communicate their grievances through 
rioting and the state, in return would solely respond to that form of demands. In both 
cases, the authors see the main actors in the “urban underclass” or “urban informal 
groups”, quite distinctive from previous descriptions of a middle class. 
Notwithstanding, Branch & Mampilly describe that underclass as having “defied 
traditional, class-based categories and [...] defined only negatively, by setting it off from 
what it is not.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 19) That, again, shows surprising 
similarities with the description of the middle class as “neither rich nor poor”. The 
proximity should not be overstretched, though, because the authors discard the 
middle class implications as a neoliberal narrative, that highlights its success story of 
global capitalism by presenting the middle class as the democratic force that is 
hindered in its aspirations by their national crony capitalism (ibid. p. 201f). 
Eventually, this brings us back to the question of how to define middle class and its 
appropriation by the concerned actors. Contrary to Russia, where protesters against 
Putin have assumed that definition for themselves (Bikbov, 2012), activists from 
current movements in Africa have been more hesitant to describe themselves as such. 
In April 2017, the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation Berlin convened several activists and 
Zacharia Mampilly, one of the authors of “Africa Uprising” (2015) for a roundtable 
titled “AfriqUPrising” (“AfriqUPrising!,” 2017). Activists included Linda Masarira of 
#21daysofactivism in Zimbabwe, Cheikh Oumar Cyrille Touré of Y’en a marre in 
Senegal, and the Burundi photographer Teddy Mazina. When asked about the role of 
the middle class, the respondents were hesitant, their answers underlined the 
inclusive nature of their social movements and they described their own social status 
as “poor urbanite” as Masarira called it. And Branch & Mampilly draw a similar 
conclusion: 
“The African experience of protest thus affirms that the occurrence and 
outcomes of urban uprisings worldwide cannot be predicted from a 
universal model of liberal progress driven on by a middle class, but are 
contingent upon complex political dynamics between a diversity of 
classes on the street.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 202) 
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We see here that the middle class label has not been used extensively by analysts to 
describe uprisings in Africa, even though they have occurred at a similar time as the 
Africa Rising narrative. At best, they even contradict this narrative, by showing how 
the growth has not led to employment among the young urban populations and that 
growing inequality and corruption have instead rendered life in the city precarious. 
But, many of these protests have also been limited in their achievements. For one, even 
if they managed to organize a regime change, they however often lacked the support 
from the rural population and only succeed due to the help of the military (Bouquet, 
2017). In other instances, the movements did not call for broad social transformation 
but rather concentrated on small, localized uprisings which only concerned a small 
part of the population (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). 
*** 
Admittedly, the review done here is broad, it does not give credit to the abundance of 
literature on each of these topics, and it neglects to take into account country-specific 
trajectories. Whereas trade unions, associations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) present high level of organization, urban informal groups are much less 
institutionalized. In the SMO literature, the middle class has been seen as an educated 
group, with sufficient income and capacity to lead and eventually bring about a 
political transformation, thus as representatives of the organized spectrum. Yet, all the 
movements discussed here, and this is pivotal for social movements, could only 
succeed because they were able to form alliances between different factions of society. 
And even though their leaders would come from the middle class, they were not at all 
“middle class movements” and it is doubtful that all members of the middle class 
joined or that they constituted the majority of these people on the street. So, while 
Oberschall observes that indeed most opposition leaders come from a middle class 
background, he reminds us that “[…] this is equally true for political leaders in political 
parties and in other institutionalized groups that have access to political influence and 
decision-making.” (Oberschall, 1973, p. 155) Thus, the middle class is not more critical 
towards the status quo per se, but simply more likely to assume a leading role. In the 
case of the more recent uprisings, which have been less institutionalized we have even 
seen some of their leading figures refusing the middle class label, seeing their identity 
as “urban poor”, in order to underline the broad base of the movements. 
In the literature on middle class and democracy, very often, no direct action is taking 
place. Instead, the middle class brings political change through their being particularly 
virtuous. Or, on the contrary, their inaction is explained through their satisfaction with 
a system in which they are not the worst off, thus taking action for them is not 
necessary. These are, however, in some way conceptual shortcuts, that fail to analyze 
actual actions and attitudes of these middle classes. Especially in the quantitative 
literature, that relies mainly on correlations between levels of democracy and income 
(e.g., Lipset, 1959b). Such an argumentation mirrors the research on democratic 
transition, much debated in the 1990s that suggested that a given set of preconditions 
(e.g., a middle class) would lead to a specific outcome (e.g., a consolidated democracy). 
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This overtly deterministic view of transitions had been criticized (see Ben Néfissa, 
2011; Dobry, 2000; Hermet, 2001). Instead, these authors argued that we have to let 
go of a linear narrative. Failing to democratize should be considered as much as a 
successful transition, the focus should turn to small events as well as big ones, and 
social movements need to be rehabilitated in such an analysis (Ben Néfissa, 2011, p. 
78; Dobry, 2000, p. 588ff). Therefore, we argue that one has to look at the activities 
and the political attitudes of a middle class, in order to put them in the context of the 
theory of political transformation. With these arguments in mind, we turn to the 
theories of social mobilization, that help put individual actions in context to collective 
ones, as a way to bring about societal change. It gives us an entry on how to analyze 
the political role of the middle income groups in Uganda from various levels: at the 
level of individual actions, individual positions (such as a favorable attitude towards 
democracy) and positions in the context of collective action (as participants of a 
movement). 
3.3 Social Movements and Nonmovements 
The idea of the link between social change and conflict has been recurrent in sociology. 
Coser shows how, as rigid medieval structures broke down, conflicts over interests 
and values that had formerly been retained now gave rise to new forms of unification 
and integration, leading to the modern western world (Coser, 1957, p. 199). He argues 
that “[c]hange, no matter what its source, breeds strain and conflict.” (ibid. p. 204). 
Scholars like Anthony Oberschall (1973) and Samuel Huntington (1972) promoted the 
concept especially in the context of developing countries. For Oberschall (1973) social 
conflict exists because of the desire to change an established social order, fueled by 
social hierarchies and the struggle of scarce resources in a context of domination and 
subordination. He draws, similar to Huntington (1972) a strong link between social 
change and the potential for conflict since transitional societies (in the transition from 
traditional to modern forms of organization) show a great disparity in wealth and 
living standards, which raises the potential for conflict. And whereas in a routine 
situation, problem-solving takes place through routine mechanisms, in a phase of 
transformation the situation is considerably altered, therefore, making usual 
responses inadequate (Koopmans, 2007, p. 32). And in this context, many authors 
bring particular attention to the emerging middle class, bourgeoisie, or which term 
they might apply. These groups are seen as particularly prone to act because: 
1. They challenge, in the words of Thorstein Veblen “vested interests” (cited in 
Coser, 1957, p. 203) in the redistribution of resources. They start making 
claims (assuming that before they have been poor and, therefore, marginalized 
from the political field), that encounters the opposition of groups “who 
previously had established a ‘vested interest’ in a given form of distribution of 
honour, wealth and power.” (Coser, 1957, p. 203) An example could be a claim 
of a middle class for accountability and rational bureaucracy, challenging 
elites, who have functioned arbitrarily and through personal rule, as it is 
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frequently brought forward by those authors arguing for a middle class in 
favor of democracy12. 
2. They have a surplus of resources to be invested, as they are not busy anymore 
to make ends meet, but not comfortably installed in their situation either, 
leading to the desire to continue to strive forward (Oberschall, 1973, p. 164ff). 
3. Since their situation changed, their demands for the government have altered 
as well, leading to different expectations regarding services provided by the 
state (Kim, 2007, p. 189). 
There are several problems with these assumptions, concerning the position of the 
middle class, already discussed at length in chapter 3.1.1. Another problematic 
argument regards the rigid dichotomies between traditional and modern forms of 
organization and between what is a “routine situation” and what a “crisis” (Dobry, 
2009, p. 7). Charles Tilly, himself refusing this approach, writes: 
“If we take [these] arguments seriously, we will expect to find sharp 
discontinuity between routine and nonroutine collective action; their 
causes, content, and consequences will all differ significantly. We will 
hypothesize that the faster and more extensive the social change, the more 
widespread the anomic and restorative forms of collective action; 
concretely, we will expect rapid industrialization or urbanization to 
produce exceptionally high levels of conflict and protest.” (Tilly, 1978, p. 
23) 
Though both, Tilly and Dobry, argue that there is no essential difference in the means 
of collective action used, Dobry concedes, that a link between mobilization and social 
transformation can often be observed (Dobry, 2009, p. 7). Kriesi argues that social 
change itself does not create conflict, but only in combination with processes of 
mobilization, turned manifest through social movements: 
“While the social-structural basis of a political conflict emerges from 
social change, the conflict itself results from the coupling of the processes 
of social change – urbanization, population growth, industrialization, 
globalization and the like – with the processes of democratization, 
politicization, and mobilization. Social change determines structural and 
cultural potentials for political mobilization that remain latent as long as 
they are not politicized by a collective political actor as such as a social 
movement.” (Kriesi, 2007, p. 73) 
Kriesi thus turns the attention to collective action, in forms of sustained social 
movements, that are necessary to convert dissatisfaction triggered by social change 
                                                 
12 For a critique of these assumptions, see 3.1. 
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into a source of conflict, that itself can then lead to social transformation. There have 
been several paradigmatic shifts in the theory of social mobilization, reflecting the 
different kinds of movements, as well as the particular biographies of those who tend 
to explain them, leading to shifting assumptions and perspectives (Buechler, 2004, p. 
47). We shall briefly sketch here some dominant strands of social movement theory, 
focusing on aspects that are particularly relevant for our analysis of the political 
activities of the middle income groups in Uganda. In the following section we 
concentrate on collective action, the relevance of organization for sustained social 
movement, of the political context in which a movement takes place, the importance 
of a shared collective identity and the importance of being organized in networks, 
prior to the existence in a social movement. In the next section, we will focus on 
individual action, and why they can give us more subtle information about the 
positioning of the middle income groups towards politics. We conclude this chapter 
by laying out our framework for the analysis of the activity of the middle income 
groups. 
3.3.1 Social Movements 
Collective action can be defined as an activity by two or more individuals, trying to 
achieve a common goal through collaboration, carried out as a result of mobilization 
(Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004). Mobilization in return is the process of assembling and 
organizing resources (financial, human, technical, etc.) to reach a particular objective. 
Social scientists over time have made different attempts explaining why and how 
individuals decide to take on collective action. 
Early explanations of the reason for protest and social uprisings were sought in the 
causality with protest. People rebel because they are frustrated. Yet, that causality had 
been widely refuted; while it is true that people who protest are dissatisfied, not all 
dissatisfaction leads to protest. Tilly points out that: 
“[The] central idea comes from elementary psychology: if an individual 
senses a large gap between what he gets and what he deserves, he will 
become angry. Given the opportunity, he will rebel. When many people 
sense such a gap simultaneously, rebellions occur. […] Run backwards, the 
argument can hardly be faulted, if only because it is virtually true by 
definition. Political violence can hardly occur without shared 
dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs; shared dissatisfaction 
cannot occur without individual dissatisfaction; individual dissatisfaction 
results from an unfavorable comparison between things as they are and 
things as they should be.” (Tilly, 1971, p. 417) 
Mancur Olson (1965) has introduced rationality to social movement theory. He was 
one of the first trying to explain the rise and course of social movements through 
collective action, inspired by rational choice, rather than as an expression of mass 
hysteria and irrational collective behavior (Daniel, 2016, p. 21). Olson distanced 
himself from mass theories, which assume that social movements originate in 
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uncontrolled masses, are leaderless and without structure. Instead, he argued that 
actors of social movements are actors of rational choice and, therefore, actively decide 
to take part in a movement. 
Olson with his focus on rationality pointed out one paradox: what would individuals 
motivate to join a protest instead of waiting for others to take the risk, as the gains 
achieved would benefit everyone? Based on his work and that free rider paradox the 
focus of mobilization theory shifted much towards the emphasis of organization in the 
1970s. This insistence, especially in North America, came through resource 
mobilization theories: 
“It replaced the crowd with the organization, and dismissed the 
psychological variables of alienation and frustration in favour of the 
rational actor employing instrumental and strategical reasoning.” 
(Foweraker, 1995, p. 16) 
Critical questions evolved around sustained collective action and the functioning of 
social movements (Daniel, 2016, p. 23). For a movement to be successful, it needs 
various material and non-material resources, such as money, organizational 
structures, equipment (e.g., photocopying machines for distributing leaflets, premises 
to house a headquarter from which the coordination takes place), but also leadership 
skills, etc. Anthony Oberschall (1973) has been among those foreseeing a leadership 
role for the middle class in these movements, due to their endowments with said 
resources.  
“It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the upper and middle strata in 
society supply the substantial bulk of opposition leaders to all manner of 
social movements in proportion far above that of their percentage in the 
population at large.” (Oberschall, 1973, p. 154) 
He concedes though that not all middle class groups are equally likely to join the 
opposition. It concerns foremost those whose own advancement is blocked, and who 
have primarily cultural capital, a resource that cannot be taken away if they need to 
go underground. Thus, the entrepreneur middle class is more conservative, as their 
assets can be confiscated (Oberschall, 1973, p. 164 f). Edwards & McCarthy (2004) 
consider the middle class to 
“[…] remain privileged in their access to many kinds of resources, and, 
therefore, not surprisingly social movements that resonate with the 
concerns of relatively privileged social groups predominate and the 
mobilizations of the poor groups are quite rare […].” (Edwards & 
McCarthy, 2004, p. 117) 
In this respect, Nie et al. (1969a) and J.D. Wright (1976) also observe that those who 
are the most capable of mobilizing have the least reason to do so. 
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In general, the resource mobilization theory has put much weight on understanding 
how social movement organizations (SMO) structure a social movement, and less on 
the origins of a movement (Daniel, 2016, p. 24). However, resource mobilization 
theories have also been criticized for several reasons. Piven & Cloward (1977) for 
example argue that organization actually hinders mobilization because it takes the 
people from the street into the conference rooms and is, therefore, a tool of the elites 
for cooptation. Poor people, they continue, lack the resources for organization, and 
thus the only way for them to voice their discontent is through riots in the streets 
(Fillieule & Péchu, 1993, pp. 108–114). Even though that criticism is sought to be too 
simple of a dichotomy, between the organization and the masses (ibid.) the SMO 
approach has been considered too focused on institutionalized movements, neglecting 
more informal groupings, such as networks or scenes (Haunss & Leach, 2007, p. 71). 
Besides, if stretched sufficiently far, a resource can include everything that leads to a 
social movement, and thus be true by virtue of definition (Fillieule & Péchu, 1993, p. 
115). Moreover, it does not account for successful movements which had only minimal 
financial and personal resources (Daniel, 2016, p. 25). Others point out the neglect of 
the political context, which might be more or less conducive for social movements to 
thrive (Tilly, 1978, p. 133). Finally, the theories did not consider values, experiences, 
and solidarity as possible explanations for the motivation to join a movement (Daniel, 
2016, p. 25). 
Since then, social movement theory has undergone several conceptual shifts, to 
overcome the weaknesses of resource mobilization theories (Foweraker, 1995, p. 17). 
Tilly (1978) for example introduces the concept of the political opportunity structure 
(POS). The POS approach links social movements to the political system and whether 
it is characterized by openness or repression, whereby an opportunity is defined as 
the extent to which a dominant group is open to new claims (Tilly, 1978, p. 133). 
Hence, the approach tries to determine when the opportunity for political action is 
conducive. Subsequently, this approach has taken on very different stances, looking at 
broader societal and cultural influences as well. However, that diversity has increased 
the complexity of the concept, making it hard to be applied. Besides, the theory can be 
criticized, in a similar vein as the deprivation approach: “[...] political opportunity 
theory tends towards a tautology: any source that produces social movement activity is 
post hoc identified as an opportunity.” (Smith & Fetner, 2007, p. 17) On the contrary, 
opportunities that did not lead to a social movement may be neglected. Therefore, the 
primary contribution of the POS approach lies in putting the focus on the specific 
political context in which a social movement comes into being (Daniel, 2016, p. 28). 
This is particularly true in authoritarian regimes, where mobilization often comes at a 
high cost. Similarly, the repertoire of action is equally shaped by the geographical, 
historical and political context. Tilly describes how collective action, comparable to 
the art of a particular era takes on not any form, but one that is already familiar to the 
participants (Tilly, 1978, p. 143). These actions are bound to change, throughout time, 
space, and depending on the political context. Thus, charivaris may have been a form 
of collective action throughout Europe in the past, but they rarely still are (Tilly, 1978). 
On the other hand, demonstrations have become an action commonly considered 
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legitimate, which has not always been the case (Norris, 2007). In a politically 
oppressive context, we might expect more subtle forms of contentious action, as the 
costs associated with any action might be higher, if the agent is identified, hence 
leading to an adaption of the available repertoire. Nevertheless, these expressions, 
even though more disclosed than movements should equally be included in the 
spectrum of collective action (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, pp. 29, 45). 
The heavy emphasis on the structure of social movements has failed to link the 
individual with shared group interests and collective action (Daniel, 2016, p. 28). The 
collective identity approach tries to overcome this shortcoming by showing how social 
movements emerge and are sustained through a shared collective identity (Scott Hunt 
& Benford, 2004, p. 433). Melucci (1996) describes the collective identity as the 
process of constructing an action system (ibid. p. 70 f) which implies a constant 
renegotiation between the individuals within the movement, by agreeing on the ends 
of the action, the means to use and the environment in which it takes place (ibid. p. 
40). It is a constant process, shaped through interaction and discursive mechanisms. 
Proximity can be created in several ways, through a shared language, conscience, 
experience, ethnicity, gender, but also lifestyle or living situations (Daniel, 2016, p. 
29). The precursor of the collective identity approach can be found in the Marxian 
distinction between a class in itself and a class for itself and has subsequently been 
picked up by other class analysts as well (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 434). For 
Weber, for example, class, status group (Stand) or party are among the sources that 
create a collective identity (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 435). Hence, in our work, 
we may see how the middle income groups in Uganda refer to particular identities, 
either in the individual interviews, but also when they are among groups, they feel 
close to: which identity is evoked, in which context? That will be a central question to 
keep in mind to analyze on which basis people take action. Though Daniel already 
points out that often several identities exist, and a particular identity (in her case 
gender) does not create solidarity by default (Daniel, 2016, p. 30). Hence, we may 
expect that different identities are evoked depending on the situation, and some might 
be stronger than others. 
Finally, very early on, authors have pointed out the relevance of pre-existing networks 
for the coming into existence of a social movement. 
Networks predating movements […] are critical in supplying the 
personnel, resources, and tactical expertise necessary to mobilization. 
They are also important in fostering and impeding the very identities and 
interests on the basis of which mobilization is mounted. (Polletta, 1999, p. 
25) 
This is essential for the development of a common identity and trust among members. 
Taylor has criticized analysts of the 1960s movements who seem to assume that the 
origin of these movements lies in an “immaculate conception” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). 
Instead, she shows the continuity between the US women’s movement from 1945 to 
1960. The women’s movement did not end once suffrage was won, but went into, what 
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she calls “abeyance”, that she describes as “a holding process by which movements 
sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from 
one stage of mobilization to another.” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). During that phase, 
alternative structures emerge to absorb activists who refrain from disruptive 
activities because the POS is not conducive. These structures then shaped the women’s 
movement in the 1960s, by providing already existing activists networks, an already 
established repertoire of action and a collective feminist identity (Taylor, 1989, p. 
770). Her contribution is essential because it questions the dichotomy between phases 
of contention and “routine” activity and rather sees them linked through continuity. 
Scholars on multiple accounts have mentioned the relevance of such pre-existing 
networks. Oberschall (1973) highlights the importance of shared norms for a 
movement to be sustained. And prior structures are helpful in creating such norms. In 
a similar vein, free spaces can be perceived as “small-scale settings within a community 
or movement that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups, are 
voluntarily participated in, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or 
accompanies political mobilization.” (Polletta, 1999, p. 1) Therefore, they allow for 
counter-hegemonic ideologies to be elaborated, or, in other words, for shared norms 
to be created. Examples mentioned by Polletta are the church in the civil rights 
movement in the United States, the intimacy of the family, bars in working class 
communities, or mosques in Kuwait in the time of Iraqi occupation (ibid. p.6). She calls, 
however, to strip the concept of its spatial notion because it is not physical proximity 
in itself that is decisive for mobilization to emerge, but the character of the 
associational ties shared between the individuals (Polletta, 1999, p. 25). Moreover, 
Oberschall shows how such pre-established structures facilitate communication 
because they can draw on already existing communication channels (Oberschall, 
1973, p. 125). Finally, they are a pool to draw participants for a movement from (Diani, 
2004; McAdam & Scott, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; Ohlemacher, 1996). Ohlemacher 
(1996) picks up the idea, that social mobilization derives from preexisting social 
networks and recruitment occurs through personal contact. But for Ohlemacher a 
meso-level is missing, that would depict how these personal contacts, in organizations, 
clubs, associations, or on a private basis turn into social mobilization. He suggests that 
this is the case through social relays (Ohlemacher, 1996, p. 199): extensive networks, 
that do not need face-to-face interaction. Instead, they serve as an umbrella, providing 
passive contact between subgroups. While homogeneity is important within the 
subgroups, to develop a collective identity, heterogeneity is decisive across the relay 
for the success of a movement because it will bring together a wide range of citizens 
and form alliances. 
“A social relay in successful mobilization must be able to attract a high 
number of heterogeneous people. Internally, the relay must differentiate 
the heterogeneity of the overall population into the critical mass of 
relatively homogeneous subnetworks, which themselves generate new 
networks. Heterogeneity is the key to linking many networks, and 
homogeneity is the key to developing the ‘critical mass’ at the starting 
point of collective action. Adjusting and mediating between heterogeneity 
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and homogeneity is the task of ties within the relay.” (Ohlemacher, 1996, 
p. 202) 
He illustrates his theory with the study of two protest groups against low-flying 
military jets. One group has nonpartisan organizations such as parental association or 
local sports clubs as social relay, connecting heterogeneous people themselves 
connected to various sub-groups. Therefore, they can reach out to a more diversified 
mass of people to mobilize for the protest. On the contrary, the other group had more 
ideologically homogeneous social relays, like the local green party and anti-nuclear 
movement, attracting only people from leftist groups, making it less attractive for 
others, who would not identify with these groups, to join. Therefore, they had fewer 
members and were not as able to mobilize successfully. 
However, as with the physical free space, one should be careful to see in the correlation 
a causality (Diani, 2004, p. 343). While it is true that many social movements have 
their origins in prior networks, not all networks are equally prone to be mobilized. It 
will, once again, depend on the character of the ties and the norms shared within a 
network. Although this is not to imply that solely networks with a particular political 
character will eventually act collectively, sometimes even the contrary might be true, 
as Ohlemacher’s example has shown (Ohlemacher, 1996). 
Finally, it should neither be assumed that these networks, associations, groups, etc. 
are inherently democratic nor that they have “positive” values. This has been one of 
the pitfalls in civil society approaches. Authors like Putnam have considered activity in 
non-political associations as automatically fostering civic virtues; instead, this will 
more likely depend on the democratic nature of the association, but also of the society, 
and the political context (Haunss & Leach, 2007, p. 84). 
3.3.2 Nonmovements 
“The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any 
human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some 
reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer 
fully the intention of the agent.” (David Hume cited in Ludwig, 2007, p. 
355) 
Social movement theories have been criticized by their emphasis on organized forms 
of action (Buechler, 2004; Haunss & Leach, 2007) and their focus on Western liberal 
democracies (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). This has led to only few systematic 
literature on social movements in non-western societies (Daniel, 2016; Fillieule & 
Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003) and the perception of entire regions such as the Arab world as 
authoritarian and, therefore, void of political contention. Instead, there is a need to 
reconsider definitions of resistance, contentious action, or political participation 
(Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, p. 29). In the same vein, Bayat reminds us that 
collective action models are shaped by local, historically and culturally built behaviors 
and social practices (Bayat, 2013, p. 4). 
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So, whereas social movements, according to Tilly (2004) are characterized by 
organized and sustained claim making towards the authorities and displayed in a 
public manner to emphasize the claim, Bayat proposes to speak of “nonmovements” 
in an authoritarian context, as “collectivities of disjointed yet parallel practices of 
noncollective actors” (Bayat, 2013a, p. 5). They are in several ways distinct from social 
movements, as the table resumes: 
These nonmovements can alter the societies in which they are carried out, without the 
need for a revolution or mass protest, albeit being neither self-conscious nor acting in 
an attempt of resistance. This is done through everyday encroachment, furthering 
claims by the subalterns, namely the poor, women and the youth (Bayat, 2013a, p. x). 
These groups lack institutionalized channels for expressing their dissent, but instead 
of exiting from the social and political stage, they create their own spaces, mainly 
through the effort of improving their lives. Bayat gives as examples the widening of 
women’s rights. Because they had no possibility of making open claims, they instead 
pursued education and a career, participated in sports, or wore their hijab “badly”, 
showing some inches of hair. These new situations allowed them to make new claims, 
such as driving a car or traveling alone. 
“These mundane doings had perhaps little resemblance to extraordinary 
acts of defiance, but rather were closely tied to the ordinary practices of 
everyday life. Yet they were bound to lead to significant social, ideological, 
and legal imperatives. Not only did such practices challenge the prevailing 
assumptions about women’s roles, but they were followed by far-reaching 
structural legal imperatives. Every claim they made became a stepping-
stone for a further claim, generating a cycle of opportunities for demands 
to enhance gender rights.” (Bayat, 2013a, p. 17) 
Social movements Nonmovements 
 Ideologically driven 
 claims through (small) 
groups 
 pressure on authorities to 
fulfill demands 
 extraordinary deeds 
(petitions, 
demonstrations) 
 Action-oriented 
 claims through (millions of) individuals 
 actors practice their demands despite 
sanctions 
 ordinary practices of everday life, action 
is often extralegal, “subverting 
governing norms and laws.” 
Table 2: Social Movements vs. Nonmovements (Bayat 2013, p. 21) 
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In other words, even the subalterns have the possibility to either reproduce or 
transform society through their practical actions. In the example given by Bayat it is 
through the modification of a practice, such as the way women are wearing the hijab, 
that social change is brought about. The scope of action, however, is embedded in the 
resources and practices shaped through experiences, leading to every individual 
having their particular “repertoire of action”, depending on their status, age, and wider 
local and historical circumstances. And this repertoire is both restraining and 
investing individual practices. Bayat’s reading of the mundane practices brings to 
mind Giddens’ idea of the practical consciousness, a mutual knowledge about how to 
act, and about the right or wrong way of doing things (Inglis & Thorpe, 2012). Thus, 
the modification of accepted practices is at the core of societal change. At one point, 
the formerly nearly invisible alterations become so apparent that they either have to 
be officially rejected or de facto accepted. 
For Bayat, however, this is distinctive from everyday resistance, as he considers 
resistance to be intentional, that is, people want their action to express defiance 
towards the established order (Bayat, 2013a, p. 42). Awareness of being oppressed is 
not in itself a form of resistance. In this regard he criticizes the literature on the 
“resisting” poor, that draws on Gramscian and Foucauldian notions of power 
(wherever power is, is also resistance) and tends to consider any action as resistance. 
For him, much of the actions described by the resistance literature should rather be 
considered as coping strategies (Bayat, 2013a, p. 41 f). For that reason, he considers 
his examples not as expressed resistance, but as “the quiet encroachment of the 
ordinary” (Bayat, 2013a, pp. 46–55). Bayat sees these encroachments for example in 
self-employment, in seeking alternative means of conflict resolution instead of 
reporting to the police, in traditional marriages, or saving in informal savings and 
credit cooperations (SACCO) instead of using formal banking. These decisions are not 
made because they are considered to be the best option, but because their 
circumstances do not leave them with a choice (Bayat, 2013a, p. 49). Scott (1990), 
instead, distinguishes between verbal forms of resistance, such as hypocrisy, the use 
of coded language (jokes, metaphors, rumors, etc.), the explicit expression of 
frustration in “free spaces”13 (what he refers to as hidden transcripts), and political 
discussions in public places without fearing repression. In a similar vein, Toulabor 
describes political derision in Togo in the 1980s through linguistic puns and jokes, 
often heavily connoted in sexual or fecal terms as weapons of the powerless against 
the regime. Albeit not leading to any concrete action, he considers them to be a proof 
of raising awareness, and as a result a form of social contention (Toulabor, 1981). 
Finally, Bayart (1992) observes in Africa several tactics of social groups to resist the 
state and its efforts to oppress them. Among those practices figure under-productivity, 
strikes, electoral abstention, withdrawal into religion, to the extent of creating 
“theocratic communities”, falsification, the informal economy, or joking (Bayart, 1992, 
p. 70). He describes, how the effort by the African state to depoliticize these social 
groups, in turn, led to an over-politicization of the everyday life, and the actions 
                                                 
13 Though he does not call them like that 
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carried out by these groups as le politique par le bas. Critics of the approach objected 
that the clear separation between “above” and “below” cannot be upheld empirically, 
as there are always overlapping or mediating dynamics. Besides — and this resonates 
with Bayat’s criticism of the “resisting poor” — it remains unclear who defines the 
political nature of the action, the actor or the analyst? This might result in an over-
interpretation of “the political” by the research, as technically everything can become 
political (Mayrargue & Toulabor, 2009, p. 107). 
Despite these criticisms, these authors have the merit of bringing different repertoires 
of action into the scope of analysis, and to widen the comprehension of political 
participation. All authors (Bayart, 1992; Bayat, 2013a; Scott, 1990) underline the 
importance to look at mundane activities of the everyday life and their potential to 
subvert state authority and bring social change, intentionally or not. This takes place 
on an individual level and is not carried out as organized collective action. Instead of 
passing through institutionalized channels of political decision-making, change in 
such instances is brought about through the mundane, individually executed activities 
of everyday life, that remain nevertheless linked through daily social practices. 
One crucial difference with social movements is that claims are not made directly to 
authorities or political institutions. This might be due to their marginalized status in 
society. Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi (2003) remind us that 
“[T]ous les groupes, au sein des sociétés considérées, ne disposent pas des 
mêmes armes. Il en résulte que le spectre des formes disponible pour 
défendre ses intérêts dépend des ressources sociales et de la manière dont 
l’État distribue les richesses […].” (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, p. 
64) 
That lack of other means of political expression is equally emphasized by 
Branch & Mampilly (2015) when analyzing the urban underclass. However, they argue 
that due to the lack of intermittent institutions, that class is exposed directly to state 
violence, which in return increases their likelihood for rioting and street violence 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 20 f). Both examples show that there is no determinism 
either, as people may resort to subversion through mundane activities, or violence, or 
both, or neither. Similarly, these options are equally available for less marginalized 
groups in society. For them, such reactions might be possible in addition to more 
institutionalized forms of claim-making. What differs is the possibility to choose from 
the actions at disposition, and these repertoires are often shaped by the availability of 
resources and the place one occupies in society. 
*** 
From these accounts, we can observe a social stratification within the movement 
theories. With more resources and capacities at disposition, the possibility to mobilize 
through more institutionalized channels increases, whereas the subalterns or 
informal urban groups resort to more subversive tactics, either intentionally or not. 
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However, it is likely that this dichotomy is neither that pronounced nor mutually 
exclusive. More likely the options to choose a particular form rise with the income. For 
example, a more affluent person can have a bank account as well as being a member 
of a SACCO or choose one of the two options. 
A tendency can be observed for a call to get rid of the dichotomies. Taylor (1989) 
demands for social movements to be considered beyond the active mobilization, by 
looking at their abeyance structures. Similarly, Melucci (1996) and Dobry (2009) call 
for leaving behind the distinction between routine political behavior and a political 
crisis. Instead, they consider the latter just to be the continuation of the former (Dobry, 
2009, p. 39). Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi demand for collective actions to be seen on a 
continuum, and not as dichotomies (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, p. 45) and 
Rigaud considers the differentiation passivity vs. revolution to be too reductive: 
“La dichotomie passivité/révolution […] occulte l’espace médian qui 
existe entre la paralysie et le passage à la violence et où se déploient un 
certain nombre d’attitudes, de pratiques, et de discours trahissant la 
défiance et l’insoumission à l’égard des ‘puissants’ du moment.” (Rigaud, 
2003, p. 206 f) 
This idea, of a continuity, rather than a dichotomy of political and “non-political” 
actions will guide us when proposing our framework on how to approach the activities 
carried out by the middle income groups in Uganda. 
3.4 Proposing a Framework 
We have pointed out several elements of social mobilization theory and forms of 
contention that are hardly mentioned in the literature analysis of the middle classes’ 
political behavior. Most of these analyses either focus on macroeconomic data of 
national wealth and democracy levels (see Kurzman & Leahey, 2004) or at 
questionnaires testing attitudes (for example Cheeseman, 2015; M. Chen & Goodman, 
2013). Such questionnaires ask respondents if they adhere to political and civil rights 
associated with democracy, about their preference of regime type and the leeway a 
political should have. However, two problems arise in that context. First, there is a risk 
of receiving answers with limited viability. It is possible that respondents either have 
a very specific or only limited understanding of what “democracy” means and, in 
relation to this, they might give an answer that is more based on what they estimate 
desired rather than their own attitude (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 659; Mattes & Bratton, 
2016). Second, the attitudes themselves do not allow any conclusion about efforts to 
bring about democratic transformation. In his literature review, Cheeseman mentions 
that authors who link the middle class to democratic behavior hypothesize that they 
will hold the state more accountable, and to force political coalitions against the ruling 
elite (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 649ff). Yet, his analysis of attitudes does not give insights 
into the actions they might take. So, while maybe the middle class may think 
democratically, it is not deriving that they will also act democratically. 
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It is the intention of this work to overcome this shortcoming and link the debates of 
middleclassness with those of political mobilization, in its various forms. We retain the 
essential recognition that there is a continuity between social mobilization, 
associational structures, and individual behavior; they interact and influence each 
other, but they differ in their intentions and their degree of institutionalization. 
Ludwig (2007) suggests differentiating between individual and collective action, but 
among the collective action also between intentional and unintentional ones. He 
distinguishes “we-intentions” (the intention to do something together) and “I-
intentions” (doing something together, but without having the intention to do so, 
which brings back to mind Bayat’s example of the hijab). He argues that: 
“In particular, to understand collective intentional behavior: (1) must we 
admit the existence of agents over and above the individuals who are 
members of groups that act; (2) if so, must we attribute intentions and 
plans to such agents; and (3) in any case, must we accept that the 
intentions of agents who participate in collective intentional behavior, we-
intentions, cannot be exhaustively analyzed in terms of the concepts 
which are used in understanding individual intentional action, that is, 
must we introduce concepts of forms of agency or intention specific to 
group action?”. (Ludwig, 2007, p. 356) 
Ludwig proceeds to answer these questions from the standpoint of semantics and 
albeit an intriguing perspective this is not a field we intend to venture into here. 
However, we believe the previous discussion here in chapter 3 may provide some 
answers, by showing how all intentions feed into one another, and that collective 
intentions are formed through processes of collective identity and framing. 
Thus, we do not limit ourselves to an analysis of the social movements that have taken 
place in Uganda (which would only be the most visible tip of the “mobilization 
iceberg”), but consider equally attitudes, discourses around democracy (or their 
absence), non-actions in the sense of Bayat, discussions in free spaces and leisure 
activities. There are many layers which feed into the final product of a social 
movement, and thus there are also many possibilities for an individual to stop short of 
any visible contentious action. Yet, they all help to contribute to the multifaceted way 
in which meaning, in this case around democracy, emerges or why precisely it does 
not. 
As guidance for our analytical framework, we suggest the following table:
68 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
Label Description Examples Measurement 
Individual Involves personal beliefs, ideas, actions of the daily life. Personal beliefs, actions, 
values, attitudes 
Afrobarometer, WVS, 
interviews, individual 
leisure 
Street level “mundane practices, […] closely tied to the ordinary practices of everyday life 
[but] bound to lead to significant social, ideological, and legal imperatives.” 
(Bayat, 2013a, p. 17) and contentious action as forms of resistance 
“mundane practices”, “hidden 
transcripts” 
Analyzing riots, 
newspapers, Whats App 
groups, jokes, contentious 
actions 
Free Space “small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from 
the direct control of dominant groups, are voluntarily participated in, and 
generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political 
mobilization.” (Polletta, 1999, p. 1), for the generation of shared norms and a 
common identity 
Associations, informal groups, 
personal discussions, group 
leisure 
Participant observation, 
interviews 
Social Relay The superstructure, that links various free spaces, but also other organizations 
that might be under direct control from the dominant groups. Sometimes social 
relays can also be free spaces, as the church in the civil rights movement, an 
example used by Ohlemacher as well as Polletta. 
Churches, cultural institutions, 
trade unions, umbrella 
organizations such as Uganda 
NGO Forum 
Literature analysis, expert 
interviews 
Social 
Movement 
An analytical category to describe all kinds of action, based on collective identity 
which is carried out to challenge or defend existent authority, whereby the 
action breaches the accepted limits of the system in which it is carried out 
(Melucci, 1996). 
Black Monday, Walk to Work, 
Save Mabira Crusade 
Literature analysis, expert 
interviews, participant 
interviews 
Table 3: Analytical Framework for the Forms of Mobilization 
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We believe that all these levels are significant when trying to figure out the positioning of the 
middle income groups. Therefore, when we speak of “forms of social mobilization” we refer to all 
of these positions, regardless whether they fit the formal definition of mobilization. The schema 
provides a blueprint to categorize the actions of the middle income groups. If put in relation to the 
POS and the collective identities that are called upon in the various actions, we hope to provide an 
understanding of social mobilization, in relation to economic emergence, collective identity, and 
the political context in Uganda. 
Evaluating whether the middle income groups support a democratic transition opens a vast field 
of methodological options. In part III we try to break this down, by choosing an approach relating 
to political participation. Verba et al. (1987) define political participation as “those legal activities 
by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental 
personnel and/or the actions they take.” (Verba et al., 1987, p. 46) In their definition, Verba et al. 
narrow the focus to the actions taken by citizens, even though they contend that actions taken by 
political leaders can equally be considered political participation. The attention on the citizen, 
however, is what appeals to us as well. Their restriction on legal activities, on the other hand, 
refers to a rather dated distinction between conventional and contentious activities, with the 
former referring to citizen activities such as voting and party membership and the latter to protest 
activities like illegal strikes, boycotts or demonstrations (Norris, 2007, p. 639). Norris reminds us 
that what is considered “conventional” depends on the repertoire of action currently available, 
and these shift over time and space (ibid.). Thus, it can be argued that in democracies 
demonstrations today have become a legitimate way of communicating with political officials 
(Norris, 2007, p. 639). Instead, she suggests distinguishing between cause-oriented and citizen-
oriented activism. She acknowledges herself, though, that such a distinction is not watertight 
either. Thus, following the suggestions by Verba et al. we focus our attention on activities carried 
out by citizens, but do not limit the observation to what can be considered “legal” or “legitimate”. 
The intention is to examine attitudes and behaviors of our respondents in relation to political 
participation, protest, and democracy. As stated in the table, we will use the middle income group 
interviews, as well as expert interviews, analyses from the questionnaires, but also Afrobarometer 
data and the results from the WVS to construct our argument. 
But to capture the broader picture, we turn in part IV towards the analysis of leisure activities, to 
derive more subtle nuances of attitudes expressed, and the willingness to take action. Here we 
will use participant observations, sources like WhatsApp groups, but also interviews to argue how 
leisure might be able to capture the less visible reasons that might bring people (or deter from) 
becoming active. 
Through the various methods applied, we hope to sketch the complexity, but also the continuity 
between the various forms of mobilization. It is not the intention to imply that all these stages are 
passed through linearly, that they are inevitable or that they will necessarily lead to collective 
action, and if it does, this does not have to be pro-democratic either. Individuals may be at various 
points at the same time, stop at one stage, skip several steps, or go back and forth. By considering 
all these layers of social mobilization, we try to paint a picture, as complete as possible, of the link 
between various characteristics, such as income, ethnicity, age, and gender and the forms of 
mobilization taken. By doing so, we hope to overcome the shortcomings of social mobilization 
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theory, with its tendency to focus mainly on formal organization, and its limited applicability to 
an authoritarian political context as well as the tendency to see a breach between “routine political 
behavior” and social mobilization. 
To do so, we, therefore, look at the position taken by the individuals at various stages, but equally, 
we try to decipher how these stages are embedded within the broader societal and political 
context. As we intend to paint an ethnographic picture as detailed as possible, we will draw on a 
mix of methods. Our approach shall be explained more in detail in the chapter on methodology.
  
4 Uganda as a Relevant Site of 
Fieldwork 
When talking about the middle class in Africa, usually countries like Ghana, Nigeria, North African 
nations, definitely South Africa and Kenya, and sometimes Ethiopia are mentioned. So, why 
choosing Uganda as a site of fieldwork, for a notion that is already contested elsewhere, but 
probably even less applicable here? What makes the “pearl of Africa”, as Winston Churchill has 
called it (a fact that Ugandans like to remind their visitors of), a suitable place to question 
middleclassness? There is an interplay of several factors which turn Uganda into an intriguing 
place of research. First, it turns away the attention from the economic outliers to an average 
performer. Uganda has had steady growth for nearly the last twenty years, conducive, in the 
argument of economists, for the development of a middle class, accompanied by numerous other 
transitions, such as urbanization, connectivity, and educational attainments of the population (see 
chapter 4.1 for more detail). Secondly, the political regime is becoming “increasingly brittle” 
(Barkan, Cooke, & Downie, 2011, p. 4). Ugandans are aware that they have never had a democratic 
(for many equivalent with peaceful) change of leadership since independence and many hope for 
one to happen. The current president, Yoweri K. Museveni came to power in 1986, after a civil 
war. Whereas he had enjoyed a lot of legitimacy in the beginning, after ending years of violence, 
he continuously loses support, especially among the younger population, who do not remember 
the civil war, but only his presidency. Thirdly, and in relation to what has just been said, Uganda 
has the youngest population in the world, and so far, it is not clear whether it can provide the 
educational structures and employment opportunities to accommodate this group (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics, 2012; UNESCO, 2012). Such concurring tendencies offer a stimulating field of 
research to test the notions of an emerging middle class due to emerging wealth and their 
positioning towards a regime that is increasingly less democratic. The youth factor adds even 
more pressure on the system, as young populations are seen more prone to openly protest. 
4.1 Uganda’s Economic Growth: Starting Low, Growing Fast 
Already in 1997, Uganda was rated as one of Africa’s emerging economies (Berthélemy, Söderling, 
Salmon, & Solignac Lecomte, 2002, p. 194). At that time, Uganda has come out of a prolonged 
economic and political crisis, led to a gross national product which, in real terms was in the 1990s 
lower than in 1972 (when Idi Amin took power) or even in 1960 (two years prior to 
independence) (Berthélemy et al., 2002, p. 189). Data is scarce on the years before the NRM took 
power in 1986. Therefore, the macroeconomic analysis concentrates on the time from 1992 up to 
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2016. First, regarding GDP growth, we can observe steady growth over the last twenty years in 
Uganda, even above the sub-Saharan average. 
While there has been a steady improvement of the economic situation in Uganda, much of it was 
due to reconstruction after the civil war (Berthélemy et al., 2002, p. 17), and growth started from 
a very low level. When looking at the change in GDP per capita, assessed in constant 2011 
international $, it becomes evident that Uganda is below the sub-Saharan average. The 
comparison with other low-income countries (LIC) seems more accurately depicting the catch up 
of Uganda in relation to other countries in its income class. 
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So, while there is still a substantial gap of approximately $1500 ppp between Uganda and the 
average of SSA, Uganda has managed to pass the average of low-income countries. However, this 
raises the question whether all Ugandans have profited in equal terms from economic growth, or, 
more importantly, whether lower income groups have profited overproportionately which would 
give more weight to the argument of an emerging middle class. 
 
Figure 4: Income Shares and GINI coefficient (World Development Indicators, 2016) 
Looking at Figure 4, it seems though, that no income group profited more than other income 
groups. The income distribution changed very little over the course of the last 20 years and neither 
did it translate into an equal society. 60% of the population hold approximately 30% of the 
country's income, and the highest 20% account for half of the nation’s wealth. So, while the 
distribution did not change much, it seems that the GDP growth had a similar effect on everyone. 
What this graph cannot tell, is how the total sum of wealth may have increased, thus making even 
the lowest 20% less poor. Here the poverty headcount and the poverty gap are better indicators 
and they do indeed confirm a picture of economic emergence among the poorest. 
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Figure 5: Poverty Headcount and Poverty Gap (World Development Indicators, 2016) 
The total number of poor at the $1.90 ppp poverty level had seen a small decline since the 
beginning of the 2000s. This is even more remarkable because Uganda had a population growth 
of 3.3% over the same period (World Bank, 2016b). Additionally, households with less income on 
average have more children, so we might assume population growth to be even higher among the 
poorest, yet the total poverty headcount declined slightly. The second poverty line, determined as 
$3.10 a day falls $0.90 short of the threshold for the floating class, situated at $4. Here we witness 
a slight increase in the total number, which we can assume to be even bigger if the gap would be 
extended to $4. Thus, these depictions confirm that the floating class did increase. The decline in 
poverty becomes even more visible when looking at the continued, and in the last decade even 
accelerated, reduction of the poverty gap. Hence, even those who are poor (at any of the two 
poverty lines) are not as “deep” in poverty as they used to be, making more transition out of 
poverty likely, if growth continues. In summary, there seems to be indeed some evidence, that the 
floating class in Uganda is on the rise, similar to the interpretations voiced by the AfDB. The 
question remains, however, in how far this overcomes other challenges and qualifies Uganda as a 
middle class country. 
According to the AfDB (2011), Uganda has a middle class of 18.7%, of which 10.6% are part of the 
floating class (thus, its majority). This ranks it on place 27 out of 44 countries for the size of its 
middle class. That is slightly in the lower half, but not substantially. However, as shown above, 
Uganda remains an LIC by World Bank terms. In the wake of the 2016 election, one of Museveni’s 
campaign promises was to turn Uganda into a middle income country by 2020 (Mwesigwa, 2016). 
To do so, it would have to raise its annual GDP per capita from currently $740 to above $1000. 
While some believe this is possible if the country starts earning money from oil sources discovered 
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in the West of Uganda, exploitation officially still has to start, and the changes it will bring to the 
country remain to be seen. Despite becoming or not a MIC, Uganda is currently, and projected to 
remain one of the least developed countries (LDC) (UNCTAD, 2016). While the share of agriculture 
as part of the GDP has declined and those of industry risen, the majority of the GDP is produced in 
the service sector. This again raises the question, whether a class system adequately reflects the 
social structure in Uganda, as the working class remains negligible. Taking into account the small 
percentage of population having a tertiary education or a formal job, it becomes evident that a 
middle class measured with criteria of educational attainment and profession cannot reflect the 
numbers given by the AfDB. We do witness, however, that these numbers are increasing, 
indicating an emergence that goes beyond the income projected by the AfDB. As human capital is 
considered one of the driving factors of economic growth, but with delayed results, it is possible 
that Uganda’s investment in education over the last twenty years will pay off in higher 
productivity and growth rates. Two caveats remain, though: first, there is a need for a structural 
transformation of the economy, as to absorb the increased labor force, and second, human capital 
is only contributing to productivity if not invested into rent-seeking activities (Berthélemy et al., 
2002, p. 109). So, while there have been substantial changes in Uganda in the course of the last 25 
years, as can be seen in the following table 4, challenges to growth remain14. 
Similarly, the Ugandan population is better connected today, the road network is getting denser, 
electricity supply reaches a bigger part of the population, even though it remains a privilege of a 
minority, and mobile phone and internet access have increased. There are more vehicles on 
Uganda’s roads today than in the 1990s, again increasing connectivity between the rural and the 
urban. 
If put in relation to the debate about nascent African middle classes, we can conclude that people 
at least are better off than they were 20 years ago. There is general economic growth, and while 
the income repartition remains nearly the same, it has not led to a rise in inequality, suggesting 
an equal distribution of this newly acquired wealth. In addition, people reach higher educational 
attainments, have better access to infrastructures such as electricity or road networks, and are 
more able to buy consumer goods such as TVs and cars. However, these positive trends should 
not hide the fact that while the growth rates are impressive, these phenomena are not touching 
all Ugandans in the same way, due to the low level of departure. Thus, while a middle income 
stratum might be emerging, it is not touching a majority of the population, and it still does not give 
any indication that it allows us to talk about a “class”. 
                                                 
14 The table was compiled from statistics of the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2016b), the Ugandan 
Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) (2014b, 2016), the Demographic Health Survey (1996), the Human Development Report 
(2015), the Freedom House Index (2015) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (2017). 
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Table 4: Selected Development Indicators, 1991 and 2014 
Population 1991 2014 
Population (Millions) 12.6 34.9 
Urban Population 1.7 6.4 
Urban Population (as % of 
total) 
13.5 18.3 
< 15 years (as % of total) 47.3 47.9 
 
Health   
Total fertility rate (children 
per woman) 
7.1 5.8 
Child Mortality (<5), per 
1000 live births 
162 (1995) 90 (2011) 
Life Expectancy in years 44.6 58.5 
Prevalence of HIV (% of 
population aged 15-49 
13.3 7.1 
 
Education   
Literacy rates (as % of 
population) 
56.1 71 
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No education (as % of 
population) 
27.1 (1995) 18.9 
Educational attainment 
primary 
61.8 (1995) 58.4 
Educational attainment 
secondary 
10.1 (1995) 18.5 
Educational attainment 
tertiary 
N/a 4.3 
 
Wealth   
GDP per capita (constant 
2010 US $)  
309 661 
Median monthly revenue (in 
US $) 
 44 
Agriculture (% of GDP) 52.8 26.7 
Industry (% of GDP) 12.4 21.7 
Services (% of GDP) 34.8 51.6 
Paid Employment (vs. Self-
Employment) 
 47.4 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) 20.3 6.0 
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Infrastructure   
Access to Electricity (% of 
population) 
5.6 20.4 
Internet Penetration 1.1 (2009) 20.7 (2013) 
Mobile Cellular subscriptions  
(per 100 people) 
0 50.4 
Estimated N° of vehicles (in 
‘000) 
50 636 (2011) 
Account at a financial 
institution (% of age 15+) 
20.5 (2011) 27.8 
 
Politics   
Freedom House Partly free (1999) Partly free 
Corruption Perceptions Index  2.71/10 (43 out of 54) 26/100 (142 out of 174) 
Human Development Index 0.308 (1990) 0.483 
 
4.2 A Brief Political History of Uganda 
The aim of this short introduction into the political history and current state of the Ugandan 
regime is to show how the NRM managed to rebuild state structures after a prolonged political 
crisis. It did so by relying on the co-optation of old elites into the new system, but it also managed 
to tighten its control over the state by continuously eroding democratic principles held at the 
beginning of their reign. We witness, therefore, how a regime started with much popular support 
but has increasingly lost legitimacy due to its long hold onto power. 
Uganda as a Relevant Site of Fieldwork 79 
 
4.2.1 Uganda up to 1986 
Historically, Ugandan politics had been for a long time divided along religious, and to a lesser 
extent ethnic lines. Ethnically, the Buganda kingdom, with its well-developed administrative 
structure has been privileged by the British colonialists, employing principally Baganda in the 
colonial administration (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Besides, the economic wealth of the country 
at independence originated mainly from the cash crops coffee and cotton in the South (Twaddle, 
1973, p. 449). Due to the colonial origins, Uganda’s political elite at independence was composed 
of the colonial civil servants from the South, whereas the colonial army had been recruiting 
dominantly among Northerners (Milton Obote’s home region), to restrain the power of the 
Buganda kingdom (Human Rights Watch, 1999). At independence, the British granted a semi-
federal system, whereby the four kingdoms Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole enjoyed some 
federal rights, but all other areas were merely considered as “districts”. De facto, however, only 
Buganda had real federal autonomy (Carbone, 2001, p. 33). 
Religiously, the country had been divided between Anglicans and Catholics, leading to several 
religious wars in the 1890s. Uganda’s first political parties in the wake of independence originated 
from religious divisions between Catholics and Anglicans (Médard, 2003; Twaddle, 1988). Despite 
the former constituting the majority in the country, public offices were predominantly held by the 
latter. Out of protest against this practice, the Democratic Party (DP) was founded in 1954 and 
managed to gain support in areas with a Catholic stronghold, mainly in southern Buganda and 
Catholic northern districts (Carbone, 2001, p. 36). As a result, the party managed to overcome 
regional divisions (especially a north-south divide) but contributed to the politicization of 
religious affiliations (Carbone, 2001, p. 37) as its main adversary emerged shortly after, in 1960: 
the Uganda’s People Congress (UPC). The UPC formed itself in opposition, as a specifically anti-
Buganda, anti-Catholic party (Carbone, 2001, p. 38). 
In 1961 finally kabaka yekka (KY) was founded. The phrase is Luganda and means “the king alone”. 
Conservative Protestant royalists constituted the majority of the party, but the emphasis of their 
loyalty towards the kabaka (the Buganda king) made them gain considerable support among 
Baganda Catholics (Médard, 2003, p. 152 f). 
These cleavages resulted in a divided state at the beginning of the 1960s: 
“In particular, the early pre-eminence of Buganda within processes of state formation 
and development, and the further inculcation of difference along religious lines, left a 
new state that was heavily divided along ethnic and religious lines. This was further 
exacerbated by the limited time that the decolonisation process left for political 
parties to form and organise around genuine national platforms, as opposed to more 
sectarian concerns.” (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013, p. 10) 
To this, one may add a north-south divide, between the prosperous south, with it well-educated 
Baganda elites and the marginalized north, who has mainly served as a reservoir for the colonial 
army and cheap labor in the south (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This marginalization continues 
up to today (Lindemann, 2011). In the elections following independence, KY and UPC formed an 
alliance, united in their anti-Catholic sentiments. The kabaka became the country’s head of state, 
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with the leader of the UPC, Milton Obote, as prime minister. However, tensions in the alliance were 
inherent in their foundation, the former being the party representation of the kingdom and the 
latter created out of the resentment of this kingdom. In the following years, Obote subsequently 
diminished the powers of the king and finally relieved him from his functions in 1966 (Carbone, 
2001, p. 41). He then wrote a new constitution, increasing his powers and declared a state of 
emergency, that led to the abolishment of the traditional kingdoms (in 1967) and the banning of 
all opposition groups (in 1969). From that time on, religious cleavages attenuated, while ethnic 
tensions rose (Médard, 2003, p. 154 f). When General Idi Amin Dada seized power in 1971, by 
exploiting ethnic allegiances in the army, he received widespread support from many Ugandans, 
who had become weary of Obote’s oppressive government (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In the 
next years, however, his popularity eroded, as his reign became increasingly brutal. Ethnic 
cleansing in the army, the expulsion of Asians, and terror against the Ugandan intelligentsia led to 
a rapid disintegration of the state and a severe economic backlash, leaving the country without an 
economic interest group, independent of the state for the accumulation of resources (Golooba-
Mutebi & Hickey, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012; Perrot, 2003, p. 16; Twaddle, 1973, p. 
12). During that time, Ugandan citizens lived not thanks to, but in spite of the state (Perrot, 2003, 
p. 17). In 1973, the scholar Michael Twaddle prophesized, that the Amin regime, while not 
everlasting, may be sustained for some time “[...] so long as Amin […] takes care not to provoke his 
neighbours too far [...]” (Twaddle, 1973, p. 454). Indeed, the regime of Idi Amin eventually came to 
a fall when Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda in 1978, in response to an annexation of the 
Tanzanian Kagera salient. Supported by the Uganda National Liberation Army, an alliance 
between different opposition groups, among them those of Yoweri Museveni and the UPC, the 
Tanzanian army managed to oust Amin, who fled to Saudi Arabia and eventually died there in exile 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999). What followed was a sequence of interim governments and a highly 
disputed election in 1980 that brought Milton Obote back to power. This triggered a civil war from 
1980-1986 to oust Obote and from which, eventually, in January 1986 Yoweri Museveni and his 
National Resistance Army (NRA) would come out as winners (Carbone, 2001, p. 45). 
4.2.2 Co-optation into an Inclusive Government 
When Museveni reached power, “[...] the notion of Uganda as a coherent political entity and the 
idea that the state was a legitimate political force were both heavily damaged during this era, 
beyond repair even to this day in the eyes of some.” (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013, p. 14) Thus, 
Museveni was tackled with the task to rebuild state structures in a failed and divided state. One 
essential element of the reconstruction of order was the abolishment of all political parties, in 
favor of an all-encompassing movement system. The justification for such a system was derived 
from Uganda’s violent past, and the strong presence of communal identities. In the absence of 
economic class differentiation, people would adhere to parties that correspond to their ethnic or 
religious affiliations, and by doing so, these parties would rather foster than transcend communal 
identities (Museveni, 1997, p. 187). The NRA was transformed into the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) and all citizens of Uganda became its members. Political offices were supposed 
to be gained through individual merit, and not through party affiliation. 
Further inclusive steps were the integration of opposing rebel groups into the army, a 
decentralized administrative system, quite advanced for African standards, and the drafting of a 
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new constitution, after a long process of citizen consultations throughout the entire country 
(Odoki, 2014; Perrot, 2003; Therkildsen, 2002). Because they had been a vital support during the 
civil war and represented a significant constituency, Museveni also reestablished the traditional 
kingdoms15 in 1993, to appease the Baganda (Perrot, 2003, p. 235). Such measures can be 
described as “hegemonic quest”, that consists of bringing a relatively stable relationship between 
different dominant groups, old and new elites, and between their regional and ethnic cleavages 
(Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 41). Because a lot of warring factions had to be included in the system, 
a large clientelist network developed. This led, however, to a distinction between being “in the 
government” and “being in power”, with the latter constituting a closed and homogeneous circle 
(Perrot, 2003, p. 136 f). The first ten years of Museveni’s rule have been considered a “success 
story” because he managed to rebuild a functioning state and turned Uganda in one of East Africa’s 
center for stability and economic growth. As a result, Uganda became a “donor darling”, even 
though political party activities had been banned (Barkan et al., 2011, p. 6). While this was 
originally considered only a temporary measure, it was eventually enshrined in the 1995 
constitution, declaring Uganda to be a no-party state. With time, however, this model has become 
increasingly under attack, with critics arguing that Uganda, in fact, is rather a one-party state, due 
to the way the movement operated and dismissing Museveni’s claim that parties created 
sectarianism in a pre-industrial country as “pseudo-Marxist” (Carbone, 2001). Nevertheless, he 
enjoyed considerable support among Ugandans, for bringing stability to Uganda, even though this 
came continuously at the expense of political freedom: 
“The view of the NRM that political parties were largely responsible for Uganda's 
post-independence woes finds strong resonance in the Ugandan population. 
Ugandans suffered greatly under the abusive governments of Idi Amin and Milton 
Obote, and the wish to avoid a return to such a period of abuse is almost universal. 
[…] But while the fear of a return to the turmoil of the past is a legitimate concern for 
many Ugandans, it is also used by the current Ugandan government to justify present 
restrictions.” (Human Rights Watch, 1999) 
Instead of using coercion, the NRM regime tries to limit critics through co-optation. Museveni’s 
politics of a “clientelist political settlement” (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013) has led to a system 
of “inflationary patronage” (Barkan et al., 2011). Obtaining consent from the parliament or 
judiciary and silencing the opposition is becoming increasingly expensive because it is bought 
rather than forced. 
While Uganda initially seemed to be heading for democracy, when Museveni took power, these 
tendencies eroded over time. In the first 15 years, there was a genuine effort to strengthen the 
independence of political institutions, a semi-tolerance for civil society and the attempt for an 
inclusive political system, but since 2001 these approaches to governance have been in decline 
(Barkan et al., 2011, p. 7). The no-party system deteriorated more and more into a one-party state 
(Carbone, 2001), harassment of opposition candidate has increased, and the media and civil 
society organizations are restricted. Thus, in 2012, the International Crisis Group observes that 
                                                 
15 A notable exception provides the kingdom of Ankole, Museveni’s home region, that has not been reestablished, 
allegedly because of pressures by the President, who himself was not in favor of bringing back the kingdoms. 
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“[s]tate policies have created a more personal, patronage-based, executive-centred and military-
reliant regime.” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 1) 
4.2.3 Erosion of Democracy 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, a continued erosion of democracy can be observed, as well as an 
increase in state suppression. This manifest itself mainly in the electoral process, in the widening 
of the mandate of the political executive and the curtailing of civil liberties. Since 2001 elections 
have seen an increasing decline in voter’s participation and an increase in political violence and 
repression (Dufief, 2016, p. 61; Perrot, 2003, p. 408). In the 2001 election, a serious opponent to 
Museveni emerged, in the person of his former ally Kizza Besigye, who challenged his position 
ever since. The government responded to that threat after the election by extending the mandate 
of the executive, to the detriment of the parliament and the courts and broadening their power 
further than what had been foreseen by the constitution of 1995 (International Crisis Group, 2012, 
p. 12). Eventually, in 2005, amidst donor pressure, the constitution was altered, as to allow for 
multipartism while the occasion was equally used to abolish term limits, which would have 
prevented President Museveni from presenting himself in the following election. For some 
observers, the shift to multipartism helped the NRM to regain internal coherence, as it allowed for 
opposing factions within the movement to break away (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013). So, while 
there has been an increase in candidates running for the presidential office, voter’s participation 
has declined – which can be interpreted as a lack of legitimacy (Dufief, 2016). Despite repressions 
of freedom of expression and civil liberties, international observers have judged the elections of 
2001, 2006, and 2011, albeit not fair, as free (Barkan et al., 2011). It has been considered that 
Museveni still benefited from widespread popular support, so that the fraudulent practices, in the 
end, did not change the overall outcome. In the most recent elections in 2016, international 
observers have criticized numerous malpractices in a highly competitive election (EU Election 
Observation Mission, 2016). Official election observers, while critical, have been hesitant to call 
the election outrightly fraudulent16. Restrictions of free speech and assembly curtail important 
civil liberties and, together with increased military control have led to a decline on the Freedom 
House rating from “partly free” to “not free” since 2015 (Freedom House, 2015). The media have 
come increasingly under pressure, with the closing of several media houses following the 
“Buganda riots” in 2009 (see chapter 10.2 for more details), and self-censorship out of fear of 
repression (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010). Nevertheless, Uganda still has a rather vibrant media 
scene, with several private radio and TV stations and print outlets and in general, a critical stance 
towards the government is tolerated (Freedom House, 2015). Since 2006 the civil society had 
been weakened by the “NGO Act 2006”, that augments control over non-governmental 
organizations, and determines whether they are “working in the interest of the country.” (Dufief, 
2016, p. 63) Freedom of assembly has been curtailed through the “Public Order Management Act” 
(POMA) 2013. As a response to the Arab Spring and the following Walk to Work Protests in 2011 
(see chapter 10.3 for more details), the government tightened the regulations for public 
                                                 
16 The EU EOM has just denounced malpractices, and the US Embassy in a press release remarked that “the Ugandan 
people deserved better”. (Toner, 2016) 
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gatherings used for political discussions. The police gained much room for maneuver to determine 
whether these gatherings are in public interest (Freedom House, 2015). 
The events of 2011 most likely increased the authoritarian tendencies. Following the “Arab 
Spring” in North Africa, the Ugandan regime decided to increase militarization, which, in an 
already budget ridden, expensive election year17, led to high inflation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, 
p. 113). High food prices, the example of the revolts in Northern African countries, and the 
discontent of those who considered the elections fraudulent favored the “walk to work” protests 
(more on this see chapter 10.3). It lasted for two months and led to a violent response from the 
state (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 32). Since then, acts curtailing civil liberties have been 
passed, or tightened, such as the NGO Act and the Public Order Management Act. 
Thus, Uganda’s political environment displays characteristics of competitive authoritarianism 
(Kagoro, 2016). Levitsky and Way (2002) describe competitive authoritarianism as regimes in 
which 
“[…] formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of 
obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often 
and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum 
standards for democracy.” (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 52) 
Democratic criteria, such as free and fair elections, political and civil rights, and a government that 
draws on elective authority, rather than military or religious support are frequently disregarded 
in competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 53). As we have seen above, this is the 
case in Uganda. In contrast to full authoritarian regimes, however, there is still some respect for 
democratic principles. 
“Rather than openly violating democratic rules (for example, by banning or 
repressing the opposition and the media), incumbents are more likely to use bribery, 
co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, 
compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort 
cooperative behavior from critics.” (ibid.) 
Elections are still competitive, even with a substantial advantage for the incumbent, and the 
judiciary, legislative and media have some room for maneuver. As detailed in the paragraphs 
above, this holds equally true for Uganda. 
Hence, the context of competitive authoritarianism, where critics are either harassed or bought 
off, and demonstrations restricted and framed as a cause of violence and a threat to social 
harmony (Tangen, 2012), has an essential influence on the political opportunity structures for 
social mobilization, and will thus likely determine how political activities by citizens are carried 
out. While there might be reasons for dissatisfaction and a wish for more democracy, the context 
                                                 
17 Elections were held in February 2011. 
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itself is not conducive for groups to openly take action in demanding democratization, as has been 
suggested by the literature establishing a positive link between democracy and middle class. 
4.3 The Ugandan Middle Class 
Despite the economic growth Uganda has witnessed, references to a Ugandan middle class are 
sparse and are often voiced regarding its absence. We have already touched upon the historical 
dimensions of the middle class in Africa (see chapter 2.2.2), and similar observations can be made 
about a Ugandan middle class. In his analysis of class formation in Uganda for example, Mamdani 
ascribes the petty bourgeoisie, comprised of civil servants, traders and rich peasants a critical role 
in opposition to the colonial government: 
“The social forces that coalesced in this historic and mass opposition to the colonial 
order included various interests, some of which were in harmony only over the short 
run: bureaucrats upset about racial discrimination in pay scales, cash-crop farmers 
full of resentment against ginners and state marketing boards […], traders demanding 
an end to state-protected monopoly privileges, and urban workers demanding better 
wages. What was later called a ‘nationalist’ movement was in fact a coalition of 
groups, each with its own specific interest.” (Mamdani, 1976, p. 148) 
In his analysis, Mamdani pointed already at the diverging interests between the very diverse 
factions of what he described as the petty bourgeoisie. However, he also points out the limitations 
for the development of shared consciousness. Thus, the political actions of the rich peasants, the 
kulaks, which came from the Buganda kingdom, were mainly motivated by ethnic concerns, 
whereas the petty traders developed their consciousness in opposition to those of Indian traders, 
which was above all a national one (Mamdani, 1976, pp. 175, 204). Besides, they diverged 
considerably in terms of wealth (ibid. p. 228). From these groups, the governing elites at 
independence emerged (ibid.). However, precisely of the diverging interests, namely between the 
government bureaucracy and the other groups, tensions heightened. They resulted in the coup 
d’état led by Idi Amin; thanks to an alliance between the African petty bourgeoisie, with an 
organizational base, but without a class organization that would allow them to take political action 
and the army who made up for these deficiencies (Mamdani, 1976, p. 294). The expulsion of the 
Indian commercial and petty bourgeoisie can then be seen as another step in advancing the 
political benefits of the petty bourgeoisie. Thus, in his analysis, Mamdani ascribes the driving force 
for political change to the African petty bourgeoisie, but also mentions its limitation, due to its 
internal, fragmented nature. Moreover, the political and economic instability of his regime 
weakened further the petty bourgeoisie (Monteith, 2016, p. 129). With the neo-Marxist analysis 
of the Ugandan class structure around the time of independence and the relevance ascribed to the 
petty bourgeoisie, Mamdani follows the thinking of writers like Fanon or Cabral (Kasfir, 1984), 
other writings on what could be considered a Ugandan middle class remained sparse. And, as 
Darbon & Toulabor (2011) or Lentz (2016) have pointed out, such a description actually could be 
used interchangeably with a post-independent elite. 
In the 1990s the category seemed to have lost further relevance. In his critique of the IMF 
programs implemented in the 1980s, Mamdani attributes the decline of the urban wage earners 
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to the structural adjustments imposed, at the cost of working people (instead of the propertied 
class) (Mamdani, 1990b). 
In the discourse held by Museveni, himself on repeated accounts highlighted the absence of a 
middle class. 
“Sectarianism is a consequence of an incomplete social metamorphosis. In other 
countries, society has been changing continually […]. Now Europe is again basically a 
two-class society, of the middle and working class. […] The problem with Africa is that 
not only has its society not metamorphosed, it has actually regressed.” (Museveni, 
1997, p. 187f) 
By doing so, he justified the no party rule of the NRM government as parties would only promote 
sectarianism along the lines of region and religion, instead of representing class interests 
(Carbone, 2001, p. 16). Images of a middle class society are also evoked to legitimate policies done 
in the interest of “development” (see p. 195). Turning Uganda into a middle income country has 
also been among the visions set for 2017 then changed to 2020 (to be a lower middle income 
country) or 2032 (as an upper middle income country). Such an economic development is a legacy 
he wants to build before leaving power (BBC, 2016; Mulangwa, 2013; Mwesigwa, 2016; National 
Planning Authority, 2013, p. 27). The current absence of a middle class has also been brought 
forward as one of the reasons that the Arab Spring did not propagate to Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi, 
2012; The Observer, 2012). 
Finally, the category is one that has for Ugandans, as elsewhere in Africa (see Darbon, 2018, p. 39), 
little meaning. Most Ugandans would not consider themselves to be middle class. In their Poverty 
Status Report of 2014, the Uganda Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MoFPED) took up the class label as well. Their statistical definition put someone as middle class 
if they had a consumption twice above the poverty line, and as insecure non-poor if their 
consumption was above the poverty line, but not twice as much (Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development, 2014, p. 6). They conclude that: 
“[…] nearly 80 percent of those households classified as insecure non-poor and 56 
percent of the middle class classify themselves as either very poor or poor. 42.8 
percent of the middle class judge themselves as being neither poor nor rich.” (Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2014, p. 25) 
So, while present in some earlier literature, the middle class category is remarkably absent from 
recent discussions about Ugandan societal structure, which is not surprising given the inherent 
contradictions discussed earlier. It is more of an aspirational image, modeling living standards 
and consumption patterns of Western countries, rather than an inherently felt affiliation. 
*** 
In this chapter, we have tried to sketch the recent economic and political context in which Uganda 
evolves. We have seen that there is indeed a group economically emerging among the poor that 
could be considered a floating class, to use the terms of the AfDB, even though the country is not 
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among the big economic achievers that are usually mentioned in relation to the African middle 
class. This allows for a nuanced questioning in how far the middle class label is appropriate to 
describe that economic emergence just mentioned. Through observations and questions, we can 
analyze how living conditions, efforts to mitigate economic vulnerability, increasing options for 
choice affect “doing being middle class” (Lentz, 2016). We have also seen that in the past 32 years 
of the NRM regime the country has become increasingly authoritarian and the popular support 
the president enjoyed for the first decade is continuously waning. This noticeable decline of 
democracy allows for a second interrogation, whether now these middle income groups become 
active in one way or another, or at least form opinions that would provide an ideological ground 
for demands of democracy
  
5 Methodology 
“For me, therefore, it is central to any argument about ‘middle class politics’ to show 
that a middle class (or classes) existed as a self-conscious collectivity, to identify its 
specific forms of political activity, and to explain their genesis and development in 
terms of its class situation however class is conceived. Otherwise, middle class 
becomes nothing more than a residual category and so of no analytical interest to 
either the historian or the social scientist.” (Nossiter, 1978, p. 72 f) 
This quote by Nossiter adequately guides us in our own research questions. It highlights two 
central points: to see whether such a middle class exists as a self-conscious collectivity (and, if 
applicable, how this class situation has developed) and to identify whether specific forms of 
political activity exist. Bearing in mind the doubts we have raised concerning the adequacy of the 
“middle class” label, discussed in chapter 2.3 we suggest talking about the middle income groups, 
with an income of $2-$20 per day and living in a predominantly urban setting. 
5.1 Research Questions 
From the conceptual challenges laid out in the first two chapters in this section, we come to the 
following research questions: 
I. How do recent economic transformations foster the development of a self-conscious 
collectivity among Ugandans within a shared income range? 
We will answer this question by referring to macroeconomic statistics and connecting them to a 
detailed description of our study population in Uganda. We aim to understand better who these 
people are that we are talking about while avoiding evoking the preconceptions that are usually 
tied to the notion “middle class” (Lemanski, 2017). We speak of middle income groups instead of 
classes as the development of the self-conscious collectivity is the question that needs to be 
answered affirmatively first. We will draw on the use of questionnaires, narrative interviews, 
economic and demographic statistics on Uganda, and broad-based surveys such as the 
Afrobarometer or World Value Surveys (WVS). 
Considering the literature on the link between middle classes and political mobilization, we 
inquire about the forms of mobilization pursued by these income groups. Hence, in relation to the 
first research question, our second one asks: 
II. How do these middle income groups cope with the political regime? What forms of 
mobilization exist? Can we identify specific forms of political activity that can be linked to 
their commonly shared income range? 
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We answer this question by looking at forms of formal political mobilization: party participation, 
voting, demonstrations, etc. However we acknowledge that the focus on formal political 
mobilization neglects other vital aspects of social interaction (see chapter 3.4). Therefore, we 
equally consider here other forms of social mobilization, which might fit less neatly theories of 
social movements but focus on everyday contentious action and the politique par le bas, individual 
attitudes and values, and leisure behavior. And again, we try to explain these actions in connection 
with class identity, income, and also other factors. How do political consciousness and 
mobilization change with rising income? If it is the poorest who are the easiest to be mobilized, 
how does this change when revenues are rising? Is more at stake? Less? How are actions linked 
to an increase in education? The value of looking at choices of pastime activity relies on its 
revelation about the preferences individuals set and these, in return, shape their identities and 
beliefs. 
The aim of the study is not to predict or refuse the likelihood of a future mobilization of these 
middle income groups against or in favor of the regime. As Lipset already pointed out: “The record 
of social scientists as futurologists is not good.” (Lipset, 1994, p. 17) It is rather a contribution to 
the critique of an overly simplified debate on the middle class as backbone of democracy. This 
thesis intends to paint a more nuanced picture, of what it means to be in the middle income groups 
and refute simple dichotomies of such a heterogeneous category in pro- or contra democracy 
supporters, made on the basis more of wishful thinking and ideological assumptions, rather than 
rigorous analysis. 
5.2 In the Field 
We have spent in total seven months in Kampala, Uganda’s capital. The fieldwork was 
repartitioned among three different stays, all with a specific focus, which changed as the research 
questions evolved. The reasons for choosing Uganda are detailed in chapter 4, but we also decided 
to narrow our focus down to only one city. As a result, it is not possible to highlight differences 
and particularities between different regions in Uganda, or also between urban, semi-urban or 
rural areas. We chose to accept these shortcomings, though, because of several reasons. First, 
conducting research in several locations would have meant to increase the time spent in the field 
substantially. There would have been the need to get acquainted once more with a new 
environment, to gain the trust of interviewees and learn about the specific local and historical 
conditions. It is certainly worthwhile to do so, as different settings might reveal particular 
characteristics of the different income groups. For example, we assume that the post-war 
emergence in northern Uganda will follow different dynamics than those of Kampala, and it must 
be interesting to single these out. But, and that brings us to the second point, it limits the 
comparability between the cases. Johnston & Abreu (2016) remind us that asset indexes as 
markers of economic stratification should only be used in a limited geographical location and over 
a short time span, and this applies to other markers of economic emergence as well. Wealth, or its 
counterpart poverty, are very context specific and multidimensional and must be understood it 
its local specificities. In addition, the rural-urban divide in many developing countries is so 
pronounced, leading to changing signs of “privilege”. Therefore, for Kampala residents’ access to 
electricity or piped water will be less of a marker of social distinction than for people living in 
rural areas. On the other hand, homeownership will be a privilege, whereas most rural inhabitants 
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occupy their own dwellings. Kampala is also the economic hub of Uganda, home to the ministries, 
a large part of the service sector and various forms of employment (formal or informal), contrary 
to the prevalence of subsistence agriculture in rural regions. Studies on the middle class have often 
underlined its urban character (Ayoki, 2012; Huntington, 1972, p. 290; Ncube et al., 2011), as well 
as their non-agricultural employment. Both reasons make us expect to find the most significant 
part of the Ugandan middle income groups in Kampala. Because of the economic opportunities it 
can offer, Kampala attracts rural migrants from all parts of the country. Therefore, we can expect 
to find a higher ethnic diversity here than anywhere else. Such exposure might help to create 
identities that go beyond ethnic affiliation, and it allows us to explore in how far a wealth-related 
identity may replace an ethnic one. Finally, because of the tendency to send young children to 
rural regions, and for elderly to return to their home villages, our target group of people in a 
working age should be overrepresented. All these reasons convince us to assume that Kampala is 
the most relevant site of fieldwork for us in Uganda. 
5.2.1 May-June 2012: Questionnaires and Political Attitudes 
This first stay in Uganda was part of the master’s thesis and of a project at the LAM research 
institute. The intention was to research and compare middle classes, inspired by the AfDB 
definition, in several African countries, as well as their influence on the political stability in the 
country. The basis was a standard questionnaire designed by the research group and applied to 
all countries. This questionnaire was, in the Ugandan case, supplemented by more narrative 
questions, in the form of semi-structured interviews to learn about the views of these identified 
middle classes on political and societal issues in Uganda, as well as their confidence in institutions, 
the opposition, and formal political mobilization. The questionnaire (see annex 1, pp. 352) had 
been used throughout all three field stays. However, in the last two periods, the questions had 
mainly been coded from the narrative answers given by respondents, instead of being gathered in 
a survey style manner, as it has been in the first case. During that period, a total of 70 interviews 
had been conducted, mostly as interviewer-administered questionnaires, but in 15 cases as self-
administered questionnaires. Discussing the questionnaire with the respondent would take about 
30 minutes. In 40 cases the questionnaire was then followed by the more in-depth interviews, of 
which 35 had been transcribed for analysis. The remaining five had been impacted by 
comprehension difficulty between the interviewer and the respondent, by several omissions of 
questions, or by apparent contradictions, so that the validity of the responses could not be 
assured. The length of this part of the interviews would vary considerably, between 20 minutes 
and two hours. Most of these parts, however, would be between 20 and 40 minutes. In the cases 
where the researcher would fill out the questionnaire together with the respondents, the 
interview was recorded from the beginning. However, as the recording of this part is for our 
purpose only little more revealing than the questionnaire itself, transcription usually starts with 
the question on political party membership, at a point where the respondents would typically 
start to talk more freely and extensively. Thus, this first fieldwork was aimed at providing an 
answer for the specific characteristics of the Ugandan middle class (this label, despite its 
shortcoming was used during the master’s thesis) and their political attitude and action. 
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5.2.2 July-October 2014: Emergence, Leisure, and Religious Bodies 
Having concluded from the first field data that the middle income groups mainly choose to abstain 
from political action, this second stay was guided by an entirely different focus, namely by the 
question of what they do instead. A second question revolved around the trajectories of 
emergence. Through extended, narrative interviews the respondents would discuss their 
upbringing, personal challenges and how they have overcome them, their current life and living 
situation, values. To answer the first question, a strong emphasis was also put on their free time 
activities18. What does their preference reveal about their values and identities? Can we expect to 
find particular forms of leisure that are tied to a particular income? Because of the anonymous 
nature of the first round of interviews, new participants were selected this time19, with an effort 
to balance between different income groups, age, and gender. In total, 23 narrative interviews 
have been conducted, and all recorded (with the consent of the interviewee). The interviews 
usually lasted between 2-3 hours and had all been transcribed for analysis. Because of the focus 
on pastime activities, we have made an effort to join Ugandans in their leisure after having them 
describe their activities extensively. This turned out to be a very challenging task because of 
several entry barriers. First, it turned out to be quite complicated to attend the various meetings: 
they are not held frequently, respondents would often state that they are part of a certain 
association but that they have not been there for months, others have not taken place at all during 
the time of the research or have been continuously postponed. Second, some of them are very 
personal meetings, and the respondents would be hesitant to allow a stranger to attend, and third, 
most of these, especially the personal meetings, would be held in a local language. The 
researcher’s presence often altered the nature of the meeting decisively, making participant 
observation more difficult, because of the status as the guest of honor. 
In total, research participation in the gathering of five different groups took place, some several 
times, others only once (see chapter 14). Information on other leisure activities was obtained 
through the descriptions of the interviewees. Additionally, 14 expert interviews have been 
conducted with leading representatives of religious bodies in Uganda, as well as several members 
of parliament, to understand the link between religion and the regime in Uganda. During this 
second stay much of the primary data from the statistical office, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
(UBOS) had been collected, through several visits to their headquarters, and research in their 
library. Finally, observations and informal discussions that we considered relevant for the 
analysis have been noted in a file, compiling miscellaneous notes, quotes, or observations 
collected “on the go”. 
5.2.3 January-February 2017: Who is a Participant of Protest? 
That last stay again had a binary focus, on leisure and political protest. In an attempt to push 
harder for information about leisure activities, and to participate in as many as possible, a specific 
leisure questionnaire (see annex 9, pp. 481) was designed and disseminated through the mailing 
lists of the Young Leadership Alumni Forum of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), and the Pan 
                                                 
18 Here, no particular definition of free time was given to the respondents, to see how they would frame it. 
19 For details on the sampling process see 5.3. 
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African Club. The responses were disappointing, though, for several reasons. One, the low turnout 
rate: of about 600 emails contacted, 18 filled out the survey, yielding a 3% response rate. Of these 
questionnaires, 12 people left a contact option for a follow-up interview, and seven follow-up 
interviews were realized. In the follow-up interview, the leisure was combined with the 
questionnaire already used during the first and second field stay, to integrate them in the data 
pool. This led to the second disappointment: the follow-up interviews took up questions already 
asked in the leisure survey but yielded very different responses – in one extreme case the number 
of children one respondent stated to have differed between the internet survey and the 
interviewer-administered questionnaire. In conclusion, this confirmed the choice for a more 
laborious and less representative qualitative study, but with more accurate data, as it was created 
in the interaction between the researcher and the respondent. 
Finally, the third disappointment came with the unfulfilled hopes of more possibilities to 
participate in leisure activities of these Ugandans. While respondents were asked more 
information on the type of activities they pursued, this yielded only in one concrete offer for the 
researcher to participate, but which eventually never took place during our stay. Because the 
sample group was already biased, and the results neither added additional insight nor could they 
be used to corrected skewed responses (overrepresentation of young male respondents), they 
were eventually not included in the data used for SPSS analysis. 
More satisfactory results were gained through interviewing political activists. As the previous 
research has shown, most people would not participate in political mobilization. Therefore, this 
time we tried to answer the question the other way around, by wondering who would participate, 
and under what motives? What were the different mobilizations about, who would constitute the 
core of the participants? This question was enlarged, to not only encompass mobilization and 
political activists but to ask more broadly: what do people do to get their interest taken care of? 
Hence, other groups, such as market vendor associations, transport sector representatives, or 
teachers’ unions have equally been included. As a result, a total of 46 interviews had been 
conducted, with 30 expert interviews, the aforementioned seven interviews based on the leisure 
survey, and nine questionnaire interviews with low income people, to balance our data towards 
the lower end. This time, not all interviews have been recorded, and of those with a record, not all 
have been transcribed. This was reserved for the expert interviews that revealed the most 
relevant. For the remaining expert interviews, content summaries were made. In other cases, only 
relevant quotes were retained. 
5.3 The Data 
Hence, in total, 153 interviews were conducted, containing 44 expert interviews and 109 middle 
income group interviews. 12 others were excluded from the analysis, due to doubt on their 
reliability. Because of the different foci of the stays in Uganda, the reader will find that, depending 
on the section in the following analysis, some parts draw more on one set of interviews and 
another on a very different set. Each person has been assigned a pseudonym, and in case of the 
expert interviews, their functions were mentioned. In the annex (see annexes 4 and 5, pp. 366) a 
list with all interviews and some basic biographic data, or in case of the experts, their institutional 
affiliation can be found. It equally lists the pseudonyms used, as well as the year of the official 
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interview and a reference number for each interviewee, which is also used in the references of the 
coded categories (see annexes 6 and 7, pp. 417). 
Secondly, since the same questionnaire was maintained throughout the three rounds of data 
collection, but altered in between, the number of relevant answers collected sometimes varies in 
between the questions. To maintain coherence when presenting the data, we mainly chose a 
representation as percentage of answers given, instead of total numbers. This is not to conceal the 
small number of our sample and imply statistical representativeness, which is not given, but 
rather to contribute to the readability of the work. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the 
nature of this work is qualitative and hence no statistical projections for the entire population can 
be made. The challenges of quantitative data collection, of which we gathered a short glimpse 
through the self-administered internet questionnaires confirmed us in this approach, even though 
it has its trade-offs. Through the repeated inquiry we were able to learn about the sporadic 
attendance of activities mentioned in the leisure surveys, and we were able to detect better blatant 
contradictions. Instead of merely validating hypotheses we were able to reiterate and refine the 
research questions that led us through our fieldwork. As we have shown before, it is precisely the 
distortion that came through quantification that has led to the questionable validity of the middle 
class concept in the Ugandan context and its perceived linkages with democracy in general. 
One of the serious shortcomings of the data is the insufficient triangulation: because the 
researcher knew few of the respondents beforehand and because most interviews have been 
conducted in public places, the workplace of the respondent or the office of the FES, no 
opportunity had been available to cross-check the answers with other people knowing the 
respondents, with what has been said at a different time, or to take the interior of the houses into 
consideration, for example. That means the analysis relies mainly on what respondents said in the 
interview setting, decreasing the validity of the data. To overcome this shortcoming, we 
triangulate for coherence between respondents in similar living conditions, but we also try to rely 
as much as possible on literature on research in similar environments (for example Bornschein, 
2009; Kroeker, 2016; Nallet, 2015; Neubert & Stoll, 2015) and primary sources such as newspaper 
articles, WhatsApp groups, advertisement, internet forums, and the like. 
The data was collected through a snowball sampling method (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, 
& Namey, 2005): first contacts with people were established either in public places like the street, 
public transport, the university, etc., or through personal connections, either with the help of the 
staff at FES, through the family that hosted us during the several stays or through the 
neighborhood in which the researcher was residing. Once an interview was conducted, the 
interviewee was asked to name a few other people who could be willing to answer the same 
questions. This referral usually worked well. Because we assume that people would refer us to 
friends with similar backgrounds (gender, age, income, education) we tried to keep the “entry 
points” of the first contact diverse, by approaching males as well as females, younger or older 
people, etc. Despite these efforts, the dataset is biased towards males aged between 26-35 years, 
educated up to tertiary education. The data bias, however, is discussed in more detail in chapter 
0. 
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5.3.1 The Questionnaire and Its Analysis 
As already mentioned, the original questionnaire was elaborated concertedly in the research 
group on Middle Classes in Africa of the LAM. In its original version, the researcher had little 
influence, as it was developed prior to our joining the group. However, through getting to know 
better the Ugandan context, some questions were paraphrased, answer categories added or 
withdrawn, and some questions left uncoded. Its final version is attached in the annex 1 (see p. 
352). Usually, the questionnaire was filled out in an interviewer-administered interview, thus 
enhancing the quality and amount of information given (see Bowling, 2005). However, it would 
make the interviewing process more time intensive and prone to interviewer bias, as the presence 
of the interviewer (always the researcher herself) most likely influenced the responses given by 
the respondents (Bowling, 2005). The interviews were done as conversational interviews, 
allowing for individually adapted narrative elements that would enhance the comprehension of 
the respondent (Conrad & Schober, 2000). If recorded, the parts of the interviews that would be 
used to fill out the survey usually would not be transcribed, as they were mainly oriented by the 
structure of the questionnaire. The questionnaire would then be coded and analyzed using SPSS. 
Because of the small sample size, the analysis would remain descriptive, and we abstain from 
inferential statistics. Instead, we focus on illustration in most cases. We acknowledge to be guilty 
of using the generated statistics in Jerven’s words “as a drunk uses a lamppost – for support, not 
illumination” (Jerven, 2016, p. 345). Since we do not aim at statistical inference, but rather 
description, we believe this fault can be forgiven. 
5.3.2 The Narrative Interviews and Qualitative Content Analysis 
The interviews focusing on the political attitudes, and the personal life trajectories and living 
situations left much more open space for narrative answers. The researcher deliberately tried to 
reduce her own interactions, while still maintaining a communication situation that would make 
the respondent feel at ease and not like they were being interrogated. An interview guideline did, 
however, exist in the first two fieldworks, which decisively structured the interviews. Whereas 
the first interviews each time had been more narrative, the researcher very quickly followed the 
interview structure given through the guideline, unless the respondent initiated a topic by 
themselves, turning it into quite directive interviews. This was due to the precise data needed, 
such as demographic questions, biographical ones on the personal life trajectories, income, living 
conditions, values, and political opinions. Hence, we have become a victim of the “interview guide 
line bureaucracy” (Rosenthal, 2011, p. 143), that made it increasingly difficult to detach our focus 
from the guidelines and be more open to the categories mentioned by the respondents 
themselves. Thus, we relied very much on categories established beforehand. The expert 
interviews had been more open in their structure, as each interview would be adapted to the 
expert to be consulted. After familiarizing ourselves with the particular topic at hand and doing 
some background reading, some general questions were marked. The interview, however, was 
much structured through the answers given by the expert, that would lead to new questions on 
the side of the interviewer. Therefore, these interviews have each a very individual structure, 
revealing very particular information. 
Most of these interviews have been transcribed, in some cases only interview summaries were 
established. Regardless of the extensiveness of the transcription, however, they have then been 
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subjected to qualitative content analysis (QCA). This has been done without the help of specific 
content-analysis software but through mostly inductive coding. The coding process aims at 
 
Figure 6: Schematic Process of QCA (Berg 2001, p.240; Mayring 2010, p. 68) 
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condensing complex textual material, such as field notes, interview transcripts, but also 
newspaper articles, etc. into units that can be processed for analysis (Berg, 2001, p. 238). 
Here we follow an approach of compression and inductive construction of categories. It serves to 
systematize text components in a category system, to evaluate the categories according to the 
context, to make statements about their frequency and to deduce their importance (Mayring, 
2010, p. 63). The intention is “[...] to reduce the material in a way that the relevant content remains, 
but to create a corpus via abstraction, that is easy to grasp but nevertheless remains a reflection of 
the original material.”20 (Mayring, 2010, p. 65). This usually involves a process including several 
steps (see Figure 6): after data is turned into text, codes are derived from this data, either 
predefined or inductively developed during the analysis. Depending on the quantity of the 
material, this can be done several times by consistently reducing the material through 
paraphrasing or in a single step. In the end, the assigned codes should give rise to new categories, 
and the material is sorted according to these categories. Recurrent patterns, relationships, 
commonalities or differences are identified and eventually triangulated with already existing 
research and theories, and generalizations are made (Berg, 2001, p. 240). 
We chose themes as our units of analysis, and hence analyzed the interviews according to passages 
relating to one topic. From there we deduced the codes that seemed suitable to use. As already 
mentioned, since some questions asked were quite directive, in these cases the codes chosen were 
close to the theme of the question. In other cases, however, new codes evolved out of the 
responses given. The codes were categorized in two ways: for one, summarized sheets for each 
person were established, containing their condensed information on two to three pages, 
according to the previously defined codes. We would equally establish category sheets, where all 
responses made by interviewees concerning a specific category were cross-referenced, including 
relevant citations. Finally, for a better overview, a spreadsheet was made, listing all codes on the 
horizontal, and all respondents on the vertical axis, allowing for a quick referencing on particular 
issues. Additionally, if possible, we turned the narrative answers into coded answers of the 
questionnaire, to include them in the statistical processing. The coded categories and the 
spreadsheet are equally referenced in the annex (p. 417). By doing so, we hope to pursue a 
systematic approach to our data processing, increasing the validity of our data and allowing for 
others to retrace the generation of our findings. 
5.3.3 Participant Observation 
To complement the information given by the respondents, participant observation is a valuable 
tool to reveal contradictions between what individuals say and what they do (Mack et al., 2005, p. 
13). We included participant observation in our research in two ways. First, we observed 
everyday life, held informal discussions, eavesdropped in the public transport, etc. We do 
acknowledge, however, that our mere presence, as unobtrusive as we tried to be, would impact 
the activities observed around us. In this case, recording would be rather unsystematic, usually as 
                                                 
20 „Ziel der Analyse ist es, das Material so zu reduzieren, dass die wesentlichen Inhalte erhalten bleiben, durch 
Abstraktion einen überschaubaren Corpus zu schaffen, der immer noch Abbild des Grundmaterials ist.“ [own 
translation] 
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entries in the field journal, but, if possible, included in the coded categories of the QCA. Most 
actively, participant observation was applied during the participation in leisure activities of the 
respondents. This time, more systematically notes were taken during the activity (as far as 
possible), describing the setting, the number, and characteristics of the people participating, 
themes discussed, moments or statements that provoked a common reaction within the group. 
These notes have equally been subjected to the analysis and serve the general arguments made.  
*** 
While qualitative research methods sometimes are reproached for being too subjective, and thus 
non-scientific, they still contribute significantly to the social understanding of reality (Berg, 2001, 
p. 2). This is not to argue for the superiority of qualitative over quantitative methods, but to 
suggest instead a new view on a topic often approached through quantitative, macroeconomic 
measures (bear in mind, that a quantitative, micro approach is equally possible and carried out by 
some scientists (see M. Chen & Goodman, 2013). By rendering the process of data gathering and 
processing as transparent as possible, we hope to “objectify” the data, and even though we are far 
from any statistical representativeness, nevertheless, to make valid generalizations through our 
qualitative interviews and observations. By doing so, we intend to advance the understanding of 
the complex realities of middle income groups and their forms of social mobilization.
  
Part II:  
The Middle Income Groups in 
Uganda 
This section aims at providing a thorough description of the characteristics, livelihoods, and 
demographics of our sample, to test the middle class label and the characteristics commonly 
referred to. We have already covered the shortcomings of the term middle class and the challenges 
of common contemporary middle class definitions (see chapter 2). We also bear in mind calls for 
a class analysis (Melber, 2013) or a more qualitative description of life situation on grounds, that 
transgress pure macroeconomic analysis – a necessary task if one wants to give meaning to the 
numbers (Jerven, 2016). By doing so, we hope to move perceptions away from a normative idea 
of how a middle class ought to be to how people who consider themselves as neither rich nor poor 
actually live in an African country like Uganda. We have shown that the depiction of the “African 
middle class” is equally misleading as the one of Africa as a continent of gloom. The middle class 
meme has been called into question in recent years, precisely because the living conditions of 
those that should be middle class did not seem to concur with how scholars expected a middle 
class to live. However, we should not throw out the baby with the bath water. We do indeed 
witness a group of people that are better off than substantial parts of the population (especially 
those that are living in rural areas) and sometimes even as their parents. It is doubtful, though, 
whether the description as “class” would be the most suitable. We, therefore, provide a detailed 
description of our sample. In chapter 6 we cover their demographics, their income, age, gender, 
household composition, profession, religion, origin, and education. Regarding these descriptions, 
we will evoke the possibilities of other prominent identities, that may go along or concur with one 
derived from a shared socio-economic status. In the chapter 7 we try to single out some recurrent 
characteristics, which were decisive for the economic and social emergence of the respondents. 
Chapter 8 will then look at their consumption and expenditure behavior, in areas as diverse as 
food, education, housing, transport, and finance. In our conclusion, we engage in some reflection 
on how the different dispositions give rise to different socioeconomic positions and whether the 
deriving shared life chances are sufficient to call these groups “classes” through the development 
of a shared identity.

  
6 Demographics of the Study 
Population 
Society can be structured along different lines. Here we look at some of the most important 
aspects, that may provide equally some explanations to varying attitudes and behavior. Among 
these lines, income is the most frequent characteristic studied in structuring class affiliation. But 
such an approach relies on mere income strata and does not per se imply a homogeneity in 
behavior and attitude. Other important factors are the education of a person, but also their age. 
Finally, in a country like Uganda with strong regional and ethnic identities, and limited social 
mobility, the origin of a person plays a role in a double sense: their geographic and ethnic origin, 
as well as the social position of the parents, are decisive in their trajectories. Thus, in the first part, 
we make a mere description of our sample and in the second part, we advance some analysis on 
persistent identities in addition to income. 
6.1 The Composition of the Sample 
Here we situate our sample in the context of national and urban statistics. We want to draw the 
attention once more to the fact that the sample is not statistically representative, but in the line of 
qualitative approaches, we believe that the observations made will still help us to draw 
conclusions. Albeit this is not a clear-cut separation, in the first part, which is merely descriptive, 
we look at income, sex, age, religion, and region. In the second, we already advance some analysis 
about these demographic aspects, with the intention in mind to show that there is not one shared 
“middle class” identity, but rather a mix of persistent identities which can be simultaneously or 
subsequently evoked. 
6.1.1 Income 
Income is probably the most popular form of structuring class affiliation (E. O. Wright, 1979). In 
our analysis, we use income as well to divide the sample into the subgroups as proposed by the 
AfDB. In careful inquiry and with several probes we tried to determine the household income of 
the interviewed person as accurate as possible. Then we divided the figure by the number of 
people living in the household and, according to the money available to each person, we would 
classify the household into the subgroups of Poor, Floating Class (FC), Lower Middle Class (LMC), 
Upper Middle Class (UMC) and Upper Class (UC). This would yield the following income 
distributions: 
Income per person in $  
Subcategory Per day Per month 
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Poor 0-2 0-60 
FC 2-4 61-120 
LMC 4-10 121-300 
UMC 10-20 301-600 
UC >20 >600 
Table 5: Income by Subcategory 
We acknowledge several methodological caveats with the data: 
 The income is not weighted according to household members. It is widely known that not 
every household member uses the same share of the income. Fix costs such as rent, 
electricity, or water will not increase proportionally with every person entering a 
household. Hence, usually equivalence scales are used, with less value assigned to every 
person following the first adult. Even if this is desirable, this adjustment cannot be made 
to our data, since we did not inquire about the age of every household member. 
Additionally, non-permanent members, such as relatives staying during the school 
holidays (or, inversely, during the trimester) or household helpers may not be counted in 
the same manner. Alber (2016a) points out that the household size is subject to variations, 
as it is rather the norm than the exception for middle class households to take in some 
relatives or foster children. As a result, economic heterogeneity even within the same 
household is common; a reality in stark contrast to the assumption inherent to statistical 
observations based on household data, which assumes an income homogeneity within the 
same household (Alber, 2016a, p. 188). Using household income and dividing it by 
household members to determine the subclass is a shortcoming we acknowledge. Thus, 
we bear in mind that our income stratification is a rough categorization and should only 
be taken as an estimate. However, in itself the sample is coherent. Nevertheless, 
triangulation with other characteristics, such as education, living conditions, etc. is 
inevitable. 
 The income is not converted to US $ ppp. Instead, we maintained the same conversion rate 
of 2500 UGX per dollar throughout the findings. This was the approximate conversion rate 
in 2012 and 2014. Between 2015 and 2016 the dollar has increased, leading to a 
conversion of approximately 3500 UGX per dollar. Hence, our data cannot be easily 
compared across nations and time, but in our sample consistency remains given. Ayoki 
(2012) has used the same conversion rate for his discussion of the Ugandan middle class, 
which confirms our choice as a reasonable one in the country-specific context. 
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 There is also the risk of misreporting income. Since some income types are not regular and 
hard to foresee, such as earnings from harvest or unexpected money earned with 
brokerage and consultancy, respondents would only give these figures after several 
probes and sometimes by giving rough estimates. Similarly, because many couples have 
separated bank accounts (see chapter 8.5), not everyone was aware of the earnings of 
their spouse. Finally, some respondents might have deliberately chosen not to tell their 
actual income, because they judged the question inappropriate or they might have 
forgotten to mention some of their side incomes. Very telling in this matter was the 
discussion that unfolded with Andrew, who was very unsatisfied with his income: “I don’t 
earn quite a lot of money to sustain more than a family of three. […] I earn one million [$400] 
per month. I fuel my car about more than half of that money, pay bills for water and 
electricity. […] A man with two degrees should earn more than that.” (Andrew) It turned 
out, upon probing, that he had several side incomes, rental units, his wife runs a well-
performing shop and he is doing some consultancy work that their actual monthly income 
added up to $2240. In this case, his various side incomes were finally mentioned, but it is 
likely that in other cases, despite careful probing, these incomes went undetected. 
 We used disposable income as a reference, that is income after tax but before expenditure. 
Some authors suggest considering daily consumption, rather than income (Ncube & 
Lufumpa, 2015, p. 11). The main reason is that consumption expenditure is considered 
more reliable, even though they admit to the possibility of a measurement error since the 
difference between consumption and income increase with rising income (Ncube & 
Lufumpa, 2015, p. 11). Unfortunately, we are not able to use that approach because 
expenditure has not been inquired as consistently as income. We believe, however, that 
our data in itself is reliable because the same income inquiry has been used throughout 
the entire research.  
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Upon these calculations, our sample was repartitioned among the different subgroups, as follows: 
First, it has to be noted that the spread of the income classes does not reflect the income 
repartition of the Ugandan population as a whole and it is not intended to do so either. 
For example, the World Bank states that 35% of the Ugandan population live below the poverty 
line. In urban areas that rate drops to 9% and thus reflects more our findings (World Bank, 2016a). 
This reveals an essential bias of our work that will also be reflected in most of the other findings. 
By limiting the research to Kampala, the most prosperous region of the country (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics, 2014a, p. 99), the distribution will necessarily be skewed towards the wealthier 
fractions of society. At the same time, increased costs of living somewhat relativize this distortion. 
As argued before (see p. 88), we do believe that this environment is most conducive to research 
trajectories of emergence, as life chances and opportunities for choice are greater than in rural 
regions. Some even argue that “Africa rising” is not a phenomenon of the continent, neither of 
nations, but one of the 67 cities with over one million inhabitants (Quénot-Suarez, 2012, p. 39). If 
we take such an argumentation seriously, we also have to re-adapt national statistics to urban 
contexts for our purposes. Besides, it is not our intention to measure the Ugandan middle income 
groups but to describe their features and main traits. 
Hence, our data displays a relative overrepresentation of the lower middle to upper class and 
underrepresentation of the poor. The LMC is the most represented among the sample. At the same 
time, even if represented by only a few cases, UMC and UC are overrepresented in comparison to 
their frequency in the Kampala population. Besides, impoverished people have been targeted only 
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punctually. However, outliers on both ends (UC and poor) are allowed to appear in the data as 
well, to learn from the delimitations that exist between the different subgroups. 
Having established the subgroups that will be referred to throughout the analysis, we like to recall 
a crucial factor before proceeding: these income groups are a mere means to an end, they do not 
in itself constitute classes. We use the terms floating, lower and upper middle class because this 
has been done so otherwise (Ncube et al., 2011) and we believe that these subdivisions may 
provide some valuable insight. However, definitions of middle class based on income remain 
merely descriptive, they have neither the potential to uncover underlying social dynamics nor to 
explain common identities or collective social action (E. O. Wright, 1979). Hence, income groups 
can structure the analysis, but to deduce class cohesiveness they are not sufficient. 
6.1.2 Age 
Similar to income, age is another essential description for analysis. For one, income and age are 
often linked, as usually income progresses with advanced age, until to the state of retirement. But 
the commonly shared experience of one birth cohort will also have an effect on the mindset and 
behaviors of people from the same generation (Ryder, 1965, p. 846). 
Our sample shows a strong representation of the 26-35-year-olds, the category accounts for more 
than half of our respondents. Minors have not been surveyed at all, and even those up to the age 
of 25 are only a few because many of them are still schooling. The absence of regular employment 
and salary would distort the sample because parental support could overcome the lack of income 
and thus not make them poor per se. Some students were surveyed, but we tried to limit these 
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cases. This does imply, however, an underrepresentation of those below the age of 26 who are not 
schooling, but already working or in search of employment. Second, older adults, above the age of 
60, but also in the group of 46-60 are few for two reasons. One, in comparison with the rest of 
Uganda, there are only few people above the age of 60. One reason might be that elderly would 
often become less visible, once retired. It is common practice for them to return to their home 
village, or they remain more in private settings and thus making it harder to get in contact with 
them. 
Trajectories of economic emergence are not solely linked with income and income opportunities, 
but also with age. Depending on the age of someone, their living conditions, job, education, family 
status, even leisure time will very likely change and depending on the potentials for earning 
income will vary according to age, as the figure below shows. 
 
Figure 9: Age and Income 
Each dot stands for one respondent. The spread of the data is high, as all income categories and 
ages are covered. However, the trend line (shown as solid line in the figure) has the shape of a flat, 
inverse U-curve because in general income starts low and raises with an advanced career and 
increasing household size (because fixed costs are lowered), and then declines with advanced age 
due to retirement. Indeed, we find that the highest income on average ($365 per person per 
month) can be found in the group of the 36-45-year-olds. 
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6.1.3 Gender 
Our data reveal a bias towards an overrepresentation of men, who constituted two-thirds of the 
interviewees. 
We assume that this is most likely because more men than women are in the workforce. This 
assumption is supported by the data which indicates that men have been three times more likely 
as women to indicate that they are the only person with an income in the family. Since we 
concentrated most of our efforts on the working population, less visible members of society, such 
as housewives (or, as mentioned before, elderly) are less represented. 
This underrepresentation is regrettable since women face different challenges than men and the 
position they occupy in society equally structures their perceptions and behaviors. Their income 
position depends a lot on their marital status, with female-headed households being more prone 
to poverty than male-headed ones (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a). They have less access to 
politics (Ferree Marx & McClurg Mueller, 2004; Tripp, 2000) and are more prone to be victims of 
violence (I. C. F. International & Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012). However, the reliance on their 
identity as women also has the potential to transcend ethnic or religious barriers because of 
shared interests common to all women (Daniel, 2016; Tripp, 2000). Thus, in the analysis, we might 
expect to see behavior that can also be explained by gender difference, and we will include this 
factor when opportune to do so. 
6.1.4 Household Composition 
On average, interviewees indicated to live in households composed of 5.11 people. We see that 
this number is declining with rising income, with poor households hosting on average 7.57 people 
and the wealthiest households 3.5. 
Regarding the number of children, we witness a similar trend with rising income: the number of 
children declines, from 2.4 among the poor to 1.84 among the UC. Hence, we might conclude with 
an observation also made elsewhere that the middle income groups tend to have lesser children 
and live in smaller households together. As mentioned above, however, the complex realities in 
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terms of household composition and income stratification even within the same household need 
to be kept in mind (Alber, 2016a). 
6.1.5 Occupation 
Occupation has in some cases been the sole defining factor of a middle class (Mills, 1953), 
sometimes it has been an essential feature besides economic factors (Weber, 2002). In the context 
of the middle class in the developing world, the focus on profession had been determined by the 
access to a stable, predictable salary. In Uganda, 47.8% of the working population is employed, 
and only 47.4% of those have a paid employment. Hence, more than half of them are self-employed 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 47). Thus, salaried employment touches only about 25% 
of the Ugandan working population. In our sample, roughly two-thirds were employed and one-
third self-employed. As shall be seen in the discussion on the diversification of income (7.2 
Diversifying Income), the salaried job is not necessarily the only one nor the one generating the 
most income, but frequently it is the one that the respondents used to define themselves. 
Regarding the type of job executed, limited conclusions could be made. While it is sometimes said 
that civil servants would constitute an important part of the middle class, they did not figure 
prominently among our sample. Most frequently administration was mentioned, allowing at least 
for the conclusion that indeed most of the respondents were white-collar workers, working in the 
service sector. This raises questions about their dependency on the state for employment: since 
they are not predominantly employed by the state, they may feel less obliged towards it (Darbon 
& Dedieu, 2014, p. 298). Secondly, since they are not deriving their primary income from property, 
they might be less fearful to protest (Oberschall, 1973, p. 164). Such an analysis quickly reaches 
its limits, however, if one considers the multiplication of class positions through the 
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diversification of income, making it the rule rather than the exception to be an employer and 
employed at the same time. 
6.1.6 Region 
Uganda has about 60 different ethnic groups, whereby the six major groups (in descending order: 
Baganda, Banyankole, Basoga, Bakiga, Iteso, and Langi) constitute more than half of the 
population (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 20). 
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Among the respondents in our sample, Baganda and Banyankole are over-represented, with other 
ethnicities being less frequent. Due to the ethnic diversity, we decided to distinguish between 
regions of origin, rather than ethnicity itself, which could have easily led to oversampling. Where 
it seems viable for understanding, ethnic groups may explicitly be referred to. 
The high incidence of people from the Central region, mainly Baganda, is not particular surprising, 
as Kampala, the site of the fieldwork, is located there, thus making their presence more likely. 
People from the West are mainly Banyankole, but not exclusively. However, since they are the 
second biggest ethnic group in Uganda, it is not surprising that Westerners also represent the 
second largest group in our sample. Inversely, the North is only sparsely populated, and by far the 
most impoverished region, thus we might suspect that they are less present in Kampala. 
Map 1: Ethno-regional Cleavages in Uganda (Lindemann 2011, p. 394) 
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When coupling region of origin with income, we see only little variation of the median, as shown 
in figure 14 except for the East. The earnings of the upper half of the respondents from each region 
differ significantly though. Here, contrary to the perceptions shared by some that people from the 
West are advantaged, Ugandans from the Center are earning better than any other group. It seems 
then that the distribution better reflects the more historical advantages that have grown since 
colonial times rather than more recent, political changes. Interestingly, it may hint at an often 
ascertained claim, that the middle class accumulated its wealth independently from the governing 
elite. If the government favors groups with ethno-regional proximity, yet here the best earning 
individuals are from the Central and the East, we may deduce that they reached their 
achievements without direct intervention from governing elites. The most destitute respondents 
come from the Center as well. This is most likely due to the fact that poor people from other 
regions probably lack the means to move to the capital, whereas poor people from Central region 
are already there. The boxplot of the North shows little variation and is indicating rather low 
incomes. Thus, it confirms the marginalized position of people from the North, as had been 
described before. 
Figure 14: Income and Region 
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To summarize, we might say that the felt imbalance voiced by some cannot be confirmed in our 
data, at least not in the middle and lower income groups (it might be justified among high earners, 
though), regarding income. The picture might be different if looked at employment opportunities 
in the ministries (see Lindemann, 2011 and 6.4 for more detail). But while the statements of 
respondents above reflect their grievances, they are not shared by all interviewees. Others, like 
Nelson (from the West), feel that historical regional imbalances are leveled out and point at the 
high voter turnout in favor of Museveni in the North of Uganda. Overall, ethnic tensions were not 
the concerns most voiced. Instead, corruption and overstaying in power have been the leading 
causes of discontent among the respondents, regardless of their regional background. 
6.1.7 Religion 
Religion plays an important role in the life of most Ugandans. Only 0.2% of Ugandans indicate not 
to have any religion at all. The most significant religious groups are Catholics, followed by 
Anglicans, Muslims and Pentecostals (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 32). Our sample is 
biased towards protestant faith groups, with an underrepresentation of Catholics and Muslims 
(see Figure 15, p. 110). Most respondents of our sample indicate that they attend at least once a 
week Sunday service. But religious groups are also important places for socialization. Choir 
practice, door-to-door evangelism, Mothers’ and Fathers’ Union – there are numerous ways to be 
active in a religious setting beyond the service. In these groups religious identities are being 
reinforced and create a common frame for interpretation of the surrounding world, they 
constitute communities of practice (Eckert, 2000). Even though most respondents indicated to 
have friends from various religious backgrounds, in intimate relationships the importance of 
having a partner from the same religion has been underlined. This was particularly pronounced 
among Pentecostals, who said most often that they need a spouse with whom they can share their 
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faith, and who is equally “God-fearing”. 
While our data shows an overrepresentation of Protestant faith groups, it is not sufficient to make 
any statements about their particular status among income groups. We do not want to argue in 
the vein of Max Weber about a pronounced protestant work ethic as an explanation for making 
them more likely to be among the middle income groups21. Instead, we suggest that the different 
faiths can be found among all income groups, however, that in an urban context we might witness 
a stratification according to income lines in addition to a particular denomination among the 
different urban church parishes. This does affect economic mobility since churches are potential 
places for networking, as shall be discussed later (see chapters 6.2.1, 7.4 and 14.1.1 for more 
thorough discussions on the points raised). 
6.1.8 Education 
Most Ugandans value education a lot. It is considered to be one of the decisive factors determining 
personal success. 
In comparison, the respondents of our sample are better educated than the average Ugandan. 
Once again, urban-rural differences factor here, as well as the focus on sampling people with 
regular employment. 
Here the differences between the sample and the average Ugandan might be the most striking, 
among all derivations discussed so far. Notably, that the categories of no education and only 
primary, who comprise the two biggest groups of the national sample, are non-existent among 
our sample. And the 71% who have a degree in tertiary education is in stark contrast to the 4% 
                                                 
21 Maxwell and Meyer both have refuted this link in relation to Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches (PCC) in different 
African countries (Maxwell, 1998; Meyer, 2004). 
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on a nationwide scale. This shows the significance of education in relation to having a middle 
income status, as has also been shown elsewhere (Kunene, Mubila, & Akinkugbe, 2015; Kurzman 
& Leahey, 2004; Zipp, 1986). 
Contrary to what one might expect, there is no significant correlation between income per person 
and education level of the respondent, probably due to the high number of university degree 
holders with a small income. However, if depicted as a box plot, as done in Figure 17, it becomes 
apparent that the median income is rising with a higher education level and that in general the 
distribution is skewed towards higher income, if the education is higher as well. 
These observations confirm the importance of education in obtaining higher salaries and thus 
increasing the probability of consolidating one’s economic position. 
In this section, we tried to sketch the general demographics of our sample. They lead us to 
conclude that we deal here with a predominantly young (35-45), male, well-educated group of 
salaried employees. With their rising income, their household size and their number of children 
is declining. In the following sub-section, we intend to draw the intention to other, relevant 
identities that have come up during the interviews. 
Figure 17: Income and Education Level 
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6.2 Markers of Identity 
Class is only one sociological category for marking identity, and it is not even necessarily the most 
powerful one (CFAO, 2015; Spronk, 2014, p. 210). Hence, in our effort to seize the validity of the 
class concept in Uganda, it is equally insightful to have a look at other, prominent categories. 
6.2.1 Religion - Morality and Prosperity 
Religion is present in the public sphere, through religious claims on buses, such as “Masha Allah”, 
“Insha’Allah” or “God is Good”, preachers in the street, who seize the occasion of rush hour 
congestion to preach their sermon to the passers-by in the cars, and politicians who make 
reference to the Bible to display their integrity. Religious leaders enjoy the reputation of being 
respectable and are thought to put the people’s needs before their own, contrary to the opinion 
on politicians (Afrobarometer, 2015). 
On a personal level, religion plays a vital role in the life of many Ugandans. As we shall see, it is 
one way of socializing during leisure time (see chapter 14.1), and it remains a relevant category 
for identification (CFAO, 2015; Stephen Hunt, 2002). It surely does not have the same relevance 
for all respondents alike, but we did find a coherence among some attitudes expressed. 
We did find little evidence though, that a specific behavior or attitude can be linked to a particular 
faith, contrary to what will be shown concerning the different regions (see chapter 6.2.3). While 
religious points of views play an important role, especially in attitudes towards morality, these 
attitudes did not differ between the religion per se. So, all respondents except one (a male) of the 
2014 dataset agreed that the wife is subordinate to her husband, in reference to the Bible or the 
Qur’an. Similarly, there was a critical stance towards homosexuality expressed across all religions 
and also across all income groups (with the men being more vocal about it, though)22. This is not 
to say that such differences do not exist. In the analysis of the interviews conducted they did not 
turn out to be of any explanatory value. 
A crucial question remains the role of Born-agains regarding “middleclassness”. Through their use 
of modern technology, their focus on consumption, their global orientation, and their emphasis 
on prosperity they can sometimes obtain similar attributes as the middle classes (see Gifford, 
2008, p. 280). While cautioning too many generalizations about the heterogeneous group of 
Pentecostal and charismatic churches (PCCs), Ojo confirms that whereas in West Africa the PCCs 
would enjoy large popularity among the middle classes, in Southern Africa it would be more 
attractive to the urban poor. However, he also contends, due to its increasing popularity, it is 
attracting people from all income groups (Ojo, 2012, pp. 301–305). Similarly, in his analysis of the 
Zimbabwean Assembly of God Africa, Maxwell concludes that “in a sense, the movement has 
become a microcosm of wider society and shares many of its tensions.” (Maxwell, 1998, p. 366) 
                                                 
22 At the time of the 2014 interviews, the President had recently signed the Anti-Homosexuality Act into law, just for 
the Supreme Court to repeal it a few months later (Fichtmüller, 2014a). Thus, without being explicitly asked about, 
respondents liked to give their opinion on the issue, mostly related to the question about modernity. 
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Indeed, through embracing materialism, Pentecostal teachings may justify capital accumulation, 
which has often been shunned upon in other denominations. So, in its emphasis on hard work, 
being entrepreneurial, leading an integer life, and giving tithes to the church the teachings 
propose a seemingly simple formula for becoming wealthy, while neglecting broader social and 
economic circumstances (Gifford, 2008, p. 285; Maxwell, 1998, p. 365). However, Meyer points 
out that herein lies also one of the tensions within the PCC preaching, as the church may lose its 
credibility if the promised miracles do not manifest (Meyer, 2004, p. 460). 
Due to this promise of miracles, the prosperity gospel has equally attracted its fair share of 
criticism (Gifford, 2008, p. 287). Among different individuals, the teachings were criticized for 
their insistence on “planting a seed”. Thus, one lecturer at a debate club remarked that if praying 
would bring wealth, why then are Africans, who are praying the hardest, also the poorest? 
Similarly, a charismatic pastor who has been selling “holy rice” for 50 000 UGX ($20) per kilo has 
been a reason for repeated mocking by Kampala inhabitants, although this did not hinder a large 
crowd to gather in front of his church in Mulago every Sunday. 
Some authors also highlight that for the believers being born-again gives an excuse to distance 
themselves from their extended family, as evil spirits can travel through blood ties, which, 
therefore, need to be cut off. Instead, the church congregation functions as a surrogate, and 
members often address each other in family terms, such as brother or sister (Maxwell, 1998, p. 
354; Meyer, 2004, p. 448). By doing so, they can avoid expectations of financial support of their 
family that comes along with their newly acquired wealth (Maxwell, 1998, p. 354). In a critique of 
this assumption, Lindhardt writes: 
“[B]orn-again Christians do not cease to be social beings, deeply embedded in family 
relationships and sharing a social world with non-born-again Christians. […] A too-
narrow association of born-again Christianity with modernist individualism fails to 
account for the complex processes of navigation and social reformulation in which 
converts are engaged.” (Lindhardt, 2010, p. 266) 
Similarly, Meyer suggests seeing these claims “to break with the past” as a narrative rather than 
an achieved state (Meyer, 2004, p. 457). Our observations confirm these findings mentioned here: 
we have seen that PCCs are attractive among all strata. Numerous small churches spring up in 
poor neighborhoods and are very popular. As already mentioned above, there might be some 
economic stratification within the congregations themselves. Thus, the big churches in the city 
center who hold their services exclusively in English might be more attractive to the people who 
can afford the transport and follow the sermon. Yet, we cannot conclude that PCCs are particularly 
attractive among middle income groups. According to official statistics, they remain a minority, 
after all (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 32). The data did not confirm either that the born-
again believers would be more likely to cut ties with their extended families. Of the 23 
respondents in 2014, 18 mentioned their extended family (either as a support to them or as a 
receiver of support) and those who had no relation to them did not do so out of religious reasons, 
but in general due to very personal tragedies. Neither were those five people all born-again. While 
we cannot make any statistically strong claims about the relation between Pentecostalism and 
middle income groups, our data allow us at least to challenge a narrative that puts PCC (attributed) 
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virtues in proximity to (attributed) virtues of the middle class. For example, David Martin argues 
that: 
“[T]he lineage running from Pietism to Pentecostalism is linked positively to 
modernity in respect of the domains of gender, secular law, transnationalism, 
voluntarism, pluralism, the nuclear family, peaceability, personal release and 
personal work discipline, consumption, modern communication, social and 
geographical mobility – as well as changes in mediation, authority and participation. 
” (D. Martin, 2005, p. 144) 
Such assumptions bear a striking resemblance to the hopes attached to the positive effects a 
middle class could have in an underdeveloped country. In both cases, however, it is worthwhile to 
remember the heterogeneity beneath the common label. Therefore, the grand narratives outlined 
by Martin neglect the local context in which they take place, and while Pentecostalism may 
provide a “compass” for individuals in rapidly transforming societies, they do not shed their 
anterior beliefs entirely (cf D. Martin, 2005, p. 151). 
Religious groups are essential sites of assembly and as such formers of collective identity (Stephen 
Hunt, 2002, p. 147). Such an identity is one that can, in return, quickly be mobilized, even though 
these kinds of movements are often ignored by social movement theory because they do not fit 
into liberal progressive conceptions scholars like to have about social movements (Siméant, 2013, 
p. 130). While most respondents indicated that the precise faith of someone did not play a role in 
interaction, it was more important for spouses to have a common religion. Dividing lines would 
hence not occur as much between religion or faith groups, but more among questions of morality, 
which were perceived to go against God’s will, and often triggered by “modernity” or 
“westernization”, such as homosexuality, pornography, miniskirts, or gender equality. These fault 
lines can spark intense debates, as has been shown in the discussion on the Anti-Homosexuality 
Bill. They reveal the mobilizing potential of religious groups, but this potential is not necessarily 
used for the cause of democratic advancement. 
6.2.2 The Youth 
The importance of life cycles has been widely recognized in social science (O’Rand & Krecker, 
1990). For one, diverse maturational processes often referred to as life stages or life course (e.g., 
birth, adulthood, marriage, parenthood, or retirement) affect the life of an individual. Also, specific 
generational circumstances converge the experiences within an age cohort. O'Rand and Krecker 
write: 
“The idea here is that the relative structural compositions (e.g. size, sex ratio) and the 
historical experiences of successive birth cohorts moving through time have causal 
implications for the life course of individuals.” (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990, p. 240) 
This observation holds true for Uganda as well. Experiences by generations who have lived 
through independence differ from those who have witnessed the regimes of Milton Obote and Idi 
Amin and the guerrilla war, and they have different perceptions from generations who have only 
lived under the Museveni regime and have been exposed to ICT rather early on in their lives. 
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It has already been pointed out that the mere size of a birth cohort will have an impact as well. 
Thus, the younger ones, who are part of generations with high birth rates face different challenges 
regarding education and employment as the generations before them. Additionally, gerontocratic 
structures play a crucial role in many East African societies (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990, p. 243). Even 
more so because Uganda has the youngest population in the world, with 48% of the population 
being below the age of 15 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 14). Popular media discourse 
reflects these structures. Contrary to income categorization, which is hardly used as descriptive 
labels in the media, “the youth” is a category widely referred to. The youth as a relevant 
phenomenon, concept, and ideology (see van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011) has equally 
been discussed in African studies. While scholars admit to the “fuzziness” of the concept 
(Christiansen, 2011; Durham, 2000; van Dijk et al., 2011), it has implications on the everyday 
political life. The youth is represented in institutions, in Uganda, they even have reserved 
parliamentary seats, together with other marginalized groups such as women and disabled 
(Christiansen, 2011, p. 131) Ugandans perceive especially youth unemployment as one of the big 
challenges the society has to face today (Wire, 2018). Claims have become popular that the youth 
should be “job creators and not job seekers” and are widely taken up, for example by the World 
Bank (2015). The category can give access to government programs, such as the Youth Livelihood 
Program (Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development, Uganda, n.d.). Forums like the 
Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs (UPFYA) have the objective to be an advocacy 
group for the youth. It seems, in line with the research cited above, that the term “youth” can be 
stretched, due to the absence of an official definition. It is often used as self-description when 
making claims about the cohort. On the opposite, people considered as elders often have a good 
reputation. Christiansen in her study in eastern Uganda describes how the youth feels dependent 
on older generations, instead of placing themselves in rebellion against them (Christiansen, 2011, 
p. 134). Several respondents expressed a similar view, when they stated that they are friends with 
older people, in order to learn from them (see 7.4 for more detail). 
It needs to be retained that age groups thus do have a structuring effect on society, and we argue 
that this effect is even more exacerbated in gerontocracies, that have been dominant forms of 
societal ordering in East Africa (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990). Van Dijk even goes as far as to argue 
that the recent reification of the category has turned “youth” into an ideology, similar to ethnicity, 
because interests and access to scarce resources (especially through accessing funds by donors or 
governments particularly targeted at youth) are controlled through the label (van Dijk et al., 2011, 
p. 7). Hence, orienting policies towards youth and tying them into the political process can become 
a way for the state of assuring their loyalty, as Sinha-Kerkhoff has demonstrated in the case of 
India (Sinha-Kerkhoff, 2011). Youth movements thus have the power to transcend other 
identities, such as regional ones, or kinship ties, but in the process, they create new borders of 
exclusion (van Dijk et al., 2011, p. 12). 
6.2.3 The Baganda, the West, and the Rest 
In addition to being the majority in the country, historically, the Baganda have been treated 
preferentially during British colonial rule, which exacerbated anti-Baganda sentiments in the rest 
of the country (Lindemann, 2011, p. 392). The post-independence governments of Milton Obote 
and Idi Amin targeted the marginalization of the North by concentrating positions of political and 
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military power in the hands of Northerners. When the NRA came to power, they consciously tried 
to overcome sectarianism by forms of inclusive elite bargaining (see chapter 4.2.2 for more 
details). The attempt remained futile, though, because regional and ethnic factionalism remained 
(Lindemann, 2011). This tendency is particularly pronounced in certain ethnicities, mainly those 
that are governed by monarchies (International Crisis Group, 2012). The country is further 
structured by regional cleavages, which have their origins in the times of colonial administration. 
The distinctions also led to disparities in economic development: The North was mainly 
marginalized because most economic activities were concentrated in the South, and foremost in 
the central region (Lindemann, 2011, p. 392). The West is the home region to the President (a 
Munyankole) and many government officials and is often suspected to be favored in terms of 
development over other regions. Besides, most oil resources are found here (Barkan et al., 2011, 
p. 2). 
However, despite historically entrenched factionalism, ethnicity had not been a very intensely 
debated topic among the respondents. If mentioned, it usually came up in the relation of the 
Baganda lobby for a federal arrangement and their loyalty to the kingdom. Another aspect was 
the suspected favoritism of people from the West in the attribution of government jobs (see also 
Tripp, 1994, p. 107). Research suggests that this is an adequate representation of the ethnic 
distribution in the political landscape (Lindemann, 2011, p. 396). Efforts of Museveni to form a 
broad-based government ceded shortly after coming to power. At least since 1995, government 
positions were dominated by people coming from the Southwest of Uganda. Among the 
respondents, this was voiced in the frustration that not qualification counted to be employed, but 
origin. 
“[A good society is] a society based on merit, where the best is taken, not because I 
come from a particular region […]. Today’s society in Uganda I see there is unfairness 
in it. Let me just begin in my own work environment, the level of promotions is long; 
people are promoted because they are related to the manager or somebody who is big 
in the bank. Someone has stayed in the bank for five years like me, but someone has 
stayed for one year he is already leading you and all that. You need to be related to 
someone to realize your ambitions, not through your capacity. […] I have not gotten 
promotion for the last three years, I have passed the interview, but there is a manager 
in that department because he is a Munyankole [from the West], he refused.” (Arthur) 
“We/ our problem is tribalism, as a country. There is a lot of it. It might seem not like 
it, but to get a job, to get this/ now people like me don’t mind tribe. If I got somewhere 
out there, I will not ask him what tribe he is. I will look at him and accept him for who 
he is and then I would buy (from any tribe).” (Reagan) 
Baganda are also well represented, even though dissatisfaction increases, as they feel the most 
important positions are held by Westerners and because of continuing tension between the 
Buganda kingdom and the national government. This feeling is not constrained to the Baganda, 
even though the disputes about the sovereignty of the kingdom and the strong cultural identity 
many Baganda embrace may intensify the conflict. Elisabeth, a Muganda, feels that the economic 
decline in her region, and her own, are due to tribalism: 
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“When this regime came, things of agriculture were crushed down. We don't know 
whether it was intentional or what. We used to deal in coffee, coffee industry 
collapsed, all factories were down. By the time these people came in, what some 
people think, they introduced a certain coffee wilt and it had dried and all areas which 
had coffee, perished. […] So, everything is in chaos in this area where I come from. 
This regime came when I was working. […] I got unemployed, I worked there for 17 
years, again, what I think as me, it was maybe intended. When they came, they started 
to lay off those people working in such places, banks, ministries, they closed some of 
them, for me, my thinking, they wanted to suddenly erase our tribe to fail, which is 
happening today. And funnily enough, they laid off people which they call a 
retirement, yet they are employed. And if you take statistics, most of the offices it is 
one tribe. So, the rest we are suffering.” (Elisabeth) 
“Politics, there is a lot of tribalism, even in the tribe it comes back to the clan, even 
within the clan people pay more attention to family, and institutions are not strong to 
check this.” (Arthur) 
The attacks by government soldiers on the palace of the king of the Bakonzo, Charles Wesley 
Mumbere in Kasese in December 2016 have been the most recent confrontations between the 
central government and a kingdom. Accusations that the king has planned to create his own 
republic and to secede from Uganda were used by the military to storm the palace and arrest King 
Mumbere. At least 55 people died during the attacks (Associated Press, 2016). These recent sparks 
of violent encounter show the underlying regional tensions that persist, and the firm identity 
claims made by the kingdoms. 
Kato and Rose are a married couple, where he is originally from the North, even though he has 
been growing up nearly all his life in Entebbe, and his wife is from the West. During the interview, 
they started to argue about whether the North was impoverished because it was marginalized or 
whether it was because poor people, in general, were lazy and did not try hard enough. 
Kato: “I wouldn’t mind a leader leading for 20 years, 30 years, 40 years, but is he 
taking care of what is necessary? Hospitals, social services, like roads, are they good? 
Or is wealth distributed equally well over the country? […] You find one particular 
area is well developed and the other area / and that is why I fear to go to my home 
area [the North]” 
Rose: “Most people are lazy; they don’t want to involve themselves in an agricultural 
set-up. […] They are trying to specialize people in agriculture, and they are 
constructing roads, but the people are not taking the idea. For example, in the west, 
the roads are well constructed, but the people are poor.” 
Kato: “In comparison, those people are doing well. If you want an epithet of poverty, 
you go to the north; you will see what poverty is. Yes, the government is trying, but it 
is not doing enough. [...]” 
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Rose: “There is only job seeking, not job creating, even in schools. Most people are just 
seeking for jobs, but they are not creating, so that is what causes the unemployment.” 
Interestingly, Rose has been unemployed at the time of the interview, yet she brings up the 
catchphrase often used by Museveni and internalized by many that people should be job creators 
rather than job seekers. These observations also show that the criticism of Western favoritism is 
often coupled (albeit not dependent on) criticism of Museveni. 
Thus, if mentioned, ethnicity was framed in relation to perceived injustice in access to resources. 
However, as said before, ethnicity was not a dominant topic for many. Respondents, in general, 
would confirm that it did not matter much to them where someone came from and several have 
interethnic marriages, or their parents had been ethnically mixed. Similarly, most would state that 
their close friends have diverse regional origins. However, tribalism has a bad reputation and is 
regarded as one of the evils hindering development. Therefore, it is also possible that respondents 
did not explicitly state ethnic preferences because they felt they may not be appreciated. There 
have been instances during the field research where people would unite for other purposes, but 
the group turned out to be ethnically homogeneous (see 14.1.1). Spronk in her research has shown 
that ethnicity also gains importance with advanced age, when people start assuming 
responsibilities within their clans and participate increased in family functions (Spronk, 2012, p. 
276). Thus, the relative neglect or importance of ethnicity may equally be linked to age. Ethnicity 
is still one major factor in the mobilization of people, as the various insurgencies have shown, that 
Uganda experienced since 1986, motivated by regional or ethnic marginalization (Lindemann, 
2011). The same has been true in more recent upheavals, such as the Buganda riots of 2009 (see 
p. 198), the Save Mabira campaign (see p. 193) or the Kasese clash in 2016 (mentioned above). 
They are not the sole motivator, but, particularly among Baganda, the regional identity is a strong 
potential for mobilization, overcoming other markers of identification, such as income or age. 
6.2.4 Neither Rich nor Poor 
One central question when trying to judge the appropriateness of a class label is the presence of a 
commonly shared identity. This, in the case of the respondents in Uganda, remained highly 
problematic. The respondents themselves rarely evoked class, or more precisely middle class. 
Usually, the notion only came into the discussion if brought up by the researcher. If asked, 72% of 
the respondents would state that they believe a middle class existed in Kampala. Of those, about 
half would indicate that they considered themselves to be part of it. The others would describe 
themselves either as lower class or as “in between”, implying that they were neither rich nor poor. 
Someone classified as poor would be more likely to state that a middle class did not exist, and if 
they would say it did, the poor were more likely to consider themselves not to be part of it. This 
share of people considering themselves to be part of the middle class would continue to grow with 
income. For those who felt they were not part of the middle class, the poor, FC and LMC were more 
likely to state that they were part of the lower class, whereas the UMC and UC would consider 
themselves to be “in between”. In the narrative interviews this emphasis on being in a 
transcendent rather than a settled state has been evoked quite frequently, as the following quotes 
illustrate: 
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“My own position, currently I am below middle class. I am not exactly a pauper; I am 
not middle class.” (Herbert, LMC) 
“I am on the boundary between the poor, to be middle class you must be able to 
predict your income. […] You are just at the boundary there, oscillating.” (Innocent, 
UMC) 
“I am not middle class; I am just penetrating.” (Benjamin, n.a.) 
“I am in the middle; if you go to the village, these people are poor, I am not poor like 
this.” (Sarah, UMC) 
“We are not peasants and not millionaires; we can afford comfortable living, in 
economic terms, we are the so-called middle class.” (Alex, UC) 
These citations highlight the vulnerability and the potential of downward mobility, in 
emphasizing the temporary nature of middleclassness, by using words such as “oscillating”, 
sometimes with the idea of upward mobility, when talking about “penetrating”. Interestingly, even 
Sarah and Alex, who described themselves as middle class did so by excluding other labels. For 
others who considered themselves middle class, they did so because they could “afford the 
necessities” (Jennifer) or “live comfortably” (Economist). No one of those asked derived their 
middle class status from anything else than their purchasing power, their assets, or their ability 
to sustain themselves until the end of the month. We have also observed that in the last field 
research people were more vocal to refuse the middle class label, painting the Ugandan society as 
an opposition between the rich and the poor, “the haves and the have-nots”. While inequality 
probably did not noticeably widen between 2012 and 2017, it may be an indication how the 
current overall economic situation of the country at the time of the interview plays into the 
perception of socio-economic stratification. In their own descriptions, being middle class thus has 
been equaled to successfully mitigating economic vulnerability, but we did not find any indication 
that from there a commonly shared class consciousness would derive. 
*** 
In this chapter, we have tried to outline a first analysis, using some demographic factors as a 
starting point. This analysis is, however, rather superficial. The sample size is small, and thus 
statistical representativity is not given. It also does not reflect the life of an average Ugandan. But 
this was not our intention either. We focused on the description of prominent characteristics that 
shape and influence the multi-layered identity of a person, such as their income, age, gender, 
profession, region, religion and their education. This list is not exhaustive, and it can be adjusted 
to a different context, but we feel these have been the most prominent markers that have come up 
during the interviews. Our intention is, in the words of Van Dijk et al., to understand 
“[...] the pursuit of certain identity-constructs in the defence and enlargement of 
socio-political, socio-cultural and economic interests in society. That is, in how far is 
the pursuit of a[n] identity forceful with regard to processes of inclusion and 
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exclusion in the defence of such interests? In how far is it becoming normative for (the 
control of) behaviour, expression and desires?” (van Dijk et al., 2011, p. 6) 
Through such an analysis we will be able to discern the distinctive characteristics of the middle 
income groups or try to discover what could be “a typical middle class lifestyle and attitude”. So, 
by taking into account these other identity constructs, we might delayer differing points of view, 
not only (or maybe not even at all) according to income, but also according to other factors which 
may play into account or even figure more prominently. Doing so will hopefully either bring us 
closer to a justification for talking about “class” when talking about Uganda or it will instead 
delegitimize this idea, for the sake of different analytical categories.

  
7 Strategies of Economic 
Advancement and the Mitigation 
of Financial Vulnerability 
The entire part II is dedicated to better describe the middle income groups in Uganda and to 
understand their recurrent characteristics. We try to provide detailed descriptions of specific 
demographic factors (done in chapter 6), their lifestyle linked with their consumption practices 
(in chapter 8), and behavior that we have found recurrent among nearly all our respondents – this 
shall be the focus of the current chapter23. This behavior was often linked to the efforts of the 
respondents made in the quest for a better life, namely through achieving financial stability and 
the capacity to mitigate unexpected hardships and times of economic crisis. We identified four 
main themes that were prominent in many of the interviews: lived trajectories of emergence, 
stability, and in some cases decline, their tendency to diversify income, their priority of investing 
into education, and the significance of networks. These themes may seem somewhat arbitrarily 
put together, but they are linked by a common motive: the mitigation of vulnerability to economic 
shocks. As we shall see, their trajectories influence the prospects of their economic advancement. 
The ability to diversify income sources is essential; without, financial stability does not seem 
possible. Education is cherished as a way to prosperity in many cases and, therefore, people will 
go to great lengths to get the best education for their children and themselves. Finally, kinship and 
other social networks are vital means of support; but sometimes also a strain or hindrance. It is 
also through these themes that stratification among income lines becomes distinguishable and the 
economic emergence is mainly determined by the capacity to mitigate vulnerability. Being 
vulnerable, therefore, means for a big part of the middle income groups that downward mobility 
is as much of an option, or even more so, than upward mobility. Resilience to vulnerability is also 
a decisive factor for middle class affiliation in the work of Ferreira et al. on Latin America. This 
World Bank study determines the lower economic threshold of the Latin American middle class 
as $10 per day – the amount perceived necessary to not be vulnerable anymore; that is a likelihood 
of 10% or less to fall back into poverty within a five-year interval (Ferreira, 2013, p. 33 ff). They 
differentiate thus between those who are poor, who are vulnerable and finally those who are 
middle class. They acknowledge though that the most significant share of the population is not in 
the middle class but among the vulnerable. This does lead interestingly to a similar categorization 
than the AfDB, but with different conclusions: the latter includes those who are vulnerable in the 
middle class, described as floating class (Ncube et al., 2011, p. 4), whereas Ferreira et al. make not 
being vulnerable decisive for being considered middle class. Likewise, it has become conventional 
wisdom in research on poverty, that many households that are poor, are not so at all times, but 
                                                 
23 The analysis of this chapter is predominantly drawn from the dataset of 2014, where the long narrative interviews 
left room for new topics and categories to arise. 
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show substantial mobility in and out of poverty (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000; Narayan & Petesch, 
2007). This up- and downward mobility closely relates to the approaches of vulnerability and 
floating class mentioned above. Hence, the mitigation of vulnerability, or the efforts to do so, 
become central to leaving this kind of insecurity. Therefore, it is not surprising that the narratives 
of our respondents revolved a lot around these topics. Even though, and this caveat remains if a 
majority of the participants have passed the state of vulnerability defined in economic terms (the 
$4 per day threshold between floating and lower middle class). However, subjectively for the 
respondents of Kampala, this point seems to come at a higher daily income per capita. In general, 
the people of the UMC were most likely to acknowledge that they felt they could not fall back into 
poverty again. 
Since we are less focused on boundaries and more on processes, it is not vital to determine fixed 
thresholds at which a person is not vulnerable anymore. Instead, we try to show how vulnerability 
decreases, through the different themes discussed here. And not only as actual decrease, but also 
one subjectively felt by the participants of the study. By doing so, we hope to determine crucial 
turning points towards more resilience and try to draw more comprehensive conclusions how 
this might affect behavior and attitudes. 
7.1 Life Trajectories 
The narrative of Africa Rising has been very prominent starting from 2010, as already discussed 
in chapter 2. If this holds equally true for Uganda, so that we can talk about “Uganda rising” as 
well, it should be reflected in the macroeconomic statistics of the country. The Museveni era is 
widely credited for continuous growth and stability. These achievements are recognized even by 
opponents of the president and are used as justification for the legitimacy of the regime. Museveni 
portrays himself as the man with a vision for Uganda, whereby this vision is one of evolving into 
a peaceful middle income country. 
Compared with the whole region, Uganda is not one of the big players and punching below the 
continental average (see p. 71ff). However, the country has experienced economic emergence on 
a macroeconomic level, lifting people out of the first poverty line and placing them in the class of 
the vulnerable, making the group of the floating class thus salient for analyses. We have seen that 
the upward mobility is not restricted to this class alone. Instead, the income distribution itself did 
not change significantly. Also, we need to bear in mind that at the same time a part of the floating 
class may have seen downward mobility as well. The question that remains now, is how these 
macroeconomic changes translate into the personal experiences of the respondents. 
Nearly all respondents are doing better than their parents did. It manifests itself in their 
education, compared to the educational attainments of their parents. However, it would be too 
hasty to conclude high intergenerational mobility from such an observation. Ferreira et al. point 
out though that in countries where educational attainment was historically very low (they use 
Ethiopia as an example, but this may hold equally true for Uganda) achieving better education 
than the parents should not be interpreted as high intergenerational mobility. Instead, the low 
starting point allows for easier catch up (Ferreira, 2013, p. 54). The education of the parents, 
however, played a role in the likelihood for their children to obtain higher degrees. There is a 
significant correlation at the 0.05 level between the educational level of the parents and the 
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respondents. In general, the children would obtain a higher education level than their parents, but 
the correlation also shows the limits to social upward mobility if someone is coming from a 
humble background. 
Education of father Percentage of Respondents with a 
University Degree 
Primary 47 % 
O-Level 57 % 
A-Level 71 % 
University 85 % 
Table 6: Relation between Parental Education and Educational Attainment 
The site where someone has spent their childhood might be another indicator, even though it is 
not straightforward. All respondents now are living in Kampala or the surroundings. Thus, we 
might assume that their children (if applicable) grow up in an urban environment. Among the 
respondents, however, about half of them grew up in the city or a small town, the other half came 
from a rural setting. Since urbanization is a critical factor of moving out of poverty (Narayan & 
Petesch, 2007), we might hence conclude that those who have left in the course of one generation 
the village to settle in the capital have advanced on a welfare ladder, compared to their parents. 
In the personal narratives, it also becomes apparent that there are obstacles to these trajectories 
of upward mobility, often constrained by the parental background (such as parental education, as 
already mentioned), therefore, limiting intergenerational mobility. For us to determine 
intergenerational mobility itself is not possible, since we did not inquire much about or talk to the 
parents of the respondents. Instead, we decided to focus on their childhood conditions and 
compare them to their current situations. At the beginning of each interview, the respondents 
were asked to tell the interviewer about their life, in as much detail as possible. In our narratives, 
we can distinguish between different pathways. 
I. The Struggle – From a poor background, passing their parents, but with limited 
advancement. 
II. The Success Story – From a poor background, passing their parents succeeding very well 
now. 
III. The Privilege – From a privileged background, continuing and expecting a privileged 
position in the future.  
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IV. The Decline – From a privileged background, with a decline in their economic situation.  
Certainly, these differentiations are hard to make and do not necessarily correspond to how the 
respondents would describe their situation. Additionally, it is not easy to disentangle which 
factors are structural and which are situational. As described in chapter 6.1.2, income is also 
bound on the life cycle. Thus, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether someone is affluent 
because of their background or their age. 
So, to make a more thorough analysis, we isolated recurrent categories24 from the narratives of 
our respondents which have influenced the overall economic well-being of the respondent. If 
present, each category for each respondent would be attributed a +1 if the situation had a positive 
effect and a -1 if the situation was negative. Recurrent categories would be as follows: 
Childhood Category Score attributed 
Presence of both parents +1 both parents were present 
-1 one parent was absent  
-2 both parents were absent 
Employment of both parents +1 Both parents had employment 
-1 Both parents were unemployed 
Polygamy -1 Parent was polygamous/multiple families 
Ability to pay school fees +1 Parents were able to pay school fees  
+/-0 Parents struggled but managed to pay 
school fees 
                                                 
24 These categories are not supposed to be exhaustive, and there is a wide range of topics that have not been covered at 
all, such as health or exposure to environmental shocks. But, as said before, they are based on items that respondents 
felt worth mentioning to describe their situation, especially during their childhood. In the categories of the current 
situation, there has been more probing through the researcher. Thus, these categories possibly reflect equally our 
framing of decisive markers of wealth. Yet, this framing has been shaped through the various stages of the research 
process and hence is not entirely external to the lives of the respondents. For example, grocery shopping places would 
not be included in these categories, because they pertain only to a negligible fraction of the respondents, as discussed 
elsewhere in this part. Even education of the respondents would not figure into, because the sample had a rather 
homogeneous level of tertiary education, with only few exceptions. 
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-1 Parents were incapable of paying school 
fees 
Student working -1 Respondent had to work to pay school fees 
or support family 
Sponsorship +1 A sponsor from outside the family paid 
school fees 
Support through family members +1 External family was able to provide 
support, financial or other 
Growing up in Kampala/Entebbe +1 Growing up in an urban environment is 
more likely to be associated with financial 
well-being 
Self-reported condition +1 Respondent describes childhood 
conditions as positive 
-1 Respondent describes childhood 
conditions as negative/ poor 
Table 7: Categories Determining Childhood Conditions 
Current Category Score attributed 
Sufficient Income (derived 
from budget sheets) 
+1 Income exceeds expenditure 
-1 Expenditure exceeds income 
Ability to pay school fees +1 Respondent able to pay for school fees 
-1 Child cannot go to school because unable to pay school fees 
Employment status +1 Currently employed 
-1 Currently unemployed 
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Multiple sources of income +1 Respondent has multiple sources of income 
Single parent -1 Respondent is raising a child/children alone 
Self-reported condition +1 Respondent describes their condition as positive 
-1 Respondent describes their condition as negative/poor 
Car ownership +1 Respondent owns a car 
House ownership +1 Respondent owns a house 
Table 8: Categories Determining Current Conditions 
The scores obtained in each category would be added up, resulting in two final scores, one for the 
childhood and one for current conditions. Depicted in a scatter diagram, the position of our 
respondents would be determined by their childhood and current conditions, whereby the score 
of the current condition is represented by the y-axis and the childhood condition by the x-axis. 
Interestingly, the groupings by quadrant would roughly (but not always) correspond to the four 
pathways described above. 
So, those who started off with a low score in their childhood (represented on the x-axis) but 
managed to score high in their present life (y-axis), considerably improved their lives compared 
to their childhood. But it also shows that those who are not doing as well today did not have a 
comfortable childhood either, and on the contrary, those who are in the third quadrant usually 
had a good start and are doing very good now, as well. This confirms the importance of upbringing 
and parental endowments, even though the respondents in the second quadrant show that even 
from a less privileged start advancement is possible. This graph, however, does not reveal the net 
differences between the childhood conditions and now. It masks small improvements in the first 
quadrant and small decline in the third. When only plotting for net difference (that is the current 
condition score minus the childhood condition score), and sorted from lowest to highest, the net 
progress of the respondents becomes more visible. 
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Figure 18: Economic Emergence; Scatter Diagram of 2014 Sample 
From those respondents who saw a decline in their living situation, only 11 (Rose), 6 (Oliver) and 
23 (Kato) are in a situation of struggle. 10 (Herbert) and 4 (Alex) are relatively young, and from 
well-to-do families, hence it is not surprising that they have not yet built all their assets, and since 
their start was from a high score, it was hard to improve on this one right away. They are also not 
Figure 19: Net Difference in Economic Emergence of 2014 Sample 
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seeing their living situation deteriorating, but rather as “I am establishing myself as any other man 
at my age should be doing.” (Alex). 13 (Elisabeth), whose case will be discussed in chapter 8.3, is 
particular since she saw her living situation decline, but remains in a somewhat privileged 
position, compared to one-third of the sample. Yet, she perceived her decline as very strong and 
considers herself to be a pauper. Oliver, on the other hand, gave up a well-paying job to pursue his 
political interests and accepted considerable disadvantage. These examples show the relevance 
of subjective life assessments, as different people with different aspirations judge their life 
situations differently. 
Case Story: The Decline 
Rose (11 in the graph) comes from Fort Portal, in the west of Uganda. Her father was 
a businessman, owning a small stationery shop. Even though he had to close it 
eventually, he succeeded in educating his children and taking care of his polygamous 
family. She recalls her financial situation at home as acceptable since her father even 
managed to support other people. To pay for her education, he sold small plots of land. 
During her studies, she met her boyfriend, Kato (23 in the graph), whom she soon 
moved in with. She got pregnant during her studies, and right now the couple has two 
girls. Despite motherhood, Rose finished her degree and is now in search of a job, 
which she finds very challenging, as she lacks experience. Instead, she turned to multi-
level marketing but failed to generate an income with it so far. They live in a rented 
three-bedroom house in Entebbe because Kato works at the airport. He comes from a 
military family from the north. His father was an army officer under Idi Amin but got 
killed during in-house fighting. He was raised by paternal relatives but describes 
these relationships as being without love, making him distance himself from his 
family, to the point that he does not speak his local language at home with the children 
but English. After school, he got a diploma in marketing, and a first employment 
selling pagers in the wake of the expansion of mobile phones. He describes this as 
“selling combs to bold men”, an experience that he hated to the point that he decided 
to never do marketing again. After being idle for a year, he found an opportunity at 
Entebbe Airport. During his time, he went on a mission for the UN in the DRC, earning 
$3000 a month. He used this money to invest it in a very luxurious house in Entebbe, 
with the plan of renting it out at $1200 per month. However, the tenant is not paying, 
and Kato is involved in a lawsuit over the overdue rent. Right now, his job earns him 
$400 of which he spends everything. To the point that at the moment of the interview 
their children were at home because he could not afford to pay their school fees for 
the trimester that had just started. He is not pleased with his conditions complaining 
“I am living in this lousy place; I don’t even have a car. […] Now I am not even able to 
pay school fees, my girls will not go to school on Monday because this salary cannot 
handle.” For him, a car is of utmost importance to his lifestyle, so he plans to invest 
the money from the lawsuit in an SUV, which will considerably improve his life. His 
girlfriend confined in a private moment that her partner does not know how to handle 
money, but that he is also immune to any advice. While in DRC her father had 
repeatedly urged him to set up different side investments, but he insisted on putting 
everything into the house. She feels she cannot say anything since he will not listen 
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and arranges herself with the situation. The couple was several times during the 
interview engaging in arguments (“Every day this is a house of arguments.”), but they 
also confirmed each other and to the researcher their love for one another. 
Case Story: The Struggle 
Oliver (6) comes from an impoverished family that he describes as living below $1 
per day. Because his brother was not interested in continuing education beyond 
primary school, he convinced his father to send him to secondary school, which he 
managed to do for some years, selling plots of land to finance his education. He 
excelled academically, which gave him the opportunity to study on a scholarship 
while also working on the school’s land to contribute himself as well. After his A-Level 
studies, Oliver received a government scholarship for Uganda College of Commerce, 
which he accepted even though being “academically devastated” because he had 
hoped to do political science instead. In school, he had already always been head 
prefect, and during his studies, Oliver continued by joining NRM and constructing the 
NRM youth league. He finally got a job as an election manager for the NRM, but 
eventually quit his job and put all his earnings in the establishment of his own party, 
which so far has failed to register for elections. He is without formal employment now 
and is focused on pursuing his political career while surviving on handouts he 
receives from friends and some funding for work he does for an NGO, but which is not 
consistent. He describes his living conditions as bad: “I am barely surviving; I am poor 
and have no income. I even got evicted from the last place because my history of paying 
rent is so bad.” 
As can be seen from these two case stories, these trajectories stagnated or declined because the 
respondents chose not to mitigate their vulnerability. For Kato and Rose, this was because they 
chose an investment which failed to pay off, in addition to Rose being unemployed and the 
unsuccessful business of multi-level marketing. Even though all three received tertiary education, 
this had not been sufficient protection to their decline. On top, they cannot rely on their families 
who are geographically far away, not well-endowed to support them with opportunities or 
handouts. Gordon, whose case will be discussed in relation to the need for education is another 
well fit example here, of a constant struggle against limited possibilities. 
Those who scored highest are not necessarily those who made the most advancement, as has been 
the case for respondents 9 to 7 in Figure 19. And finally, respondents 8-21, who made the most 
progress, are all presented in quadrant II, as success stories (except for 16 (Innocent)). 
Case Story: The Success 
Raphael (2 in the graph) comes from a polygamous family; his father had more than 
30 children. Raphael’s family is poor, but his father has much influence in his home 
area. Because he was a head teacher in primary school, Raphael was able to go to 
school. He then managed to get a sponsor from Germany, “not because we were the 
most needy, but because my father was the most influential.” After secondary school, he 
got a government scholarship due to his good grades and took a bachelor’s in politics 
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at Makerere University. He later continued his master in Germany, with the help of a 
scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and today is 
working for a German organization in Kampala. He is pleased with his situation – he 
considers himself to be middle class – and confident about his future, saying “I 
progress, I am like MDGs, I have socially and economically evolved.” 
Case Story: The Privilege 
Alex is a young man at the end of his twenties. He grew up in Kampala, his father is a 
UPDF captain who has joined the rebels in 1985, during the fights in Luwero. His 
mother runs a small kiosk. At one time his father was accused of allying with the 
wrong people and had been suspended from service for two years. During that time 
the family managed to survive nevertheless, living from investments (mainly houses) 
they had put in place before. Alex knows about his privileged position: “I come from a 
loving, caring family, my parents provided everything, I grew up with peace and security. 
God has been merciful.” He studied law at Makerere University and the Law 
Development Center, graduated in 2013 and is now working in his first job. He 
invested into multi-level marketing as a side business, hoping for high returns, as his 
ambitions are to become a millionaire. Side earnings can come through the drafting 
of a legal agreement for the family or an acquaintance and through doing well-paid 
studies for the World Bank. He is living by himself in a self-contained two-bedroom 
house in Bukoto that belongs to his parents, thus freeing him from the charge of 
paying rent. He has plans for further investment into agriculture and real estate and 
is optimistic about his future. 
The majority of those in quadrant III can be considered as a second generation of members of the 
middle income groups, with well-to-do parents. As shown in the case story above, they are to some 
extent conscious about their beneficial position. This awareness will equally shape their 
perception, as the mitigation of vulnerability is not the highest priority anymore. Instead, they 
focus on wealth accumulation, since they know that they can turn to their families for support in 
case of need. The respondents most determined to become wealthy were found in this quadrant, 
some of them even quite overtly, such as Alex, mentioned above. Inversely, if the generational 
contract of doing better than the parents is violated, as in the case of Elisabeth, the deception may 
be even worse, as the fragility of the own position had not been perceived as such before. 
Through the Figure 18 and Figure 19, we have tried to visualize the trajectories of the respondents 
and show some recurring patterns. Usually, those who came from well-to-do families would score 
high in their current situations as well, and some of those from struggling families did not manage 
to dramatically improve their lives, compared to their parents. Others, however, managed to make 
substantial leaps forward. Through their life stories, some important factors decisive for poverty 
or well-being in childhood and now have been singled out and have been reflected in the 
categories that we used to attribute the scores. These determinants correspond with findings from 
other studies on the necessary endowments for moving out of poverty (Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development, 2012, p. 35 ff). Among others, a study conducted by the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in Uganda lists multiple 
sources of income, formal employment, education, support from family members as decisive for 
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moving out of poverty (ibid. p. 35) and other factors such as divorce, family size, death of an 
earning family member or employment loss as likely to increase falling into poverty (ibid. p. 41). 
Here we determined factors that would lead or hinder their emergence. These categories had been 
illustrated by chosen case stories, to get a better understanding of the endowments needed to 
advance, but also to the limits that may be hard to overcome. Three of these factors, namely the 
ability to diversify income, to invest in education, and the connection within networks will be 
looked at closer now because they have figured so prominently in these trajectories of economic 
emergence. 
7.2 Diversifying Income 
That point has been a central characteristic of leaving poverty (Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development, 2012) and of petty prosperity (Nallet, 2013, p. 92; Strode et al., 2015, p. 
83). In the research group on the African middle classes at the LAM, this was common practice 
among all countries researched. While a regular salary and formal employment are decisive for 
reaching a status of “respectability” that goes along with the notion of middle class (see also 
chapter 6.1.5), very often a particular lifestyle could not be maintained without other sources of 
income. Also, it would not be unusual if the side income exceeded the formal salary, yet the latter 
would be the first income mentioned. It would also be the label how the respondents would refer 
to themselves. Hence, Andrew would complain how his income as a university lecturer was barely 
enough to fuel his cars, but upon further inquisition it became apparent that his real monthly 
income was nearly six times as high, putting him among the best-earning individuals interviewed. 
Even though he describes himself as poor, he concedes that 
“I do not see myself getting to the lowest level of the poverty line. […] I do not foresee 
a situation that I am not able to not completely have money to run my home. My 
shares will always be there; the houses will always be there.” (Andrew) 
Since the time of our interview, his contract with university expired and did not get renewed. He 
used this as an opportunity to establish his own NGO in the area of conflict resolution. Even though 
he cannot rely on his regular salary anymore, he was able to maintain his lifestyle without any 
concessions. 
On the contrary, those who are among the most destitute struggle to put aside sufficient money to 
invest in another business and as a result remain in a state of vulnerability, where they are unable 
to compensate once they lose their current source of income. Additionally, many of them cannot 
turn to their families because they are already better off than them and thus know that they do 
not have any securities, in case of economic hardship. 
“My safety net is not yet constructed; there are a lot of risks surrounding my life, I am 
just building, I am just building.” (Nelson) 
Even here the notion of temporality is evoked. Most of those respondents are aware of the benefits 
that come with diversified income sources and are thus working hard to receive multiple incomes. 
There is some variation in the nature of the capital used for generating the secondary income. 
Since the poorest do not have any surplus money, if the opportunity is present, they will most 
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likely put their own labor to productive use. One person, for example, after working half-time as 
a cleaner in an international foundation, would spend the other half of the day as an electrician in 
his neighborhood. The surplus money he earned he invested into his third income opportunity, 
setting up a store for electronic equipment, such as sockets and switches. Even here, he is still 
working on his own labor since he is the only salesperson. If he manages to make more profit, he 
plans to employ someone to do the work for him. It would be interesting to see whether he will 
use that time to do further work or for his leisure. Thus, even with very little money, most 
respondents would plan investments in other income opportunities. If the surplus money is more, 
investments become more cash intensive, such as buying a plot and building a house for rent. 
Nicole said they would even first invest their money to build houses for tenants and only after 
finishing the construction, build their own house, so that they could use the money earned from 
the rent to invest in their construction and thus avoid taking a loan. On the other hand, people 
with many savings are giving out credits and earning through the dividends (often in addition to 
the side business they already run). Innocent says he is not saving with the bank out of principle: 
“I decided never to go to these schemes of the bank; I would rather lend some money 
to my colleagues, this system is much better, you get much better returns than with 
the bank.” (Innocent) 
As a result, he usually engages in business ventures with friends, which earns him about $10 000 
in a year, even though it is not regular and sometimes he loses out or returns are less than 
expected. Albeit some financial risks involved he is still confident about his future. “Even if the 
money is not there, you know, you will not collapse.” 
In general, regardless of their earnings, respondents perceived their salary not to be sufficient and 
hence concentrated on generating more income. George, who has diversified into very different 
activities explains he is doing so because: 
“First: out of interest. Second: Because of economic benefit. What you earn [in his case 
approximately $400 per month] is not enough to be sustainable considering the 
family, so you need other income generating projects.” (George) 
Because he is running his firm, he cannot be entirely sure about the amount, and the time he will 
be paid. Thus, some side incomes he set up (carpentry, agriculture, a wine business) give him a 
more regular income: 
“They helped me the most because some of those incomes are daily, some of these are 
daily incomes, coming every day and you find that at least you are able to sustain a 
home a period of time.” (George) 
Others, again among the higher ends of the income spectrum are actively seeking investment 
opportunities, such as Herbert. He has set up a Savings and Credit Association (SACCO), and while 
he did not know yet in what to invest, he and 13 other friends contributed $40 per month. They 
planned to accumulate money for about a year and a half and then choose where to invest. They 
eventually decided to acquire a plot of land and use it for farming, waiting now for their payouts. 
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The most common side incomes are from real estate, agriculture or small shops, and often relying 
on poorer family members as employees. This combines the advantages of having someone take 
care of the business or field who can be trusted, and at the same time supporting a member of the 
extended family; thus, reducing expectations from family members to share the wealth. 
The diversification of income leads to blurring class lines in a Marxian sense because it is quite 
possible that someone is a laborer, a farmer and an entrepreneur at the same time. This duality of 
salary and side incomes is mutually reinforcing, and one without the other increases the economic 
vulnerability. The salary gives a certain predictability and security, yet in itself it is often too low 
to meet the financial needs of the household. The side income serves to bolster the paycheck, 
however, is often riskier. A failed payout, due to a bad harvest, a tenant who has run away before 
paying or a badly-performing shop are, therefore, no threats to the economic survival. The 
accumulation of activity gives rise to several questions: whether class allegiances can be found 
through the primary employment, which is often used as a personal identification or if they are 
blurred or even overcome by interests that stem from other incomes, how they structure the 
perception of and relation to the state, or the relation between the “formal” and “informal” sectors. 
However, there remains also the questions whether this duality salary/side income will persist. 
While educational attainments rise, the job market has difficulty to adapt. A challenge for the 
government remains in this regard the prevailing high levels of youth unemployment, 
underemployment (26%) and informal employment (95%) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. 
iv). In such a context, having a salaried profession remains a source of prestige as well as an 
exception to the Ugandan rule. The World Bank observes in a report on youth unemployment, that 
chances for unemployment rise with higher educational attainment and when living in an urban 
area (World Bank, 2009, p. 5), most likely because little educated, rural youth can be more easily 
absorbed into agriculture. A youthful population can have a significant potential for the Ugandan 
economy, given that they will be absorbed in the productive sector, increasing pressure for the 
government to create jobs. However, the formal sector “is small and produces jobs at a much slower 
rate than the out turn of graduates from universities and other higher institutions of learning.” 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. 45) In addition, insufficient real wages make it more likely 
for young, educated Ugandans to venture into self-employment. Bennon, for example, works as a 
baker, albeit having a diploma in education. He explains his choice due to “meager pay. It would be 
meager if they were paying it.” Albeit being financially far from secure, this still seemed to be the 
more reasonable decision. Similarly, it is possible to find young graduates who prefer driving a 
boda boda because it offers better earning potential than working in an office at an entry-level 
wage. Equally, respondents would sometimes assert that the second-hand clothes traders amass 
quite some income, yet no one would suspect them of “being middle class”, as they do not live 
conspicuously. The emphasis on entrepreneurialism is also supported by government agencies. 
Thus, for example, the Uganda Investment Authority commissioned a paper in 2010 outlining 500 
business ideas and the money for investment required, which now regularly circulates in its 
complete or abridged forms through WhatsApp groups. It raises the question whether occupation 
is an adequate characteristic of middle class in Africa, or if it creates blind spots concerning micro-
entrepreneurs. This tendency is not unique to Uganda. In a study on entrepreneurship in Africa, 
the authors observe for Kenya: 
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“There is a strong culture of entrepreneurship in Kenya, and survey responses suggest 
that entrepreneurs are accorded a higher level of status and respect than mid-level 
and senior managers in medium-sized companies. Entrepreneurship is increasingly 
being viewed as a desirable career option. This is at least in part due to the role the 
media has played in profiling successful entrepreneurs.” (Omidyar Network, 2013, p. 
30) 
The valorization of self-employment, even though not commonly shared by all, goes along with 
declining confidence in the utility of an educational degree, as sometimes doubts are raised. One 
common narrative is of the university producing only “job seekers and not job creators”. While the 
usefulness of going to university is questioned by some, though, we have not yet seen anyone who 
was willing to forgo the education of their children for them to work in a micro-enterprise. 
7.3 Investment in Education 
Since a majority of Ugandans is young, and at the same time, educational attainments are at the 
rise, we might expect that a major preoccupation for those having accumulated some wealth will 
be to invest into education. Programs for Universal Primary (started in 1997) and Secondary 
Education (started in 2007) have contributed to higher school enrollments, nevertheless high 
dropout rates in primary school and the low quality of the education affect the achievements. 
Therefore, for those who can afford, private educational institutions remain the first choice. Going 
to university remains an exception, rather than a rule (even though the number of students has 
increased), and is still below the regional standard (UNESCO, 2012). 
Case Story: The Need of a Breakthrough 
Gordon was born in 1987 in a village in Western Uganda. His parents are subsistence 
farmers and are, according to him, the poorest family in the village. Because it was 
clear that they could not pay for his school fees beyond P7, Gordon ran away as a child, 
one night he jumped on a lorry that brought him to Kampala. He did not know anyone 
and had nowhere to go, so he lived as a street child, sleeping in the trenches around 
Kalerwe and doing small jobs like being a porter. Once he got himself 200 000 UGX, 
Gordon joined S1 but stopped again in S2 for four years because he could not raise the 
tuition. He then was lucky because he found a former employer who was willing to 
pay his schooling up to S6. From then on Gordon had been on his own. While he has 
the grades allowing him to go back to university, he did not manage to get the money 
to pay for tuition. He also did not get any formal employment, thus doing small 
contractual works in data entry and some brokerage to make him survive and support 
his brother. He is now desperately hoping for a breakthrough, allowing him to pursue 
a university degree and get stable employment. 
The story highlights the difficulty of accessing education if the parents or extended family are not 
able to pay for tuition and if there is no sponsor available. It also reveals the limits to the promise 
of education. With high school graduates becoming more common than in previous periods, the 
high school diploma is losing value, due to its inflation. For Gordon advancement now seems 
blocked because his prospects of being able to finance his university education are limited. Several 
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studies have shown that higher income is linked to higher education (Strode et al., 2015) and 
everyone will go to great lengths to educate themselves or their children. 
It is also very common for someone who can afford to do so, to continue their education. Hence, 
higher education in such cases is due to higher income and will possibly entrain higher income; 
thus, the respondent becomes part of a virtuous circle. 
Case Story: From Teaching to Banking 
Arthur has grown up in northern Uganda. Both of his parents died in the 1990s, while 
he was still in primary school. His relatives then financed his education in secondary 
school. When he finished his A-Level, he had to choose a degree; his brother agreed 
to pay the tuition. He explains his choice: “I took B.A. Education, English language 
because it was the cheaper option. It was not what I was intending to study. My interest 
was in law, but I went to education because it was 205 000, but law was about 1.5 
million, so I looked at myself as not in the capacity to pay the law cost, it was too much 
for me.” After graduating, he worked for two years as a teacher but finally left because 
salary payments had been infrequent. He then started working in a bank, inspired by 
the career changes of other teachers, even though he lacked any formal training. 
While he was teaching, he started a Master’s in Ethics and Public Management, but he 
only managed to pay half of the tuition so far. Thus, he arranged with the university 
that he will slowly pay off his debts, and when everything is cleared out, he will be 
able to graduate. But he still has more plans: “My ambition has been that now that I am 
working in a bank to study afresh because my degree now is not relevant to the bank. 
[…] Now I am taking a post graduate diploma financial management. […] The fee is 
about 2.8 million, I already paid one million, and they agreed that I start to study. So, I 
am left with 1.8 million which they say I can pay in February.” His wife, too, started her 
master’s degree in 2014, after having graduated in 2008. The couple pays the school 
fees from a joint account, but Arthur adds that he had started saving for tuition 
already earlier on. He puts 100 000 UGX away for his schooling, and already 50 000 
UGX for his children, even though they are not in school yet. 
This case story shows how people rarely pursue their desired degree but opt for the most practical 
choice and how, in return, this may have little to do with their future employment, or with their 
consecutive degrees. In the case of Arthur, after paying off all tuition, he will have obtained a 
master’s and a postgraduate degree since he started working full time. Hence, an undergraduate 
degree often serves for getting a title and thus an academic qualification. The real specialization, 
however, is pursued afterward in a post-graduate degree or a master’s degree. Besides, the story 
illustrates the various arrangements made around the payment of tuition. Starting from the family 
support to give an education foundation, but then the own efforts to continue the education and 
adapt it to the current needs and situation, often resulting in evening classes and less time for 
family or free time. Arthur admits to sometimes skipping church, or not attending a club where he 
used to be a member because he is under pressure due to his studies. Education, therefore, is 
highly valued and it does not necessarily stop with the first job. Its high value is also reflected in 
the priority that parents place on the education of their children. This will be further detailed in 
the chapter 8.2 when looking at expenditure for education. It is often said that the middle class 
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places a high value on education (Alber, 2016b, p. 23; Kroeker, 2017, p. 281; Spronk, 2014, p. 210). 
We would argue that in a context like in Uganda, this holds true for everyone because people have 
understood the relevance of education in securing a good future. Lindhardt has found a similar 
attitude on the universal value of education among Tanzanians: 
“But education is in and of itself related to prestige, modernity, development, and 
progress. Whatever it may lead to in terms of future occupation, education is seen as 
an efficient way of cultivating productive, healthy young people and preventing the 
youth from going idle.” (Lindhardt, 2010, p. 248) 
As shown above, though, the extent to which this aspiration can be realized changes according to 
financial and human capital. The financial capital to pay for tuition or the connection to others 
who might be able to finance the education is vital. Such observations indicate that social mobility 
is rather limited and thus contributes to reproduce a class effect where poor people will be more 
likely to have poor children, due to the lack of these connections. Haveman and Wolfe have 
demonstrated how the parents’ education played a vital role in the income of their children, as it 
would affect time and goods dedicated by the parents towards the children’s upbringing, which in 
return would affect the final schooling level. The income would also influence the post-school 
investment, and eventually, all these factors influence the income of the children (Haveman & 
Wolfe, 1995, p. 1833). Even though Haveman and Wolfe conducted their studies in the US, it 
remains applicable to Uganda as well, since similar mechanisms are at work. The government can 
have a decisive influence in this trajectory, though, through providing an inclusive school system 
and an efficient labor market (Ferreira, 2013, p. 50). In the case of Uganda, it does seem that the 
government cannot live up to these expectations, as the relatively low number of high school 
graduates and the high rate of youth unemployment show (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. 
45). Hence, there are important impediments to intergenerational mobility. Financial support 
systems within the extended family are, therefore, vital to overcoming these boundaries. It is of 
no surprise then, that nearly all respondents regardless of their income, have other family 
members at their charge, for whom they pay school fees (see also 7.4 and 8.2). Education levels 
play a role beyond mere income though, as it will shape attitudes and values. Hence, for example, 
Bourdieu’s distinction between cultural and economic capital. They can exist independent of each 
other, and cultural capital (that includes schooling) is even more prestigious than economic 
capital (Jurt, 2008, p. 73). For some authors, the origin of the erroneous assumption that middle 
classes would foster democracy lies in the confusion between middle class and education. 
Kurzman and Leahay (2004) argue that it was rather an intellectual class than a middle class who 
pushed for democratization in various historical settings. Lipset himself in his famously cited 
study that laid for many the ground of the relationship between middle class and democracy 
points out that more than income education will decide about the fostering of democratic values 
(Lipset, 1959b, p. 79). Such assertions should be treated with caution, though, as they ignore the 
historical and political context of the countries studied. We might consider though to scrutinize 
certain attitudes not only according to income but also to education level, even though the two are 
closely linked, as shown before. 
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7.4 Networks 
Knowing the right people is another relevant factor for the mitigation of economic vulnerability. 
This has become quite visible in the narratives of the respondents’ childhood experiences. Those 
who did not manage to find someone to step in to pay their school fees when their parents were 
not able had the hardest time to advance economically. Raphael in the case story mentioned above 
pointed out that he was able to get a sponsor from Germany, not because he was the most 
destitute, but because his father was well-connected within the community; thus, this opportunity 
had been pointed out to him. Gordon, on the other hand, ran away from home after primary school 
because he felt his parents, whom he describes as “the poorest of the village” could not provide 
him further opportunities. In Kampala, he lived on the streets because he did not know anyone 
who could help him. Even though Gordon succeeded to educate himself up to senior six, he feels 
now that his advancement has stalled because he fails to get an opportunity to prove himself and 
he does not know anyone who could provide such an opportunity to him. It is even possible that 
he agreed to the interview in the hope that this would give him further employment opportunities 
as he repeatedly highlighted his data processing skills. When asked what he was doing for leisure, 
Gordon said, among others, that he seeks advice from people who are better off than himself. Later 
on, he conceded that particularly with politicians this was difficult to do, as they would believe he 
will only ask for money and not even pick their phone anymore after he had called once. 
Having realized the importance of knowing the right people has led several respondents to engage 
in conscious networking – actively seeking contact with key figures, often described as mentors. 
Learning, or seeking advice, from older or more affluent people has come up several times during 
the interviews. 
“That is why I use them [older friends] /ok, not using them but/ that is why I make 
them my friends, that is why they are my friends because they have been where I am, 
so they guide and say ok, so where is the problem?” (George) 
Sometimes the respondents would frequent a place because of the people they could meet there. 
This was the case for Nelson, who would attend a sauna and steam bath once a week because 
“there are these high profile citizens”, like ministers, officers, prominent businesspeople and the 
like. “And I feel happy; you meet, sweat, you discuss with them.” For a similar reason Innocent is a 
member of Entebbe Golf Club, even though, according to his own words, he does not even play 
golf, the membership is merely “[...] to go and greet these old men and learn from them.” Even 
though he pays full the membership fee for the golf club, he is only rarely going there. He had also 
been a member of the Rotary club but is not active anymore. Aida hinted that she used the occasion 
of their befriended family meetings to learn from people better off but also to get customers for 
her business. Career advancement had also been a networking reason for Joy, who is a member of 
an alumni association from her school. Women who have graduated from that school would meet 
up and try to benefit from each other’s connections when looking for job opportunities for 
themselves or relatives or friends. 
Finally, various respondents indicated that they would befriend with some people because of the 
benefits they could get, like being friends with older people for advice on business matters, or to 
get support in case of financial hardship. Raphael said when talking about the type of friends he 
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had: “You will think of I have a problem like I need 500 000, whom do I talk to? So, I need to get 
friends of that caliber.” George and Alex also stated that they had older friends to learn from them, 
as well as friends of the same age. For Alex and Abdul meeting with friends is also an opportunity 
to find new ventures for business opportunities. For Abdul, who describes himself as an introvert, 
friends are mainly there to discuss questions on how to bring forward their careers instead of 
personal issues. 
Even though coincidence may play a role, there is a re-enforcing tendency. Knowing the right 
people (whereby “right” depends on the context) offers opportunities which in return offer more 
connections. On the contrary, someone with little exposure will have fewer opportunities and thus 
a harder time making meaningful connections. Income stratification does indeed play a role here, 
on several accounts those who are poor have pointed out the hard times they have to get in contact 
with people who are better off and who fear that they will ask them for money. Options like the 
steam bath or the golf club do not exist for somebody like Gordon simply because he cannot afford 
such leisure activities. Entry barriers are high, therefore, (deliberately) creating spaces of socio-
economic homogeneity. Here we can witness stratification of groups in the sense of Bourdieu’s 
social capital: resources become available (current or potential) due to the adherence to a 
particular group. If this group, as in our case, is structured along income lines, we can see a 
reproduction of class or income structures within the social networks (Rehbein, 2011, p. 113). 
Religious groups can provide one opportunity to transcend these income frontiers. Out of the 13 
respondents who had a childhood in poor conditions and were not particularly well-connected 
into higher echelons of the community, more than half managed to receive a scholarship through 
church organizations or find a willing cleric who would take over their school fees. And all except 
one are now situated in quadrant I or II, which in a way reveals the extent to which they have 
managed to overcome the lack of network in their childhood through their scholarship. 
The extended family is often, especially at a younger age a very viable source of support. In many 
cases, the family had played a key role in the education of the respondents. George, growing up in 
a female-headed household because his father left when he was ten years old, describes his 
childhood conditions: 
“So of course, there were financial pressures, but because of / as I was saying / 
because of the extended families that helped us/ groomed us, we would find ourselves 
working and earning for ourselves.” (George) 
The support of the extended family had been most important in cases where only one or no parent 
was present, and no religious organization would step in to pay for school fees. Most likely these 
were not clear-cut dichotomies, as presented here because relatives may have supported the 
parents or paid school fees until a religious sponsor was found. But in the narratives of the 
respondents, these situations were presented as consecutive events, and no further inquiry in the 
subject was made. Hence, these events are reflected here as they had been told. Beyond school 
fees, relatives might have proved valuable in finding job opportunities or the like, but this had not 
been explicitly mentioned. It only became evident in the case of Alex who found his first 
employment through personal connection, though he did not specify whether this was a family 
member and in the case of George and his uncle Innocent who both mentioned various family 
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members that were working in different ministries. Additionally, they came both from the West, 
thus nurturing through their statements accusations made by other Ugandans that nepotism 
prevailed within the state structures. Other respondents simply mentioned family members who 
were married to influential people or who had been abroad, which in these cases let to 
opportunities to travel abroad for the respondents as well. 
Sometimes this assistance of the family would continue up to today and, therefore, be even now a 
decisive factor of decreasing vulnerability. This, however, would only be the case among those 
people well off and from well-endowed families, mainly those represented in quadrant III. For 
those in quadrant I and II, turning to their family would not be an option because they are not able 
to give any help. As a result, respondents find themselves again in either a virtuous or vicious 
cycle, where those who are already less vulnerable know that they can get support in case of 
hardships and those who find themselves in fragile positions are aware that any shock will 
increase their poverty. Hence, their necessity to mitigate vulnerabilities is even bigger, yet their 
capacity to do so is smaller. Neubert suggests here to distinguish between the upward mobility of 
the vulnerable, with poor networks in which they have more to invest than they might get out off 
and the established, who can rely on better-situated networks to consolidate their positions 
(Neubert, 2017). This positioning and its desire to change it has a decisive impact on the life 
choices made, on the decision what to spend money on and what to do in their free time. 
Because they enjoyed the support of their families, and even if they did not, respondents feel the 
responsibility to help out their other family members. “I have to make that sacrifice [of supporting 
the extended family] because there were others who did sacrifice for me.” (Innocent). As a result, 
nearly all respondents, with the exceptions of the young respondents from privileged families, 
would pay school fees for a family member, regardless of their financial situation. The benefit of 
education has already been discussed, and respondents are well aware of its importance. George 
stated that he would support his nephews’ education so that they will not “disturb” him later on 
by remaining dependent. Very often, family support is expected from the family members. This 
sometimes came to be seen as a strain for the respondents. Joy had been the most outspoken on 
the issue: 
“I hate this social responsibility; I hate it. I feel like it is one of the things that has kept 
us Africans in poverty.” (Joy) 
She comes from a destitute family, her father abandoned the family, and the mother had to leave 
the country to look for work, leaving her children with a friend (for more details see the case story 
on p.278). Joy could not count on any support from the family but got her education through a 
well-meaning nun and finally through a government scholarship. While she is in steady 
employment now, the most dramatic change in her income situation was her relationship with a 
wealthy man. So, while he pays for most of the expenditure at home, she uses her salary to help 
her family. Her mother got sick, and now she is the one who has to see her siblings through school. 
Sarah is financially helped by her children, and in return, she helps out some other relatives of 
her. She describes her financial situation as such: 
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“We have many relatives and most of us we are very poor. […] If I was alone, if I didn’t 
have those extended family, when I am by myself, that money could maintain me. 
Except, the problem [is] expensive relatives, those extended family, they are difficult.” 
(Sarah) 
Her case shows the brokerage going on in the negotiation of dependencies. While her daughter 
could support those relatives and she would be off the hook, this solution does not seem 
acceptable because then she would not give any help to anybody. 
In most cases, the respondents do not suffer so much from helping their family, even if it is not 
easy for them. Some even do not perceive it as a pressure at all, which will very much depend on 
the financial situation of the respondent and of the wider family. Some authors argue that PCC 
churches are particularly appealing to new middle classes because they allow them to break with 
their kin and hence free themselves from social obligations towards them (cf Lindhardt, 2010). 
We believe that these arguments undermine the agency of those subjected to family contributions. 
From our interviews, we instead got the impression that there was negotiation involved 
concerning the extent of help given. Pamela has barely enough income to get through the month 
herself. She explained: 
“I don’t feel happy when my family asks for money, but I cannot say no when I am not 
willing, only when I really don’t have. Unless I know it is not a serious issue, but not if 
someone’s life is depending on it.” (Pamela) 
This quote shows that she very well evaluates the severity of the problem before giving money 
and she also has the option to decline if she feels that she cannot spare any money. Raphael 
describes this as “You have to learn how to disappoint people here”, referring to the constant 
demands made on him. Innocent responded when asked about his budgeting: “The Bible says, 
whatever you get, give some, spend some, and save some. So, it is a principle.” He then continues 
explaining that he has at any time at least five relatives depending on him and he confesses not 
using mobile money on his phone because it would make it too easy to send the money, as soon 
as someone calls and asks for a small sum of money. Instead, he can reply that he would have to 
go and look for the next mobile money kiosk to make the transferal and that this is not a good 
moment right now. By this indirect refusal, he can reduce financial pressure on him, again, for 
demands that do not seem to be vital. Nelson described that he would connect young boys from 
his family to construction companies in town, so that they would be able to earn an income and 
reduce expectations from his family on him: “Instead of looking at me, they look at them for 
support.” 
So, while the respondents may not give out their money enthusiastically to their family, they are 
not victim to a rapacious family either. They know about the importance of their contribution, and 
they are willing to accept their social responsibility. However, they are also able to protect 
themselves from requests they deem inappropriate. Hence, support to the family is not a single 
road, but a bargain within the person and with their relatives (see also Kroeker, 2017, p. 293). 
Thus, networks provide an essential safety net for the respondents from which they can draw 
material, emotional, and social support. To be strategically well-placed within such networks is a 
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crucial factor of stabilizing a middle income position. These networks can be based on traditional 
solidarities, such as kinship, but they can also transcend these. Knowing that they cannot rely on 
their less privileged extended families, middle income groups seek to diversify their support 
network (Kroeker, 2017, p. 295). In alumni groupings, networks are entertained that evolve 
around similar education (and age), in women networks gender is a basis for mutual support (see 
Tripp, 1994), and sometimes the networks are established in regard to income. However, as the 
analysis of the leisure activities shows, these categories of networks are not exclusive. They can 
easily overlap, as is the case with the middle-aged, Western-dominated, Anglican, women’s group 
of Mother’s Union (see p. 257). Hence, we need to bear in mind concerning our analysis that 
identities are not unidimensional. 
*** 
In relation to the ascension to or maintaining of a middle income position, we have seen through 
our data that the theme of vulnerability and its mitigation had been central. Hence, the picture 
drawn here, shows that leaving poverty is a process that often unwinds over several generations, 
and is not unidirectional, but may include down- as well as upward mobility. Thus, those who have 
come from privileged backgrounds are the least exposed to vulnerability because of the assets 
their parents can give, regarding education, financial assistance in times of hardship and also 
connections with influential people. On the contrary, those without meaningful family assistance 
and other external help struggle the most to advance themselves economically. Catalysts for 
economic emergence can be external factors such as receiving a scholarship from an NGO or 
religious organization. But even those are not necessarily targeted to the most destitute, but again 
to those who are the best connected within the local community and thus the most likely to learn 
about the opportunity. 
Singling out decisive factors that are necessary for economic emergence allows us to have a more 
honest debate about those that have left poverty and their needs, instead of a celebration of the 
emerging African middle class. Chances are not equally distributed, as the examples have shown. 
For a broader-based middle income group to emerge, the responsibility of the state has to be 
brought back in focus. In a well-functioning educational and labor market system having a sponsor 
for education or being well-connected lose centrality because educational opportunities are more 
accessible for everyone and jobs are distributed on merit (Ferreira, 2013, p. 50). If this is not the 
case, social advancement is not open to anyone but will remain with those who are already 
privileged. 
The crucial turning point between the respondents seems to be the awareness that they are not 
vulnerable anymore, and this has been present only in the UMC and UC, where people know they 
have sufficient reliances that protect them in case of unforeseen hardships. Kroeker has shown in 
her work that the middle class in Kenya occupies a privileged position, because it can draw on a 
mix of several methods for assuring their social security, such as government-provided welfare 
schemes, private insurances and social networks (Kroeker, 2017, p. 278). We have observed 
similar tendencies, especially regarding government schemes and social networks. Perceiving 
oneself as vulnerable (and here the subjective perception is more decisive than actual income) 
will affect people’s behavior. They will strive to feel as economically secure as possible, by 
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directing their consumption towards the choices that help them construct their economic safety, 
as we shall discuss in the next chapter.
  
8 Consumption and Expenditure 
When trying to point out common characteristics of these middle income groups (besides their 
income range), it is helpful to look at their consumption patterns. Using net income as a definition 
for middle class categorization has several shortcomings, as has been pointed out before in 
chapter 2.2 and measuring consumption can be one way to overcome them. Chinganya et al. 
(2015) consider measuring consumption to be the most reliable welfare indicator. They compared 
the consumption of the fourth to ninth decile of the population, in 19 different countries over a 
period of ten years, using the PovCalNet Database from the World Bank. For Uganda, the data 
reveal a positive trend in consumption over the last years. Using expenditure data, however, still 
runs the risk of high measurement error, due to misreporting and, especially in African countries, 
unreliable and infrequent data (Jerven, 2016; Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 401). Asset indexes have 
the capacity to draw a more nuanced picture of inclusive growth (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). 
According to Johnston & Abreu asset indexes already revealed a growth of wealth in Africa at the 
beginning of the 1990s, when the common narrative on the continent was one of doom (Johnston 
& Abreu, 2016, p. 400). Using assets derived from the Demographic Health Surveys in several 
African countries, Sahn & Stifel conclude that poverty has been declining in the 1990s, particularly 
in rural areas (Sahn & Stifel, 2000, p. 2152). And Young, equally working with the Demographic 
Health Surveys observes that “real household consumption in Africa is growing between 3.4 to 3.7 
percent per annum [1990-2006] i.e. three and a half to four times the 0.9 to 1.1 percent reported in 
international data sources.” (Young, 2012, p. 698) All authors suggest that the reliability of data in 
Africa is a problem and believe that asset indexes can paint a more accurate picture. These 
observations underline our assumptions that we indeed witness a slow decline of poverty over 
time. However, this does not in itself allow to conclude that a middle class is emerging. With these 
suggestions in mind, our analysis of economic stratification will, therefore, triangulate our 
qualitative findings with data from the most recent National Household Surveys and various asset 
indexes. By doing so, we hope to provide a nuanced picture of consumption and expenditure 
behavior. We use the subgroups proposed by the AfDB to highlight changes in consumption 
behavior that are related to changing income. 
In the 2012 dataset, we asked respondents what their household main expenditure was, in the 
2014 dataset we deduced the principal expenditures from the budget overview given. Since we 
assume that most people have an accurate estimation of their most significant spendings, we 
imagine that the answers would have been similar to our calculated output in 2014. When treated 
as equal, the 2012 and 2014 results show that by far the biggest perceived spending is still on food 
(indicated by 55% of the respondents), followed by education (27% of answers). Other significant 
budget items are transport and housing; health, business, and other items yielded only very few 
responses. 
When looking at income classes, the picture gets somewhat refined. The percentage of people who 
would call food their main expenditure decreases within the middle classes (FC to UMC). At the 
same time, the number of people stating rent and housing as their main expenditure increases, 
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and transport, not having been named by the poor and FC becomes a relevant expenditure item 
for the LMC to UC. This increase is probably due to more people owning a car and thus spending 
more money on gas and maintenance than those using public transport or even walking. Thus, 
with increasing income the willingness increases as well to spend on items that are beyond mere 
(felt) necessities, such as comfortable housing (discussed in chapter 8.3) or personal transport 
(see chapter 8.4). However, one of the primary concerns in spending habits remains education, 
which is in line with our observations made earlier (see chapter 7.3). This focus becomes possible, 
once the burden to spend money on food decreases, as we shall see. 
8.1 Food Expenditure25 
Food expenditure is a necessity for everyone, but it can also become a marker of wealth, a 
possibility of distinction through consumption. However, with increasing budgets, the percentage 
of money spent on food will decrease. Thus, while it may remain the main expenditure (depending 
on the percentage spent on other items), we see that, nevertheless, in the smaller sample of the 
2014 interviews, the percentage of income spend on food tends towards zero (see Figure 21). 
The figure above shows data from 17 households of all income groups collected in 2014. On the 
                                                 
25 This sub-chapter is a revised version of an analysis made for l’Institut français des relations internationals (IFRI) in 
2016 and reused with permission from the IFRI. For the original text see Fichtmüller (2016). 
 
in
 ´0
00
 U
G
X 
Figure 20: Food Expenditure and Total Income per Household 
Consumption and Expenditure 147 
 
horizontal axis, each number represents one household of the sample. The purple squares 
describe the households’ expenditure on food, varying roughly around 300 000 UGX 
(approximately $130), while total incomes – represented by the orange diamonds – differ 
significantly from one household to another. It is striking how little the expenditure on food varies, 
despite the higher amount of money at disposal. 
Figure 21 uses the same data but depicts the food expenses as a percentage of the total household 
income. It illustrates, as stated before, that whereas the households with less income spend a 
substantial share on food, those of the UMC and UC use only a fraction of their income – showing 
that a surplus in money is not necessarily invested in food consumption. 
Albeit the percentage of income spent on food decreases, it is still widely considered to be the 
primary household expenditure among all strata. Because food is still perceived to be the most 
significant financial burden for the majority of the respondents, conscious choices are made to cut 
down on food expenditure to alleviate budget strains and to be able to invest the surplus 
somewhere else. Similarly, the upbringing and acquired tastes affect their food expenditure 
decisions. Hence, the middle income groups do not spend more on food simply because they earn 
more. Through the interviews the following reasons could be found: 
a) Nutrition habits only change slowly 
When asked about their diet, most interviewees responded to rely mainly on local food, such as 
rice, maize, plantains, beans, cabbage, or tomatoes. Even though imported food like pizza, cheese 
or ice cream can be bought in the big supermarkets, they do not constitute an essential part of the 
daily menu. For those of the lower end of the middle income groups, they remain too expensive. 
Even for the UMC such items are “special treats” and are rarely consumed. Sophie Chevalier points 
out that even though eating is a way to express lifestyle, it is also part of more persistent identities, 
usually formed in early stages in life and “this changes more slowly than our willingness to 
Figure 21: Food Expenditure as Percentage of Total Household Income 
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experiment with fast foods imported from around the globe.” (Chevalier, 2015, p. 119) Eating 
imported food becomes hence a form of conspicuous consumption for the Ugandan UMC – a 
deliberate choice made because one can afford it but remains far from being integrated into the 
regular menu. Local markets are, therefore, the principal food shopping places for all the 
respondents. Small grocery stores are used to supplement the basics bought on the market by 
everyday items like sugar, bread or margarine. Big supermarkets or shopping malls are mostly 
avoided. Even someone who can afford to shop in the supermarket is not necessarily interested 
in doing so because the imported foods do not correspond to their eating habits. The pattern 
changes, however, depending on the type of product bought. Especially for electronic equipment 
people will more likely buy them in supermarkets or abroad if they can afford to do so and have 
the necessary contacts. 
b) “Health consciousness” among the higher income range 
The Uganda National Household Survey establishes a correlation: the number of meals taken per 
day goes up in accordance with the rise in income (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014). In our 
sample, the relation is not as straightforward since the respondents who declared to take only one 
meal per day are evenly distributed among the income classes. Money can be an explanation, but 
this can also be attributed to a lack of time due to a stressful working day or for health reasons, 
such as the desire to control weight or blood pressure. The “healthy” choice often seems to consist 
of skipping an unhealthy meal instead of replacing it by a healthy one. Most interviewees eat meat 
only rarely, in general once a week. Some because they lack the means to do so, others because 
they choose to do so due to its reputation of being unhealthy. With rising income and education, 
awareness of the risk of unhealthy eating rises as well, making meat consumption, therefore, not 
a proportional indicator of wealth. Besides, among the younger members of the middle income 
groups, other lifestyle choices have to be taken into account: for example, the redefinition of 
beauty norms, corresponding to an accrued interest in weight loss. As a result, nearly half of 
university graduates take only two meals per day, and one-third eats meat only once per week. 
Regarding gender, however, there are no significant differences in the number of meals and the 
amount of meat consumed. 
c) The availability of agricultural exploitation 
Thirdly, many of the individuals with higher income have access to arable land, usually possessing 
it and letting someone exploit it on their behalf. The harvest may be used for resale, but it is equally 
a mean to supplement individual needs, therefore, cutting the budget considerably lower. 
Particularly if the land available for agriculture is small, food supplementing is preferred over 
agriculture for resale.  
d) Seeking ways to save on food expenditure 
Related to the aforementioned point is the search for ways to cut on food expenditure. This 
involves, as pointed out before, buying on local markets, buying in bulk or sometimes buying in 
the villages. In the case of Arthur, this search turned into a sophisticated system. Arthur, a 
representative of the LMC, sends money via mobile money to the village, where someone in return 
puts the food on a bus and sends it to Kampala, without anyone having to go to the village to get 
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the food. Other ways to cut back on food expenditure involve limiting the amount of fish, or meat 
consumed, or of bread, margarine, and other non-vital food commodities. In the same vein, if 
people are eating out regularly, they do so in local restaurants; hotel restaurants or fast food 
chains are only visited occasionally as a “special treat”. However, eating in restaurants remains a 
privilege of unmarried men and UMC. Because the priority to mitigate vulnerability goes up to the 
UMC, the tendency to save on food expenditure, or at least to shop parsimoniously is widespread 
among the entire income stratum. Big supermarkets, like Shoprite or Nakumatt, are mostly 
avoided because they are perceived as too expensive, regardless of the income of most 
respondents. Knowing that supposedly cheaper alternatives exist nearby, it seems unwise to 
“waste” money in such a place. The surplus is instead saved and invested somewhere else. 
Innocent, who is among the best-earning interviewees, responds to the question of the shopping 
place: 
“Usually, I buy my groceries / depends on where I am currently oscillating [income 
wise, between poor and middle class]. But, you know, if you have an economic sense, 
these are things you look at. We have different grades of markets, where the poor 
shop, where another group of poor shop, where poor of my character shop and then 
there are these shopping malls. You look at where you get the things in an economic 
sense. When I need groceries, I cannot go to the shopping malls, no.” (Innocent) 
Studies from IFRI (2012) and CFAO (2015) come to similar conclusions concerning the reticence 
of all but the highest income groups to go for shopping in big supermarkets. The CFAO observes 
that supermarkets are 
“[…] a place that one plans to go to rather than a store well-suited to everyday 
shopping needs. […] Nevertheless, supermarkets are visited less frequently due to 
their less central location, the added time needed to do one’s shopping and the 
(sometimes mistaken) idea that their products are more expensive than those in small 
shops.” (CFAO, 2015, p. 27) 
And Quénot-Suarez (2012) adds as an additional explanation the difficulty of payment, a reason 
equally evoked by our respondents, particularly those of the lower echelons: whereas prices are 
negotiable in small shops and items can be bought on credit, these options are not available in 
supermarkets, making them again less attractive. Those who do shop there belong to the upper 
end and would do so out of convenience: because all the products needed can be found in one 
place, and parking is available. This makes them attractive to car owners. On the other hand, for 
those not having a car shopping in a shopping mall turns out to be more hassle, as they are usually 
not located in residential areas, but rather at big streets, contrary to local markets which can often 
be found within walking distance. Bearing in mind, that the density of car owners still is quite low, 
shopping in the big supermarkets often represents a more impractical choice for most people. 
Yet, the convenience of parking does not in itself guarantee that car owners will buy there. Most 
affluent people, instead of going to the supermarket would adopt grocery buying strategies to 
their needs. One prominent example are the street vendors, selling necessities, fruits, vegetables, 
or other food to those stuck in the traffic jam (see also Quénot-Suarez, 2012, p. 19). John, an 
entrepreneur from the UMC, explained how he perfected this system with one of the vendors at 
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the local markets: he would send him his grocery list in advance and transfer the money via mobile 
money. In the evening when passing by at the market, the vendor would hand him the bags 
through his car window. 
The difference in food expenditure of the middle income groups interviewed and the average 
Ugandan (9% of the budget vs. 34%) confirms the observations of Chinganya et al.: food becomes 
an increasingly smaller item of the overall budget. This trend is well documented among different 
nations and different periods. Already in 1887, the economist Ernst Engel undertook a study 
among Belgian households and concluded that for those with the lowest income, the highest share 
is spent on physical needs, such as food and shelter and with rising income the expenditures for 
luxury, religious and intellectual items increase (Engel, 1887). The interpretations brought 
forward in this section give some reasons why people do not necessarily spend a higher 
percentage of money on food if they have a higher income. Even though more money might be 
available, household budgets are still tight. Because they still consider themselves struggling, they 
will deploy various techniques to keep their food expenditure as low as possible. In her work on 
the South African middle class, Sophie Chevalier observed that especially the lower middle classes 
still feel precarious and that this is equally reflected in their food buying habits (Chevalier, 2015, 
p. 120). Hence, to counter these feelings of economic vulnerability, consumers will go to great 
lengths to save on food expenditure, through the various ways mentioned here. In our sample, it 
is striking that the efforts to limit the food budget do not seem restricted to the lower echelons of 
our respondents, but even present among the upper middle and upper class. Instead, the 
techniques of saving change. The poorest, for example, are not able to buy in bulk because they do 
not have sufficient daily disposable income. This is equally reflected by the possibility to buy 
everything in small units, such as single cigarettes, single rolls of toilet paper, single diapers, small 
size packages of laundry detergent, or small units of telephone credit. An entire market is focused 
on people with only very little disposable daily income and adapted to cater for their needs 
according to their means. In the same vein, buying in bulk or hunting for bargains requires a car, 
to facilitate transport. Again, this option is only available to those better off. The lowest strata can 
mainly limit their budget by cutting off all items not deemed vital and reducing the food intake. 
But, as already outlined before, these indicators are not straightforward, as even those who can 
afford to have several meals a day or eat meat on a regular basis do not necessarily do so, but for 
different reasons. This places the Ugandan middle income groups somewhere “in between”. They 
are on the cusp between their humble backgrounds, that will contribute to the consumption 
choices they make, and the possibility to afford new lifestyles. They also find themselves between 
the vulnerability of falling back into poverty and new opportunities and aspirations that have 
come with the rising disposable income. As a result, choices for surplus spending concentrate on 
advancement, either their own or that of their children. It indicates also that the middle income 
groups may not be the promising new market, at least not for comestible goods, and at least not 
for now (see also CFAO, 2015, p. 39). 
8.2 Education 
Instead of food, most of the surplus income is invested into education: among our 2014 sample, 
the average household will allocate nearly 20% of the budget to education. Education is one of the 
most robust indicators of future income (Kunene et al., 2015, p. 140) and Ugandans are well-aware 
Consumption and Expenditure 151 
 
of this fact. The middle income groups are putting much effort into securing good education: either 
through continuing their education, in forms of higher or different courses, or through investing 
in their children’s education. Even though more expensive, the middle income groups prefer 
private instead of public schools. Also, when asked, most respondents name education as priority 
for their children. However, especially in tertiary education, school fees are rising while the 
possibilities to obtain government scholarships are declining. Gathering the funds to pay is still a 
challenge for many. Therefore, education will most likely remain a preoccupation even for the less 
vulnerable. 
Among the 23 interviewees of 2014, five recorded their highest expenditures on school fees, in 
some cases for themselves, but mostly for their children and other dependents. Most of them 
would come from the upper middle and upper class. The average figure compiled to 700 000 UGX 
($280) on education expenditure, representing one-fifth of the monthly budget. When taking into 
account the dataset of 2012 as well, the figure lowers to an average spending of 540 000 UGX 
($216) in total on education per month. This finding is contradictory to the results mentioned 
above, however. When asked what demanded the most significant share of their budget, most 
respondents answered food. It reveals the necessity to gather more precise data on the issue. Is 
the underreporting due to the impression that more money is spent on food because the spending 
is more regular (on a daily or weekly basis, compared to once per term or semester)? We also 
have to take into account that variation, in this case, is very strong, depending on the age of the 
educated child. Pre- and primary school education is comparatively cheap, contrary to secondary, 
and even more so tertiary education, quickly skyrocketing expenditures per semester. It also 
hides nuances, since some respondents may seek help in paying the school fees from other 
relatives, but when asked they might only indicate the general tuition fee, not the share covered 
by them. Nevertheless, the data reveals linearity between the income class and the money spent 
on education: the higher the class, the more money is spent on education. Equally, the number of 
people for whom education is paid, apart from own children, increases with income range. 
Hence, it is safe to assume that the middle income groups have more capacity to spend money on 
education. Some indicators are their preference for private instead of public schools, the priority 
of education for their children and the positive correlation found between income and investment 
in children’s education (Strode et al., 2015, p. 92). Besides Kunene et al. point out that countries 
with higher education levels also have a more significant middle class (Kunene et al., 2015, p. 140). 
This is often represented as the middle class valuing education more than others, a statement that 
should be used with caution. From our findings, it becomes clear that there is much awareness of 
the importance of education in securing a good job, a positive correlation that is confirmed all 
throughout social sciences' literature (Strode et al., 2015, p. 90). What differs is the extent to which 
this can be realized by the respondents (evident through the correlation between income and 
money spent on school fees). Having had someone to step in to pay for school fees when the 
parents were not capable, has proven as a turning point in the social trajectories of many 
respondents. Vice versa, the failure to do so has, in the respondents' view, hindered them from 
attaining a more stable economic position. Similarly, one support that nearly all respondents 
would give, irrespective of their own income, was paying school fees for some relative. Much more 
than giving cash handouts this was the most common form of support given to the extended 
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family, reflecting the general awareness throughout all economic strata of the importance of 
education, especially secondary and tertiary. 
Case Story: “From a P7 Nobody to being a graduate, with the capacity to attract a 
graduate and even go to church and wed” 
Nelson was born into a family of peasant farmers in 1976 in a village in Western 
Uganda. His mother was the fifth of seven wives of his father, and neither parent was 
able to support his studies. After having completed P7 with some delays due to the 
lack of school fees, he stopped schooling in 1991 to work in masonry. However, 
because he had political ambitions and feared that his low education level would be 
turned against him and because he always considered himself an intellectual, he 
decided to continue his studies. In 1998, he agreed with a headmaster to allow him to 
sit for O-Level exams, even though he had not attended Secondary School Form I-IV. 
He caught up on the material covered and passed the exams, allowing him to continue 
with A-Level. He then made an arrangement to work on the school farm and repair 
the school buildings to pay for his tuition. He finished his A-Levels in 2000 and came 
to Kampala in 2002, to work as a contractor around town. By doing so, he earned some 
more money and in 2003/04 he applied for the Bachelor of Political Science and 
Philosophy at Makerere University. Two dead years in between his studies allowed 
him to gather the money needed and Nelson finally graduated from Makerere in 2009. 
For him, having managed, against all odds to educate himself, has been a major 
transformation in his life: “This is a person, five years or six a P7 nobody, [...] with some 
tools building in town there, but he is now a graduate, with the capacity to attract a 
graduate and even to go to church and wed.” Also, his ambitions do not stop there. At 
the time of the interview he was campaigning for the NRM primaries, but once his 
financial situation stabilizes again, he has plans to continue with a master and even a 
Ph.D. “In ten years, I see myself a leader [...], an opinion leader, an academician, a writer, 
with a family that is ready to conquer the world.” 
Nelson’s story shows the individual value of education and the difficulties of continuing higher 
education if the support of the family is lacking. It requires more determination, seeking special 
arrangements adapted to the personal situation, accepting temporary setbacks and a prolonged 
period of financial instability to achieve a long-term goal. Having had this life trajectory makes 
Nelson, he believes, a suitable leader because he knows the needs of the small people since he has 
come from a humble background. It has also led him to pay the school fees for a stranger, a girl he 
picked interest in because she was smart but not able to afford to pay school fees and who 
reminded him of himself: “The very feelings I had about education, I am transferring them to her, 
that at least you can extend a hand to someone.” 
There are several stories similar to the case mentioned here, where the interviewee had only been 
able to get the education he or she was aspiring for because they have shown some persistence. 
However, it is also proof of the lack of opportunities if one has not at least some higher education. 
Moreover, it underpins the importance of the parents and extended family who would in many 
cases step in and pay for tuition; which in Nelson’s case was lacking. As the respondents of 2014 
indicated, in 25% of the cases, the parents paid the tuition, followed by the extended family and a 
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state scholarship (both 17%). Own efforts or a private sponsor or scholarship would be relevant 
in 21% of the cases. 
The government has implemented some educational policies, such as the Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) in 1997 as a commitment to attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 
This has led to an increase in primary school enrollment, attaining 94% in 2011 (UNESCO, 2014, 
p. 352 f). In 2007 the government launched the Universal Secondary Education (USE) program, 
guaranteeing free secondary education in the first cycle. As a result, secondary enrollment has 
more than doubled in the period between 1999 and 2011 (ibid.). Both programs allow receiving 
free education (apart from paying for school fees and uniforms which for the poorest can already 
present an obstacle), but often at the cost of the quality of education, which has made those who 
can afford, to concentrate entirely on private schools. Hence, 13% of students in primary 
education are enrolled in private institutions (UNESCO, 2014, p. 352). Data on secondary 
enrollment in private institutions is not available in the “Education for all” report of UNESCO. In 
our research, no distinction between primary and secondary school had been made, the level of 
private enrollments is significantly higher, though, on average of 86%. The figure below details 
the percentage according to income class: 
In contrast to the nationwide figures, this reveals once again the privileged position of the middle 
income groups or even those that are qualified as poor in this sample. The substantially higher 
enrollment in private schools, even among the LMC is a testimony of the availability of private 
schools on the one hand and the higher spending power compared to rural environments on the 
other. Not surprising, but very telling as well, is the disappearance altogether of public schools in 
the UMC and UC. This emphasizes the withdrawal of the wealthy from poorly functioning state 
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institutions. Even though we have not explicitly inquired on that point, similar behavior can be 
observed in the health sector. Because institutions offered by the state are considered of poor 
quality, those who can afford to pay a higher price but receive a better service instead will do so. 
The logic that we can find in food buying patterns, to save as much as possible, does not apply to 
education, where everyone will go to great lengths to get the best service possible. 
However, insufficient state funding for tertiary education remains a challenge for many of the 
lower groups. Oliver Provini has shown in his Ph.D. dissertation how public funding of universities 
in East Africa has deteriorated since the implementation of the structural adjustment programs 
in the 1980s (Provini, 2015, p. 398). Concomitantly, the demand for higher education has risen, 
due to higher levels of secondary school completion. Yet, the budget allocated by the government 
has consistently been below what the academic staff of the university deemed necessary. As a 
result, entry to public university has been restricted, and tuition fees have gained importance to 
offset lack of funding (ibid.). Uganda’s oldest university, Makerere University at Kampala, has 
become increasingly reliant on tuition fees paid by private students. In 2008, they accounted for 
60% of Makerere’s overall budget, contrary to 17% in 1995 (ibid, p. 410). These evolutions have 
left an impact on the middle income groups as well. Whereas 17% of our respondents were able 
to go to university funded by the government, most of them pay tuition fees for their children, 
relatives or themselves nowadays, or they do not go to university because they lack the means. 
Government scholarships are still available, they are supposed to be allocated based on academic 
performance, but the attribution is not always transparent, and the demand is continuously rising. 
Since tertiary education is expensive, it represents a big burden in the individual’s budgets. This 
has led to diverse financing mechanisms, like only having evening or morning classes to work 
part-time, not finishing a degree in one straight go, but pausing in between the years to gather 
more money, or making a first degree, than starting to work in a job (not necessarily related to 
the field of the first degree), than doing a master’s or a post graduate with more relation to the 
field of working. However, it also marks a shift in the generational expectations of continued 
economic emergence. With increasing reliance on private funding, social upward mobility within 
a generation becomes restricted, and social status will be more determined by the family’s 
financial position. Similar to the insertion into various networks, the family’s ability to pay for 
tuition becomes a decisive point for the future economic emergence. 
8.3 Housing 
Especially in Kampala, housing is a problem, since the demand is high due to rapid urbanization. 
Nyakaana et al. (2007) estimate the annual population growth rate of the capital at 5.61%26. This 
makes Kampala one of the fastest growing cities on the continent (Nyakaana, Sengendo, & Lwasa, 
2007). Since urban development cannot keep pace with growth, in 2006 the estimated housing 
gap amounted to approximately 300 000 houses, according to the authors. While there have been 
several policy initiatives, such as the Condominium Property Act 200127 and slum upgrading 
                                                 
26 In comparison, annual national population growth was 3%. (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016) 
27 The law was passed as an attempt to tackle the housing deficit by developing estates in some Kampala residential 
areas. However, demand had been nominal, in 2007 only about 100 titles had been issued under the act. There might 
be several explanations, but among others it is assumed that the condominiums offered are too expensive for the 
average Ugandan, foreseeing installments of approximately 2 million shilling per month (Hinamundi, 2013).  
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projects, the demands are still high. Informal settlements (usually referred to as slums) are the 
principal type of housing in Kampala, giving shelter to more than half of the population (ibid.). 
These tenements are called “mizigo” (singular: “muzigo”) and consist of usually a single room, at 
the most two, without sanitation facilities inside the house (by the interviewees described as not 
self-contained), in a slum area. From our observations, it seems that even the simplest housings 
are still concrete and brick constructions, being somewhat permanent structures. This correlates 
with the finding of the UNHS 2013, indicating that in Kampala 96% of houses had iron sheet 
roofing28, 81% were constructed with bricks, and 85% had concrete floors (UNHS p. 123). Because 
Kampala is built on hills, the high class neighborhoods are built uphill, and the slums are 
concentrated in the wetlands, usually being flooded during rain season, leading to “poverty hot 
spots” marked by high density and low income (Nyakaana et al., 2007, p. 18). It does, however, 
also increase the proximity between the rich and the poor. Michael Lofchie points out that before 
the old middle class was geographically living on a different side of a city than the poor, therefore, 
assuring some social peace because inequalities were not as visible. Now the proximity will lead 
to more awareness among the poor of their social status, becoming, therefore, a possible source 
of unrest (Lofchie, p.53). 
Case Story: ComPol Muyenga 
LC 1 II is the local chairman of one of the more affluent neighborhoods in Kampala, 
situated on one of Kampala’s hills. However, due to demographic pressures, more and 
more people have settled in the area down the hill, in informal settlements, in 
proximity to the uphill neighborhood. Over the years, an increase in crime has been 
observed, which led the chairman to start a community policing initiative, with the 
goal “to reduce the gap between those who don’t have and those who have. Those who 
have, we can call them the middle class. Which we don’t have in Uganda, but let’s assume. 
And the poor. Because we established that one of the biggest causes of crime is based on 
the theory of different social classes. The poor blaming the middle class for their 
problem, therefore, they justify actions on them, by stealing, attacking, assault, what 
not.” Among other aspects, they started charity programs for the people downhill, 
collected old toys and clothes, sometimes money, to distribute them in the downhill 
settlements. According to him, it worked: “Muyenga became safer because the mothers 
told their children: why do you steal from them, when they are our friends, they are 
helping us, they are giving us money to start our business, they help.” Apparently, 
however, now the neighboring quarter of Bugolobi reported an increased incidence 
of crime. 
Apart from the LC’s vision of the social stratification of Kampala, the case story illustrates the 
tensions brought about by the increasing visibility of inequality. Thus, it is not surprising to see 
security becoming a concern for many of the middle income groups, particularly in the higher 
echelons (discussed in more detail in chapter 15.4). 
                                                 
28 None of the houses in Kampala would have thatched roofs, being more prone to disease-causing agents. The 
remaining 4% constitute tin, asbestos or concrete. 
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House ownership remains an aspiration for many but becomes increasingly challenging. The 
majority of the people (60% of our interviewees) are renting, contrary to 28% of house owners, 
but many have intentions to build. This leaves the middle income groups slightly above Kampala 
average (24%) but compared to the nationwide figure of 78% the number is low. This is not 
surprising since demands are much higher in the capital than anywhere else in the country (UNHS 
2013, p. 104). When sorted by income group, the figure of housing remains somewhat 
inconclusive, however. 
 
Figure 23: Living Conditions by Income Group 
We do witness a decline in renting and an increase in house ownership, but in every income group, 
renting prevails over owning a house. Because the people in the sample are rather young, we can 
assume that the part of future house owners will be higher since many voiced their intention to 
build. Thus, it is more a matter of time, than a matter of money. If arranged for age rather than 
income, this assumption can be confirmed. 
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Figure 24: Living Conditions by Age Group 
Here a sharp increase in house ownership can be observed for the group of the 36-45-year-olds. 
The trend is not linear, though, because again house ownership decreases for the age groups of 
46-60 and >60. The sample sizes (5 and 2) are too limited here, making the data more volatile to 
outliers. Hence, we intend not to make a statistical regression, but use our data for an informed 
guess and provide a plausible explanation for our observations. The data reveals the strongest 
correlation of house ownership and age for the age group of 36-45, people who are well-
established in their respective careers and as parents, thus increasing the need for a house and at 
the same time providing the best means to afford one. This correlation is more robust than 
between high income groups and house ownership, which in any class never exceeds 50% of the 
respondents. 
Even for those who are renting in Kampala cost of housing is an important issue. In general, the 
most basic living conditions consist of a single room, not self-contained. All respondents lived in 
permanent brick and cement structures, and all of them have access to electricity. This kind of 
habitation, generally used by the poor, costs 100 000 UGX ($40) per month in the various slum 
areas of Kampala. For a cheaper place to stay one has to move to the outskirts of Kampala, but 
thereby directly increasing the cost of transportation. For those who are commuting every day, 
this then becomes a considerable share of their budget. 
On average, rent in our 2014 survey is approximately 250 000 UGX ($100). Essential variations 
here are of course depending on the size of the house and its location, with the highest rents being 
in Entebbe (Rose, Kato, George, and Abdul). As seen in Table 10, however, there is some linearity: 
with increasing income, money spent on rent will increase as well. 
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 Total Household Income in 
UGX 
Rent in UGX 
Jude 200.000 150.000 
Pamela 300.000 100.000 
Oliver 300.000 100.000 
Elly 420.000 350.000 
Gordon 480.000 100.000 
Herbert 500.000 0 
Nicole 580.000 0 
Jennifer 660.000 200.000 
Rose 1.200.000 400.000 
Kato 1.200.000 400.000 
Sarah 1.670.000 0 
Nelson 1.825.000 250.000 
Alex 2.000.000 0 
Arthur 2.427.000 250.000 
Elisabeth 2.790.000 500.000 
Josephine 5.250.000 500.000 
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Joy 5.350.000 0 
Andrew 6.225.000 0 
Innocent 9.250.000 0 
Abdul 10.630.000 650.000 
George 13.000.000 500.000 
Table 9: Total Income and Rent Expenditure 
The table shows the indications given by respondents on their total household income and the 
amount of money spent on rent. Contrary to food expenditure, which remains somewhat stable 
across income groups, it becomes evident that people are willing to spend an income surplus on 
housing. Moreover, rough categorizations are possible on which class will spend how much: for 
the poor and floating class seem to opt for the cheapest housing possible, paying around 100 – 
150 000 UGX ($40-60). Outliers here are Elly, who is living with 24 other people and thus cannot 
be contented with a single room, like many other of the poor and floating class do, and Rose and 
Kato (a couple) who are living in Entebbe. They were the only ones in this sample who would 
consistently live above their means. The LMC spends between 200 000 and 500 000 UGX ($80-
200) and UMC and UC 500 000 UGX ($200) and above on rent. The number of those not paying 
rent at all is increasing at the top, since many of them can afford to have their own houses. Again, 
beyond income, age plays an important role here as well, as many of the respondents, regardless 
of their current subclass, foster plans of buying a plot of land and slowly constructing their own 
house. Similarly, two respondents are still lodged by their parents and thus do not have to pay, 
and another one’s rent is paid by her daughter. Also, needs for housing rise with increasing age, 
whether the accommodation has to provide sufficient room for a single person, or an entire family 
will equally impact rent expenditure. The South African Advertising Research Foundation 
(SAARF) has noted the importance to stratify according to life stages, in order to understand socio-
economic differentiation. Their research has shown that young, independent singles are more 
likely to live in single rooms or flats than the rest of the population, whereas young or mature 
families and mature couples will most likely be living in a house (SAARF, n.d.) This pattern is 
confirmed in our findings. While people can cut on expenditure according to where they choose 
to stay, there seems to be some consistency in the amount of rent according to the income ranges. 
It is possible to discern different types of housing, equipment, and rent according to the income 
group:  
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 Dwelling Equipment Rent (approx.) 
Poor and FC Single room, often in 
informal settlements; 
unless it is a family, 
then small houses 
Not self-contained; 
kitchen outside; 
cooking with 
charcoal; TV, kettle 
100 000 – 150 000 
LMC Houses, one to three 
bedrooms, often 
somewhat outside 
KLA 
Self-contained or not; 
kitchen inside, 
cooking with 
charcoal, sometimes 
gas; TV, kettle, fridge 
200 000 – 250 000 
UMC Houses within KLA, 
two to three 
bedrooms 
Self-contained, 
kitchen inside, 
cooking with gas, 
sometimes charcoal; 
within a fenced 
compound; TV, 
kettle, fridge 
500 000 
UC Houses within KLA or 
EBB, two to four 
bedrooms; furnished 
apartments in KLA 
Self-contained, 
kitchen inside, 
cooking with gas, 
sometimes charcoal, 
fridge, microwave 
≥500 000 
Table 10: Living Conditions According to Income Group 
More resilient to geographical variations, household equipment may provide a more systematic 
marker of wealth. Johnston & Abreu (2016) have pointed out the various advantages of using asset 
indexes to measure wealth in Africa. They are often more reliable, less prone to underreporting 
and cheaper to make (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 401). They are an efficient way to counter 
unreliable or insufficient macroeconomic data (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 406). The authors note 
that asset indexes are suitable to depict socio-economic differentiation, even though they point 
out, in response to its use by Shimeles & Ncube (2015) that they are not sufficient to determine 
class status, which is more complex than mere ownership of assets (ibid. p. 403ff). Since the 
inquiry in the narrative interviews had not been structured, we merely concentrate on recurring 
descriptions given by the interviewees in the table above. It is noticeable that the dimensions 
mentioned here can also be found (though not exclusively) in other indexes, such as the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) from the University of Oxford (OPHI, 2016) or the Living 
Standards Measurement (LSM) by SAARF (Haupt, 2005). Hidden gradients, however, may apply to 
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the quality of the product, or its age (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). Every respondent interviewed 
owned a TV, however, whether this would be a small cathode ray tube monitor, or a flat screen 
does make a difference. The same differentiation applies to radios, computers, and mobile phones, 
or even cars. In general, hardly anyone owns a new car, but even within the car owners, type and 
age of the vehicle differ greatly. Nevertheless, the possession or not of an item is an indicator of 
the person’s wealth. Two other important, and in the interviews recurring, makers of wealth are 
cooking means and sanitation. In an urban context the lowest households use charcoal for 
cooking, then predominantly charcoal but with use of gas for quick cooking procedures, such as 
scrambled eggs and heating milk for the children, or predominantly gas but with charcoal for long 
cooking times, such as steamed plantains. Striking is here the persistence of charcoal, even in 
affluent families, as a way of saving because refilling gas is too costly. Results from the National 
Population and Housing Census (NPHC) 2014 show that in urban areas, charcoal is the main 
source of energy for cooking, used by 58% of households, whereas gas is only used by a minority 
of 2% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 32). It underlines the relatively privileged position of 
the UMC and UC of our sample which are able to use such cooking means and reminds us of the 
small size of these populations, compared to the lower groups. In the same vein, sanitation 
facilities differentiate between the various socio-economic groups. Up to the LMC, it is common 
that bathroom and toilet are not included in the dwellings – this is usually referred to by the 
respondents as not self-contained. There are several distinctions here that allow for more precise 
differentiation, such as the complete absence of a toilet, which really concerns the poorest 
population of Kampala (New Vision Online, 2016), paid public toilets, shared toilets on the 
compound, and private toilets on the compound and even the type of toilet used. These details 
have not been asked during the interviews. Thus, they can only be pointed out here, without 
making more remarks concerning our interviewees. While 55% of Kampala inhabitants have 
access to piped water, only 8% have water access inside their house (Nyakaana et al., 2007, p. 11). 
In our case that concerns some LMC members, the UMC and the UC; showing once more their 
privileged position in comparison to the rest of the population. When asked about their household 
equipment, most commonly TV sets, mobile phones, and kettles were named, owned by nearly 
everyone. According to the NPHC, 95% of the Kampala population owned phones and 66% at least 
one TV (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Thus, these findings are close to our results, yet the 
difference in TV possession already shows that our sample on average is more privileged than the 
general Kampala inhabitant. Economic differentiation within our sample became obvious when 
asked about the possession of a fridge or computer and car. According to the data gathered during 
the field trip in 2014, 61% of the respondents owned a refrigerator, with an increase in the higher 
income groups, starting from the LMC. Here three out of four can cool their food. Compared with 
the urban average (including other urban centers than Kampala) of 18%, again the interviewees 
are relatively better off (Uganda Bureau of Statistics & I. C. F., 2015). Strikingly, no one in the 
sample owns a dishwasher or washing machine. Instead of risking high electricity bills, it is easier 
to have the maid or houseboy do the dishes and laundry. Because labor is cheap (a maid costs 
between $15-30 per month, plus board and lodging), assets for doing labor-intensive work that 
are expensive in purchase and use are hardly present in Uganda. It holds probably equally true 
for a vacuum cleaner. This is more telling of the economic state of the country rather than its 
individuals and shows once more the necessity of specific local knowledge when assessing the 
middle income groups. 
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When comparing the results from this limited sample size with the nationwide survey, the 
relatively privileged positions even of these urban income groups become apparent, through the 
rural-urban divide. Even the poorest among the sample use electricity for lighting and are thus 
among the only 14% of Ugandans who do so (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 126). Since 
all of them acquired secondary education, their educational attainment places them among the 
top 25% of the country (ibid. p. 24). The MPI names Kampala as the wealthiest region of Uganda 
(OPHI, 2016), which gives weight to the assertion of Johnston & Abreu that asset indexes and their 
conclusions about welfare should only be used over a limited geographical area (Johnston & 
Abreu, 2016). It equally supports our decision to limit the scope of the research to Kampala, even 
though inquiring in different regions may be revealing. Since trajectories of emergence are bound 
to local context and poverty, or respectively wealth, is multidimensional, we might get an entirely 
different picture of wealth and emergence when researching for example in post-war Gulu town. 
Restricting the research to Kampala allows us to paint a refined picture of social ascension in the 
specific context of the capital and reminds us that even the urban poor have access to 
infrastructures that put them in a privileged position in comparison to their rural counterparts. 
To put the figures in relation to the countrywide data, reveals the significant disparities, even 
within the country and is a reminder that the majority of Ugandans is poor (Ncube et al., 2011). 
8.4 Communication and Transport 
Communication and transport are essential parts of everyday life for city dwellers. Because of its 
size, density and, as mentioned earlier, rising housing costs using transport means becomes 
inevitable. Respondents rely mainly on public transport, principally used by 36 respondents and 
closely followed by a private car, used by 30 respondents. This figure is relatively high since only 
3% of Ugandans own a car (Poushter, 2015; Uganda Bureau of Statistics & I. C. F., 2015). Even 
though this number is likely higher in Kampala, there are no reliable data on actual car ownership. 
We may assume though, that again here the interviewees have a relatively privileged position in 
comparison to the average Ugandans. However, the car ownership itself does not give any 
indication about its usage: The car is by far the most expensive means of transport because fuel 
prices correlate with the prices paid for in Europe, but income levels are not the same. For 
example, Elisabeth owned a car but said they only use it on the weekends for outings or to visit 
the family in the village because it was too expensive. So, for her daily commuting to work, she 
prefers to use public transport. Boda bodas, motorcycles who function as private taxis, are often 
a popular alternative to or combined with public transport because they allow to circumvent the 
daily congestion during rush hour traffic and provide a more efficient, even though more 
expensive, way of transport. As with the cooking methods, once more, these groups have in 
common that they mix transportation modes. On the lower end the mix of public transport with 
boda bodas, for faster and more comfortable transport and on the other end between the own car 
and public means or boda bodas when the budget does not allow for refueling again at the end of 
the months. 
Every respondent in our sample owned at least one phone, in several cases even two or more. This 
corresponds to the findings of the UNHS, which indicate a mobile phone coverage of 95% in 
Kampala (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 103). Similarly, the CFAO witnesses that the usual 
frugality observed among African consumers does not apply to technical appliances, which enjoy 
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a high spending priority (CFAO, 2015, p. 39). Again, economic differentiation here is along the 
number of phones, its quality and age, and the usage. Money spent on airtime varies significantly 
between the respondents, and expenditure for internet and communication technology (ICT) 
range from $6-65 (in the latter case they often include internet and digital TV subscription). The 
market is well adapted to a target group with only little disposable income. For one, most mobile 
phones are on pre-paid subscriptions, and it is possible to recharge telephone credit (airtime) 
with very low denominations. In addition, the telephone companies have a range of special offers, 
called “bundles”, allowing for reduced prices for calling or texting for a limited period. Besides, 
many Ugandans have several subscriber identity module (SIM) cards. For one, this ensures 
greater network coverage since, especially in remote areas, not all networks have the same signal 
strength. Secondly, prices vary when calling within the same network or across networks. To be 
always able to get the best price, Ugandans will decide which SIM card to use according to the 
person they want to communicate with and the offers currently available. Other reasons for 
switching SIM cards include the various services they want to use. As one Ugandan explained in 
2014: “You need three SIM cards, Airtel for telephone, MTN for mobile money and Orange [now 
Africell] for internet.” This citation again reveals an attitude of in-between; brand loyalty is not as 
important as receiving the best service at the best price. Another cost-saving technique is beeping: 
the person with little credit but the need to call someone will let the phone ring only shortly and 
then wait for the other person to return the call. The practice of beeping reflects the social 
responsibility of those with a higher income, as for some people beeping is more acceptable than 
for others. Thus, it is not the one with a matter at heart that pushes them to initiate the call and 
who has to bear its cost, but the one who is most able to do so. Finally, another cost-reducing factor 
is the provision of mobile phones or internet through the working place. This has been the case 
for four people, and in four more cases, the respondents could at least access internet through 
their working place. However, that privilege was only for those respondents with stable, formal 
employment, as respondents of the Poor and FC usually could not resort to that option, thus 
making communication expenditure not linear. 
Apart from communication, the mobile phone gains importance as a substitute for computers. In 
many SSA countries, computer use is still minimal, especially compared to developed countries 
(Pew Research Center, 2007, p. 78) and computer literacy remains a problem. According to the 
Afrobarometer, internet use in Uganda is below the average of the Afrobarometer countries, with 
81% of Ugandans who never use the internet, compared to 67.3% across the entire continent 
(Afrobarometer, 2015). With the rapid expansion of mobile phones (see above), and mobile 
internet, it is likely that the leap in Africa from no computer to mobile or smartphones will bypass 
the step of owning a computer. Mobile broadband systems are more affordable than fixed 
broadband systems, especially in developing countries, where fixed broadband prices are three 
times higher than in the developed world (International Telecommunication Union, 2015). As a 
result, household internet access is rarely an option. The expansion of mobile broadband, 
however, allows for the purchase of even small units of megabytes and thus making it affordable 
to the majority of the population. It does mirror the development of mobile phone use in 
comparison to landlines, which had faced similar challenges. Through the expansion of mobile 
phones, the subscription to expensive landline rates had not been necessary anymore and, 
additionally, small pre-paid telephone credits target especially households with little disposable 
income. It is thus likely that internet usage via mobile phones will continue to grow over the next 
164 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
years. In Kampala, internet access is easier available. Thus, only 53% of the Kampala population 
have never used the internet. When cross-tabulated with the perception of their living conditions 
(very bad, fairly bad, neither good nor bad, fairly good, very good), those who perceived living in 
very bad conditions would be most likely to never use internet, with an increase of internet use 
when living conditions are better (Afrobarometer, 2016). However, the variation is equally strong, 
when cross tabulated with age (ibid.). So, while the possibility to use internet depends indeed on 
income, the age of the respondent is a decisive factor as well. In our sample, most people do use 
the internet (approximately 87%). This figure above average can be explained through the young 
age of most of the respondents (34 years on average) and because most respondents have stable, 
formal employment which grants them internet access, in case they cannot afford it at home. Thus, 
the respondents here are relatively well-connected through the internet, mainly through social 
media and email and many of them also report that they use the internet for news. 
As a result of the long distances and the high prevalence of mobile phones, a higher part of the 
budget is allocated to communication and transport. In our study, an average of 9% of the total 
income is spent on communication and transport. It thus makes this item one of the top priorities 
– maybe surprisingly as it is neither vital nor does it directly contribute to the mitigation of 
economic vulnerability. However, these spendings can allow for saving time and more efficient 
means of communication; they become essential for all our income groups. Moreover, the market 
has well adapted to respond to all the needs of the various income groups as well. 
8.5 Finance 
The banking system in Africa faces several challenges, such as insufficient policy regulations, 
macro-financial policies that increase uncertainty, or external shocks. The primary problem, 
however, is the excessive unit cost for banking transaction, due to low population density and lack 
of infrastructure (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 5). Low saving rates, high fees and inadequate 
banking services that do not reflect the need of the clients makes banking unattractive or simply 
not affordable for a large part of the population. In return, the banks consider these low-income 
groups without a regular income as “unbankable” (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 59). Additionally, 
because risks are elevated, interest rates are often prohibitively high, making on the one hand 
borrowing unattractive for many, and on the other hand, increasing fault rates. As a result, banks 
in Africa have difficulties to find credit-worthy loans and remain thus with high liquidity rates 
(Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 32). Yet, a financial system with debt is a sign of a well-developed 
economy, and it can contribute to economic growth since it can channel funds into necessary 
investments that in return have the potential to create jobs (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 71). Uganda 
is no exception to this situation in Africa, as only 4% of communities have banking institutions 
within their community (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 162). The state of the banking 
system is reflected in everyday life of the middle income groups, through their efforts to mitigate 
its effects. Mobile money systems replace basic savings and withdrawal accounts, and Savings and 
Credit Cooperations (SACCOs) are an accessible alternative to bank loans with high interest rates. 
a) Banking accounts and loans 
A majority of 88% of the respondents have at least one bank account, in many cases even several, 
often one for own expenses, and a shared one with the spouse for running household expenditure. 
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Some even have additional business accounts for their various side businesses. All those who did 
not have an account were part of the LMC or lower. So, the access to formalized banking does 
reflect income strata as well, even though not exclusively, as also many poor would use bank 
accounts (64% of poor). It is common for couples not to pool their entire income. Instead, they 
make arrangements who will cater for which expenses. Most often, it is the man’s responsibility 
to take care of school fees and rent, whereas the woman will pay for clothes, household items and 
food. These arrangements are negotiated and also depend on the financial capacity of each spouse. 
Even though separate accounts increase costs for fees, they are popular because they maintain 
some financial privacy towards the partner and leave money for personal spendings and hence 
some financial independence for both partners (see also Spronk, 2014, p. 221). The option 
proposed by the bank to take a loan is used by only few respondents. According to the data, only 
one-third of the respondents took a loan (see also CFAO, 2015, p. 16). Many respondents shun 
away from that option and those who did borrow hope that they will never have to take one again. 
George had paid off his loan, which was a great relief to him, and he said: “I fight so much to make 
sure that we never get a loan again.” As a result, he tried to increase his savings and his income so 
that these profits could finance other ventures. Sarah is aware that her only financial security is 
her (grown up) children. In order not to rely too much on them, she tries to adapt her needs to her 
budget. Loans are not an option for her, as they imply too much stress: “You will have sleepless 
nights, and you will cause hatred.” Hence, financing for example of a house, becomes a challenge. 
Interests on loans are prohibitively high – around 20-30% – and in general people avoid taking 
loans. Abdul and Nicole are both building houses right now, but they advance only slowly, putting 
every available income in the construction because they do not want to take loans. Nicole explains: 
“We don’t have a loan because when you go for a loan, those people want a lot of profit and this profit 
could have worked for our [own profit].” Kampala is the region with the lowest percentage of 
people taking loans (12%). This might be due to the higher availability of cash, the absence of 
microcredits, which in general concentrate on rural areas and as mentioned, the perception of 
loans. The case story of Elisabeth illustrates for one the status symbol of house ownership and 
secondly, the attitude towards loans: 
Case Story: “Generally life is not so good, we are all miserable.” 
Elisabeth had come from a background of what could be described as the old peasant 
middle class, the kulaks (Mamdani, 1976), her father being a cultivator and trader of 
coffee. She seemed to be heading into a comfortable lifestyle as well, having formal 
employment with a bank and being married to a doctor. But in 2000 Elisabeth lost her 
job due to retrenchment, concerning all those having been employed for 15 years or 
longer. She got a loan to invest in an already existing side business, but because 
interest rates went rapidly up, she was not able to pay the installment. The company 
of the father was by then indebted and sold off and her husband had retired, both not 
able to step in financially. Reportedly, she then got into the hands of a dubious “well-
meaner” who bought off her loan but then seized her house to cover the expenses. The 
experience with the loan and the impounding of the house were deeply traumatic for 
her, giving her an impression of her life being a failure and living in abject poverty. 
She considers it a shame that a person at her age (54 years) is still renting and she 
feels that the decline of her living situation and income has put her in a situation of 
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social isolation. “I am on the pauper side, someone at my age without a home, I am a 
pauper.” 
Besides the risks of taking loans and the importance of house ownership the case story illustrates 
another interesting point: the dominance of the perception of the own situation over the actual 
underlying numbers. Even though she still has an income from the business she invested in at the 
time of the loan, her husband still receives his pension and they have some land in the village 
allowing for agricultural exploitation and leasing; and even though she has been able to pay for 
university education of her four children, she perceives herself as a pauper. The decline of the 
living situation and income has, therefore, an exacerbated effect on her positioning in society than 
an improvement would have. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) note that subjective value is more 
attributed to changes in wealth rather than fixed states of wealth. Thus, their studies have found 
that the loss of something is perceived much stronger than a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 
1984). This principle might also explain why many respondents would be reluctant to describe 
themselves as middle class. Instead, they are “not there yet”, or somewhere in between being poor 
and middle class, as their “gain”, economic emergence, weighs not as strong as a decline in their 
living situation would have weighed. The reluctance to call themselves middle class may equally 
affect their behavior, as we have seen with their food buying practices beforehand. Because they 
still consider themselves as poor or “in between”, their consumption practices might rather reflect 
patterns of economic scarcity than of wealth. 
The negative attitude towards loans, in relation to a deficient banking sector and the absence of 
consumer credit offers, as found in South Africa for example, indicate the low scale at which the 
Ugandan middle income groups function, compared to other middle classes (cf Escusa, 2013, p. 
18f). Similar to their supermarket shopping behavior, they are not yet an attractive target for 
banks and credit companies because their liquidity remains limited. 
However, the rather high presence of saving accounts puts the middle income groups once more 
in a relatively privileged position, contrary to the average Ugandan. The availability and 
complexity of the bank services used are also signs of economic stratification. Many of the 
respondents who lack a regular, fixed income used to have a bank account at one point but chose 
to close it because they failed to make regular deposits. Instead, most of them resorted to mobile 
money to replace their savings and withdrawal account, as shall be detailed below. 
b) Saving and Credit Cooperations (SACCOs) 
SACCOs can be found all over the world and have a long history in Africa, some dating back to the 
16th century (Rosberg & Coleman, 1964). In general, they can be distinguished in two types of 
savings associations. Some are with a rotating spill out, where members contribute on a regular 
basis, and at one point each member receives the full share of contributions. In a more investment 
centered form, members accumulate capital for a certain period, which is followed by an 
investment (Bouman, 1995). Estimations of membership vary between areas and studies but are, 
in general, esteemed to be high, covering between 50 and 100% of the population (ibid., p. 371). 
SACCOs can make up for deficiencies of the banking sector because they fulfill important welfare 
and insurance functions (ibid.) and because they have nearly no transaction costs. Thus, fees 
remain affordable for the clients. Some authors also suggest that they provide an efficient way of 
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channeling money away from claims of the extended family (Miracle, Miracle, & Cohen, 1980, p. 
702). If the volume and scope of the group gets too big, it is even possible that they transform into 
banks, as has been observed in Cameroon (ibid. p. 720). Through their self-regulation and self-
sufficiency, they operate outside of the control of governmental authorities and provide hence an 
alternative to state institutions which are viewed suspiciously by the population. This separation, 
however, is not clear-cut, as many SACCOs, especially in Kampala, do not operate fully isolated 
from the banking sphere. Hence, the group savings may be deposited into a bank account to be 
well administered. 
This overall popularity of SACCOs is also reflected in our sample. Being part of an investment 
group has turned out to be among the interviewees the most common form of organized meeting. 
Of the 23 interviewees, seven were part of a SACCO. However, in its procedures and primary 
purposes, the groups would differ from one another, ranging from mere financial services up to 
groups who unite for socialization processes, with the benefit of saving. 
The most impersonal SACCO was the saving scheme of one respondent proposed by his employer, 
a bank. With that institutionalized SACCO, a certain amount of money would be directly 
withdrawn from his income for savings. It seemed that there was not much social gathering 
involved. Gordon, who has no regular income and is continuously struggling is part of a SACCO, 
initiated by a news vendor who approached twenty different acquaintances and asked them to 
join. Each one of them brings every day a certain amount to the newspaper vendor and gets a 
receipt in return. After every six months they come together in a general stakeholder meeting and 
the money saved up gets distributed. The SACCO thus fulfills the mere function of a savings 
account, with an additional incentive to safe due to peer pressure. Abdul works as a legal advisor 
for a SACCO that is using a similar procedure. He does not contribute though, probably because 
the amount of money saved is irrelevant to him. Innocent is part of a similar savings club, but they 
meet once a month as a long-standing, well-acquainted group, and everyone contributes $20. 
Herbert, Aida, and Sarah contribute money not for it to be saved, but to be invested afterward, 
which in return, will bring them more profit than the mere saved money, plus maybe interests. 
Herbert just started, so he has had no payouts so far, only contributions of $40 per month, but for 
Aida (member of two investment clubs) and Sarah, these systems work well. 
For Aida and Innocent, there is yet another and maybe more important dimension to the 
investment and saving groups: the social gathering. In the case of Aida, they meet as “Mr. and Mrs.”, 
about 20 couples who have known each other for 15 years. They pay $20 per month plus $40 
annual fee, and the money is used to acquire various goods, like a car for the club, finance 
gatherings and the like and the meetings take place once a week in a hotel in Kampala. It is also an 
important place for networking, as Aida confirmed, the members are those “who have properties”, 
some are her customers, from others she seeks advice in business questions. Usually, during their 
meetings, Luganda is used, which hints at an ethnically homogeneous group. She is also part of a 
second investment group, concerned with the rebuilding of Luwero Dioceses, which had been 
severely destroyed during the war. Here about 40 families invest in cattle rearing, and of the 
returns, 30% goes as a donation to the dioceses, and 70% remain as profits. Meetings take place 
once a month. For Innocent, the meetings of his savings group are also more about the social 
gathering. These men meet at a restaurant once a month, eat, drink and chat. The money they 
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contribute can be borrowed by the members if they have significant investments coming up, so 
the payout is not that regular, but every once in a while it is each one’s turn to be on the receiving 
end. Again, the group is rather homogeneous, genderwise, agewise and regarding ethnicity, as all 
its members come from the West and the language used during discussions is Runyankole. Most 
likely this is equally true for income, as the participants must be able to pay the $20 plus the social 
outing. All of its members also live in Entebbe. In both cases, for Aida and Innocent, members 
attend the social functions (weddings, introduction ceremonies, burials) of other members, 
indicating once more the close social ties established. Because sometimes individuals are 
entrusted with large sums of money from each participant, this kind of saving requires some 
amount of trust among the members and thus hint at stronger social cohesion. Because the 
amount of money needs to be adapted to the needs of the participants, economic stratification 
takes place in these associations. Bouman notes that: 
“Because members make equal contributions at regular intervals, they need a rather 
steady income of comparable size. Hence, [SACCO] membership tends to be 
homogeneous, participants sharing the same occupation, income group or residential 
area. The rich and the poor generally have separate clubs. […] For a social researcher, 
an analysis of [SACCO] membership is an ideal way to detect the horizontal substrata 
that divide a society.” (Bouman, 1995, p. 374) 
And while the economic homogeneity certainly can be observed in our cases, we do witness the 
persistence of other identities, mainly ethnic and agewise, especially in groups with greater social 
cohesion, beyond the mere process of saving. It remains, therefore, questionable whether vertical 
cleavages substitute horizontal ones or whether they add just another layer. 
c) Mobile money as a substitute for saving accounts 
Already at the beginning of the 21st century, first pilot studies to use mobile phones for sending 
and receiving money have been conducted in Africa (Honohan & Beck, 2007). In 2007, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) and Vodafone developed a system for the 
Kenyan market which became known as M-Pesa (M stands for mobile and pesa is the Swahili word 
for money). From there the service has rapidly spread to the neighboring countries and is today 
also very present in Uganda under the name of mobile money. Even though these services were 
praised as “banking the unbanked” (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, p. 212) its early adopters were the 
wealthy and educated, and even up to today many respondents use the service in addition to their 
regular bank account. For those respondents with only irregular income, however, many of them 
used to have a bank account but decided to turn it inactive, by making all their transactions 
through mobile money services. It is possible now to pay electricity bills or school fees via mobile 
services, thus reducing transaction costs, as it is not necessary anymore to own a bank account or 
send money via other people. And even though mobile money is not banking from a legal 
perspective since no interest is earned on savings, it does fulfill the most basic banking services 
and thus reflects better the actual needs of clients, as Honohan and Beck have called for (2007). 
Thus, mobile money has become a vital system of payment. While it is essential for the lower 
income groups who would otherwise not have any form of banking at all, the higher echelons of 
the middle income groups use the system in combination with their regular bank accounts, mixing 
once more between the different available options. 
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In chapter 8 we tried to understand the economic stratification of the Ugandan society, and of the 
middle income groups in particular, through a thorough description of their consumption and 
savings behavior, covering their choices for expenditure on food, education, housing, 
communication, transport, and finance. Even though these descriptions do not allow any 
conclusions for class allegiance, we used the subcategories proposed by the AfDB to distinguish at 
which points of income consumption behavior changes. This has led to several conclusions: 
A first insight concerns the economic stratification within the subgroups. While some 
stratification is discernible, it is not always straightforward. The strata are most apparent 
concerning the living conditions. Living area, type of dwelling and household equipment correlate 
well with the income subgroups. They do not entirely depend on income, though, since the needs 
for housing rises and falls with age, as well. The importance of taking into account the position in 
the life cycle in market analysis has been pointed out elsewhere (SAARF, n.d.), but they hold 
equally true in our sample. Expenditure and income usually change with the living situation, 
whether single, married, with or without children will all have a significant impact on the living 
conditions. They do not only transcend consumption behavior but also attitudes and values, as we 
shall see below. As a result, age groups undermine the coherence of class, or add another layer of 
stratification to it and make a thorough class analysis even more challenging. However, bearing in 
mind that our sample group, particularly when divided into subgroups becomes too small to make 
statistically relevant statements. Instead, we invite the reader to take our observations as critical 
reflections on the straightforwardness correlations between income and consumption. 
A second insight is derived from the relatively privileged position of the middle income groups, 
even of the urban poor, compared to their rural counterparts. Their housing conditions are better 
than the rural average, and they have access to electricity, education, opportunities to earn cash 
(in comparison to subsistence farming in rural areas), they own a mobile phone, have easier 
access to internet and bank accounts and a public transport system. Despite these privileges, the 
lower middle income groups still perceive themselves as poor, and many of them experience the 
everyday life as a struggle, guided by uncertainty about their next source of income. This is also 
reflected in their consumption decisions. In a similar conclusion than ours, the CFAO observes 
“This rational approach to budget management is a defining characteristic of the 
middle classes that appears to leave little room for non-essential spending or ‘treats’, 
even when factoring in a hypothetical increase in income. This helps explain their 
needs and receptiveness to selling points rooted in saving time and money, efficiency, 
durability and health benefits, rather than conspicuous consumption.” (CFAO, 2015, 
p. 26) 
Thus, thirdly, the consumption behavior reveals very often a position of “in-between”, an indicator 
of the recent emergence of our sample. Hence, their reluctance to increase spending on food, by 
buying “extravagant” food or by shopping in places that are deemed too expensive. If money still 
is short at the end of the month, then food is often not a priority to many of the respondents, and 
they rather see it as a possibility to save and invest elsewhere, most likely in education. Other 
behaviors, such as combining cooking means, or transport, or using formal banking as well as 
informal SACCOs or mobile money tell about the flexible adoption to everyday life, recurring to 
different means according to the situation in which they suit best. It uncovers that the stratum 
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interviewed is not in economic abundance, to the point where they do not care about their 
expenditures, but many of them are in the position of being able to make a choice: “I can choose 
to take the car to work, even if I do not use it today because I have to save gas money and pay for 
my children’s school fees.” “I can use gas for cooking, even if I prefer charcoal when I cook steamed 
plantains.” The choices change with income, a poorer person may choose between using public 
transport or walking, instead of using a car or using public transport, but a possibility of choice 
nevertheless remains. It is among the poorest, and parts of the FC in our sample that the option to 
choose becomes restraint. Unless it is an emergency, Pamela will not go to town other than on 
foot, to save costs. Gordon does not have a choice but cannot open a bank account because fees 
would be too expensive for him and mobile money covers his needs. 
This “in-between” position places the middle income groups on the cusp, between their own 
economic vulnerability on the one hand, and the aspiration for and access to new lifestyles on the 
other. These decisions are usually carefully weighted and more often than not surplus income is 
rather invested in securing the future – their own or of their children – rather than in luxury and 
leisure. 
*** 
In section II we have tried to carefully examine the features of what we call the middle income 
groups in Uganda. We label them as middle income because, in general, they are in better economic 
positions than large parts of the population. However, we have also seen the challenges that 
prevail, especially if one wants to call these groups middle classes. 
In their literature review and own quantitative survey, the CFAO has distilled a picture of a typical 
middle class individual which in many instances comes close to the characteristics we have 
outlined in the chapters above. 
Some of their findings we could not confirm because we did not inquire specifically about them, 
such as future intended purchases, and some seem to be in stark contrast to our findings, such as 
the class awareness. However, this particular point is presented misleadingly, as they describe 
their class awareness elsewhere as a definition “by what they are not: rich or poor” (CFAO, 2015, 
p. 12). Such a description bears more resemblance to our analysis. Neither could we confirm the 
health insurance coverage nor the refrigerator possession (and even less so for a freezer) or the 
solidarity as being focused on the immediate family, as we have seen that the extended family still 
plays an important role. 
Our analysis has brought some other aspects to the fore as well: For one, we have shown how 
other identities equally prevail, namely regarding age, region, or religion. This is not unique to 
Africa. In marketing research in the Global North studies talk about milieus rather than classes 
(Neubert, 2014, p. 26). The categories of region and religion weigh even stronger than in Europe 
(CFAO, 2015, p. p.40; Neubert, 2014). Thus, one needs to bear in mind when explaining behavior 
or attitudes through class that such identities are rarely unidimensional and that we might expect 
to find a vast range of behaviors within one income range.  
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Secondly, it turned out that efforts to mitigate vulnerability were central to the behavior of the 
middle income groups and would also guide their consumption practices. What turned out to 
decrease vulnerability in the case of our respondents correlated with findings from literature 
focused on poverty reduction (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012; 
Narayan et al., 2009). Hence, we see that most respondents, even if they do not objectively belong 
to the categories of the Poor or FC given by the AfDB, are still in proximity to poverty. Having 
education and diversified income sources and being well-connected within a social network is 
crucial to increasing the distance with the poverty threshold. Many of the behaviors display an 
“in-between” strategy, mixing methods or utensils of lower and upper groups. This does indeed 
reveal some stratification between the respondents. Even those in the higher strata are still in a 
position where they have to ask themselves which transport or cooking material to use, but they 
are in the position where they can pose themselves the question. This puts them in a preferred 
position to those who have to cope with whatever comes along. Such an observation adds a second 
definitional aspect to the middle income groups, besides limiting vulnerability: the aspect of 
choice. Thus, different socio-economic positions allow for different social strategies in the way the 
individuals deal with their surroundings. If a similar position also gives rise to similar interests, 
Figure 25: CFAO Middle Class Profile (CFAO, 2015, p. 29) 
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as Bourdieu (1984, p. 4) suggests, however, remains to be seen, at least in the case of Uganda. So 
far, we have seen, that the life chances are distributed differently and that the different 
dispositions indeed lead to different socio-economic positions. We have identified some similar 
behavior that changes as the income changes. However, from there does not derive a commonly 
shared class awareness and neither is it a salient category for identification for our respondents. 
In our analysis we have also seen the limits of upward mobility. Here one of the blind spots of the 
Africa Rising narrative becomes visible: the African emergence is by no means one of a continent-
wide social upward mobility. Instead, many of those who are doing economically better at one 
point might as well fall back into poverty at another point in time. However, for a stable middle 
class to establish, there would be a need for inter-generational upward mobility, a sign of equal 
societies (Ferreira, 2013, p. 51) and in stark contrast to the increasing inequality in many African 
countries. Religious or kinship ties offer the possibility here to transcend income barriers, as an 
influential person may be more inclined to speak to an impoverished person from their own ethnic 
group than from a different one. Hence, the observations made so far do not allow us to speak of 
a middle class in Uganda, even more so because other identities remain very strong. As we shall 
see in the discussion of their leisure activities (see part IV, p.251), a socio-economic position often 
comes in addition to other aspects but does not necessarily manage to transcend them. 
  
Part III:  
Forms (and Absence) of Political 
Participation 
In this part III we try to see how the Ugandan middle income groups invest themselves for the 
democratic advancement of their country – or not, by analyzing the behavior and attitudes of our 
respondents. From these answers we will then draw some hypotheses on the forms of political 
participation these groups partake, and which ones they shun upon. We let us guide by several 
questions: how do our respondents view democracy, elections and conventional forms of political 
participation? Which major protests have taken place in Uganda in the last years and who were 
the main participants? Do we have evidence for particular middle class protests? How do our 
respondents view protest actions and what acts as a deterrent for them to participate? To answer 
these questions, in chapter 9, we look first at democratic attitudes in general in Uganda, using data 
from the Afrobarometer and World Value surveys and link them with insights gained from our 
own field research. We then proceed to look at citizen-oriented activism, particularly voting, but 
also other interactions that have taken place with politicians and government officials. Chapter 10 
turns to cause-oriented activism, by analyzing the main demonstrations, protests and an anti-
corruption movement that have been taken place over the last ten years. Historically 
demonstrations have played an essential role in the democratization of countries, and they are 
still seen as a struggle for citizenship in non-democratic regimes (Cottle, 2008). This has also been 
the case in the democratic transitions in sub-Sahara Africa in the beginning of the 1990s (Bratton, 
1994). We will analyze these demonstrations and link the academic discussion of the events with 
the positions taken by our respondents. In chapter 11 we look at some other dynamics at play in 
social mobilization, notably the co-optation of leaders and the “NGO-ization” of protest. Drawing 
on the conclusions made in the previous three chapters, chapter 12 will investigate the reasons 
why our respondents refrain from political participation, and we suggest this is mainly because 
they feel their access to politics limited. It is our intention with this chapter to illustrate the context 
in which political participation takes place and how the middle income groups position 
themselves in this context and act within the options that remain accessible to them. Such an 
analysis will allow us to start a reflection on what is considered a legitimate, or useful, repertoire 
of action in political participation in Uganda today.

  
9 The Presence of Citizen-oriented 
Activism? 
Before analyzing whether or not the middle income groups become in some way active in 
promoting democracy, we can at least refute the assumption voiced by some authors that they are 
politically apathetic (cf Mills, 1953). We find high rates of interest in politics among Ugandans in 
general and the middle income groups in particular. Hence, in the Afrobarometer survey, 69% of 
Ugandans indicated that they have an interest in politics (Afrobarometer, 2015). The number was 
slightly higher for men than for women. Among the middle income groups interviewed, the 
number was similar, albeit lower than the Afrobarometer results, with 60 out of 95 people 
showing an interest in politics. 55% consider politics to be very or rather important and 67% 
indicate that they discuss political matters with friends or family occasionally or frequently. 
Gamson (1992) has shown that discussing political matters is an important way to construct 
meaning about an issue and that these are helpful to develop political consciousness, through 
constructing collective frames. This itself is a prerogative for collective action (Gamson, 1992, p. 
175). Thus, while conversations about politics itself does not lead to political participation, it is an 
essential step towards it. Hence, we may maintain that there is a general interest in political 
matters. However, the interest itself does not necessarily lead to political participation. Rather, a 
sentiment of political efficacy – among others – is decisive; i.e., citizens need to have a feeling that 
they can change something through their actions (see Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969b, p. 811). Here 
we will look at their democratic attitude in general and voting behavior and experiences with 
public officials more specifically and see how these avenues of “conventional” forms of activism 
are perceived. 
9.1 Attitudes Towards Democracy 
Some authors have noticed a global decline of democracy (Diamond, 2008; Kurlantzick, 2013). 
Since 2006 the Freedom House Index marked a continuous drop in worldwide civil liberties 
(Mattes & Bratton, 2016). Governmental malpractice had dampened the democratic euphoria that 
caught many transitioning countries at the beginning of the 1990s, and, as a result, disappointed 
citizens would turn to populists and autocratic strongmen, the argument goes (Diamond, 2008, p. 
38). Others are more optimistic; while there might be a current democratic recession, the 
countries in question are all more democratic today than they were at the end of the 1980s (Mattes 
& Bratton, 2016). It is not our intention to join the debate whether or not a democratic recession 
is taking place. Instead, here we want to use the observation, and the data gathered from the 
Afrobarometer surveys to see how far a popular demand for democracy is present in Uganda. To 
put it bluntly: is there a desire of the Ugandan people to be ruled democratically? How do the 
middle income groups position themselves in this regard? The answer to these questions will 
factor into the actions taken or not in advancing democracy in the country. 
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Asking whether someone supports democracy is not sufficient, as people, surrounded by 
democratic rhetoric, often fostered through donor discourse, may have a positive attitude towards 
the concept while neglecting elements such as accountability or being at the same time supportive 
of paternalistic rule (see Neubert, 2016). In Uganda, the World Value Survey registered 88.2% of 
people who believed that a democratic political system was either a very good or fairly good 
system of governing the country (World Values Survey Association, 2001, p. 44), and 
Afrobarometer reports an approval rate of 67% for democracy. However, when combined with 
the rejection of presidential dictatorship, military rule, and one-party rule, the percentage of 
“committed” democrats drops to 42% (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 5 ff). Significant variations exist 
regarding education, occupation, gender, age and living area. Thus, male, urban respondents, with 
post-secondary education and full-time employment, aged between 26-35 years and living in East 
Africa are the most likely to demand democracy (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 11). Ugandans are 
slightly below average in their demand for democracy, and while they are more likely to reject 
presidential dictatorship and military rule, they are more positively inclined towards one party 
rule (ibid.). This is telling of the historical and political context of the country, where the 
experiences with past regimes are often negatively associated, whereas the movement system, a 
de facto one-party rule (Carbone, 2008), has higher societal acceptance. Overall, the demand for 
democracy (what Mattes & Bratton refer to as the committed democrats) has declined, 
particularly since 2011/13.  
In this graph, we might be able to recognize the broader societal developments that Uganda has 
undergone during that period. Interestingly, support for democracy was at its lowest in 2005/06, 
at the moment of the introduction of multipartyism. These might have been the aftereffects of the 
2002 referendum, which had been preceded by a successful campaign for the maintenance of the 
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Figure 26: Demand for Democracy in Uganda 2002-2015. (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 16) 
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movement system (Therkildsen, 2002). However, since the introduction of multiparty elections, 
support for democracy has grown, until the 2011 elections, which were accompanied by 
allegations of fraud and the Walk to Work protests. Mattes & Bratton have noticed a relationship 
between elections and the demand for democracy: if the elections were successful, demand for 
democracy would increase in the aftermath. However, if they were flawed, the negative impact on 
democratic demand would be much more significant (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 17). The 
contested elections of 2011 might be one explanation, but there is another correlation as well. 
While in 2011, 73% of Ugandans believed the country was heading in the wrong direction, the 
figure was nearly inversed in the sixth round of the survey (Afrobarometer, 2016). Hence, it might 
equally be possible that Ugandans were content with the performance of their government and 
thus did not feel the necessity of a more democratic regime. The drastic changes over a short 
period show us equally the volatility of such opinions, often influenced by situational 
circumstances. This also highlights the limits of such broad-based surveys because they remain in 
their answers highly contextual. 
We suggest that it might be useful to look at other variables when measuring “committed” 
democrats because the rejection of other types of rule might be too narrow. Mattes & Bratton 
themselves note that  
“[...] people are more certain about the kinds of political regimes they don’t want 
(perhaps based on earlier experience with authoritarian rule) than the kind of regime 
they affirmatively do want (that is, something called “democracy”).” (Mattes & 
Bratton, 2016, p. 11) 
The approval rate for democracy is similar to the rate of people who understood what ‘democracy’ 
means. And indeed, most people who would believe that democracy did not matter would also not 
assign any meaning to the term (Afrobarometer, 2016). Inversely, those who believed that 
democracy was the most preferable regime type, would mention positive connotations such as 
civil rights and liberties, multiparty competition, accountability, mutual respect, etc. when asked 
what the term meant to them (Afrobarometer, 2016). Consistently, more than half of Ugandans 
asked during the survey would approve of democratic principles, such holding the government 
accountable, even if it means that the decision-making process takes longer, that leaders should 
be chosen through regular elections, that the president is accountable to parliament or that people 
should abide to the rule of law (Afrobarometer, 2015, pp. 27–31). Approval rates would in general 
be higher in Kampala than for the whole nation, although the differences rarely exceeded five 
percent points. Similarly, men were more approving than women. If we take education as a proxy, 
we find that support for democracy rises with the level of education obtained. The graph below 
illustrates some examples, by taking the percentage of people who strongly agreed with 
statements on democratic support, multipartyism, government accountability and the superiority 
of laws and courts. 
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Hence, using the Afrobarometer dataset, we might conclude that those with the highest education 
level (as is the case with most of our respondents) are also the most supportive of democracy. 
Turning to our dataset, we might gain some additional insights. Even though respondents in 2012 
were explicitly asked about their opinion on democracy in the country, we did not test for 
democratic attitudes thoroughly, as done by Afrobarometer. In the subsequent rounds, people 
would sometimes mention it but were not explicitly asked about their point of view on democracy. 
Thus, we cannot make a similar analysis only pertaining to our sample. Considering the 
Afrobarometer data as reliable, we would expect general support for democracy from our 
respondents, as many of them resembled the ideal democratic supporter mentioned above. Only 
two people in the 2012 dataset expressed the view that democracy was not good and preferred a 
military government. For others, the kingdoms were better options because they worked before 
the adaption of democracy. However, the majority either would feel that even though the country 
was democratic, there was the need for more; or they would respond that there is no democracy 
in contemporary Uganda. 
“There is no real democracy. Democracy is just in favor of some. Because someone 
tells you: if you don’t vote me, chaos is coming back. Will that be democracy? You will 
just vote that person so that you have rid chaos. Period. But not your own free will.” 
(John) 
The Afrobarometer (2016) shows similar results, with striking differences according to residency 
and education: 
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In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Uganda today?  
 Total Kampala University 
completed 
Not a democracy 5% 7% 15% 
A democracy, with 
major problems 
19% 33% 45% 
A democracy, with 
minor problems 
38% 31% 23% 
A full democracy 14% 4% 13% 
Do not understand 
question 
7% 10% - 
Don’t know 17% 16% 3% 
 
Table 11: Extent of Democracy in Uganda (Afrobarometer, 2016) 
Among those with a completed university education, the impression that Uganda either was no 
democracy at all or one with major problems prevailed among nearly two-thirds of the degree 
holders29. Continued analysis of the Afrobarometer data shows that support for democracy, in 
general, is high, albeit higher for those with more education. What differs, though, is the evaluation 
of the democratic situation in Uganda. While people with higher education are more critical of the 
state of democracy in the country, the average Ugandan is rather content, believes the President 
never ignores the laws and is pleased with the regime’s performance (Afrobarometer, 2015). In 
concordance, Mattes & Bratton (2016) conclude that, in Uganda, the supply of democracy 
outweighs the demand for it – contrary to most African nations. They suggest that the decline in 
demand for democracy is due to the narrowing political space and the flawed presidential 
elections (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 18). 
From our analysis, we have seen that the middle income groups seem to be supportive of the idea 
of having democracy in Uganda, but they see its current implementation in the country as critical. 
                                                 
29 Interestingly, the rate of those who believe it is a full democracy is elevated as well among those with a university 
education, close to the national average. Thus, albeit the critical point of view of our respondents, there are equally 
circles among the well-educated who are content with the system as it is. 
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For some, this is an indication that the country is not “ripe” for democracy, as the Ugandan or 
African “culture” is more inclined to authoritarianism, but for many, it is an expression of 
misguided politics. In comparison, it, therefore, seems, as if the middle income groups are more 
supportive of democracy than the rest of the population and have a higher demand as the current 
supply can provide. 
“We have rulers masquerading as leaders. I think if we were democratic enough, we 
would be having leaders, not rulers.” (Anthony) 
However, does this lead to the individual desire to participate in changing the situation? We try to 
answer this question by looking at their actions: Albeit in a flawed institutional environment, do 
the middle income groups resort to forms of “conventional” political participation, such as voting 
or petitioning to bring about change within the system? Also, what is their general experience 
with and expectation of politicians? 
9.2 Elections 
A minimalist approach to democracy usually describes regularly held elections as the essential 
factor (Perrot, Makara, Lafargue, & Fouéré, 2014, p. 7). However, in countries like Uganda, often 
characterized as “semi-authoritarian” or “hybrid”, it becomes evident that the mere electoral 
exercise is not sufficient to qualify it as a democracy, even though it introduces aspects of 
uncertainty (Kagoro, 2016). While Uganda indeed has held regular elections since 1996, they have 
often provoked criticism from NGOs, international Human Rights Groups and opposition parties. 
Thus, interpreting the participation in elections of the middle income groups as support for 
democracy might be misleading, since in a context where free and fair elections cannot be 
guaranteed, abstention, rather than participation, can be seen as a pro-democratic stance (see J. 
Chen, 2013, p. 142). In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, initial optimism about the continent's 
democratic transition at the beginning of the 1990s ceded to an “electoral crisis” in many 
countries. In these cases, elections came to be considered as 
“[…] an expedient political exercise for ruling regimes, partly because of their 
economic implications in terms of external aid flows and economic assistance, and 
partly because of their public relations advantage in propping up the political profile 
of the regime in the international arena.” (Adejumobi, 2000, p. 66) 
In Uganda, the electoral record is not a great one either. Since the first elections in 1996, at that 
time under the movement system, the process has been marred by through irregularities, 
intimidation, and violence (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 13). This was accompanied by a trend of declining 
voter’s participation, from 73% in 1997 to 59% in 2011 (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 16) Only the 2016 
election marked a reversal, as voter’s participation went back up to 68%. However, since the bulk 
of the fieldwork had been done in the aftermath of the 2011 election (in 2012 and 2014), the focus 
of our analysis will be on the 2011 election and the post-election violence that was triggered by 
the aggressive response of the regime to the Walk to Work protests. 
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9.2.1 The Voting Behavior of the Middle Income Groups 
We have already touched upon the challenges that arise when attributing a specific political stance 
to the middle class (chapter 3). Particularly the idea that the middle class has a shared political 
ideology, derived from collective interests (often material ones) has been challenged. The 
heterogeneity of the group itself, made up of different occupational categories and – in the case of 
the African middle classes – large income ranges, make it difficult to generalize (Bechofer & Elliot, 
1978; Gerteis, 1998; C. S. Rallings & Andeweg, 1979; Rose, 1997). Additionally, in Europe, some 
differentiations approximate the working class as being on the left spectrum of the political 
ideology and the middle class on the right, with some nuances depending on the kind of capital 
they have available (cultural vs. economic) (see Jary, 1978, p. 135). Such a distinction between left 
and right is of little relevance in many sub-Saharan countries, as well as in Uganda, as the parties 
do not differ substantially in their programs (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992, p. 440). Rather, voting 
behavior and party allegiance are perceived in terms of ethnic or clientelist ties (see Bratton, 
Bhavnani, & Chen, 2012; Randall & Svåsand, 2002). However, even in Western democracies, 
scholars suggest that class affiliation cannot convincingly explain voting behavior (Jary, 1978; C. 
Rallings, 1978). Instead, age and gender are found to influence, while not voter choice, at least 
voter turnout (Nie et al., 1974, p. 319ff). On the other hand, particularly in the context of the Global 
South, we find proponents who suggest that the middle class will sideline with the regime, due to 
the intertwining between the economy and politics, and thus even support undemocratic regimes, 
as long as they are beneficial to them (J. Chen, 2013; Tamarkin, 1978). Looking at our data, and 
using voting behavior as a starting point, we might thus expect the vote to give an indication about 
the attitudes towards the status quo rather than a particular political ideology. Through the 
analysis, we might also discover variations between sub-groups. However, since the sample is 
small, the results cannot be treated as statistically representative, but rather as an indication 
towards certain trends. 
When asked, “What did you vote in the last30 election?” the majority of the respondents indicate 
that they voted for the opposition. 
                                                 
30 Depending on the time of the interview, respondents answered either in regard to the 2011 or 2016 presidential 
elections (with the majority referring to 2011).  
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It needs to be pointed out that the vote for opposition was split among the different opposition 
parties. Not all respondents indicated the party they voted for, making an estimation difficult, 
whether any one opposition party was able to gather more votes than the ruling party. For those 
who were more precise (N=64), 20 respondents voted for NRM, whereas 17 respondents voted 
for FDC, which was the strongest opposition party. Thus, in that subsample, NRM was still the 
most dominant among all parties. The table below presents a comparison with the national 
results31: 
 2011 2016 Field Data 
NRM 68.4% 60.6% 32.8% 
Opposition 31.6% 39.4% 67.2% 
Not Voted 40.7% 32.4% 33.7% 
Table 12: Election Results in Comparison 
The relation of votes cast for the ruling party and the opposition is nearly inverse, whereas the 
abstention rate does not differ significantly from the national average. Hence, we notice that the 
middle income groups were much more likely than the average Ugandan to support the 
                                                 
31 To be able to compare, the percentage of the party votes was calculated by using the number of all respondents who 
voted (N=61), instead of all who answered (N=92).  
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opposition, but not to be more or less involved in voting. Many respondents expressed concerns 
that their vote will not be counted since they intended to vote for the opposition; thus, we might 
even assume that a considerable share of those who did not vote, would support the opposition 
as well. The high vote for the opposition may be due to the urban environment in which the 
research was conducted and where most of the middle income groups can be found, rather than a 
particular political preference of the group. This reminds us of the rural/urban divide which is 
pronounced in many African countries and has already played a role for us when comparing living 
conditions of the respondents with the average Ugandans. Kampala, like many other African cities, 
has traditionally been an opposition stronghold (Gore & Muwanga, 2014, p. 2202; Rakner & van 
de Walle, 2009, p. 117; Resnick, 2011, p. 142). In Kampala in 2016, Museveni received 30.9% of 
the votes, whereas the opposition was able to draw a support of 69.1%, which resembles more 
closely our results (Electoral Commission, 2016). Thus, the results from our respondents present 
an urban phenomenon, and can equally be applied to the urban underclass, hence is not guided 
by a collective interest derived from a common ideology or material position. Nevertheless, it may 
be worthwhile to have a closer look at the voting behavior and see whether any difference arises 
according to income, education, sex or age. 
We chose to depict the results in their total numbers as well as in percentage, to allow a better 
comparison between the subgroups, while also revealing distortions that come about due to small 
sample size. Thus, the 100% abstention for those above 60 is put in context when compared to 
the table above, revealing that only one respondent was 60 or older. All other income groups have 
a similar range of respondents (between 9 and 15); only the LMC is much more represented, with 
26 respondents. Hence, Figure 31 helps to put the LMC in perspective to the other groups. The 
conclusions drawn from alignment according to income are somewhat ambiguous. We see that 
opposition support is high among all groups except for the floating class, but highest among the 
UMC and UC. The floating class, equally termed as the “vulnerable”, might also be the most 
vulnerable to political change that may threaten their already unstable status. With some caution, 
we may say that those respondents best off are more likely to support the opposition than any 
other group. This would go against the assumption that those who managed to be in a good 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Poor FC LMC UMC UC
Voters' Alignment by Income
N=73
Governing Opposition Not voted
Figure 29: Vote by Income Figure 30: Vote by Income, in Percent 
184 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
position will support the regime that allowed for their ascension. Instead, it might be that for these 
groups the services provided by the government are not sufficient anymore and other benefits 
gain importance, such as the guarantee of civil liberties, or the respect of human rights. 
In terms of age, we notice a generational shift concerning political alignment. For those aged up 
to the age of 45, opposition was the preferred voter’s choice, followed by abstention. Only for 
those above 46 regime support is more pronounced. Even the person who is above 60 intended 
to vote for the NRM but could not do so because she was not in Kampala at the time of the election. 
As indicated by some interviewees, the “youth” is more critical of the regime and more likely to 
vote for the opposition. The experience of the previous regimes and times of civil unrest play a big 
role in support for Museveni, a consideration absent among younger respondents who have only 
known Museveni as a president (see chapter 12.2.2 for more details). It remains to be seen 
whether in following years this trend will continue, as more and more young people reach voting 
age. 
Regarding education, the sample gives an overrepresentation of people with tertiary education, 
which does not allow us to make any statements about the other educational groups. Here, the 
rates of abstention and opposition vote reflect approximative the general results, which is not 
surprising, given that they constitute the majority of the respondents. The vote in terms of gender 
is more revealing. Women are more likely than men not to vote at all or to refuse to answer that 
question. If they vote, they will less likely vote for the opposition; vote for the NRM regime remains 
about the same. This observation brings back to mind the argument from Ferree Marx & McClurg 
Mueller (2004) that women feel that access to politics is more restricted towards them and thus 
refrain from engaging in any political activity. This seems to be supported by the voting behavior 
of the female respondents. Similarly, they were less likely than men to report having an interest 
in politics (38.9% vs. 69.7% of male respondents), while at the same time they have more trust in 
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the current political leaders than men (32.4% of women trust their political leaders, contrary to 
15.4% of men). 
In her study on women and politics in Uganda, Tripp shows how Ugandan women movements, 
particularly in the time after the civil war were able to gain considerable rights, which may explain 
their favorable stance towards the regime (Tripp, 2000, p. 68ff). 
On the contrary, neither religious affiliation nor regional origin gives some revealing insights into 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Male Female
Voters' Alignment by Gender
in %
Governing Opposition Not voted n/a
Figure 36: Vote by Gender, in percent 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Male Female
Voters' Alignment by Gender
N=99
Governing Opposition Not voted n/a
Figure 35: Vote by Gender 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Primary O-Level A-Level Tertiary Other
Voters' Alignment by Education
in %
Governing Opposition Not voted
Figure 34: Vote by Educational Attainment, 
in Percent 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Primary O-Level A-Level Tertiary Other
Voters' Alignment by Education
N=92
Governing Opposition Not voted
Figure 33: Vote by Educational Attainment 
0
20
40
60
80
1 0
Primary O-Level A-Level rti r
Voters' Alignment by Education
N=92
186 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
voting behavior. This has also been confirmed elsewhere (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016). So, we find 
that voting behavior is influenced by some demographic characteristics, as already mentioned in 
other research on the topic, such as age or gender. We do not find a strong indication of regional 
voting, especially since the President and the principal contender both come from the Western 
region. Neither do we find that people with higher income are more inclined to vote, as suggested 
by Verba et al. (1987, p. 76). Thus, in this regard, the middle income groups do not behave overly 
“democratic”, by making use of their constitutionally given right to vote. Linking a democratic 
attitude with voting remains problematic, however, given that the credibility of the elections is 
highly questioned by many respondents and the stakes are quite low, as people are relatively sure 
of the outcome. 
 
Figure 37: Interest in Politics, by Gender 
9.2.2 The Legitimacy of Elections 
There have been several issues that challenged the legitimacy of the various elections held in 
Uganda. For one, every election had been accompanied by irregularities (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 13). 
Thus, for example, only 44% of Ugandans believe that elections are adequate to remove unwanted 
leaders from office – in Kampala this rate is even eight percentage points lower (Afrobarometer, 
2015, pp. 35–37). Ugandans like to remind themselves and others that the country has never seen 
a peaceful change of leadership, and there is a prevailing sentiment that the chances they will any 
time soon are rather bleak. For many, there is a dire need for change, but unless Museveni decides 
to leave power, this change will not come. Hence, in such a context, voting for change seems futile: 
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“Because really, it is like doing something when you know the end result. So, you do a 
formality, but you know the end result. So, there was no need for that [to go and vote].” 
(John) 
“Why should I elect, I stopped voting because I can already predict the results […] I 
rather go to the beach and get some fresh air.” (Kato) 
“It is a waste of time. They are going to rig, what the heck.” (Taibu) 
Voter bribery is another problem mentioned. In a recent Afrobarometer survey, 75% of Ugandans 
indicated that they believe voters are at least sometimes bribed during election times 
(Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 36). Many respondents share this view. In a discussion about the local 
council elections, the president of the leading opposition party FDC was outspoken when he said 
that not the method (voting through lining up), that caused much controversy, was the problem, 
but “YOU, the people, who vote for small bribes.” (Fieldnotes 2017) Such a point of view, however, 
is in stark contrast to results from a survey done by Research World International, in which 81% 
confirmed that they did not get any material incentives prior to the election (Research World 
International, 2016). 
Furthermore, elections are questioned as people feel that there is no viable alternative to the 
ruling candidate (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 60). 
“There is no difference between Museveni, Besigye, Mugisha Muntu, they all still 
believe in the NRA ideology from their time spent together in the bush.” (Martin) 
Martin in this quote refers to the same origins of the current principal opponents in the political 
system, who have all been fighting together in the civil war. Fall outs which appeared later on, led 
to the fragmentation of the group into opposing parties. The feeling that there is no alternative to 
Museveni is also related to the bad reputation of politicians. 
“I voted Museveni [in 2016]. Even though many things are bad, but we have no 
alternative. I rather remain with the thief I already know.” (Janet) 
“Politics is always the same since I was born, it is all about individual benefits, that is 
why the President says no one can take over his shoes. At least, under him, the country 
has been developing. I have only been voting Museveni, the only president I have seen 
because no one else is there to administer the country.” (Rose) 
However, that picture is somewhat mitigated. While some still criticized the opposition for their 
internal fighting or lack of agenda, others believed that they are a genuine solution to the country’s 
problems. Often, albeit not always, the views expressed would correlate with voting behavior. 
Finally, there have nevertheless been some respondents who expressed their sentiment that 
voting was part of their civic duty, regardless whether they considered it would make any 
difference or not.  
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“You must look for a way forward to pull out our country; otherwise, it is still rotting.” 
(Salome) 
“I understand well, voting is my right, and I need to exercise it, and that’s why I vote. 
But I vote also knowing that this system is not transparent. […] It would discourage 
me, but I have the strong feeling that I still need to exercise my right. And you/ 
definitely there is some small hope that one day things will become right, we cannot 
fool things always.” (Geoffrey) 
Compared to the criticism voiced concerning the electoral process, these considerations were only 
expressed by few respondents. All in all, concerns about electorate fraud prevail, damaging the 
credibility of what is supposed to be the minimum requirement for a democracy. Thus, even 
among the voters in the last election, a sentiment exists that their space for expressing citizen-
oriented activism through voting is limited. 
9.3 Politicians: Experiences and Expectations 
Beyond voting, there are other possibilities to engage with the government. Another often 
mentioned form is petitioning, bringing an issue to the knowledge and debate of parliament. 
According to the World Value Survey, 16% of respondents have already done so, and 33% might 
do it, while 28% say they would never do it (World Values Survey Association, 2001, p. V134). 
Thus, while it is nothing people would shun away from, it is neither a common practice. In our 
sample, such an attempt was made by those interviewees who were already involved in some kind 
of activism, thus by people who are already somewhat familiarized with the political system. 
However, in general, they perceived their actions to be rather futile. At the Pan African Club (see 
p. 263) members were discussing a bill tabled by parliament concerning the regulation of 
genetically modified organisms. At the end of the discussion, participants decided to bring their 
concerns to parliament, in the form of a petition. Eventually, they were even invited to present 
their petition in front of parliament. However, the organizer of the club was convinced that this 
was merely a formal procedure, that will not yield any significant results if their petition goes 
against government plans. Similarly, the founders of the Jobless Brotherhood recounted how they 
developed ideas and petitioned the government to contribute to the development of plans 
directed at resolving pending problems of youth unemployment. 
“So, having interacted with people of our perception, we decided we, first of all, wrote 
concepts, we wrote proposals, but they all ended up in waste baskets. We wrote 
proposals to parliament because this is where / but they ended up in waste baskets 
because you find that in Uganda a budget is discussed in parliament […].So, we wrote 
concepts, we wrote letters, we wrote proposals, we went and seeked [sic] meetings, 
and no one was paying attention. Through again, internet, of course, we realized that 
there are some other people who had a better mode of communication which made it 
to the authorities to respond. So that's when together we sat, we designed the pig 
demonstration. That was in 2014.” (Brian) 
The experience from Brian shows how he felt compelled to engage in other actions to make the 
government respond, which made them turn to non-violent protest. The same was true for Ronald 
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(for the background information see the case story p. 232): before mobilizing the spare part sector 
and planning a boycott, the association petitioned government to enforce the laws and act against 
the Chinese retail traders, but nothing was done. Ronald described how he felt ignored by the 
government and a lack of comprehension for their situation because the controlling bodies were 
not the ones acting on the ground. Similar to elections, petitions, if perceived futile, are not 
considered an efficient way of engaging in communication with the government, which ultimately 
will narrow once again the space of political participation given to the citizens. 
The uselessness of interaction with politicians was not only described concerning petitions but 
even face-to-face interactions. Afrobarometer asked citizens how often they have contacted 
District Councilors, Members of Parliament, officials of government agencies, or political party 
officials concerning a problem they had. 82% of Ugandans they said they had never done so. For 
Kampala, the score rose to 85% (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 20). In contrast, only 62% had never 
contacted a traditional and 39% never a religious leader for an important problem (in Kampala 
82% and 49%) (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 21). Among the middle income groups, negative 
experiences or a perceived uselessness of going to public officials prevailed. Josephine explained 
how she had been to the Local Councilor ones, but he only wanted bribes. She left angered, 
wondering what she was paying taxes for, if such services can only be given with an extra “fee”. 
Chris also explains the shunning away from officials in a similar way: “Rarely Ugandans ask the 
regime for something because they know they are corrupt.” (Chris)32 Jennifer said she never 
contacted public officials because they will do nothing. She lost her faith when someone stole her 
chairs and even though she pointed out the thief, no one would support her, as the thief had bribed 
the police officers. These figures can lead us to two conclusions: for one, public officials are not 
considered the best address for the solution of a problem. Given their bad reputation and the little 
trust they enjoy, this might not be surprising. It also shows that the middle income groups will not 
keep the state accountable, as hoped by some (see p. 42). This might be due to an accurate 
estimation of the situation, since the state can hardly be kept accountable if elections are not 
working. Secondly, the rate of people who had never contacted an official for the solution of a 
problem is higher for Kampala. This might be an indication that the people of Kampala have access 
to other mechanisms of problem-solving, and we suggest that self-sufficiency, which is often tied 
to income, might be one of them. 
Because public officials are considered inapt to solve particular problems, people tend to find their 
own solutions. In our case, respondents would use their money to make up for shortcomings, such 
as taking their children to private schools, using private hospitals, repairing their own roads, or 
the like. 
“If there is a pothole, why to wait for state council? You pay the money, and we fix it.” 
(General Secretary, LC1 Parish) 
Such engagement is partially wanted by the government, for example the community program 
Bulungi Bwansi (Luganda, meaning Good Citizen). In such a case, the Kampala Capital City 
Authority (KCCA) provides the material and the citizens put in their labor to achieve a change. 
                                                 
32 Transparency International ranks Uganda on place 142 out of 174 countries (see p. 78) 
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However, if it is not planned through KCCA, these self-initiatives altering the urban landscape are 
seen critical by the authorities. Similarly, neighborhood watches develop in close cooperation 
with the local police station as a way to improve security in the different Kampala neighborhoods 
(for more details, see chapter 14.5 and 15.6). 
The insufficient service delivery and its increasing monetarization have led to the development of 
two kinds of attitude. Particularly among the poor, political officials are contacted for financial 
assistance, in cases like paying for school fees or medical bills. In the Afrobarometer survey, nearly 
half of the respondents who had contact with a leader in the last twelve months did so due to a 
personal problem (Afrobarometer, 2016). During our fieldwork, the deputy mayor of Kampala 
Central, as well as the Regional District Commissioner, both mentioned this as reasons for being 
contacted (Fieldnotes 2017), and some respondents resumed their experiences with public 
officials in their seeking assistance. Arthur who grew up in a camp for internally displaced people 
mentioned that the current (at the time of the interview) minister of foreign affairs lived in a 
neighboring village from his home and that he approached him for support in paying his 
university tuition. While the minister promised to connect him to a sponsor, Arthur never heard 
of him again, and eventually, his brothers paid his school fees. Gordon mentioned in the interview 
that he cannot even get in contact with public officials, as they will not pick their phones because 
they believe “you are calling for money, yet you seek advice. They promise to call you back but then 
will not answer your calls.” (Gordon). Hence, politicians try to limit their contact with citizens, as 
they suspect to be solely asked for money. On the other hand, political activists mentioned that 
politicians, when approached with a particular policy concern would propose personal solutions 
to their problems, instead of addressing the issue itself: 
“Oh, by the way, we do our work, those kinds of guys they don't want to meet us. First 
and foremost, for them they are used to these kinds of people who come with 
problems, expecting, expecting temporary solutions. We have gone with fundamental 
solutions. […] But these ministers, we had an interface with some. But they are asking 
what is your personal problem as you? Can we sort you out? Because you are not 
Jesus, you are not going to die for.” (Joseph) 
The cooptation of critical voices into the patronage system has been mentioned by many activists 
as a common way of silencing dissent and will be discussed in chapter 12.4. 
Combined with the perception of vote buying, there seems to be a shared perception, that poor 
people expect handouts and financial solutions to their problems, instead of changes in 
institutional arrangements. On the other hand, many of the respondents said that they have little 
to no expectation of the government, as they feel it cannot do anything for them. 
“But socially, I have lived without this government, and I don’t think this government 
has anything to help me.” (Andrew) 
“I lost my expectations for this government a long time ago. I am just waiting for them 
honestly to go.” (Raphael) 
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Especially the lack of service delivery led to some disillusionment, which dampened all 
expectations. Most often, if anything at all, respondents would expect the government to provide 
for them peace and stability. 
“I don't have a lot of expectations of the government at the moment, all I need the 
state to do for me as a person is to provide an atmosphere that is convenient to carry 
out my work. That would be a state where we do not have wars, a state that is free of 
terrorists, a state where the economy is steadily growing, something like that.” 
(Herbert) 
*** 
Our analysis has shown that the middle income groups are in general more supportive of 
democracy than the average Ugandan, and, contrary to the findings from the Afrobarometer 
(Mattes & Bratton, 2016), they are not pleased with its current state in Uganda. This is in some 
respects reflected in their voting behavior. We find above-average support for the opposition and 
below-average support for the ruling party. However, this finding mirrors the official results for 
Kampala and hence cannot be attributed to a shared political attitude of the middle income groups 
due to a similar material position. Rather, it confirms what Rallings has already pointed out: the 
social environment is more decisive to determine political behavior than class affiliation (Rallings, 
1978, p. 202). Thus, in an urban environment, with more access to media and better 
communication from the opposition parties, ideas contrary to the dominant regime narrative can 
circulate more easily. While we have already highlighted the strong presence of middle income 
earners in urban environments, the voting behavior seems to apply also for the urban poor. 
However, the finding also refutes the idea that the middle income groups are particularly attached 
to the incumbent regime because it made their position possible (Musyoka, 2017; Tamarkin, 
1978). We find that discontent with the current regime, mistrust towards the political leaders and 
strong opposition support are pronounced among urban Ugandans. Instead, women show a voting 
behavior that we would have expected for status-quo oriented income groups: they have more 
trust in the leaders, show less interest in politics and are more likely to vote for Museveni. While 
less coherent on the other aspects, elderly as well are more likely to support the current regime, 
even though they do not necessarily trust them more. The findings suggest that their experience 
with previous regimes has left an overall disenchantment with politicians, and the current 
situation as one of the lesser evils, since, at least “there is peace and stability.” 
Seeing the state as the guarantee for peace and stability echoes the popular discourse led by the 
NRM and Museveni, that depict them precisely as these guardians and hence in a way, albeit not 
necessarily being in support, respondents at least give some legitimacy to the regime because it 
fulfills this function. Yet, in other aspects, a general sentiment prevails that there can nothing 
much be expected of public officials. Whereas poorer people might turn to them for material 
support, wealthier respondents have the feeling that they cannot do anything for them, and that 
they are only interested in bribes. It seems that the state can hardly be held accountable by its 
citizens, particularly if problems arise. As a result, many of the middle income groups turn away 
from the state, as their financial resources permit them to seek solutions elsewhere.

  
10 Recent Protests and their 
Perceptions 
Over the past ten years, Uganda has witnessed four major political protests, namely the Mabira 
forest protest, the Buganda riots, Walk to Work, and the Black Monday Movement, as well as more 
numerous strikes, or suddenly erupting riots (see Salehyan et al., 2012). The latter however have 
remained short-lived and small-scale, touching only comparably few people. The former, on the 
other hand have had a bigger media coverage and especially in Kampala people have been affected 
by the demonstrations, even if they may have remained bystanders. Studying these protests 
allows us to better understand the context in which they evolve, the constraints put up by the 
regime and its mechanism of controlling dissent, the legitimacy accorded to the protests by 
Ugandans and the socio-demographics of those who actively participated. Albeit sometimes 
supportive of the cause, most Ugandans interviewed chose to abstain from any political activism. 
As seen in chapter 4.2.3, the willingness of the state to accept open criticism has been continuously 
declining. So has the motivation of the president to leave his position and to make space for a 
successor. The condition of democracy in the country has been criticized from various directions 
(see Barkan et al., 2011; International Crisis Group, 2012; Kagoro, 2016) and the likelihood of 
regime change through democratic elections is rather bleak. Thus, contentious uprisings have 
increasingly been framed not only as a critique of a particular issue, but also as a critique of the 
regime in power in general: by those protesting, the regime, and also bystanders, who would 
decide to join or not to join depending on their point of view towards the government in place. An 
analysis of past protests in Uganda might be revealing in that sense, as it has the potential to shed 
light on the issues at stake, and their perceptions by protesters, the state, and by our respondents. 
Looking at the attitudes from the middle income groups and their behavior concerning their own 
participation allows us to describe key ideas of social movements, such as perceptions of collective 
identity, political opportunities and repertoires of action, considered legitimate by the middle 
income groups. Hence, we will discuss the most important protests of the last ten years, that have 
been widely debated in the public. We follow here a chronological order, starting with the earliest 
protest. All of these protests reveal their proper dynamics and perceptions by the public, that 
greatly contributed to their course. 
10.1 “Save Mabira”: United Behind a Common Cause for Diverging Reasons 
In April 2007 Uganda witnessed what some at that time described the largest street protests of its 
history (Child, 2009). President Museveni had revealed plans to give one quarter of the Mabira 
Central Forest Reserve to a sugarcane company, Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) to 
use it as a sugarcane plantation (NAPE, 2016). Apparently already in 2005 meetings between the 
president and the owner of the Mehta group, of which SCOUL is a subsidiary were held, but plans 
for the de-gazettement became public only after the first multiparty elections, won by Museveni 
(Child, 2009, p. 246 f). Since the first public announcement, mobilization to preserve the forest 
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started. The forest reserve, that covers over 30 000 hectares of land has important ecological 
implications, as ecosystem for several species, but also as a water catchment area for the river 
Nile (NAPE, 2016, p. 12). Initially starting in the internet through petitions and blog posts, the 
mobilization quickly spread to the real world. Environmental NGO’s like the National Association 
of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) and groups of university students brought petitions to 
parliament, and international donors increased pressure (Child, 2009, p. 247 f). The EU withdrew 
funding from SCOUL, the Norwegian government announced that it would decrease aid flows to 
Uganda if the government realized the plans, and the World Bank argued that this decision would 
go against an agreement made in 2001, and as a result the bank would not fund the construction 
of the Bujagali hydro-electric dam33 (ibid.). Despite these protests, the government maintained its 
plans and in March 2007 the cabinet agreed to the President’s demand. This decision led to 
aforementioned street protest in April, when several thousand people demonstrated to maintain 
the Mabira Forest Reserve. The scope of the protests is quite remarkable, and this was mainly due 
to a broad-based coalition of environmental and civil NGOs, donors, religious leaders, the Buganda 
kingdom, Kampala traders, academic institutions, and the politicians. Those came mainly from the 
opposition, but representatives from the ruling party and national agencies were equally present. 
The protest, which was planned as peaceful, however turned violent. For one, the police used live 
bullets and teargas to disperse the crowd that quickly grew, but demonstrators were also involved 
in looting, vandalism and xenophobic attacks on people of Indian origin (Mahendra Mehta, the 
owner of SCOUL, is Ugandan of Indian descent), leaving four dead, several wounded and numerous 
people arrested (Rice, 2007). However, eventually the president withdrew his plans and in 2007 
the forest was not de-gazetted. Yet, illegal logging apparently continues (Hönig, 2014, p. 56) and 
the issue resurfaced in 2011 and 2016, always shortly after elections (Hönig, 2014, p. 57; NAPE, 
2016, p. 13). But environmental NGOs reacted quickly and revitalized protest, leading in 2011 to 
two meetings with the President himself, and so far, the plans have not been realized. However, 
NAPE itself concludes: 
“For now, Ugandans can say they have won the Mabira forest battle, but the war still 
continues. Who knows the power of money may eventually consume the widely 
cherished forest.” (NAPE, 2016, p. 13) 
So, while the situation may still change, the result of the Mabira forest protest can be considered 
a success for the protesters. While the international media focused primarily on the violence of 
the event (BBC, 2007; Rice, 2007), subsequent academic analysis either celebrated the active civil 
society in Uganda (Child, 2009; Twesigye, 2008) or criticized them for actually being used for 
identity politics (Hönig, 2014). However, both sides, and this is in concordance to our own 
findings, refer for their analysis to the multiple reasons that brought people to join the protest. 
That the protest was so successful, especially compared to other protests in Uganda, is due to 
diverse motivations, united by a common short-term objective, make the Mabira forest protest a 
“poster child” for social mobilization. 
                                                 
33 Due to its function as water catchment area, reducing the forest could risk reducing the water levels of the Victoria 
Lake and Victoria Nile, and with reduced water levels the dam could risk to not function properly (Executive Director, 
NAPE) 
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In his analysis of the protest, Child (2008) identified five discourses that were present in the 
confrontation between the government and the protesters: On the side of the government, a 
development discourse was used, arguing for the give-away to promote job creation and higher tax 
revenues. The president opposed the “backwardness” of the country. Such an economic 
opportunity that would bring modernity through industrialization should not be missed. He 
invoked his plans of transforming Uganda in a middle class country: “We, therefore, need to balance 
the needs of preserving the eco-system with the needs for social transformation, changing the society 
from peasant to middle class, skilled working class society.” (Museveni, 2007) Thus, the protesters 
were framed as enemies of progress. When taking a public stance for his support of the forest give-
away, Museveni argued that. 
“Our ignorant traditional chiefs caused our enslavement in the past; ignorant African 
elites are responsible for our continued enslavement today. […] Why should any 
Ugandan obstruct, harangue or inconvenience such people [that bring economic 
activity to the country]? What sort of disorientation is this? How can enemies of the 
future of the people of Uganda be allowed to thrive? […] The delays and controversies 
generated by the enemies of progress and permitted to continue make us lose 
opportunities.” (Museveni, 2007) 
Albeit its reference to middle class, modernity, and economic development, this discourse 
attracted only few supporters, as skepticism about the intentions of the government prevailed. 
Instead, opposing discourse weighed stronger for many. On the side of the protesters, there was 
obviously an environmental discourse, brought forward by NAPE and other environmental NGOs, 
that gained wide acceptance among the Ugandan population. Child suggests that with the effects 
of climate change becoming noticeable for many Ugandans in the form of prolonged droughts or 
too heavy rainfalls, “the environment” has the potential to become a new arena for protest, that 
will equally be used to demand more democracy (Child, 2009, p. 241). While the environmental 
argument certainly appealed to many, particularly educated Ugandans, in the case of Mabira there 
have been neither any other large-scale environmental protest in the last ten years, even though 
similar forest-giveaways have been taken place before and after Mabira (Nampewo, 2013; NAPE, 
2016) nor does the environmental conscience apply to other areas, such as the widespread 
practice of private waste burning or the continued use of plastic bags, albeit officially declared 
illegal (following the Rwandan example). Additionally, as far as we know, no demands for more 
democracy have been made during the protest, as this would clearly but the campaign in a 
“political” light, something the organizers wanted to avoid. Hence, putting too much emphasis on 
the environmental discourse seems to fit well in an agenda by international donors, highlighting 
the success of civil society and environmental awareness programs brought by NGOs. However, 
in our opinion, it exaggerates the “official”, the environmental, aspect through which the protest 
was framed, and neglects other concerns, mainly identitary ones. 
Another opposition discourse focused on livelihood and the income local communities generated 
through the forest, such as charcoal or timber production, honey collection, meat provision, or 
eco-tourism. Thus, especially communities living in the immediate environs of the forest opposed 
its de-gazettement out of fear of loss of income. Promised job and wealth creation through an 
expansion of the factory were met with caution. One respondent explained: 
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“There is already too much sugar cane in that place, but are the people rich? They are 
not. So if you can't convince them that by cutting the third of this forest you are going 
to make them rich? It was not making a lot of what? A lot of sense to the people.” 
(Executive Director and Assistant, NAPE) 
On top of that, there was another discourse centered around questions of governance. While there 
was no proof, watchdog NGOs suspected issues of corruption accompanying this agreement 
behind closed doors. Mamdani in a comment on the protest observed that: 
“Mabira turned into a major scandal because it symbolised a collusion between an 
increasingly unaccountable president and an arrogant tycoon from a racialised 
minority. The president had taken to treating the country as his private preserve; the 
grant of Mabira was simply the latest in a series of grants (of a school in one case or 
an information ministry facility in another) by the president, always claiming that his 
personal will represented the interests of ‘development’. The tycoon too claimed to 
be doing the country a favour — once again, ‘development’ — rather than lining his 
own pockets.” (Mamdani, 2007) 
NGOs criticized that protocol had not been followed for awarding tenders and reasons for 
choosing SCOUL lacked transparency, nourishing claims of corruption. 
Another governance aspect refers to the role of the Buganda kingdom. Baganda claimed that the 
land, in fact, belongs to the kabaka and the government had no right to simply give it away (Child, 
2009, p. 252). The kabaka, who himself took sides with the protesters offered land in another area 
of Central region, but the Mehta group refused (Child, 2009, p. 248). Thus, for Baganda, the issue 
brought questions of the autonomy of the kingdom, or rather the lack thereof, to the forefront. 
Additionally, the forest was said to be home to the ancestors and, therefore, equally had a sacred 
function among Baganda. Given the significant mobilization power of the kabaka and the loyalty 
he enjoys among his people, it is likely that this contributed to the protest. Finally, a third aspect 
of the governance discourse, not mentioned by Child could have been axed on the opposition. 
Opposition politicians used that opportunity to criticize government policies. Beatrice Anywar, 
MP for the FDC invested herself in the demonstrations, she called for people to come to Mabira 
and she organized a boycott for sugar from SCOUL. Her actions gave her the nickname “Mama 
Mabira”, and it is equally possible that some protesters used the occasion to voice their discontent 
about the ruling government. However, most likely, the protest was successful precisely because 
this aspect was only subordinate. The fact that MPs of opposition as well as from the ruling party 
joined the protest gave it some credibility among Ugandans who did not feel that this was only 
about “politicking”. One of the organizers explained the success of Mabira, contrary to other 
protests, in these terms: 
“But with Mabira, the leaders were not necessary opposition, like me, I was not an 
opposition person, I was just civil society. Religious leaders were not in opposition; 
cultural leaders were not opposition […], so that was the difference.” (Executive 
Director, NAPE) 
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The most controversial discourse focused on the racial violence. In the course of the 
demonstrations, people of Indian descent had become victims of attacks by black Ugandans. The 
owner of the Mehta Group is of Indian origin himself, and Indians control a large part of the 
Ugandan economy. This imbalance, grown since colonial times has sparked widespread anti-Asian 
sentiments in the population and has found its peak in the expulsion of Indians through Idi Amin 
(Mamdani, 2007). When Museveni came to power, he invited the Indian community back into the 
country and returned confiscated property. During the Mabira protest, these sentiments surfaced 
again and were voiced openly in calls for violence against Indians. One interviewee, now active in 
non-violent protest, admitted: 
Brian: I had a rage against Indians, I must confess. So, I saw an opportunity to go for 
them, and whatever I did I don't want to talk about it. Having worked with them, I 
remember how they used to treat me, so I had to pay back. 
AF: So that was not part of your non-violent/ ? 
Brian: No, I don't want to pronounce that I was non-violent in the Mabira riot, I was 
really/ and when I look back, I feel sorry. 
Also, another interviewee who saw himself as one of the leading organizers of the protest stated 
his reasons as protecting the climate and “going against those investors who have made us suffer a 
lot.” (General Secretary, UTRADA) 
It is hard to tell to what extent these sentiments played into the mobilization (as it is for all the 
others). Hönig (2014) portrays them as “free-riders”, who co-opted “noble” causes for their 
interests of identitary politics, but we would argue that rather than a by-product, they were among 
the reasons that the protest succeeded. Such a distinction brings to mind Siméants assertion that 
scholars of civil society like to neglect “ugly movements”, that mobilize around questions of a 
religious or ethnic identity, even though they are often very powerful (Siméant, 2013). 
In concordance with our analysis is Child’s conclusion that the Mabira protest, unlike other 
environmental concerns, such as the Bujagali hydroelectric dam or the forest giveaway on Bugala 
Island34, was successful because of the  
“[…] temporary alliance of diverse civil society organizations. […] Individually none 
of the oppositional discourses examined above would have provoked enough civil 
society opposition to force the NRM government to withdraw its plans for the forest 
reserve.” (Child, 2009, p. 253) 
Not going into Child’s discussion of civil society that he does at length in the article, we would like 
to stress here, that the alliance was successful because it was not only carried by NGOs (like the 
Black Monday movement, see p. 209), but equally touched upon questions of identity for Baganda 
                                                 
34 The President gave forest land on Bugala Island in Lake Victoria to private investors for the production of palm oil 
(Nampewo, 2013, p. 528f) 
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and for black (vs. Indian) Ugandans and because it was not seen by many as a cause brought 
forward by the opposition, who would secretly follow its own hidden agenda (like Walk to Work, 
see p. 205). In this diversity of reasons, the Mabira protest became legitimate for the loyal 
Muganda royalist, as well as for the marginalized Ugandan who felt they did not have their share 
in the national economy, as well as for the educated who worried about effects of climate change. 
The organizers underlined the diversity of profiles of those demonstrating on the street, they 
described the protesters as mainly young, aged between 15-55 years. According to the NAPE 
director, the original protesters were well-off people with an employment (except for civil 
servants, who may have been supportive but are more cautious to go on the streets), who then 
had been joined by boda boda riders and the unemployed youth. However, they highlighted that 
“some important people from Buganda put on their kanzus35“ (executive director, NAPE) to 
underline the respectability of those protesting. Others described that protesters joined 
regardless of their tribal affiliations and that participants were also MPs or “middle class people” 
(Brian). Given the broad reasons for which people joined, as discussed above, this observation 
seems plausible. As a result, the middle income groups interviewed, even those who did not 
participate themselves, were generally in favor of the protest and supported its cause. It was an 
adequate projection for the very different concerns, mentioned above, which could all be equally 
found under the label of the middle income groups. 
The protest then was met with a lot of violence from the side of the regime. Tear gas and live 
bullets were used, and the majority of deaths (three out of the four) was caused by police violence 
(BBC, 2007). Despite having undertaken the legal steps to stage a demonstration, the main 
organizers have been arrested and tried in court on charges of treason, terrorism, murder, theft 
“and other trumped-up charges” (executive director, NAPE). Eventually they won the case and the 
charges were dropped, but the case revealed the methods of the regime to deal with dissent. Hönig 
(2014) observes that the government does not distinguish anymore between lawful and unlawful 
dissent, but between loyal and disloyal opposition. Because any activism is considered disloyal 
opposition very quickly, activists often go at great lengths to show that their activism is not 
“political”, or directed against the regime, as some other cases will show. 
10.2 The Buganda Riots: Loyalty to the Kingdom, not the Nation 
Between 10th and 12th of September 2009, violent riots took place in Kampala and other parts of 
Central Uganda, that left at least 27 people dead36, several injured and over 800 arrested (Baral & 
Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 165; Rutanga, 2010, p. 143). The street protests had been triggered by 
a decision from the national government to stop a planned visit from the kabaka to Kayunga, one 
district of the kingdom, which had recently declared independence from Buganda. The declaration 
of autonomy had been controversial among Baganda, who believed that this was a technique of 
the NRM government to divide the kingdom into smaller entities, in an effort to “divide and rule”. 
When plans of the kabaka to go to the region became known, the government argued that it could 
not guarantee the king’s security (to protect him from the secessionists) and, therefore, decided 
                                                 
35 Buganda wear for men, often used for official reasons, such as cultural functions, ceremonies, etc. 
36 This is the official number, Human Rights Watch, who did its own investigations, estimated at least 40 casualties 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
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he should rather not go (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 122). When the katikkiro (the Buganda 
prime minister) and a group of Buganda officials were stopped on their way to Kayunga by 
security forces, a public outcry by Baganda followed over this restriction and quickly spread to 
Kampala. Protesters erected roadblocks and set tires on fire to protest the government decision 
(Rutanga, 2010). Accounts of looting, rioting and harassment of people perceived to come from 
Western regions took place. At roadblocks, people were asked to pronounce certain words in 
Luganda and if they failed to do so, those identified as coming from the West were beaten or 
harassed (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). Police and military forces responded with 
heavy violence, that led to an escalation of the situation and put the city in an exceptional state 
that lasted for three days, and made the Buganda riots, as they became known the “most violent in 
Uganda’s recent history, in terms of life and property.” (Rutanga, 2010, p. 143) The violence 
eventually stopped when the kabaka announced that he would refrain from visiting the district. 
What seemed like a violent, but spontaneous, eruption rather was an expression of long built up 
grief and the anticipation of confrontation. Since the end of the guerrilla war, a sense of betrayal 
reigned among Baganda who felt that the government did not sufficiently respond to their 
demands for more autonomy. During the liberation war, the Baganda had been a key ally to 
Museveni’s insurgency and their implication had been rewarded with the restoration of the 
kingdom, despite objections from within the inner political circle (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 22). 
The re-establishment equally served as a way of appeasing opposition in a still fragile peace 
(Perrot, 2003, p. 232). Subsequently, however, the relation between the kingdom and the central 
government eroded. In the years prior to the riots, three bills had been tabled that were highly 
controversial and widely rejected by Baganda, as they were seen to undermine the kingdom’s 
autonomy (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 763). First, in 2005 the government proposed a law concerning 
the decentralization of the country into “regional tiers”. This was refuted by Baganda, who instead 
called for a federal system, generally referred to as “federo”, that would grant Buganda the status 
of a federal state. Secondly, already in 1998, the government had passed a Land Act, with the 
intention to give more rights to peasants and thus limit the powers of the (often Baganda) 
landlords. In 2007, the Land (Amendment) Bill was tabled in parliament, emphasizing the rights 
of “Bonafide occupants” over Baganda landlords. The bill was widely perceived by Baganda as a 
way for people from the West to grab Buganda land (Activist III, (formerly) Nkoba Zambogo). The 
framing as an occupation of Buganda by “foreigners” was one of the reasons that explained the 
attacks on Westerners (Brisset-Foucault, 2013, p. 80). Thirdly, 2009 Kampala Capital City Bill 
intended to expand the boundaries of Kampala, by taking Buganda land and turning it into Capital 
City Land. In response, in July 2009 the lukiiko (the Buganda parliament) instructed the regime to 
remove the government from Buganda soil and settle elsewhere in Uganda (Rutanga, 2010, p. 
127). Goodfellow (2014) has shown that the controversial bills were used by the government as 
a tactic to provoke Baganda and cause resentments against them in the rest of the population, as 
eventually none of the bills, once passed as laws, had been implemented to the detriment of 
Buganda. Thus, Goodfellow assumes that the government may have foreseen upcoming protests 
(Goodfellow, 2014, p. 764), even though they may not have measured the amplitude. Others recall 
allegations at that time that the protest had been planned beforehand (Brisset-Foucault, 2013; 
Rutanga, 2010; Tangen, 2010), but substantial evidence seems to be lacking (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). However, the account given by Activist III, presented here in the following case 
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story, seems to support the assumption, that the rioters, too, have not been taken entirely by 
surprise. 
Case Story: Preparing for War 
In the heightening tensions between Buganda and the central government, the 
Banyala ethnic group in Kayunga district declared their autonomy from Buganda in 
August 2009 and announced its opposition to the royal visit (Rutanga, 2010, p. 140). 
At this point, the Baganda student’s group Nkoba Zambogo37 started preparing for a 
confrontation, to assure that their king could continue with his travel plans as 
intended. Activist III was an active member of the group at the time of the riots. He 
explained that in his section they gathered about 800-1000 students who would 
travel to Kayunga one month prior to the scheduled visit, prepare the place through 
sweeping and cutting grass. However, they also prepared for a possible confrontation 
with Banyala, by cutting sticks, and gathering machetes. As he described it “the 
students were ready to prepare a war” (Activist III). On the days before the visit, he 
went back to Kampala, however, because “we knew”. The group expected that the 
kabaka would be stopped and they prepared to protest. Once the message reached 
him that the katikkiro could not continue his travel, he immediately went to Kisekka 
market, a downtown market dealing in used motor spare parts, got tires and started 
burning them at junctions all over Kampala, to stop traffic.  
According to him, they were able to take the city the first day, since the government 
could not deploy soldiers from the Kampala army barracks, as they were all Baganda 
themselves. Instead, they allegedly flew in soldiers from Karamoja and South Sudan 
overnight, which eventually allowed them to regain some control. The protesters in 
the street received support from “some big people in Buganda”, who distributed 
Waragi [a local brand of gin] and Marijuana to the crowds, to keep up their morale. 
Activist III believes that if the protests had continued, they would have been able to 
topple the government. And even though peace was restored when the kabaka 
announced that he would not go to Kayunga, Activist III believes there is only the need 
for a spark for new protests to break out. “Buganda is hibernating. We are told to 
survive in any situation, but the issues are still there.” 
During, and even more so after the riots, the incident had been framed in very different ways. 
Rutanga (2010) denounced it as ethnic violence and compared the role of the media to those of 
the Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda during the time of the genocide (Rutanga, 2010, p. 142). 
Museveni himself, when addressing the Buganda members of parliament put the sectarian 
intentions of the Buganda kingdom in contrast to his own national concerns, which ignore 
ethnicity. “CBS [the broadcasting service of the kingdom] promoted sectarianism, at one time talking 
of people with long noses [a nickname referring to people from the West]. It is not our duty to 
                                                 
37 Nkoba Zambogo is the student cultural group of the Buganda kingdom. It was founded in 1991 by students at 
Makerere University and is said to have over 100 000 active members and is present in all higher learning institutions 
throughout the country (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 18). 
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measure people’s noses – long or short.” (Museveni, 2009) Such a discourse aimed at portraying 
Baganda as arrogant and in the desire of special treatment that they would not refrain to use 
violence against other ethnic groups. This perception was shared by many who were opposed to 
the riots, on the grounds that they did not come from Buganda. 
However, Brisset-Foucault (2013) argues that: 
“Nevertheless, the accusation of ‘genocide’ is fanciful: the demonstrations were not 
organized against civilians, the demonstrators were not all Baganda, and the victims 
were essentially hurt because of police retaliation […]. This interpretation frames the 
events in a very specific way, presenting them as violence between royalist ‘rioters’ 
against civilians instead of as the result of repression by security forces. It also 
foregrounds an ethnic interpretation of the crisis, and, by so doing, keeps the riots 
from being understood in the larger context of the economic and regime crisis, and 
the growth of security forces’ violence against demonstrators.” (Brisset-Foucault, 
2013, p. 80) 
Hence, for her, the riots were an expression of wider grievances shared by the urban poor and not 
solely by Baganda (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). This observation is supported by 
claims from Activist III that about 40% of the people arrested were non-Baganda, and that the 
argument of ethnic violence was only made because “people want others to hate us”. Similarly, the 
General Secretary of UTRADA, a driver in the transport sector, acknowledged that he joined the 
protests, albeit not being a Baganda himself, because “If whatever they organize can bring change, 
I have to participate.” (General Secretary, UTRADA). Similarly, Golooba-Mutebi (2011) 
acknowledges that Buganda and other pre-colonial institutions serve “to fill an ideological gap” 
(p.11) when dissatisfaction with the regime, public service delivery or inequality mount. 
Especially the violent crackdown from the government contributed to the escalation, exacerbating 
sentiments of injustice among the lower urban groups (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). 
The framing as ethnic violence is equally countered by arguments from Human Rights Watch. 
They argue that mainly the government forces were responsible for the deaths and violence that 
occurred, by using unnecessary lethal force (Human Rights Watch, 2009). While maybe not 
necessarily ethnically motivated, the mobilizing role of the king cannot be neglected, as seen in 
his powers to quickly demobilize the protest. Golooba-Mutebi points out that “The tremendous 
loyalty it [the Buganda monarchy] commands cannot and should not be dismissed as only a reaction 
to the incompetence of the central government.” (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 12) So, while some 
Baganda were motivated to join, others were criticizing the tribal nature of the riots: 
“I did not support them [the Baganda riots] because they were tribalistic.” (Chris) 
“But whereas the kabaka riots, again it turned into a tribal, where people from 
Western were asked some questions and if they didn't answer them properly, they 
could be punished. So, it became it developed into a tribal kind of conflict. So, the 
participation was reserved for Baganda much as some non-Baganda played some big 
role.” (Brian) 
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“Recently, like in 2009, we had this rec/ tribalism thing, Baganda and Banyara. So 
many people were killed in town and so many (wares?) in so many buildings were 
destroyed, cars were burnt because people had started these things of Rwanda, you 
know, genocide stuff. But this man [the president] came up with his one word, told 
them, we don't depend on / Uganda is not made out of Baganda.” (Halima) 
Hence, identity has been a central issue in mobilization during the protest, even though it may not 
have been confined to it. Thus, contrary to the Mabira Forest protest, it did not manage to span a 
broad-based alliance between all Ugandans but was widely perceived as a “Baganda issue”. 
Beyond the immediate consequences of deaths, injuries and arrests, the riots led to an increase in 
police presence and equipment, and efforts on the side of the government to avoid similar events 
through increased repression. Additionally, the government drafted the Public Order 
Management Bill, a bill that foresaw a curtailing of freedoms to assemble in public. At that time, it 
provoked international criticism and was put on hold but resurfaced again after the Walk to Work 
protests (see below) and eventually was passed in the turmoil surrounding the Anti-
Homosexuality Act (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 765 ff). Already during the riots, the government closed 
several media houses, on the grounds that they were inciting sectarianism and violence. Among 
them was the Central Broadcasting Service (CBS), the media station of the kingdom (Brisset-
Foucault, 2013, p. 83; Human Rights Watch, 2010). While many of them reopened shortly after 
the protest, CBS remained closed for a year and eventually returned on air on renegotiated 
conditions what could be said on air and what could not. Similarly, the ebimeeza, popular 
interactive open-air radio talk shows, were forbidden and have not returned to the public scene 
in Kampala since. In her analysis, Brisset-Foucault attributed the restrictions to the fostering of a 
“political” instead of a mere “developmental” speech in the radio talk shows: 
“The specific targeting of interactive shows is not a coincidence. They symbolize the 
transformation of the Kingdom, the politicization, generalization, and mass 
communication of its demands, and, more importantly, the existence of a popular 
political speech (because it targeted directly the decisions and behaviour of national 
elites and thus was not considered as developmental) that is detached from the 
institutional apparatus of the National Resistance Movement and attached to a 
‘traditional institution’, promoting a mode of popular speech that contravened 
Museveni’s definition of citizenship and modernity.” (Brisset-Foucault, 2013, p. 81) 
This distinction between political versus non-political, or developmental is interesting insofar, as 
it is an often used rhetoric tool by the government as well as by activists to define their actions; 
with political often implying illegitimacy. This point shall be discussed later on in more detail in 
chapter 12.1. 
In an attempt to appease the protesters, allegedly, Museveni himself called at least one of the 
Nkoba Zambogo mobilizers, to ask him “why I was burning the city” (Activist III). The organizers 
got offered money or positions as Regional District Commander (RDC) because “their thinking was 
that most people who are doing this are unemployed, so we better get them jobs.” (Activist III). The 
direct personal intervention of the president fits well a pattern observed in other protests (see 
10.1 and Goodfellow 2012), as well as the tendency to appease by integrating opponents in a 
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patronage system (Barkan et al., 2011). The perception that it was mostly the unemployed youth 
who would protest was shared by others, like Baral and Brisset-Foucault. They attributed the 
frustrations to the “classes urbaines démunies” (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). Also, 
Rutanga argued that  
“The business people attributed the riots on the redundant, unemployed youth. They 
argued that such activities usually became occasions for the unemployed youth to 
vent out their anger and frustrations through fighting, looting and destruction.” 
(Rutanga, 2010, p. 150) 
The role Nkoba Zambogo played during the protests supports the observation that many 
participants were youthful, as the group largely draws its members from universities. However, 
with these members being university students, the conclusion may be drawn that the protests 
were not only fueled by an urban underclass but also through young people with access to tertiary 
education; something that only applies to a minority of the Ugandan population. However, 
whereas “the energy of the street is always youthful” (Activist IV, Black Monday), the accounts of 
Activist III reveal also a supporting structure behind the protests, that did not manifest itself in 
the streets, but in the provision of logistic and material support. It, therefore, hints at the changing 
repertoires of action available to an individual, according to their income, age, and position. For 
the people interviewed, the decisive question whether or not they would feel concerned often 
depended on their ethnic affiliation. Usually, the Baganda would be supportive of the cause, even 
if they did not participate. 
For Ibrahim, the Buganda riots were the only demonstrations he, himself a Muganda, ever 
participated in, and he proudly felt the protesters had achieved something: 
Ibrahim: [I participated] because I think it [is unfair for] my cultural leader to be 
hesitated from going / be hindered from going to a certain part of the country, which 
is under his ownership. 
AF: And did you think / or did it have an effect? 
Ibrahim: Yes, of course, it had. [...] All things in the country, most especially in the city 
had to get stalled for three days. There was no business in the city for three days. 
There were bullets everywhere. People were shutting their homes. So, yeah, it was a 
big signal to the government that people love their king and they should be doing what 
they want. 
Stephen, who earlier in the interview has emphasized his love for the kabaka, recalls: 
“I wanted to participate in a demonstration where my kabaka was refused to visit one 
of the counties in Bugerere. But by the time I wanted to participate, it had become 
SOUR. Live bless over. I said I support you guys, but for the sake of my life, I couldn't. 
Yeah. But had it been a peaceful demonstration, and hadn't it gone sour, I would be 
part of it. Because I didn't like it, the way they did it. But that turned out sour. I'm 
sorry to be a coward, but things were not/ [good].” (Stephen) 
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Others may have still felt that it was wrong from stopping a Ugandan to go to some place of 
Uganda, as it was limiting a fundamental freedom, but did not participate. Gerald, who was not at 
Kampala at the time of the riots described his attitude as follows: 
“Though I felt touched, I had nothing much to do. I was working in a[n internet] cafe, 
and just, as usual, I was on social media. [laughs] but me as a person I did not 
participate. Otherwise, the Buganda riot, there is one thing, some people misquote 
Ugandans. They say people look at this thing as if they are for a particular tribe. 
Buganda riot came and people from the Western, people from the Eastern, people 
from North said this is a Buganda issue. I think there is a way this thing needs to be 
looked at; the kind of that thing happened in a situation that there was a scuffle that 
why should I not go to one of my counties. Then the government operatives are saying 
we have sensed danger. What danger? Unless you are the one that wants to kill me. I 
cannot have my own subjects kill me.” (Gerald) 
Thus, we do find here again a schism that goes across the lines of the income groups and divides 
instead along questions of age and ethnicity (young people, even educated, and loyal Baganda). 
On the contrary, mainly the people from the West portrayed the riots as tribalistic and considered 
them to be wrong, only inciting violence. Some described harassments they had experienced 
during the riots and did not keep them in good memory. So, unlike Mabira, the issue was much 
more divisive, and due to the accrued level of violence, leading to more fatalities, many people 
refrained from participating, even though they may have been supportive of the cause, as the 
quote by Stephen shows. While the issues may have equally provoked other informal urban 
groups, it remained primarily a Baganda question (who also constitute the most significant part 
of the urban poor in Kampala, as the city is located in Buganda). Branch & Mampilly (2015) argue 
that the protests even managed to overcome a usually very present rural/urban divide by 
appealing to ethnic identities. They state: 
“An alternative political and social order was being imposed in the streets, one in 
which the true authority, the Kabaka, was returned to his rightful place above the 
Museveni regime, even if only temporarily.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 124) 
And Guma highlights:  
“Nevertheless, the mere fact that such an event, which to a casual observer may 
appear minor, could trigger riots that left dozens dead, over 800 arrested, and an 
immense amount of damaged property is testament to the emotive power and 
political fealty that kingdoms in general — and Buganda in particular — are able to 
command in Uganda […]. That the King of Buganda was still able to foster social 
cohesion in his ethnic group in many ways calls for a rethinking of the role of 
traditional institutions in Africa’s quest for democracy in the present day.” (Guma, 
2017, p. 192) 
Thus, while some may have used the occasion to express their dissatisfaction in general, the 
protest mainly drew its energy from sentiments of identity and loyalty to the king, turning it into 
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a question of “Buganda versus Uganda”, with the Baganda protesters choosing the former over 
the latter. In these orientations, the protests lost appeal to many of the middle income groups, 
particularly if they were not Baganda. However, even among the Baganda, due to the violent 
nature of the protest, active participation would much depend on age, drawing its support from 
the young people. Older, but also wealthier Baganda, however, would be more willing to finance 
underlying structures. 
This high mobilization potential suggests that the Buganda kingdom can be seen as an “abeyance 
structure” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). While not active at the moment, it can use its loyalties to be 
quickly reactivated for a cause, especially if it touches on the Baganda identity. 
10.3 Walk to Work: A Good Cause, but the Wrong Means 
In February 2011, Ugandans went to the polls and re-elected President Museveni for another 
term, after him being for 25 years in power. This did not come as a surprise to many observers, 
who predicted a landslide win for the incumbent against his opponent Kizza Besigye. Though the 
elections were marked by less violence than the previous 2006 elections, the ground was not 
leveled. To avoid repression, Museveni resorted to co-optation and invested heavily in the pre-
election period in securing loyalty through financial means (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 
25ff). As a result, the election was the most expensive one in Ugandan history, with the lion’s share 
of the NRM campaign being drawn from the national budget (Barkan et al., 2011, p. 11). In January 
2011, only seven months after the begin of the fiscal year, the parliament passed a supplementary 
budget of 250 million dollars, with about 100 million dollars allocated to State House (Tangen, 
2011). At the end of the month, however, the minister of finance acknowledged that the 
government had run out of funding and thus had to concentrate spending only on a few areas with 
high priority. Allegedly the money of the supplementary budget had been used to buy fighter jets 
and military equipment, “a classified category of purchases conveniently exempt from line-item 
scrutiny by parliament.” (Izama & Wilkerson, 2011, p. 69) As a result, in the months following the 
election, inflation soared up, reaching a peak of 28% in August 2011, the highest since 1993 
(International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 32). However, even before its highest point, the inflation 
frustrated ordinary Ugandans who felt the effects in increased food and fuel prices. Hence, when 
the opposition called for middle class Ugandans to walk to work, as an expression of protest 
against the high fuel prices, an outlet seemed available for the resentment build up through the 
lost elections and the increasing struggle for daily survival (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 129). 
The concept was simple: People were asked to walk to work twice a week, instead of using means 
of transport. Since walking was not an assembly, it did not require a specific permit by police and 
security forces and government politicians were ridiculed in their attempts to disallow citizens to 
walk, on the grounds that this was “political walking” (Mamdani, 2011, p. 560). 
“That was the stroke of genius: to put food prices and increasing poverty at the centre 
of the agenda, articulated by an ostensibly independent activist group, instead of the 
tired message of election rigging centred around polarizing opposition politicians.” 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 129) 
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The walking started in Kampala but quickly spread to other parts of Uganda. Branch & Mampilly 
attributed the resonance of the campaign to the fact that it was not about a political issue, but 
about living conditions (ibid). While this may have been true in the beginning, and was a reason 
for many people to acknowledge the rightfulness of the protest, it quickly turned into a 
demonstration led by opposition politicians, with Kizza Besigye becoming the face of the 
demonstration, protesting against the “stolen” election (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 771f). 
The government responded again with repressive measures, cracking down on protesters and 
opposition politicians. At the peak of the protests, Kizza Besigye was attacked and teargassed, and 
violently shoved under the seat of a military pick up truck, driven away for his arrest (Branch & 
Mampilly, 2015). However, the increasing centralization around Besigye turned the protests into 
a political question and eventually led to them dying out. The protests lasted for about a month 
and left approximately ten people dead and over 100 injured and 600 arrested (Human Rights 
Watch, 2011). Additionally, instances of rioting and looting took place. Thus, during and after the 
protest, the government was quick to frame those participating as rioters and as a threat to peace 
and stability in the country (Namiti, 2011). Members of the opposition refuted those claims, 
arguing that the government paid those looters, as a way of discrediting the opposition (Brian; 
Executive Director of NAPE). 
The participants of the protests were largely considered coming from the urban informal groups, 
or the idle youth (Branch & Mampilly, 2015; Goodfellow, 2013, p. 443). So, while the protest was 
framed around questions of living conditions and supposed to be particularly appealing to the 
middle income groups, it failed to garner their support. Most respondents, even if supportive of 
the cause, would not embrace the form in which the discontent was voiced. There were three main 
concerns that stopped people from participating. One, the way in which the protest was organized 
would impact their working hours and most were not willing to forgo their income in an already 
strenuous time. Second, the affiliation with the opposition, turned the protest “political”, which is 
often frowned upon. Thirdly, the desire prevailed not to be associated with the protesters, because 
they were seen as the urban poor. 
So, already the sheer setup of the protest was a hindrance to participation. 
“Like I live in Entebbe, would I have to walk up to here, twice, or three times? People 
would walk and get tired. There are some political party leaders who actually gave up 
the walk and 'Ah, police take me back to my home; I'm tired.' Leaders of political 
parties.” (Judith) 
“At the end of the day, I'm like: 'OK, things are high, that's true.' But why walk to work? 
You see? And there are other things than walk to work. Because when I walk to work, 
I'll be late for work and I need the work, you get it? I need the work; I need the job. 
Maybe it is not the best, but I need it because apparently, I'm earning a living from it. 
You see those people down at the arcades. I showed you our middle class. They are 
those people in the markets; you get it? She will say: 'I walk to work and leave my 
stall? What will I eat at the end of the day?' You get it? She's like: 'Aaah, the leader. 
That guy is a wealthy man.'” (Justine) 
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“That 'Walk to Work', the way I saw it / it was right, a right thing, though the people 
who were engaged in it, lost focus of reality. And the way they brought it; it was a 
dissatisfaction [with the commodity prices]. They had a right to walk. […] but with 
me, I didn't look at them to engage myself in that. Look, I'm not the / my boss wants 
me at eight, how can I start walking from my place and my residency walking up to 
here, when you reach here you are disorganized in the brain, you're tired, you're what. 
Me, personally, I couldn't do it.” (Daniel) 
Thus, for people with regular employment it was hard to join the protests, and as a result, the 
demonstrators were described as the “boda boda guys”, which turned into a metaphor for the 
urban poor38. They did, however, receive support from the FDC and activists closely affiliated with 
the opposition. 
Case Story: How to Organize a Protest 
Brian explained how he was involved in the organization of the protest. He was 
assigned a particular region, and there he would look for groups of about five people 
every day, and watch documentaries with them, on the Polish revolution and other 
protests. This would serve as a base for explaining the principles of non-violent 
protest. “What I was trying to do is to show them the power of non-violence. How non-
violence works and how it has ever triumphed elsewhere and how it can help us.” When 
asked how he would find the people willing to join the training, he answered: “Like I 
told you, when you live with these people it is easy. Now, like for me, if I want, if I have 
an emergency, I jump on a boda boda. So, I don't know how many boda boda riders I 
know in this city. If I am so hungry, I go downtown; I eat kikommando39. So, these people 
they meet there. And when they are in this kind of meetings, you hear their pain; you 
hear their/ so it is very easy to go to the people you really understand.” The FDC 
provided the logistics and he acted as a member of the opposition party. However, he 
emphasizes that the campaign appealed to many people, beyond FDC, because 
everyone felt the pressure of high food prices, FDC was merely giving them an option 
to voice their discontent. 
“Fuel was too scarce. Now before even we came to talk to them, they had this pressure 
daily on their households. Now, of course, this pressure, the, like I told you, Ugandans 
expect answers. So, they started looking into a certain direction. We came in; we gave 
them an option.” While it was intended for everyone, he does content though, that the 
protest was most present in the poor neighborhoods of Kampala, such as Kawempe, 
Kalerwe or Kasubi. It was also in these areas that he concentrated his recruitment, 
looking for people with idle time. Talking about the violence that occurred during the 
protests, he dissociates them from the FDC campaign, as this was against the 
                                                 
38 This attribution mainly took place in 2012, shortly after the protest. Meanwhile, there seems to be a shift in 
recognition of motorcycle drivers, as several interlocutors in 2017 pointed out that boda boda riders often earn more 
than employed people. 
39 A local dish consisting of red beans and chapati, a flatbread originally coming from the Indian subcontinent. It is filling 
and not very expensive. 
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principles they used for training protesters. “Personally, I moved into different units, 
teaching people please don't throw stones, it is not our campaign. Walk with your 
hands folded like this, so how could we be the rioters. [The rioters] were those people 
that we had not gone to share with them the concept of the campaign.” Instead, he 
believes the regime hired “goons” and gave them FDC t-shirts to tarnish the name of 
the opposition and the protest.  
Both affiliations, however, with the opposition or with the urban poor, made the issue less 
appealing to wider parts of the population. Ronald states that he did not support the protest 
because he saw them as a “confusion between FDC and NRM government” and felt that Walk to 
Work had its own hidden agenda. For him, he did not believe “this is the solution to change the 
government” and perceived his own interventions, of organizing people in a group of professionals 
within the same sector to overcome shortcomings of government regulations (see more on this in 
chapter 15.6) as more tangible. 
“The walk to work (...) is still one of those activities of the pressure groups and the 
political parties. Like I said, they are always there to critique; they are always there to 
find fault […].” (Judith) 
The idea that the protest had been “hijacked” by political parties was mentioned by several 
interviewees, some arguing that it was Besigye’s attempt after a lost election to seize power. 
“But for them, they were using that/ they were using the economic crisis you know? 
But they were trying to / maybe to / they have other hidden agendas, you know? Like 
I think they were looking at how the Tunisian / the Tunisia [unintelligible] / Like 
there was this chaos, and they managed and even like this man of Libya/ they thought 
they could do the same here.” (Norah) 
For others, the participants of the protest, rather than the organizers, discredited the 
demonstrations. Mainly because looting was involved, those interviewees felt that the 
demonstrators did not actually subscribe to the cause of the protest. 
“You will find that the people that are involved in such things they are the 
unemployed. You get it? […] Explain it to a certain class of people, maybe to the 
lawyers. You think if you found lawyers protesting, would you take that lightly? 
Because these are believed to be the elites of the society! You get it? Find / maybe get 
a / get / convince the doctors, convince the teachers, convince the accountants, 
convince those people. Because they are THERE. When such people protest, you don't 
take them lightly. But a hungry fellow, who looks more miserable, if you found him 
protesting, first you will thing: 'Maybe this person is a lunatic. Does she or he even 
understands why she or he/ people protest because they enjoy. Maybe because they 
are tired, because they are idle.” (Justine) 
“You see demonstrations, and you will find boda boda guys, shouting, running, people 
who really don’t have this agenda. I don’t know. But people who / they don’t have this 
thing at heart, they are just there because something is happening.” (Julius) 
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Mistrusting the opposition was also fueled by the feeling that there was no clear agenda behind 
the protests. Goodfellow recalls a radio interview with Kizza Besigye where the opposition leader 
went silent for several seconds, after being asked for his objectives. The demonstrations thus were 
mainly guided by a sentiment of injustice concerning the conduct of the police and over the right 
to protest (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 772). The violence used by the police and armed forces to 
suppress the protests reinforced these sentiments, while they also deterred many from joining. 
So, while the protest lacked ethnic undertones, as had been the case with the Buganda riots, it was 
mainly confined to the urban precariat and the political opposition (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 
137). The increasing focus on FDC leader Kizza Besigye in addition to the lack of a pronounced 
political agenda and repressive government response eventually led to the movement slowly 
dying out, albeit no substantial concessions from the side of government had been made. 
In response, the Public Order Management Bill resurged in parliament and was eventually passed 
in 2013, as Public Order Management Act (POMA), making political activism increasingly difficult 
(Goodfellow, 2014, p. 770). 
10.4 Black Monday: That Civil Society Thing 
While the presence of urban poor people may have refrained some from participating in the Walk 
to Work protest, activism led by more “respectable” civil society and clerics does not necessarily 
yield a better result. In 2012, an assembly of several civil society organizations (CSOs) decided to 
launch the Black Monday Movement (BMM), as a response to accrued cases of corruption. Uganda 
is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world, occupying rank 142 out of 174 
countries (Transparency International, 2017) and in the wake of the launch of BMM the office of 
the prime minister had been the center of attention for the embezzlement of national funds 
(Wamara, 2017). Thus, a group of 50 CSOs declared a week of national mourning, at the end of 
which the movement was born (AfriMAP, 2016, p. 82; Guma, 2017, p. 194). It called upon 
Ugandans to wear black clothes every Monday, as a symbol of opposition against corruption, to 
denounce corruption wherever encountered, to boycott those that are known to engage in 
corruption, to demand law enforcement from the State against perpetrators of corruption, and to 
raise awareness among Ugandans about the negative aspects of theft of public funds. Hence, it was 
conceived in a way that would make it citizen-led, by calling for the simple actions mentioned 
above, so that everyone could participate (Uganda National NGO Forum, n.d.). 
“Then we said, ok, one is we are going to ensure that we make this campaign very 
personal to them. So, it is not about fighting something out there, but it is about me as 
a citizen, seeing myself as part of this country, being part of the change I would like to 
see. So, in that case, we said, fine, let us have a number of very simple actions that 
people can take.” (Executive Director, Black Monday) 
In addition, the organizers published and distributed a newsletter that would highlight ongoing 
corruption cases and tried to relate the money stolen to the services it could have provided. 
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“That if, if, if a citizen reads all these bubbles and say ‘Wait a minute. You mean this 
money could pay a salary for a full year for 30 525 primary teachers?’ then that gets 
to their mind. And then they start following up.” (Activist II, Black Monday) 
“And we thought, yeah, how do we do it. You must make a connection between theft 
and service delivery. Theft and their lies on a regular basis. We make connections 
between a terrible school and a terrible corruption scandal.” (Activist IV, Black 
Monday) 
The newsletter publication, however, stopped in August 2016 due to the challenges its 
distribution encountered. The BMM activists highlight how it had become increasingly difficult to 
find someone who would be willing to print the newsletter, out of fear of being associated with 
the campaign. Additionally, the volunteers who distributed the newsletters would be arrested on 
the grounds of spreading “harmful propaganda” (AfriMAP, 2016, p. 82). Some of them captured 
wide-spread public and media attention, such as the arrest of retired Archbishop Zac Niringiye in 
February 2013, who was one of the public faces of the BMM (The Observer, 2013). 
By the beginning of 2014, a little more over a year after its launch, the movement faced 28 arrests 
and had experienced violent suppression of the activities through the police (Guma, 2017, p. 194). 
And while the charges had not been prosecuted, they made the work of the activists more 
challenging.  
“So, we ended up investing our time and energy in running to police cells than doing 
the actual work. Now, we spend a whole year, reporting to police for police bond, 
making sure people are getting representation. But now we became a legal aid, 
whatever. Because of Black Monday.” (Activist II) 
At the time of the interviews (January/February 2017) no action had been going on because the 
organizers were rethinking the format. The intolerance shown by the regime towards the 
movement is evidence for the shrinking space for public action left in Uganda. Because as the BMM 
activists argue, they do not target specifically the government in power. Instead, they subscribe to 
the government’s program, which claims to fight against corruption. 
“Because the way we have framed it, it is very hard to stop. The president said that he 
wants zero tolerance to corruption in his manifesto. So, we keep using that line and 
say you know the president says zero corruption and we are promoting this phrase. 
So, they say, ya, ya, ya, but you are not doing it the right direction. But they cannot tell 
us stop. Because stop would mean to tell us, please support corruption. And nobody 
wants to say that. So, what do you do. You just leave us, you rubbish us, you make it 
look like ah, this is political [emphasis added], this is not about anti-corruption.” 
(Executive Director, Black Monday) 
The discursive struggle over whether the campaign is political or not has been mentioned by all 
three BMM activists interviewed (Activist II and IV, and the Executive Director of the NGO Forum). 
Thus, Activist II points out one of the challenges of activism “Because the problem we’ve had is 
people mixing politics into activism. It has not yielded.” Even though the movement highlights on 
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their website that they are “non-partisan, but certainly political” in vernacular discourse, partisan 
and political often become synonyms. That tactic is equally used by the government, opposing 
political (as aligning with the opposition) and developmental (supporting the government 
agenda). As a result, being political has become a biased expression, as shall be discussed in 
chapter 12.1. 
So, while the activists claim that the movement is alive and strategizing, there are currently no 
ongoing activities. One of the central discussions revolves around the question how to make the 
campaign more appealing to citizens again. Corruption being of a major concern to many 
interviewees, it seemed that a public action campaign launched to shun corruption and those 
involved in it and led by public figures of the church and civil society would find good resonance. 
However, Pearson and Pedersen describe the attitude towards corruption as “national apathy 
with deep-rooted anger” (Pearson & Pedersen, 2016, p. 9) and indeed, the campaign has yielded 
little response from citizens. 
“Now, there is absolutely no doubt, one of the weaknesses of the Black Monday 
Movement leadership was not to develop / I guess the word that I would use is 
vernacularization of the movement. To put it in the language of the street. […] It is that 
because it was led by people within the NGO sector it suffered the pitfalls that it did.” 
(Activist IV) 
That seems to be confirmed by reactions from interviewees and in casual discussions when BMM 
came up. While many were sympathizing with the movement and felt the causes were justified, 
they did not feel concerned themselves, or convinced by their activities, brushing it off as a “civil 
society thing.” Apparently, in the beginning, it captured some attention, but for many, it died out 
quickly. Some felt the issue of corruption was too complex and hard to grasp, contrary for example 
to “Save Mabira”, which had a very concise issue around which people would rally. Hence, Arthur 
Larok, one of the main organizers explained in an interview: 
“The first expectation we had was to demystify the idea of corruption. You know 
corruption is a corrupted concept, and this is due to the fact that the media has been 
awash with scandals of corruption, something that has made the public embrace it as 
part of life.” (Kakaire, 2013) 
“Corruption is very nebulous. So that is why it became clear to us, we need to relate 
corruption to the life of the people. […] And that is something that we have really been 
thinking a lot about, is it actually possible to build a movement around such a broad, 
amorphibic [amorphic]. When you think you are touching it, it disappears. It is in 
education; it is everywhere. It is in agriculture, it is in procurement, it is in how roads 
are constructed; it is everywhere. […] I think the fact that it is difficult to focus it on 
an issue, and we have been reflecting, maybe we need to identify one or two things 
which embodies everything we know is the enemy around corruption and focus. But 
if you are trying to build everything, it is difficult to build a movement around such a 
nebulous, amorphibic [amorphous] monster type thing.” (Activist IV) 
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To others, however, the presence of NGOs acted as a deterrent. Gerald said he joined the 
movement on social media but did not participate because it was “more of civil society engagement, 
an elite’s thing.” That lost credibility in his eyes because “more of this civil society individuals work 
for accountability. That is the worst thing I hate about them.” The General Secretary of UTRADA 
said he had been supportive because of its anti-corruption stance but felt it had been little 
effective. “Wearing black clothes cannot intimidate Museveni, it must bring a loss to his government. 
Non-violence? [smiles and shakes his head]. Museveni fears violence.” The loss of credibility of a 
movement through the “NGO-ization” of protest has been known to the organizers, as the quote 
from Activist IV on this behalf shows. On their website they particularly dedicate a section to the 
“Misconceptions about the Movement”, addressing these problems (Uganda National NGO Forum, 
n.d.). It has also been discussed in the literature on the pitfalls of civil society (AbouAssi, 2014; 
Fisher, 1997), and is worth discussing further, as will be done in chapter 11.1. Branch & Mampilly 
even go as far as doubting the relevance of the term “movement”, they describe it as middle class 
activists denouncing corruption but without pronouncing any political allegiance. 
“Civil society ‘politics’ was reduced to moral declarations of grievance, focused mainly 
against corruption, while the work of political organization and action was left to the 
parties — who in turn, were condemned as self-interested.” (Branch & Mampilly, 
2015, p. 142) 
The framing as “elitist” or “middle class activism” (the terms are often used interchangeably and 
essentially refer to those working in the NGO sector) has made the campaign less appealing to “the 
common man” (Gerald), a group the majority of Kampala inhabitants would refer themselves to. 
This is in stark contrast to the Buganda riots and Walk to Work, which were precisely targeting 
this group. Yet, this does not make it more appealing for the middle income groups, who consider 
themselves to be at least above the urban poor. Albeit the weight of corruption is felt by many 
middle income groups, again the issue fails to get their support. This is in contrast to other protests 
worldwide, that have been said to be triggered by the anger against corruption and led by the 
middle classes, such as in India, China, Brazil, or Thailand (Fukuyama, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2013; 
The Economist, 2011a). It is not our intention to discuss the analysis of these other countries, we 
would merely like to point out that corruption did not succeed to become an issue around which 
middle income groups would mobilize in large masses in Uganda. Again, an explicitly political 
question stopped many of the middle income groups from participating. The citation above, 
however, points out another important aspect: with political action being delegitimized through 
discursive and repressive methods, and civil society action not triggering a sense of responsibility 
for action from the people, options for being politically active become increasingly narrow. 
*** 
It is hard to measure the “success” of a protest, but in general, it can be retained that most of the 
demonstrations triggered little concessions from the government. The notable exception here 
being the “Save Mabira” campaign. As argued before, it was the broad alliance between different 
factions of society, in addition to pressure from donor countries, which made the issue hard to 
ignore for the government. If it had remained limited to the realm of NGOs, most likely it would 
have suffered the same pitfalls as the BMM or other environmental protests, like the forest 
giveaway on Bugala Island or the Bujagali-dam protest. The other protests mentioned here, 
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however, had in common that essential parts of the population did not feel immediately 
concerned, even though the issues brought up may have affected them. Thus, the Buganda riots 
and Walk to Work aimed at urban underclasses, and in the case of the riots more particularly to 
an ethnic identity. As a result, the protests were discredited for people who either did not feel the 
same loyalty to the king or did not want to associate with those “urban poor” that were protesting. 
In the case of Walk to Work, the monopolization of the protest by the opposition additionally made 
people shun away from demonstrating. Hence, “political”, i.e., partisan activities have a bad 
reputation. Finally, the BMM, on the other hand, was seen as invested by civil society, hence not 
being something that would concern the ordinary Ugandan citizen, as it was the NGO leaders who 
would take care of this (see also chapter 11.1). On top of that, the violent response from the 
government and everyday discourses around political activism made the environment even less 
conducive to join protests for many. Thus, regarding socio-demographics, it seemed that 
protesters were mainly from a low income background and young. 
This recount of the major protests in Uganda’s recent history is instructive to provide a partial 
answer on what makes people descend to the streets. Here, ethnic identity has been one of the 
prominent factors that provided mobilization power in two of the four protests. Similarly, income 
has played a role, as those protesting had often been described having a low income and the 
protests as fueled by the frustration of the challenges of everyday life (e.g., Brisset-Foucault, 
2013). Branch & Mampilly term this the “political society” because they lack representation 
through institutionalized channels and, therefore, engage directly with the state through 
confrontation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 20 f). However, this does not account for the 
university students, who had been vital in those protests as well and thus these “urban poor” need 
to be viewed in a more nuanced light. Income itself may not be a sufficient determinant, especially 
because the protests here are different from the violent, but brief (usually less than a day) and 
localized outbreaks that happen regularly in downtown Kampala, which are much more driven by 
the frustration of the precariat40. Finally, age is another important aspect, as the protesters have 
mainly been described as youthful. This is relevant for two reasons. One, Uganda has the youngest 
population in the world. Second, and in relation to this, older Ugandans remember the time under 
Idi Amin and the civil war and often prefer stability over confrontation with the government 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 133). What we can see here is that, if at all, the middle income groups 
rarely protest as a “class” or one group with specific interests, but rather in smaller entities, such 
as the young, or the university students or in reference to a particular ethnic identity. We also find 
that the forms of participation shift, mainly with age, from active protesting to potential material 
or financial support. But again, this does not happen as a class, but as individuals who identify 
with the groups mentioned above. 
Finally, the reasons why people go to the street are equally insightful to answer why some 
Ugandans would abstain from protesting. The framing of political activism and those who 
participate make the environment for protest in most cases not conducive for the middle income 
groups. As a result, it seems that members of the middle income groups would refrain from 
mobilization for political causes, considering this to be something they should avoid.
                                                 
40 The database on armed conflict counts 211 riots and protests in Kampala since 2000 (ACLED, 2018) 

  
11 Mobilization without Protest – 
Protest without Mobilization 
In this chapter we look at other actors of political participation, that have already been mentioned 
but not discussed in detail: NGOs, religious groups, and unions. NGOs tend to channel protest into 
very consensual forms of mobilization and are often perceived as somewhat futile in their actions 
(Siméant, 2013). On the other hand, actors like unions or churches have certain visibility and often 
trigger a direct intervention from the President, but without necessarily achieving long-lasting 
structural changes (Goodfellow, 2013). Instead, we argue, that organizations, as soon as they 
manage to capture some attention, are co-opted into the patronage system by buying off their 
leaders. This has very harmful effects for the legitimacy of actors such as trade unions or religious 
umbrella organizations, with especially the latter having been vital during the democratic 
transitions in Eastern Europe at the end of the cold war (see for example Burgess, 1997; Pollack, 
1990). 
11.1 The NGO-ization of Protest 
Daniel suggests bridging the gap between the protest and mobilization literature and its neglect 
of the Global South through the integration of the civil society discourse (Daniel, 2016, p. 44ff). 
Without wanting to go into the debate of the challenges the concept entails, we focus here on the 
role civil society plays in mobilization or demobilization for political causes, through one of its 
main actors in the Global South, NGOs. Certainly, there is a lot of variation between NGOs, their 
internal organization and funding structures which will lead to vastly different outcomes. The 
gross generalizations described here serve to show some constraints that NGOs might be facing if 
they decide to mobilize for a particular cause and its impact on protest mobilization. 
Because many NGOs are dependent on external financial resources, international donors become 
key players as well (AbouAssi, 2014). Also, NGOs are usually not independent of the state nor are 
they controlling it, but often collaborate with the state or are co-opted by it (Daniel, 2016, p. 46). 
As a result, the dependence of the NGOs either on the donors, the state, or both has an impact on 
the reputation of protest. 
First, due to the financial dependence on external donors, NGOs are limited in their freedom on 
how to set their agenda, even though it might alleviate their dependence from the state in some 
cases. In his study of three environmental NGOs in Lebanon, AbouAssi has shown how the 
dependence on donor financing effects the strategies used by the NGOs. While he highlights that 
different NGOs, depending on their internal structure react differently to the same donor, he 
concedes that particularly the NGO which is most dependent on foreign aid for its persistence, is 
the most likely to adopt their program to the donor’s agenda (AbouAssi, 2014). He observes that 
“The tendency of NGO3 to adjust its activities in accordance with donor funding has caused a 
distortion in its public image as a serious environmental organization.” (AbouAssi, 2014, p. 984) In 
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her comparison between women NGOs in Kenya and Brazil, Daniel observes the higher 
dependence on foreign aid in the case of Kenyan NGOs, which create a tension between the goals 
of the organizations and the conditionalities imposed by the donors (Daniel, 2016, p. 296). As a 
result, NGOs become more accountable to their funders and less to the communities they are 
supposed to represent. Thus, a perception can arise that NGOs are mainly tools to implement 
Western agendas (Fisher, 1997, p. 454). In Uganda, the issue has become particularly salient in 
the discussion of the Anti-homosexuality bill, in which NGOs working on LGBT rights have been 
considered as tools promoting the spread of the “Western practice”, fundamentally detrimental to 
“African culture” (Kalyegira, 2014; Titeca, 2014). The need for the BMM to explicitly distance itself 
from Western influence, albeit highly dependent on donor money, is speaking in this regard, as it 
shows their effort to portray the movement as an indigenous answer to the problem of public theft 
(Uganda National NGO Forum, n.d.). 
Secondly, the access to foreign funding can lead to what Daniel has termed a “conference 
mentality” (Daniel, 2016, p. 187), that makes it increasingly hard to mobilize volunteers. With the 
increasing withdrawal of donors from Latin America, Brazilian women organizations 
strengthened their volunteer basis which had a positive impact on the collective identity of the 
organizations. On the other hand, Kenyan women NGOs, which are more aid-dependent, complain 
about the difficulties in mobilizing women to participate in their events. They are always met with 
expectations to pay a daily allowance and transport cost, regardless of the social origins of the 
participants (Daniel, 2016, p. 298). In addition, working in an NGO is an attractive career option 
for graduates, who thus may decide to join an NGO that promotes a specific cause, while lacking 
the ideological identification with that cause (Daniel, 2016, p. 299). These challenges, the 
influence of donors on the agenda-setting, its limited capacity to mobilize people without cost 
reimbursement, the reliance on paid staff, who choose the NGO as a career path, and the absence 
of a volunteer support structure all have a limiting effect on their potential for collective action. It 
is also likely that this in return affects their credibility among the local population, as an adequate 
tool for representing the people’s concerns, as the quote by AbouAssi above has shown. In our 
work this has become prominent in the respondents’ evaluation of the Black Monday Movement, 
which they have seen as “a civil society thing”, but nothing that would concern them directly, or 
demand any actions on their behalf (see chapter 10.4). This observation leads us to suggest that if 
an issue is taken up by an NGO, it might as well have a demobilizing and delegitimizing effect in 
the eyes of the wider population, if it is not backed up by other, more “credible” sources, as has 
been the case during the “Save Mabira” campaign (see 10.1). And it will shift protest from a 
confrontational to a more consensual form of political participation. 
Even in cases when they are not financially dependent, NGOs are by no means as dissociated from 
the state as their name would make belief. They still operate in a framework that is defined by the 
government and are, therefore, depend on the latter for its proper functioning. Fisher, 
emphasizing the heterogeneity of relationships between NGOs and governments, argues that 
nevertheless “[…] NGOs are often intimately connected with their home governments in 
relationships that are both ambivalent and dynamic, sometimes cooperative, sometimes contentious, 
sometimes both simultaneously.” (Fisher, 1997, p. 451) For example, NGOs are dependent on the 
public space that the government is willing to provide. In the case of Uganda, the requirement for 
every NGO to register with the NGO board, which is appointed by the government. The board 
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retains the power to withdraw a license if it deems it to be in “the public interest” (Nassali, 2014, 
p. 37). Such a vague formulation, similar to the grounds on which someone can be arrested 
mentioned in the Anti-Homosexuality Act and the Anti-Pornography Act (see Titeca, 2014), gives 
considerable leeway to the government to control NGO dissent. As a result, Siméant observes, 
mobilization through NGOs are very consensual because if they carry out any action, they have 
beforehand passed through the governmental stages of approval. Protest repertoires, such as 
protest marches or demonstrations, deemed contentious thus turn into tools of governmental 
control (Siméant, 2013, p. 138). She even questions the link between mobilization and 
protestation: 
“J’ai ainsi été amenée à réviser cet implicite qui assimile la mobilisation à la 
protestation en découvrant par exemple à quel point les marches qui se déploient à 
Bamako sont loin de posséder tous les attributs de la protestation, et renvoient à un 
rapport privilégié à l’État, soit du fait du statut de ceux qui défilent, soit de l’habitude 
de ces nombreuses journées nationales de mobilisation qui sont l’apanage de l’État, 
en partenariat ou non avec des organisations internationales, soit enfin du fait de 
l’aspect très policé de la marche. Bref, ces dernières se situent à l’intersection de 
l’espace formel, du monde du droit, de l’écrit et de l’État. Cela suppose de penser à la 
mobilisation autant comme un instrument d’État qu’une technique de protestation. Si 
le sens de la même pratique varie selon les contextes où elle se déploie, autant ne pas 
s’acharner à voir de la protestation là où s’observent surtout des techniques de 
mobilisation bien rodées.” (Siméant, 2013, p. 138) 
In addition, NGOs may opt for an approach of “silent diplomacy” and thus position themselves 
close to those in power, to be able to influence the policy process (see Siméant, 2014) which may 
comprise their actions in the eyes of those opposed to the regime. Similarly, the authors underline 
that again the dependence on donor funding may push NGOs to take on a less controversial 
approach (AbouAssi, 2014; Fisher, 1997; Siméant, 2013) 
It is hard to measure the impact NGOs have on the policy process, as such an assessment would 
need a case-by-case analysis. Branch & Mampilly are rather cynical in this regard. They come to a 
similar conclusion as the observations outlined above and remark: 
“Donor funding has created a professional, NGO-based service sector commonly going 
under the name of civil society. Its sphere of political action is restricted by its 
financial base, as many donors forbid NGOs from involvement in overtly partisan or 
oppositional activities. The politics of the NGO sector are further restricted as many 
who seek employment in civil society view it as an opportunity for a secure lifestyle 
and not as part of a commitment to an opposition or even liberal politics. […] As a 
consequence, when today’s self-proclaimed civil society gets involved in protest, it 
may have little political importance. For instance, witness the spectacle of well-
ordered marchers from a Western-funded pro-democracy or human rights 
organization, placards aloft with clear messages referencing international protocols. 
If the state actually responded to their demands, it would come as a shock.” (Branch 
& Mampilly, 2015, p. 76) 
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For them, the civil society does not need any actual change because themselves they are 
comfortably living from the situation as it is. And knowing about its limited transformative 
potential, the state does not respond in the same way to an NGO organized protest march as it 
would to a demonstration organized by peasants or unemployed youth, which would be met with 
a violent reaction (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 77). 
We do not want to dwell on the effectiveness of NGOs, as we believe the evaluation needs to be 
more complex than the general observations stated by Branch and Mampilly (2015). The point we 
want to retain here is the one brought forward by Siméant: the consensus pursued by NGOs tends 
to define “a right kind of civil society”, and as a result disqualifies other forms of protest (Siméant, 
2014, p. 338). We would like to add, though, that on the other hand the awareness of the 
conditions under which NGO operates, as detailed above, dissociates the Ugandan people from the 
NGO actions. It turns their mobilization into an event someone might be willing to attend, if they 
receive free lunch or transport allowances, but not into something that would require getting 
personally more involved. This default might be initial to the very set up of many NGO structures: 
“Top-down planning, top-down funding, and upwards accountability negate participation.” (Fisher, 
1997, p. 455) 
As a result, and as the example of the BMM in contrast to the other protests have shown, NGOs in 
Uganda have only limited credibility and are seen as dissociate from the rest of society. Their 
potential for mobilization is restricted and follows specific forms that are rather a hindrance to 
the collective action of Ugandans, as they feel this “civil society thing” belongs in the realm of 
professionals but does not concern them as ordinary citizens. Thus, NGOs are not considered 
representatives of the society with the potential to bring social change on the behalf of everyone. 
It now remains to be seen whether other actors in Uganda have greater capacities to do so. 
11.2 Religious Groups – Credibility among the Masses 
We have already shown how the democratic transitions of the 1990s in Africa were often analyzed 
through the lens of civil society (see p. 51). In many instances, the clergy had a crucial role in 
managing these transitions, particularly in West African states, as they would often head the 
National Conferences, that would set up a new constitution and a peaceful transition of power. In 
Uganda, however, churches are said to have had a role as mediator between state power and the 
Ugandan population (Okuku, 2002). This does not mean, however, that the churches, or other 
religious groups, lack political clout. First, they enjoy legitimacy among the citizens. According to 
Afrobarometer, 68% of Ugandans trust their religious leaders a lot – this is significantly higher 
than for traditional leaders (48%), the President (42%), the parliament, the district council or the 
police (all 18%) (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 35). Besides, they have well institutionalized lobby 
groups, namely the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) and the Interreligious Council of Uganda 
(IRCU) that are engaging with parliament and voice their opinion on the legislative process 
(Fichtmüller, 2014a). Through these bodies they have been able to influence a number of 
proposed bills concerned with issues of morality, such as the Anti-homosexuality Act, the Anti-
pornography Act and they have lobbied against the passing of the Domestic Relations Bill. In the 
last decades a religious revival has happened all over the continent, that has led to a considerable 
gain in importance of religious ideas and affiliations (Ellis & ter Haar, 2004). For Ellis and ter Haar 
it is precisely the weakening of state structures that motivated people to seek for alternative 
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sources of authority. In their view, “the reoccupation of public space by religious movements 
expresses in a spirit idiom a concern with poor governance.” (Ellis & ter Haar, 2004, p. 100) The 
presence in the public space manifests itself in the public display of religious slogans, the presence 
of religious leaders at public events, or the general acceptance that gatherings are opened or 
closed with a prayer, particularly if a clergy is present and regardless of the faith of participants 
(Fichtmüller, 2014a). The endorsement by religious leaders is equally crucial for MPs to win in 
their constituencies. As one respondent remarked: “Even me, as a MP, I must have Fathers, I must 
have Imams, you cannot win.” (MP I, NRM) Equally, several interviewees mentioned that to be 
elected in certain constituencies, one had to have the right confession, otherwise they would not 
stand a chance. And once elected, politicians still take into considerations religious concerns, even 
if it may go against their own convictions. In relation to the domestic relation bill41, one female MP 
mentioned: 
“Because we all know them, we usually tow their line. Because we know the kind of 
damage they can make in the campaigns. It affects us greatly in that sometimes, even 
when you know that something is good for the nation you are forced to retreat 
because you do not want a war with religion.” (MP IV, Independent) 
Yet, the influence of religious leaders is somewhat ambiguous. While their political expression is 
considered acceptable for certain topics, such as the Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB) or the 
Domestic Relations bill, it is less so for other issues, particularly if they criticize the government 
too openly. Too strong criticism of corruption or the demands for more transparency have been 
reprimanded by the government (Fichtmüller, 2014a, p. 23). Thus, more controversial bills, which 
were not confined to the sphere of morality, were passed despite religious opposition. This had 
been the case for the Petrol (Exploration, Development, and Production) bill 2013. The bill 
foresaw an extensive array of executive powers given to the minister of energy, to the detriment 
of the parliament, thus limiting transparency on issues around oil exploitation. Despite lobbying 
from IRCU and UJCC, and other civil society groups, the bill was passed in 2013. As soon as 
religious leaders become outspoken against the government, they are reminded that politics is 
none of their business and they are accused of sidelining with the opposition. Recently, the 
constitution was amended to remove the age limit as a condition for presidency, which will allow 
Museveni to represent himself in the next election (otherwise he would legally be restrained, as 
he would have surpassed the age limit). In the debate before the vote on the amendment, one 
minister was quoted warning the clergy, that they may talk about politics but “they should not 
forget what happened to Janan Luwum [an Anglican bishop that was murdered due to his 
opposition to the Amin regime].” (Lumu, 2017) 
In relation to the Churches positions in the 2016 elections, Alava & Ssentogo (2016) find that the 
bodies of IRCU and UJCC mainly promoted an “NGO-ized message” of encouraging people to vote, 
but wisely, to stay calm and abstain from violence. They suggest that these institutional bodies 
correspond to what Gifford describes as the “NGO-ized plane of religion” (contrary to the 
                                                 
41 The bill was aimed at reforming marriage law in Uganda, to provide more rights to women in case of divorce and 
heavily opposed by religious groups. Muslims considered Muslim marriage regulations threatened and Christian 
churches opposed it because it presented divorce as legitimate option, which they considered wrong. 
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enchanted one). However, such a discourse ultimately serves to legitimate those in power because 
“the peace narrative of Uganda’s religious leaders underemphasised the violence that undergirds 
Uganda’s contemporary ‘peace’.” (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016, pp. 681–684) This observation may 
equally be valid for other projects of democratization and good governance carried out by the 
bodies and funded through donors. In that sense, they are run in a way similar to NGOs and they 
face similar constraints, as discussed in chapter 11.1. 
There is, however, also a considerable degree of self-censorship among the clergy, due to the close 
ties between the NRM regime and the various religious groups. In its restoration of political order 
after nearly twenty years of chaos the regime has relied on integrating the diverse factions of 
society within the same system, former opposing rebel groups as well as key members of civil 
society (Perrot, 2003, p. 22). The International Crisis Group writes: 
“Museveni’s growing reliance on patronage responds to the ethnic, regional and 
religious division every prior regime has faced but is compounded by the decline in 
rule of law and rise in official corruption.” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 9) 
So, it is not surprising that religious leaders are part of this network. Besides their 
institutionalization, the religious and political actors interviewed recognize the importance of 
direct contact with the President and of key positions in government. There are three main aspects 
recurrent in the different interviews showing the religious groups on the receiving end of favors: 
the repartition of political positions according to religious affiliation, private auditions with the 
president and gifts made to religious leaders. These aspects are well-known in the wider society 
and often considered as legitimate. 
Since his arrival in power, Museveni has been vigilant to assure a religious equilibrium in the 
cabinet. The example evoked the most frequently is that of the vice-president: because Museveni 
himself is a Protestant, the position of a vice president has always been attributed to a Catholic. 
This repartition is not an invention of Museveni. Following the Buganda wars, a violent encounter 
between Catholics and Protestants for hegemony in Buganda at the end of the 19th century, the 
agreement of 1900 already accorded different political positions to the different denominations 
for the sake of stability (see Welbourn, 1965, p. 7). Religious leaders are keen to assure that their 
religions are sufficiently represented in government. Some accounts even say that after pre-
selecting his ministers, Museveni sends the list to the archbishops to get their approval. 
The second channel of influences is through private auditions with the President. The general 
secretary of UMSC highlights how simple it is to obtain a tête-à-tête with the President. This 
confirms also an employee of IRCU: 
“Now, as you know, faith groups don’t go to the streets to demonstrate, when things 
go wrong. They seek audience with the President. And often, he has allowed. And they 
tell him, the Council Presidents go to State House and tell him: ‘Look here, I think there 
is a problem. Corruption is going beyond the edges. Something must be done.’ So, they 
also lobby at the very top-level.” (Staff, IRCU) 
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These auditions are either held in group or with individuals, even though the President prefers to 
receive religious leaders one by one. This influence through personal ties should not be neglected 
and can also be observed in other countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, David Maxwell notes that: 
“However, in Zimbabwe religious and political interactions do take a specifically local 
form. Given the relative weakness of civil society in Africa, the relative strength of the 
church (Gifford, 1995, 1998) and the limited size of the dominant elite, Church leaders 
can exert a direct and personal influence on politicians in a way that the complexities 
of the American political system would not allow.” (Maxwell, 2000, p. 267) 
The third aspect concerns gifts given to the religious leaders. The recurrent example here was the 
four-wheel drive given to each bishop at his ordination. The money used for such donations does 
not come from the national budget, but the budget allocated to the State House, and it angers 
opposition politicians for its lack of transparency and because it is a tool for buying votes, even 
though the practice itself is not questioned: 
“But for us in Parliament, we are saying: why don’t we say we have three main major 
religions: Catholics, Protestants, and Islam. Why can’t we put a vote, a line in the 
budget, that every after five years the head of the Church, the Bishop, should have a 
car? Why should you, you as a President, go as an individual, right? Because you want 
their votes, the Catholics, [the Protestants], you want their votes.” (MP III, FDC) 
It is disputed whether these gifts compromise the neutrality of religious leaders. While some may 
say yes, others argue that the religions are doing the state’s work and it is, therefore, legitimate 
that they get some state support for their work and since everyone receives the money, there is 
overall equality. However, the example of Zac Niringiye, the former bishop who is among the 
known faces of the BMM (see p. 209) shows that the clergy may indeed feel compromised to critic 
corruption too outspokenly. Niringiye faced criticism from other church members that he was 
“desecrating the collar” and calls to defrock him (Political Activist IV) due to his activities for Black 
Monday. Asked about the reluctance of bishops to respond to claims of corruption, one MP 
responds: 
“You know, religious leaders are usually cautious of judging people. They believe in 
forgiveness. So, I believe they might have seen it as a very hard decision to implement, 
OR, maybe they did not want to part away with the monies. Because these people 
contribute largely to these church activities, and some may also look at that angle and 
say: ‘But if we blacklist so-and-so, then who will support the church because the 
church also needs to grow?’” (MP IV, Independent) 
Parish clergy remain with some leverage in their capacity to voice criticism from the pulpit. 
However, this wanes with increasing visibility. The proximity between religious groups and the 
government do not turn them into free spaces and a focal point for dissenting voices, as has been 
the case in Eastern Europe (Burgess, 1997) or some other African countries (Okuku, 2002). A 
similar pattern of integration into the patronage system, through handouts and personal 
intervention of the President, can also be observed among other actors, such as unions and 
informal interest groups. 
222 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
11.3 Interest Groups – Corrupted Leaders and Voiceless Members? 
Mass organizations, such as labor unions, have an essential role in fostering democracy, by 
implying a large group of people in the process of political decision-making, through the 
advancement of common interests (Skocpol, 1999). In addition, their broad member base assures 
the representation of diverse factions of society, particularly bridging class divisions (Skocpol, 
1999, p. 499). In Africa, unions are said to have been crucial political actors, particularly in the 
independence struggles and during the decline of one-party rule at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Webster, 2007). Webster sees their potential in its mobilization capacity, turning them into a 
voice that needs to be considered: 
“Unlike advocacy groups and NGOs, their membership base and strategic location in 
the economy, especially in transport and key public services, gives them the capacity 
to mobilise and disrupt on a country-wide basis. Also, unlike advocacy groups, trade 
unions are not issue based. As a result, organised labour is capable of offering voice 
and leadership to a wide range of popular forces.” (Webster, 2007, p. 2) 
However, Webster also observes that the role of unions differs between countries, and only in 
some cases, they take on an active opposition role or become a vital part of the civil society. In 
Uganda, unions have reserved seats in parliament. However, they do lack autonomy and are not 
accountable to their organizations, but instead expected to follow the ruling party. As a result, the 
relationship between the government and union representatives can be characterized as 
patronage (Barya, 2010, p. 97; Webster, 2007, p. 4). In addition, Barya (2010) observes for 
Ugandan trade unions what we already analyzed in relation to other mobilizing groups: their 
emphasis on their apolitical and technocratic role. He criticizes this political and ideological 
demobilization, stating that 
“But from Uganda’s history and, more glaringly, in the last two decades of SAPs, 
liberalisation and privatisation, it has become clear that the apolitical stance has been 
very unhelpful since the processes and policies that unions were fighting were clearly 
political processes that needed an articulate and organised political response.” 
(Barya, 2010, pp. 96–97) 
Barya evaluates the potential of trade unions to bring about labor-friendly change as rather bleak, 
as their capacities have been eroded through their technocratic stance, and if they become 
politically it is in forms of patron-client relationships, and the erosion of labor rights due to 
liberalization and the casualization of work (Barya, 2010, p. 104). If change has been achieved, it 
was due to foreign intervention from donors and thus raises questions whether the new laws will 
actually be implemented. These observations have been shared by some NGO leaders, who were 
frustrated by the close ties between the government and union leaders that hindered effective 
cooperation in advocating for social change (Fieldnotes 2017). Here we will look at the case of the 
strike of the Makerere University Academic Staff Association (MUASA), that had been upheld for 
two months and was finally terminated without any significant concessions shortly before our 
arrival for the 2017 fieldwork. This example serves to highlight the tendency to buy off leaders 
and to show how this erodes the legitimacy of unions truly to speak on behalf of their members 
and not only serve the interest of some few. We then supplement the observations with field data 
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gathered on more informal groups, but which still hold significant political clout, due to their size, 
such as market vendors and the transport sector. 
Case Story: MUASA and the Strike of 2016 
University lecturers, being public servants, are not allowed to unionize in Uganda. 
Instead, the Makerere University Academic Staff Association (MUASA) exists to 
represent the lecturers’ concerns to the university administration (Fieldnotes 2017). 
Lecturers become members by default, with the membership fee being directly 
deduced from their salary (Lecturer I, Makerere University). The association has been 
a vocal advocate for better employment conditions since the arrival of the NRM 
regime, having achieved some notable concessions, particularly salary increments 
(Provini, 2015, p. 200). In 2013 the staff went on strike to demand a 100% salary 
increase. At that time government accepted to increase their salary, which partially 
should be paid by the university administration in the form of teaching incentives. 
However, these agreed upon incentives had not been paid for several consecutive 
months, so that at the end of October 2016, the academic staff of Makerere University 
decided unanimously at a MUASA general assembly to go on strike again, to pressure 
the administration to pay for their incentive arrears (Ndyabahika, 2016). The strike 
lasted for nearly two months, and very early on, the President decided to close down 
the university altogether, allegedly because he feared that protests would spread to 
students and from there expand to the city (Fieldnotes 2017). However, at the end of 
December, in another general assembly, the strike was called off, in a more 
contentious vote, dividing MUASA into two camps, because no noticeable concessions 
had been achieved (Niwamanya, 2016). Instead, there was an agreement to put a 
committee in place which should evaluate the situation and publish a report, upon 
which follow up decisions should be based. That is a typical pattern to end the strikes. 
Sometimes the reports are at the origin of the next one, if no action is taken (Mwine, 
2016; Provini, 2015). The administration was said to have embezzled the tuition fees 
received and failed to pay their staff appropriately, and one of the main tasks of the 
committee is to investigate how the university funds are used. Initially scheduled for 
February 2017, the report had not been released by October 2017. And even if it 
should be published, hopes that it will bring any notable change are low. “[Q]uestions 
linger to whether the Rwendeire report will not gather dust on some government shelves 
like previous reports.” (Mwine, 2016) Members of MUASA were convinced the reason 
the executive committee of the association pressured for the strike to be suspended 
was due to them being bought off. As a result, the association has lost trust of its 
members who feel they are not represented anymore (Lecturer I and II, Makerere 
University). “Those who were talking on our behalf now kept quiet.” (Lecturer I, 
Makerere University) 
The case story reflects a general sentiment of disappointment and betrayal that reigned among 
staff members after the strike had been suspended, albeit a majority of members of the association 
(81 to 56) voted to take up their functions again. Lecturer II highlighted the additional challenges 
the staff faced: for the majority of them it was too hard to maintain the strike for a more extended 
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period, as they would not receive any salary at all during these two months. Nevertheless, the 
futility of the two-months strike contributed to the frustration towards the university 
administration and the MUASA executive board, for not having been able to find common grounds 
for negotiation. 
The feeling, that the associational leadership, supposed to represent their member base, is 
captured by the political elite is also recurrent in other sectors, such as among the informal groups 
representing market vendors or the transport sector. Both areas are highly politicized because 
they regroup a large number of people and as such provide platforms for gaining voters and an 
opportunity for patronage. Conservative estimates believe that there are about 200 markets in 
Kampala, of whom only one quarter is gazetted by the KCCA (Monteith, 2016, p. 155). And this 
does not take the numerous hawkers and street vendors into account. It is equally evoked as a 
place of the “common man” and thus an important target for political support. The transport 
sector in return is estimated to employ about 100 000 people; it services even many more 
commuters on a daily basis and has, due to the nature of the work, a large geographical outreach. 
For these reasons, it is an important tool for mobilization (Goodfellow, 2017). So, since both 
sectors have political clout and are well organized into associational structures, they appear to be 
important counterweights, representing the interests of the employees of their industries towards 
the government. A closer look, however, reveals the proximity between past and present 
associations with the government through co-optation of the leadership and the misappropriation 
of fees that should be used to develop the respective sectors. Besides, a “de-democratization” of 
these structures is going on by integrating their mandates into the work of the KCCA, a body 
controlled and appointed by the central government. 
Case Story: The KCCA, a New Player in Town 
The Kampala City Council (KCC) has been the body of the city government, 
approximately 80% of services were provided through the KCC. With the introduction 
of multipartyism, Kampala became a stronghold of the opposition, and the KCC has 
since then been in the hand of opposition parties. Among other problems, frequent 
interference of the President in policy decisions rendered the KCC highly ineffective 
(Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p. 11). In 2010 the Kampala Capital City Act paved the 
way for the creation of KCCA, which was widely considered as a mechanism to 
restrain opposition control over the city by stripping the KCC of their executive 
functions and degrading the mayor to a merely ceremonial role (Goodfellow, 2017). 
The KCCA is an executive body appointed by and accountable to the government. 
Albeit still existing, interference from central government has decreased, which has 
also gained KCCA the reputation of being an efficient organization, particularly among 
middle and high income earners in the city. 
Goodfellow & Titeca (2012) have shown how urban informal groups successfully resisted 
regulations enforced by the KCC by calling directly upon the President for support. Drawing on 
their and our findings we can see a pattern where associations representing the interests of these 
groups often seek the proximity with the central government. This had been the case in two 
markets, albeit with very different outcomes: the markets of Nakasero and Park Yard. Nakasero 
market is situated in downtown Kampala, and the land belongs officially to the city. In the past, 
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the city authority has attempted to lease the area to private investors, often close to the NRM 
themselves, which sparked the protests of the market vendors. They solicited support from the 
President, and in the end, the market was given to the market association, making them 
responsible for the modernization of the markets (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012; Monteith, 2016). In 
return, the market association in charge of the management decided to elect a chairperson close 
to NRM, in order to maintain a good connection with the government. But even though they 
managed to resist being gazetted through KCC, the market had eventually been taken over as a 
regulated market by KCCA, which received mixed responses from vendors. While some called it 
“an act of betrayal”, others welcomed the removal of the corrupt market association. All in all, the 
takeover was accompanied by only a few protests (Monteith, 2016, p. 186). Park Yard was an 
informal market situated along Nakivubo channel, and even though the relations between the 
market vendor association and KCCA were strained, one representative of the association 
underlined the good terms on which they stand with government: 
“The government listens to us; we created awareness through KCCA and the ministers 
of Kampala. […] We are not disappointed; they are promising the best. Now we have 
fewer evictions; we meet on a roundtable.” (General Secretary, Park Yard Market 
Association) 
The allegiance with the NRM was well-known among the vendors of the market, to the point that 
one vendor, affiliated with the opposition, complained that the leaders would be hazy to even talk 
to her (Fieldnotes 2017). However, their government affiliation did not help the market 
association in the end, as the market has been officially closed down in February 2017, about one 
month after the interview with the association representative (The Spear, 2017). The closing was 
done under heavy police surveillance, but without any protests, which sparked allegations among 
the vendors that their leadership had been bought off, to prevent that they would mobilize against 
the ministerial decision (Fieldnotes 2017). 
A similar pattern of resisting KCC order had been observed for the motorcycle taxis, the boda 
bodas (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012). Attempts to introduce taxation or safety regulations, such as 
wearing helmets and safety vests, or registering with the authorities, sparked protests and the 
boda boda drivers eventually called upon Museveni to intervene. Positioning himself in opposition 
to KCC and seizing the opportunity to gather widespread support, he stopped the proposals, 
calling it an “exploitation of the poor” (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p. 269). Only when KCCA took 
up its function, taxation and licensing eventually were introduced to the sector. Government 
support has also been given through material incentives, such as the mediated purchase of 120 
boda bodas by states house, that was offered to the drivers through their umbrella organization, 
Boda Boda 2010, and another 500 that drivers could purchase through advantageous loan 
schemes (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p. 268). And on the other hand, Boda Boda 2010 is known to 
be closely affiliated with the ruling party. Having recognized the potential of capturing these urban 
groups, politicians from other parties have equally tried to gain support through their own 
associations. One representative from Boda Boda 2010 describes the current state of the sector 
as such: 
“We have been having more than like 58 associations in the industry. But majorly, 
they have started then because of politics, that is one, their own interests, their own 
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interest of getting money from other people, so that is where that people have started 
many associations. […] So, these politicians, […] they are pushing them to set an 
association of which it will be very easy to get these people when they are organized. 
[…] According to me, they are all under political groups.” (Chairman, Boda Boda 2010) 
However, Boda Boda 2010 is the most prominent one and currently making efforts to streamline 
all the other organizations under their umbrella, calling them to leave “politics” behind and to 
unite in order to favor the development of the industry. 
“Fighting each other will not be the lasting solution of this industry. So that is the 
maturity that we are building now. That let us sit on a roundtable, you join that 
association, which is in power, and then we resolve all the problems in the industry.” 
(Chairman, Boda Boda 2010) 
So far, we have shown through examples from market and transport associations how on the one 
hand they have called for presidential interference if they considered a policy change to be 
unfavorable and on the other hand, how the most visible association would place themselves in 
proximity to the government. Either this was done out of strategic reasons, or because the 
leadership was rendered “cooperative” through handouts or favors. However, raising contentious 
issues becomes more challenging, and these behaviors provoke the anger of some association 
members, as we have shown through the example of MUASA. As a result, the reputation of 
associations to genuinely represent the interest of their members is damaged, with many 
perceiving communal or professional associations to mainly serve a personal gain. 
Unaccounted membership fees can further such a perception, as Gombay (1994) has observed for 
Owino market, Monteith (2016) for Nakasero market and Goodfellow (2017) for the Taxi Drivers 
and Owners. In all cases, money collected from the workers, that should have been used to develop 
the respective places, was only partly passed on to the city and to a large extent disappeared in 
private pockets on the way. Again, this is a way of decredibilizing claims that these associations 
would present the interest of all their run-of-the-mill members. 
The tendency of embezzling collected fees has led the KCCA to increase efforts to cut out the 
“middlemen”, as the KCCA executive herself has termed it, by circumventing these associations 
and setting in place their staff, directly controlling markets and the transport sectors (Goodfellow, 
2017, p. 1577). Through the direct appointment42 of market leaders and transport committee 
members the KCCA can choose a leadership at their liking, in favor of the ruling party and not 
accountable to those they are supposed to represent. Closing down associational structures 
additionally limits the capacities of the workers and vendors to mobilize against legislation they 
deem unfavorable and thus diminishes their possibilities to voice discontent. And despite the well-
                                                 
42 One KCCA representative argued that the market chairmen are elected democratically by the vendors (Deputy 
Director, KCCA). We know of at least of one market chairman, from USAFI market who has been directly appointed by 
the KCCA executive director. And in the case of the transport sector, elections that have been held were annulled and 
new ones – at the time of the interviews – had not been set up yet (General Secretary, UTRADA). However, we concede 
that between these contradicting statements there is room for error and suggest that the question deserves further 
investigation. 
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known undemocratic character of the KCCA as an institution, it has a good reputation among some 
interviewees. They credit it for cleaning up the city and taking street hawkers off the roads, 
making the streets safer and less prone to pickpockets. Others, however, while appreciating the 
outcome, are concerned about what will happen to the expelled people, as the institution is not 
offering any alternative to them. 
We, therefore, suggest that the advent of the KCCA has significantly altered urban politics in 
Kampala. The same is true for informal groups calling for presidential intervention. In the past, 
the President had used his interference as a tool of gathering political support and at the same 
time discrediting the opposition-led KCC of not being able to govern the city. However, with the 
installation of the KCCA, a government body under the direct control of the national government, 
the initially resisted regulations were finally passed, as any interference would mean that 
Museveni opposed the entities created to serve the national government’s purpose. Interventions 
still exist, particularly around election time, but are more limited in time and scope. 
While organizations which represent group interests are usually seen as a positive sign of 
democratic consolidation, the example of Uganda has shown that they can also have detrimental 
effects. If “authoritarian pseudo-representative organizations” (Goodfellow, 2013, p. 1) are 
controlled by elites to capture streams of rent rather than to represent the interests of their 
members genuinely, a vivid associational sphere can hardly be interpreted as a marker of 
democratic advancement. The proximity of the leadership with the government, even though vital 
in personalized politics to guarantee a good connection with high ranking politicians, 
compromises the management to act on behalf of their members. This problem of accountability 
is exacerbated if the leadership receives personal gains, such as gifts or handouts. Since they are 
often coupled with the repression of opposing points of views, the politics of the “carrot and the 
stick” widely used by the NRM government can also be observed in these sectors. In that light, the 
shift from dysfunctional to no representation, as a result of KCCA hegemony, narrows yet another 
possible avenue for mobilization. 
*** 
In this chapter, we have tried to look at other actors that could serve, or have in the past, or 
different contexts served as potential mobilizers or had a role in transitioning to democracy, such 
as NGOs, religious groups, and interest groups. We have highlighted the challenges they face, that 
turn them into less credible avenues for political participation for many Ugandans, or limit hopes 
that they are capable of bringing about the desired change. In the case of NGOs, we find that they 
may protest, but without gathering a constituency behind themselves, that could serve to 
mobilize. They may write communiques, organize workshops or roundtables, but without any 
popular political action deriving from there. They are prone to be what one activist (and NGO staff 
member), describes as “armchair activists” (Activist II, Uganda National NGO Forum), from whom 
no legitimate action can be expected. From the comments made by respondents and other 
literature on the topic, we have seen that civil society is often considered as something apart from 
society, that, therefore, does not concern ordinary Ugandans. Religious groups, on the other hand, 
have an excellent mobilization potential, but they are somewhat cautious to use it for protest, as 
there are deliberate efforts on both sides to remain in good terms with the ruling government. 
Thus, they will most likely advocate for moral or religious issues, that touch upon their identities 
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as faith groups, instead of voicing explicitly political demands, such as claiming better governance 
or more democracy (Kassimir, 1998). What we can observe here and also among the interest 
groups studied, is that as soon as a group gains certain visibility, there are efforts to integrate them 
into the patronage network and foster patron-client ties. 
The realms studied here are all places in which the people employed have at least a middle income 
position. Their methods are very consensual. However, it is not our intention here to argue that it 
is the consensual nature of middle income groups which renders the mobilization less 
contentious. Instead, we have tried to show that it is already in the structure, in which these 
realms are embedded with the political sphere that shapes the way the interactions take place. 
This does not mean that we can never expect these groups to become effective mobilizers for 
political issues nor that they have no capacity to influence political outcomes because as we have 
tried to show, they do. But we should be careful to expect them to serve as vehicles promoting 
more general democratic interests. Instead, they will most likely remain limited in scope. In a 
similar observation, Branch & Mampilly describe today’s protests as 
“[…] small-scale, particularized demands for improvements in the conditions of 
specific constituencies, to be attained through informal negotiations with political 
elites who are pressured by the threat of local upheaval. Indeed, from this perspective, 
today’s small-scale protests are politically limited because they make only local 
demands from the government for marginal improvements. If such small-scale 
demands start to be made in a coordinated fashion across the country, however, they 
could become politically explosive and give rise again to the other face of protest by 
political society: a general uprising as seen in 2011 [reference to Walk to Work].” 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 149) 
So, instead of promoting democracy, these groups intervene according to the “rules of the game”, 
which are shaped through a patronage system. And as a result, they restrict access to politics in 
the ways described above.
  
12 Restricted Access to Politics 
In her work on the women’s movement, Ferree & McClurg advance the hypothesis that women 
organize themselves rather apolitically because their access to regular political activism is 
restricted (Ferree Marx & McClurg Mueller, 2004). Drawing on the insights gained through the 
analysis of the recent protests, and the stance on political protest taken up by the majority of the 
interviewees, this chapter aims at pointing out the mechanisms that stop many of the middle 
income groups from becoming politically active. 
12.1 The Bad Reputation of Politics 
Among many respondents, politics, in general, do not enjoy a good reputation and, as a result, are 
often portrayed as undesirable. This is fueled by the discontent with the government, but also the 
dissatisfaction with the opposition. As a result, politicians enjoy little legitimacy, compared to, for 
example, religious or traditional leaders (Afrobarometer, 2015). 
12.1.1 Discontent with the Government 
There is a general dissatisfaction with the government regarding service delivery, corruption, and 
the regime’s longevity. All are widely recognized problems in Uganda by supporters, as well as 
opponents of the government. Regarding service delivery, most Ugandans are not satisfied, 
criticizing the poor quality of roads, schools, and hospitals. “Yes, we have good health services 
infrastructure. We have built health centers up to the lowest level, parish even. But there are no 
medicines. There are no medical personnel. These are just white elephants.” (Geoffrey) And Janet 
states: “The work [done in Uganda] is like a Chinese product. Comes in flashy, doesn’t last long.” This 
frustration finds particular expression when people condone politicians for taking their children 
abroad for education or health treatment: “You are a minister, and you don't do anything, yet when 
your children and grandchildren get sick you put them in a car and drive them abroad” (Raphael). 
This dissatisfaction had been consistent among the respondents of the three years interviewed 
when asked about the work of the government. It is related to a problem, mentioned by nearly all 
respondents: corruption. Condemning the state of corruption is not necessarily related to a critical 
stance towards the government, but considered a problem that affects all levels of society: 
“Because the corruption has become part of us, it is in our skin; you can’t get any/ 
even if you say you are a practicing Christian, you are a Pentecostal, whatever are your 
principles, you cannot get any services if you haven’t paid.” (Josephine) 
Arthur believes that “now people at the lower level look at corruption as a way of life.” Even 
though people concede that it happens at all levels, politicians are especially disregarded because 
“they only satisfy themselves and do not consider the common man.” (Joseph) And in one 
WhatsApp group members have joked that nowadays corruption has been institutionalized, by 
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already stating in official forms the need for a “facilitation fee”. This criticism is ubiquitous, albeit 
interpretation differs according to NRM supporters or opponents. 
“Fighting corruption today is fighting Museveni’s government. Why? Because it is a 
government that only functions through theft and lies and so on.” (Activist IV) 
“I trust Museveni; he made Uganda a country everyone would want to live in, but I 
don't trust the cabinet. He chose the cabinet in a good way, but they are the ones who 
are bringing the corruption.” (Pamela) 
Finally, a third dissatisfaction with the government lies in its reluctance to leave power and let 
somebody else take over, often articulated in a wish for “change for the sake of change”. Again, 
even supporters of the NRM and the president expressed this view.  
“Thank God for the president now, he is a Christian; he is a believer. But he has played 
his role and his time is out. […] Our president is not a bad leader, but his time is out.” 
(Elly) 
There is fatigue expressed by many “Already ten years is too much. In marriage it is good, but not 
in politics.” (Sarah), “You leave when people still need you.” (Richard) and a wish for a peaceful 
change of government, especially since Uganda has never witnessed one since independence. For 
some, this is the only way that this will bring meaningful transformation to the country’s situation, 
others, however, are not sure if viable alternatives to Museveni exist. 
12.1.2 Discontent with the Opposition 
While government supporters may be critical of the regime’s performance, similarly the 
opposition lacks credibility, even among those who oppose the government (Tangen, 2011, p. 5). 
In many African countries where single-party systems or other forms of autocratic rule would 
prevail, opposition parties did not re-enter the political arena with ease, once multipartism had 
been established (Olukoshi, 1998; see also Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Opposition activities 
throughout the continent would be limited through the lack of finances, advantages of 
incumbents, elitism and ethnic or religious divisions (Olukoshi, 1998, p. 12). Thus, Olukoshi 
observes: “Indeed, in a number of cases, the opposition parties are severely discredited before the 
populace and do not present a viable alternative to the electorate.” (Olukoshi, 1998, p. 29) This is 
equally true for Uganda. The years under military rule and the movement system had 
systematically eroded the organizational and personnel base of the established political parties 
(Ssenkumba, 1998, p. 174 f). Beyond that, according to the NRM ideology that promoted a no-
party movement: 
“[P]arties have been blamed for being inimical to peace and order since they allegedly 
disrupt even the most fundamental of solidarities, pitting brother against brother and 
neighbour against neighbour. Parties are also accused of promoting a winner-take-all 
attitude towards political competition, disenfranchising the losers and thus creating 
permanent resentments and antagonisms. […] The destructive ambition inherent in 
parties is held responsible for infecting the very internal structure of the parties 
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themselves, making them not only outwardly disordering, but inwardly disorderly as 
well.” (Ssenkumba, 1998, p. 183) 
Additionally, there is the tendency that political parties develop or manifest themselves around 
personalities, rather than agendas (Olukoshi, 1998, p. 30; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009, p. 115). 
This, in return triggers a perception where the competition for political office is not for a greater 
good but a reliable way of upward mobility and access to state resources (Rakner & van de Walle, 
2009). In Uganda, this seems to be the case particularly with the development of the FDC, who 
was born out of a fall-out between Museveni and his former ally Kizza Besigye and who has since 
competed four times unsuccessfully against Museveni (Tripp, 2004). The lack of a publicly known 
agenda seems present among the other parties as well, as they have repeatedly entered in 
opposition coalitions to be stronger in their unity against the NRM, but with little programmatic 
discussion. These evolutions lead to a perception that political competition is fought between two 
fronts, turning it into an “us against them” fight. Thus, to many, the opposition cannot propose a 
viable alternative to the government, when it comes to running the country. This has earned 
politics the reputation of being “a dirty game” (Anita) or only about telling lies. Herbert for 
example acknowledges that most of what the NRM is doing is bad, “but others are not better”. Elly 
says that both, government and opposition have messed up, but since the opposition is just 
fighting, it cannot be trusted. 
Hence, there is a general atmosphere of distrust concerning the political leaders of the country, 
and the political arena is not perceived as one where meaningful change is achieved, but rather 
one where individual struggles for personal profit are carried out. 
As a result, activists often underline their unpolitical, or non-partisan nature, to appeal to as many 
people as possible and not to be branded opposition by the government. This had been prominent 
in the Mabira Forest protests, the Black Monday Movement, and also among occasional activities, 
carried out by smaller groups and on a smaller scale. Thus, a group of youth activists, albeit hosted 
in the FDC offices, points out that their activities target the opposition as well as the NRM (Martin). 
Another member of the group states that: 
“I am still subscribed to that party [FDC], but you see when you go into activism, 
especially on a national cause, you don't want people to be limited by political 
affiliation. Because like joblessness affects both those in other parties. That is why we 
created a platform where we could mix, and as a generation we, we pave a way 
forward.” (Brian) 
The quote reveals how political affiliation is diminished, while age as a uniting factor is brought 
to the fore. 
Another activist complains about the branding as opposition, which he feels is not right. “Because 
considering the perception of our government, for them they think when you always come out, to 
fight for that common person, they look at you as an opposition personnel, they think you are 
opposing them, which is wrong.” (Joseph). As the citation shows, again an effort is made to 
emphasize that their activities are about issues, not about political parties. Even more explicit is 
the case of Ronald, who has put his mobilization in an explicitly non-political framework: 
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Case Story: Organizing the Motor Spare Parts Sector 
Ronald has been in the motor spare parts business since 2009, as an importer and 
wholesaler. However, his concerns have been growing as he noticed an increasing 
influx of foreign traders, mainly Asians, who before had been his suppliers into the 
domestic market. According to Ugandan law, they should not get concessions to trade 
within the country. However, appeals to the government have not yielded any success. 
Worried that they might take over the entire supply chain, he has founded in 2011 an 
association and started organizing roundtables, to bring motorcycle spare part 
dealers together. In 2017, he feels his worst fears realized: he is not selling any stock 
in his shops anymore because the foreign “so-called investors” supply his clients, and 
even up to village level. But the association is preparing to defend themselves. In 
February 2017 the executive committee went to Dubai and China to establish contacts 
with the manufacturers themselves and import directly from them, intending to 
create their own brand. During the same time, they called all spare part dealers to 
boycott the Chinese products and only buy from their association, to bring the 
Ugandans back into the business. In his activities he is very clear that he does not 
“want to mix up development and politics.” to assure the greatest coherence within his 
association. In a similar approach, he reprimands members of their common 
WhatsApp group if they make political remarks in the group. As he states, his goal is 
to create a self-help group, which leaves political issues aside. “So now we are trying 
to see how we can build a group of patriotism people, people who can think about/ feel 
that Uganda is their home, is their country. People who are not political, but who feel 
that Uganda can be secured or rescued from the so-called investors. Uganda can be 
rescued by non-political people. Because politicians have done so much to put Uganda 
in the what/ in the hole where it can’t even easily be lifted up.” 
The quote also reveals a sentiment that politics has little to offer in bringing about a change in the 
situation. In that sense, people often have the impression that they are mere bystanders in the 
overall direction the country is taking. As one Ugandan has described it in an informal discussion: 
“It is as if you are riding a bicycle and you are passing an accident. You see the man 
lying on the street. It hurts you in your chest while you continue riding, but you cannot 
do anything. If even those in the big cars don’t stop, what can you do?” (Fieldnotes 
2017) 
A similar attitude is revealed in the expression of many that change in leadership, for example, 
will come because “nature will take its course”, referring to the advanced age of the President. 
From the paragraphs above we can hypothesize that our respondents display an intense distrust 
towards the political sphere, and they try to keep themselves away from it. They remain rather 
neutral (albeit having their own points of view) and do not perceive themselves as actors capable 
of changing the situation. Instead, they decide to concentrate more on their private advancement 
and immediate issues or interests, rather than inscribing in long-term investment on broader 
societal change. 
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Thus, government’s inadequate performance, the rampant corruption, but also the failure of the 
opposition to propose a viable agenda has earned politics a bad reputation. In a way that has 
affected activism as well, since it can act as a deterrent for many if it is perceived to be “political” 
or “about politics”. 
12.2 The Bad Reputation of Protest and Protesters Among Middle Income Groups 
Thus, politics itself already has little respectability among large parts of the Ugandan population. 
Besides, various mechanisms are at work to portray protests and protesters in a bad way, which 
in turn diminishes the probability for a collective identity to develop. 
12.2.1 Governmental Framing and the Protest Paradigm 
Scholars working on the coverage of protests through mass media have often observed the so-
called protest paradigm (Lee, 2014). The paradigm describes the fact that protests challenging the 
status quo are often depicted by mass media in negative terms, focusing on incidences of violence. 
This in return influences the public perception of the particular protest and those protesting 
(McLeod & Detenber, 1999). In their coverage, the media closely align the interpretation of the 
events with the dominant discourse led by the government. As a result, the media becomes a 
vanguard of the status quo. In Uganda, press freedom is limited, and the government owns the 
majority in one of the two big media groups of the country. We might, therefore, expect media 
coverage to be even more tilted in favor of the governmental position. And while the media 
coverage of the protest is not the scope of our analysis here, we do find a reproduction of the 
government discourse that shapes public perception of the protests and protesters. The 
government aims at delegitimizing the opposition, through three closely related discourses: The 
antagonism of development (what the government is doing) and politics (what the opposition is 
doing), the antagonism of stability (brought by the NRM regime) and violence (if one lets the 
opposition act) and, more broadly, a slandering of opposition. 
For one, there is a government discourse, which brands any opposition activity as “politics” and 
considers it to be bad, as it poses a threat to social harmony. This can be found on numerous 
accounts. Thus, in her accounts of the interactive radio shows in Uganda and the regime’s reaction 
to them, Brisset-Foucault observes that in the local discourse, “une question devient « politique » 
quand il y a polarisation et notamment quand l’opposition s’en mêle.” (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 
492), and that the President advises journalists to stop doing politics and concentrate on 
development, as they would be more useful in that sense (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 490). 
Similarly, a representative of the Boda Boda 2010 union recalled an intervention from Museveni, 
due to conflicts between various unions, competing for the claim to represent the industry: “His 
[Museveni’s] directive was: I don’t want here such nonsense of politics in this industry of transport.” 
(Chairman, Boda Boda 2010). In another instance, a pro-NRM market chairman reprimanded 
some vendors in the market after they approached the Lord Mayor of Kampala (who is a member 
of DP) because they were unhappy with a decision made by the chairman. He advised them not to 
go “politicking” (General Secretary, UTRADA) because politics are bad. These “bad” politics are 
opposed to development, as seen above in his advice to journalists, and equally in his reaction to 
the Mabira forest protests (see 10.1). This distinction recalls the President’s arguments that 
Uganda needed to develop and modernize before it could pass to multipartism (Hickey, 2005, p. 
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998). “Development” has been a major element of the government’s discourse, through action 
plans for eradicating poverty (Hickey, 2005, p. 999) or Museveni’s repeated promises to turn 
Uganda into a middle income country (see chapter 4.3). Thus, the separation between “us”, the 
government, who are making efforts to develop the nation and “them”, the opposition, who are 
doing politics seems to evolve as a conclusion. 
In a similar vein, the government opposes its stability to the threat of violence that the opposition 
presents to the regime. At the wake of the 2016 presidential elections, General Katumba Wamala, 
the Chief of Defense Forces said that the army would not tolerate any destabilization of the 
country by the losers of the election (Dominic, 2016). 
But also, during his public appearances, the President is keen highlighting the stability of the 
country. In his 2017 New Year’s speech he states:  
“Uganda has been at peace for the first time in 500 years, for many years now. Uganda 
will remain at peace. Nobody has the capacity to disturb this, however hard they 
might try. Therefore, my dear Ugandans, I can confidently tell you that the future is 
bright.” (Museveni, 2016) 
The affirmation that no one can disturb the peace, “however hard they may try” can easily be read 
as an allusion to the opposition, whom Museveni sees as one of the main causes of violence. In an 
interview with BBC Africa shortly after the elections, the President explained the measures of 
house arrest taken against opposition leaders, saying that they had plans to incite violence 
through the youth, attacking petrol stations (BBC Africa, 2016). Already in the first election 1996, 
at that time held under the movement system, Museveni campaigned with the slogan “Me or 
Chaos” and stability has been a central part of his election campaigns ever since (Perrot, 2003, p. 
256). These tendencies are congruent with the observation that the government does not 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful dissent, but frames it increasingly as disloyal opposition 
(Hönig, 2014, p. 70). In an interview with Al Jazeera, Museveni makes yet another antagonism, 
between liars and those telling the truth. 
Journalist: Are you afraid of kind of Arab Spring happening in Uganda? 
Museveni: No, no. We shall/ Because they tell lies, we tell the truth. So that’s what we 
do, they tell lies using/ 
Journalist: So, opposition tells lies. Government tells truth. 
Museveni: Yes! 
Journalist: That is what you are saying? 
Museveni: Yes! (Al Jazeera, 2017) 
These rhetoric tactics, of branding the opposition as violent and doing politics, in contrast to the 
development and stability the NRM regime brings, has had an impact on the way political activism 
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and the opposition is perceived. For one, to some interviewees, there is no difference between a 
demonstration and a riot, as they used the terms interchangeably during the interviews. Several 
mentioned that to them it is the opposition that causes violence, either by hijacking 
demonstrations for their interests (John) or because they incite unemployed youth to come up 
and take arms, without reasons, but merely “based on assumptions” (Ruth). She feels the 
opposition mobilizes the ordinary people, but they are not the one suffering the consequences. 
“Like the greatest opposition person, now that he is a threat, is Besigye. So, when he 
is in a place, you see for him it may be safe and/ but the most people you find there is 
so much teargas, people are dying, others are hospitalized.” (Ruth) 
Closely related to this, some people believed that the protests, particularly Walk to Work, would 
only serve individual interests, rather than a common good, as the quote of one deputy mayor of 
Kampala during a meeting on community policing and local security has shown: 
“Even though I am a member of the opposition, I will never go on the street to 
demonstrate because it is not secure. It is for personal benefit, not for the nation.” 
(Fieldnotes 2017) 
Thus, a hegemonic framing of protest is established, that tends to equal all criticism of the 
government with unlawful and violent dissent, often perceived to be at a personal gain rather than 
a greater good. This in turn often leads to a failure of middle income groups to identify with the 
protesters, even if they might support their causes43, and as a result, obstructs the construction of 
a collective identity. 
12.2.2 Obstacles for a Collective “Middle Income” Identity 
The framing of a protest is an essential part of establishing a collective identity, with the aim to 
appeal to bystanders, and to demobilize opponents (Messer & Bell, 2010, p. 854). Thus, it is not 
surprising that different frames exist in government and protesters’ discourses, competing for 
support. As it has become obvious in most of the protests, except for the Save Mabira campaign, 
the collective identities evoked were not appealing to many. For example, in the Walk to Work 
protests, though many respondents supported the cause, a lot of them failed to identify with the 
people who would participate in the demonstration. There was the common understanding that 
the people involved in such kind of activities are idle and unemployed. This depiction was 
influenced by government and media presentation of the protesters. Thus, the “boda-boda guy” 
has become the symbol for a young, unemployed man who barely survives by taking passengers 
on a motorcycle. And because they are neglected by the system, they seem to have nothing to lose: 
“All those boda-bodas if you ask them and tell them that I want to start a, b, c, d, they 
tell you what are you waiting for? We are ready to join. They were actually waiting for 
                                                 
43 It is worth pointing out that there equally exists a counter-hegemonic frame of political activism, used by political 
activists to gather support that has not gone unnoticed among the respondents. However, since most of them abstained 
from any activism on the grounds given here, we are led to the conclusion that the hegemonic frame is the more 
prominent one and concentrate thus on this prevailing discourse. 
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Doctor Kizza Besigye to just say: 'Now, we are recruiting in this region here.' And you 
would see people disappearing from the city.” (Isaac) 
“And you know but enough, it is almost our age, who are suffering, mostly our age. 
This is the unemployed. And the government is not careful. Thus, you see that fighting 
thing, you get someone of my age on the street, demonstrating. These people who go 
for it / who go for demonstrating on the street, what they / they / they do it because 
they have nothing, so whenever they go and demonstrate, they have nothing to lose.” 
(Francis) 
As already shown in the description of the protest, it is very likely that, particularly during the 
Walk to Work, main protesters have come from urban marginalized groups (Branch & Mampilly, 
2015; Goodfellow, 2013). However, these demonstrators also work as a deterrent for others to 
participate. That description as idle and unemployed draws a symbolic boundary, where issues, 
while not of class, at least of socio-economic categories are brought to the fore. Thus, there is an 
intention to bring a distance between those that had been participating in the protest and the 
middle income groups. This dissociation is not dependent on whether the participants were 
economically more struggling than non-participants but rather led by the motivation of not being 
identified with that group of “poor urbanites” but to consider oneself more of a person “not quite 
there yet, but not poor”. As a result, even people who identify with the issue would not participate 
in Walk to Work because they felt there were different motivations between them and the 
demonstrators; they lacked a common ground. 
The quotes from Justine and Julius on page 208 highlight a similar dimension. Because those who 
participate in protests are the hungry, poor or uneducated, the issues do not seem relevant to 
them, as they are neither. Hence, the protests become less appealing due to how the participants 
were depicted; as somebody, most people do not want to be associated with. So, it seems that 
some social distinction exists, between us, the working, and them, the boda boda guys, the 
unemployed. But it appears as if this consciousness inhibited rather than promoted collective 
mobilization. 
Other factors contributing to the bad reputation of those mobilizing are their attribution to a 
particular ethnicity, as done in the Buganda riots. In its worst form, the protesters were 
considered causing sectarianism and inciting ethnic violence, a conclusion much supported by the 
government. Once again, participation did not feel appealing to those who would not want to be 
identified in these terms. The fear of causing sectarianism is deeply rooted in the Ugandan history 
and, therefore, can work as a strong deterrent for many. For example, the development of the 
major religions in the country has been accompanied by conflict (Welbourn, 1965) and questions 
of ethnicity have played a role in the military rules of Amin and Obote (Museveni, 1997). In 
response, the NRM had based its movement ideology on the idea that political parties cause 
sectarianism because they repeat patterns of regional or religious exclusion (Carbone, 2008). The 
ideological teachings of the NRM, particularly in its early years, as well as the ethnic conflicts that 
had happened in the region, and the fear of a too dominant Buganda made people very receptive 
to allegations of sectarianism and thus worked as a strong deterrent to the protests. 
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Age was another aspect along which participation in political protest would be determined. Norris 
points out that concerning political activism, age-related behavior can be explained through three 
distinct effects: a generational one, a life-cycle effect, and a periodic effect (Norris, 2003, p. 8). 
Generational effects refer to trends or societal developments that distinguish one generation from 
another. Thus, one could argue that the interconnectedness through the internet, as well as rising 
education levels, have increased the awareness among younger generations. Even the sheer size 
of a birth cohort has an influence in this regard (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990, p. 240). The rising youth 
unemployment can be mentioned here as well, as the prospects for a job of a better-educated 
generation are rather bleak. In response to this phenomenon, the Jobless Brotherhood was created, 
with the aim of mobilizing young people affected by joblessness. Life-cycle effects describe events 
that are in general tied to a particular age, such as the entry into the workforce, marriage or 
childbirth. There is also evidence that this played a role in the absence of activism among older 
people, who would occasionally mention their social responsibilities, like caring for a family, or 
their obligations towards their workplace when they gave reasons why they abstained from 
protesting. Students, in general, do not have to bear these factors in mind. Finally, periodic effects 
refer to distinct historical events, which leave a profound impact (Norris, 2003, p. 8). The political 
regimes of Obote and Amin and the civil war can be said to have such an effect. Attitudes of 
respondents towards the system, its achievements and overall stability in Uganda and towards 
protest would differ, depending on the age of the respondents. Older people, in general, who 
remembered how life was during the bush wars and the Amin era were more prone to credit the 
regime for the pacification of the country. One respondent, 62 years at the time of the interview 
recalls: 
“Because I/ according to my view. I lived during the colonial days. I've gone through 
all the regimes. Since then this has been the best regime we have ever had. [...] So, to 
tell you the truth, this is the (.) best (.) regime we have ever had. Apart from the 
colonial regime.” (Susan) 
In the commentary section of a recent Al Jazeera interview with President Museveni, one 
commenter writes: “Respect my President you did your best for us Ugandan that's why we Love 
you.....i remember Uganda before you terrible. God bless you.” (Al Jazeera, 2017) 
And, on the other hand, the younger generation airs out its discontent, which goes partly along 
with a glorification of past regimes: 
“I am as old as this government I can say because I was born a year earlier, the next 
year it went into power, I think. But there is nothing phy/ physical, tangible, you can 
say, that the government has done. Because they can tell you that the satellite in 
(Impoma?) it was put up by Amin. They can tell you, Uganda house was built by / The 
roads, Mulago Hospital, they can show you something that the past leaders did. But 
this present leadership, there is nothing tangible.” (Justine) 
So, the protests are often very much driven by a generational divide as well. Branch & Mampilly 
come to a similar conclusion. They write: 
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“For instance, there is an important generational aspect to participation in protest, 
given the widespread perception that many older Ugandans who remembered the 
bloody upheavals of the pre-NRM period would rather let Museveni stay in power 
than risk another descent into fratricidal civil conflict and insecurity – a caution 
absent from the younger, post-NRM generation.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 133) 
As a result, the threat of political instability has left an older generation, weary of the past conflicts, 
as strong supporters of the status quo. They feel the regime is not such a bad option, compared to 
previous presidents (we have for example seen an increase in votes for the NRM regime among 
those aged 45 years and older, see chapter 9.2.1). Efforts to construct a collective identity 
sometimes frame issues as a generational question. Hence, “youth” is a collective identity, as broad 
and blurry as it may be, that is often invoked in political struggle. Particularly the Jobless 
Brotherhood frame their struggle as the new generation against an old elite. Martin describes his 
generation as “messed up by those Bushmen [referring to those who have fought in the bush war, i.e., 
the political elite] who cannot understand our needs as generation.” He strongly feels that it is time 
to leave the leadership of the country now to that younger generation (preferably himself). 
So, the mechanisms how protests and protesters are depicted influence the development of a 
collective identity and can prevent solidarity that spans across broader factions of society. 
Especially ethnic identity and economic marginalization may be powerful mobilizers for small 
sections of the society. However, they diminish the legitimacy of their protest for other parts of 
the population. Among these sections, we might expect to find some members of middle income 
groups, as the previous analyses have already shown, but motivations for participation depend 
more on individual reasons rather than a collectively shared class sentiment. This is not to say 
that such a sense of unity cannot be created, but it will first and foremost be a political narrative 
that streamlines individual motives behind a common cause (Bikbov, 2012, p. 23; El Chazli, 2012, 
p. 854). However, Bayat (2013b) points out in his analysis of the Arab Spring, that the attention 
on the moment when these diverse identities unite to form a movement, “when attitudes and 
behavior [sic] are suddenly transformed: sectarian divisions melt away, gender equality reigns and 
selfishness diminishes” (p.48) should not divert the focus away from the question of political 
change. He believes that “the focus on ‘revolution as movement’ has served to obscure the peculiar 
nature of these ‘revolutions’ in terms of change, with little to say about what happens the day after 
the dictators abdicate. It may even serve to disguise the paradoxes of these upheavals, shaped by the 
new political times in which grand visions and emancipatory utopias have given way to fragmentary 
projects, improvisation and loose horizontal networks.” (Bayat, 2013b, p. 48) Hence, it is necessary 
to not only look at identities and moments in which divisions are overcome but also projects that 
construct an alternative, counter-hegemonic vision of society. 
And while the politicization through a shared label is possible, we have also shown here that, 
similarly, rhetoric of “de-politicization” are at work, notably through the perception of the protest 
and its chances to succeed, that inhibit participation in a political movement. However, as El Chazli 
points out, it would be erroneous to equate “de-politicization” with apathy, or even regime 
support: 
“[Il s’agit de] mettre en lumière le fonctionnement du mécanisme de dépolitisation. Il 
joue ici comme conditionnement des perceptions du possible. Mais on voit aussi 
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l’erreur qui consiste à rendre la dépolitisation équivalente à l’apathie ou au 
désintéressement, et surtout, l’erreur qui consiste à tirer un principe d’(in)action qui 
découlerait de la dépolitisation diagnostiquée. Autrement dit, croire que les individus 
seraient dépolitisés parce qu’ils n’agissent pas politiquement, et vu qu’ils n’agissent 
pas, ils ne sont pas amenés à se politiser.” (El Chazli, 2012, p. 857) 
So, it might still be possible that the individual motives and dissatisfaction come together in times 
of a “critical juncture” (Dobry, 2009). However, for now, we have little indication that such 
mobilization will happen through the call for a commonly shared identity that revolves around a 
shared income nor that it proposes a genuine alternative to the current political system in Uganda. 
12.3 The Fear of Consequences 
While there has been a perception linking demonstrators to the cause of the violence, many 
respondents were aware that the regime used excessive force cracking down on the protests. The 
state brutality has been a deterrent to many. But also, the fear of more subtle consequences in the 
broader societal realm has made people cautious of becoming overtly political. 
12.3.1 Protest and Repression 
In the 2012 interview set, and with very recent memories of Walk to Work, the respondents often 
referred to the risk of “being teargassed”, which has become a symbol of state repression. The fear 
of violence was the principal reason for the 2012 respondents not to participate in activism. 
Salome simply said that “I am not ready to be teargassed.” and in similar wording, Ruth confirms: 
“But I will not wake up knowing even before I walk one kilometer and I will be huddled up perhaps 
on a police car or teargassed.” 
The use of force has increased over the years, particularly after the Buganda riots and Walk to 
Work protests (Freedom House, 2012). In January 2017 media attention was captured when the 
police presented its 2017/18 financial year budget to the Parliament’s Defense Committee. Of the 
505 billion UGX, 44 billion UGX were allocated to procure teargas (Tajuba, 2017). These 
tendencies have not gone unnoticed, thus, participation in demonstrations, in addition to the bad 
reputation of protesters, also entails the risk of being hurt or arrested. As a direct result, BMM, for 
example, has decided to change its tactics and refrain from street protests, and as one of the 
activists explains, it is among the primary reasons they fail to recruit: 
“But I think the ultimate issue here is about fear. Because the current government has 
used fear and threats a lot. That even if you wanted people’s responses and what/ fear 
is number one. ‘I will be shot down.’” (Activist II, Black Monday) 
In this regard, we can also recall the quote from Stephen, that made him eventually refrain from 
participating in the Buganda riots (see p. 203). 
The governmental response with fear and repression is by no means new, nor tied to Uganda. In 
his work on riots in West Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, Wiseman (1986) has similarly noticed 
that the government usually responded with repression and that, in general, few concessions were 
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made. The same holds true for a preliminary analysis of the wave of contention that sub-Saharan 
Africa witnessed at the beginning of the 1990s. Bratton & Van de Walle (1992) observed that 
“Governments responded to the initial protests with a familiar formula of threats, repression, and 
selective compromise.” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992, p. 423) If the demands were explicitly 
political, then repression would be the preferred government reaction (ibid.). And it seems to 
apply particularly to semi-authoritarian regimes, that face real competition from the opposition, 
but have a wider arrear to control dissent than democratic regimes (Carey, 2009, p. 17). But 
Davenport points out that the relationship between conflict and repression is consistent and 
withstands scrutiny over time and country. He suggests this to be a “Law of Coercive 
Responsiveness.” (Davenport, 2007, p. 8) Therefore, it seems not surprising that the government 
of Uganda responds to protest with repression. 
However, while these individual accounts testify how fear of repression has stopped people from 
participating, the academic literature is not unanimous in that regard (Carey, 2006). Davenport 
(2007) ascertains that the causality between conflict and repression is strong. However, the same 
cannot be said if the relationship is inversed. Analyses investigating how oppression affects 
dissent yield highly inconsistent results (Davenport, 2007, p. 8). And indeed, those already 
political active usually relativized that fear. Martin, who subscribed to non-violent activism, states 
that: “Museveni is a dictator, but as long as you do not touch his guns, you will not remain in jail.” 
Joseph, himself arrested several times, explains why people still join the protests they organize: 
“The police will not arrest everybody in a protest, but only the known faces, the ringleaders.” 
Others accept that the violence is part of the activism and the inconveniences caused, including 
incarceration or torture, for the fight for the greater good. “If you ever see a rat running to hide in 
fire, you must bear in mind that whatever is chasing the rat is worse than fire.” (Martin) Indeed, 
observations show that the frequency of protest has increased over the last 15 years, despite an 
increasingly repressive environment (see ACLED, 2018). Carey (2006) calls this a “tit-for-tat” 
strategy, as the government’s response to protest with violence is likely to increase violent protest 
in return. And Goodfellow (2013, p. 442) argues that the rioting has become an accepted way of 
communication between the government and the city dwellers because the government only 
seemed to respond to demands made by market vendors or boda boda drivers if they used “noise” 
to capture the government’s attention. He describes the government response as “a paradoxical 
language of violence and small favours.” (Goodfellow, 2013, p. 444) However, the analysis from 
Goodfellow mainly concentrates on locally defined riots, voiced by specific groups who demand 
some specific policy change. He does, however, apply his estimation of the situation to the Walk 
to Work as well: 
“It was therefore always doubtful that the ongoing protests would escalate into 
anything like an ‘Arab Spring’. The riots built on existing urban discontent but the 
scale of the protests remained within certain bounds, as did the government response 
in the sense that Besigye was not permanently confined and the clampdown on public 
space was limited. Rather than escalating into more transformative and revolutionary 
events, the “walk to work” episode represented what had come to be normal politics 
in Kampala, in which noise played a central part, writ large.” (Goodfellow, 2013, p. 
444) 
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Thus, it seems, while the repression may act as a deterrent for some, it equally increases 
frustration and thus incites others even more. 
12.3.2 Beyond the Immediate Realm of Protest 
Yet, the fear of consequences goes beyond the immediate realm of the protest. On several 
accounts, respondents have iterated how they already have experienced disadvantages. Others 
explain how they fear being disadvantaged if they voice their opinion. Martin described how he 
had been expelled from the university for an activism he had done, on the accounts that he was 
tarnishing the university’s name. Also, he has trouble selling a book he has published because 
bookshops refuse to display it in their shops. Another persistent fear is not getting a job, as had 
happened to Gerald, who believes he was the best qualified for a job advertisement, that he did 
not get due to his activism. Joseph had a similar experience. The caution also manifests itself in 
the reluctance of people to discuss political matters in public spaces. Andrew feels there is no 
possibility to voice criticism, and even though in office they talk about politics, he is usually 
cautious when on the street. On several accounts, interlocutors have lowered their voice when 
they felt politically sensitive topics were touched. 
Case Story: The Shopping Mall of the First Lady 
In 2017 during an excursion with Kato and his family, we were driving in a special 
hire, as the private taxis in Uganda are called, through Entebbe. On our way, we passed 
Imperial Mall, a luxurious shopping mall that had not been completed at the time of 
the incident. On inquiry to whom the Mall belongs, the driver, as well as, Kato said 
they did not know. Upon remarks that it bears a lot of resemblance to Acacia Mall in 
Kampala, which is said to belong to Janet Museveni, the wife of the president, both, 
the driver and Kato laughed but did not say anything; and while Kato nods 
affirmatively, he signals me nonverbally to be silent. Asked later about the situation 
he says you never know whether this will bring you a disadvantage, but before we 
were able to elaborate further, he trails off again as a waiter comes to our table to 
serve the drinks. 
The BMM activists mentioned the difficulties they had to find people willing to print their 
newsletter, out of fear to be associated with them. “So, it is really, a resource again, it is related to 
the first point I made to you. Where a state, a regime, captures the economy. Nobody is able to give 
any money to a local cause.” (Activist IV) In a similar vein, the organizers of an elite discussion 
platform, the State of the Nation (STON) platform44, highlight the openness of their discussions, 
which at times tend to be highly critical of the government, yet they are not met with repression 
because “the government does not fear conversation, that is in-house.” (former Executive Director, 
ACODE). They concede though that with an increasingly narrow civil space people would start 
censoring themselves in the discussions. 
                                                 
44 See p. 267 for details 
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“Some of them are looking for opportunities, including from government. If you are 
hoping that, if you are a businessperson […] and you are looking at winning a tender, 
who wants to speak badly about the regime when there is an informer there?” (former 
Executive Director, ACODE) 
Stephen, a banker that has been categorized as UMC, is a party member of DP. He states that his 
party support is mainly in monetary terms: 
“What we normally do, although the government / they don't want us to get in politics, 
but we do support our parties. Like if, say my president is going to stand, Norbert Mao, 
from DP, in one way or another, I may contribute towards his campaign. Although not 
openly. It would be (...) secret because once they get to know you are the kind of 
people who give in towards the political activity or something like that, oh, they may 
follow you wherever you are to see at least the political party loses strength. Because 
once there is no money it can't carry out its activities. So you do it quietly. And that's 
what we do mainly, like myself, that's how we support the party.” (Stephen) 
These statements must be relativized, though. Political discussions still take place, even in public 
places such as minibuses or bars. People also have been quite willing to discuss political matters 
with a stranger like me, and political persecution of individuals is still quite targeted on those that 
become publicly known. The political atmosphere thus cannot be compared to countries like 
Ethiopia or Rwanda. However, it seems that there is a rise of caution on what is said and to whom. 
The general fear is also expressed in messages circulating in social media: 
“Museveni has added himself to most watsapp [sic] groups mbu he wants to know 
what people say about him… I know he is in this group … let me say my point at once 
Muzei twesasile…. Gwe ne wenger mutuleke [Old man, have mercy on us and leave 
us].” (WhatsApp, 01.09.2017) 
“Don't forward any posts or videos etc., u receive regarding politics/present situation 
about Government/PM etc. 
Police have put out a notification termed ..Cyber Crime ... and action will be taken...just 
delete...inform your friends & others too. 
Writing or forwarding any msg on any political & religious debate is an offence 
now....arrest without warrant... 
This is very serious, plz let it be known to all our groups and individual members as 
group admin can b in deep trouble. 
Please take note of this seriously.” (WhatsApp, 17.03.2017) 
The messages are likely hoaxes. For one, it is doubtful whether Museveni himself will follow 
various WhatsApp groups. In the second case, the use of the word “cyber crime” in reference to 
political content is indicative, whereas it is usually applied in a context referring to crimes such as 
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hacking, property infringement, online child abuse, online fraud, etc. (see Tushabe & 
Baryamureeba, 2007, p. 377) 
Nevertheless, the repeated reposting in WhatsApp groups reveals that people believe it at least 
possible that the government of Uganda would target such messages and as such testifies a general 
sentiment of fear. 
12.4 Money and Activism — Determinants of a Repertoire of Action 
We can find on several levels the intertwined relationship between money and activism. The 
literature suggests that financial resources are among those that need to be mobilized for political 
activism (Oberschall, 1973). On the other hand, there is the assumption that those who have 
access to money have less reason to challenge a status quo (J. D. Wright, 1976). Hence, money, or 
the lack thereof, will shape the form of activism taken. 
12.4.1 Activism needs Money 
Political activists are often constrained in their activities by a lack of resources. Obviously, there 
is the need for providing the logistics of a mobilization such as buying airtime to facilitate 
communication or the placards that can be held up. Elijah describes their mobilization as: 
“We always know ourselves. We know who has money, who does not have. […] We 
always try to identify someone who is financially able to come and fund the activities 
on behalf of the what? The rest of the members.” (Elijah) 
In other cases, certain activities have not taken place or stalled because of a lack of funds. A recent 
example at the time of the 2017 fieldwork was the strike of lecturers at Makerere University. After 
nearly two months of strike over salary disagreements, the lecturers returned to work without 
any notable concession achieved. Since they did not receive any salaries during the time of strike, 
many felt they could not sustain it any longer. This also brings up the question of co-optation. On 
several accounts activists have told stories how the regime has co-opted opponents into the 
system. Similarly, money that comes from donors can equally be seen as co-opted because it may 
be perceived that a local agenda is given up for a foreign one. One particular challenge activism 
faces is to counter the costs of repression, such as the provision of legal support and bail for those 
activists who have been arrested. This involves also the opportunity costs that activism may cause. 
Elijah describes the activism of the “working class men” as going to a bar, watching news together 
and discussing them. “They cannot go beyond that, they fear losing their job is they go to the street, 
they cannot be detained for 48 hours.” (Elijah) Thus, the failure to generate income, which is 
perceived as vital for the maintenance of everyday life increases the cost of activism. The General 
Secretary of UTRADA, who mobilizes in the transport sector says that most drivers are reluctant 
to join because they need to provide financial support to their families. This has been a prominent 
reason for people not to join Walk to Work, as discussed above. Those who were working would 
not participate because they felt constrained by their obligation towards the workplaces. The self-
employed, unemployed and students were less restricted in that sense, even though material 
considerations may have played a role as well. A boda boda driver for example, who is self-
employed still would have to decide to forgo the opportunity of earning money by participating 
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in protest. Thus, it is hard to determine how far money is a constant variable in the participation 
of protests. This is also reflected in the literature as some authors argue that the truly 
marginalized are too busy to make ends meet and will therefore not engage in activities other than 
those assuring their own economic survival (Huntington, 1972, p. 52; Oberschall, 1973, p. 135f). 
A useful distinction here is offered by Miller & Krosnick: resources alone are not sufficient to 
determine someone’s political participation, instead they are an indicator of the potential, 
however eventually motivation will be decisive (Miller & Krosnick, 2004, p. 508). They do concede 
though, that what people will do, regardless of their motivation, is shaped by the resources they 
have at hand (Miller & Krosnick, 2004, p. 509). This leads us to the question of the behavior of 
those who do have money. 
12.4.2 Money does not need Activism 
Some people with money or in certain work positions are more reluctant to openly engage in or 
support activism, out of fear that this will bring them a disadvantage. One, there is the fear of 
material loss. Shop owners disapprove of riots because they risk being looted and are forced to 
close for the day. Rocca noted in this regard in the case of China: “A class that owns fears change.” 
(Rocca, 2008), a statement that recalls the assumptions of the status panic theory, according to 
which the lower middle class is the most afraid of losing an acquired status and hence actively 
supporting the status quo (Mills, 1953; cf C. S. Rallings & Andeweg, 1979). Secondly, there is the 
fear to lose out on income opportunities, already mentioned above. That problem becomes even 
more exacerbated through the close ties between the state and the economy in Uganda. In a 
society where the economy and the state are closely linked, and a large part of white collar jobs 
are in the civil service sector, the government maintains considerable leverage over the hiring and 
firing of employees and through awarding tenders, since the public sector is the most solvent 
client for many private enterprises. But even the private sector is penetrated by state officials. 
Privatization and liberalization of the Ugandan economy have provided ample opportunity for 
political patronage, as many formerly state-owned enterprises had been given to allies of the 
president, who would often also share a common ethnic background (Lindemann, 2011, p. 404). 
Another example is illustrated by the case of the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association 
(UTODA), which was officially supposed to represent the interests of all taxi operators and drivers 
in the transport sector (Goodfellow, 2017). Because the industry represents such a large number 
of people and also generates vast benefits, the association was quickly captured by government 
interests to assure a stream of rent to state officials. However, over time they became so strong 
that they, in return could exert pressure on the government. 
“By the end of the 2000s UTODA was neither effectively representing its membership 
nor fulfilling its obligations to the state, yet was so closely imbricated with political 
power as to be unassailable from either above or below.” (Goodfellow, 2017, p. 1569) 
That link between the state and the economy suggests that those in economically powerful 
positions often have other means to influence political outcomes. Hence, people better endowed 
with resources may either be content with the status quo or have more effective ways of 
determining political decisions. In a similar observation, Wright observes for the case of the US: 
“[…] those most able to do something about their discontent are also the least discontented.” (J. D. 
Wright, 1976, p. 151) 
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That statement equally applies to another area: the individual action taken to address discontent. 
With rising income, a greater variety of solutions can be employed. Higher revenue allows for 
people to redirect their demands and seek answers elsewhere than in government action. This 
tendency is most obvious in the case of education and healthcare, where private facilities attract 
many people, as they are considered more efficient than government institutions. Hence, service 
delivery, a source of discontent for many Ugandans, is often addressed by turning away from the 
state and to private institutions. Given the wide range offered, this option is viable even for those 
with only little disposable income, who will go an extra mile to put their children into private 
schools. 
The data gathered is not sufficient to state a clear causal relationship, as some of the activists have 
high profile positions. There is, however, a common pattern: as observed by others, people 
demonstrating in Walk to Work or the Buganda riots were predominantly young and 
marginalized. The less confrontational and less violent activism of BMM was led by activists with 
higher education, and stable professions in NGOs. Others refrain from any open action because 
they fear disadvantage and try to seek solutions without voicing demands towards the 
government. Thus, we may conclude that the resources at hand shape the way in which people 
can participate in the political process; however, it cannot answer the question whether they will 
do it. 
*** 
In this part III, we have tried to analyze what determines forms of political participation and what 
are reasons for its absence among many individuals, particularly the middle income groups 
interviewed. First, we have looked at so-called “citizen-oriented” activism, such as voting behavior 
and democratic attitudes, but beyond that also interaction with political officials. We have found 
that while being inclined towards democracy and seeing its current state in Uganda rather critical, 
little action beyond “conventional” political participation is taken. Indeed, support for the 
opposition is strong among the respondents; it reflects a tendency that can be observed all over 
Kampala and thus cannot be linked to “middle-class characteristics”, such as higher income, better 
education, or stable employment, per se. A question arises that we have already touched upon in 
part II: in how far are these characteristics, frequently mentioned regarding the middle class mere 
reflections of urban phenomena? And where do the fault lines lie? To fully answer these questions, 
a detailed study of urban stratification is necessary, including poor as well as better-off groups. 
Looking at experiences with and expectations of political officials, we see how these change with 
income. Those respondents who are more financially unstable are more reliant on financial 
support, thus becoming tied into a patron-client relationship with politicians. With rising income, 
the need for such handouts diminishes. Does this mean we can find here evidence that evolution 
towards middle income does promote democracy, simply because it offers a possibility to opt out 
of a patronage system? Maybe, and we cannot answer this question conclusively. But perhaps only 
the forms of patronage change. A higher income may allow access to elite networks and to bring 
advantage through personal connection, rather than financial support itself. Thus, we can 
consider again an in-between area: for those, who are financially less dependent, but who do not 
have the same access to personal networks as higher placed people. Again, no decisive answer can 
be given, but as already mentioned (see chapter 7.4), establishing a network that reaches higher 
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up is a priority for many respondents, as the benefits it can provide are well-known. And it also 
raises the questions of what is a legitimate and useful repertoire of action for the middle income 
groups in Uganda today? Is it different from the rest of the Ugandans? From the observations 
mentioned here, we can at least suggest that their access to politicians and their expectations of 
them change with income. 
While seeking personal connections with politicians is considered legitimate, it is less so for 
contentious political activities. We turned to an analysis of recent protests and reasons why 
people would join them. It suggests that several mechanisms contribute to a declined probability 
of people becoming active in protest. These mechanisms relate to the framing of protests and 
protesters, which equally prevent a collective identity from developing. Immediate and more 
diffuse ways of repression act as a deterrent and increase the cost of action and finally the 
resources at hand determine how people can interfere in the political process. By looking at other 
vectors that could be used for mobilization, such as NGOs, religious groups or interest groups we 
have tried to highlight similar constraints that affect their credibility as being voices for the mass 
of people. Hence, we argue that if there is some activism, it does not necessarily follow democratic 
channels. People know how to play by the rules in an undemocratic state; and this is not by 
pushing for democracy, but by trying to get ad-hoc benefits and maintain a good stance with the 
government. But this comes to the detriment of a mass movement that seeks to represent as many 
as possible. 
All these mechanisms result in the feeling among many, that political activism is not an accessible 
and acceptable option for them, making them return more localized or private engagement. In 
such a context our respondents were more likely to act for a specific, material interest, as in the 
case of Ronald (p. 331) than for a broader cause like Walk to Work, that, in addition, is deemed to 
be “political”. Braud observes in this regard: 
“Insatisfactions et mécontentements peuvent demeurer ‘sans suite’ sous l’influence 
de divers facteurs comme le sentiment d’impuissance ou l’exposition à une culture 
politique qui inculque avec succès l’acceptation de l’ordre des choses. Les religions 
ont souvent joué ce rôle mais aussi un conservatisme social qui souligne les coûts du 
changement et valorise au contraire les bienfaits de la stabilité, voire de 
l’immobilisme […].” (Braud, 2011, p. 373) 
One of the possible solutions to such situations are strategies of individual exit (ibid.). These 
conclusions bear a striking resemblance to the case study led by Bennani-Chraïbi (2003) on 
neighborhood associations in Casablanca. In her analysis of life stories of political activists, 
Bennani-Chraïbi has come to the conclusion that all of them eventually concentrated their 
activism in local initiatives. This retreat was borne out of the disappointment what the political 
sphere can offer and the sentiment that it is not an adequate relay to solve national problems, as 
politicians merely follow their interests and are concentrated on internal struggles. She postulates 
that the associations develop because they offer an alternative to institutionalized politics, which 
is widely seen as illegitimate (Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). Such an observation we can link to the 
argument made above that the middle income groups will not mobilize as one big entity, but (if at 
all) through diverse different identities, with their specific motivations and methods which are 
fostered precisely in the smaller groups and associations that Bennani-Chraïbi, for example, talks 
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about. Following a similar approach, we will turn to the leisure activities of the middle income 
groups in the next part, to better comprehend the spheres in which and what kind of “we-
intentions”45 (Ludwig, 2007) are formed.
                                                 
45 See p. 68ff 

  
Part IV:  
Forms of Social Participation: 
Looking at Leisure 
After having focused on forms of political participation in the third part, we have found that many 
ways of politically participating are blocked and that for the middle income groups a multitude of 
reasons exist not to mobilize politically. We have equally seen, that there is a vital interest in 
political affairs among many and respondents often have quite pronounced opinions. 
Nevertheless, this does not seem to lead to any accrued efforts to participate politically nor to 
voice demands for more democracy. Thus, is it right to conclude, as some authors do that these 
middle income groups are the most conservative in a given society (see for example J. Chen, 2013; 
Rocca, 2008)? We agree with authors like Siméant (2013) that it is not sufficient to look at 
mobilization outcomes, such as social movements, but that we have to consider processes, personal 
as well as structural. To fully understand what brings an individual to protest, Siméant suggests 
following individual trajectories, to see the continuity of practices: 
“Que ce soit sous le registre du passage au politique, de la politisation ou des réseaux 
dormants, c’est bien le problème de la continuité ou pas entre les pratiques d’avant et 
d’après qui se pose. Suivre les individus pour comprendre comment ils se trouvent 
eux-mêmes confrontés à la continuité de leurs pratiques en situation autoritaire et 
dans un processus lu peu à peu comme révolutionnaire est une des façons stimulantes 
de comprendre la politisation dans et par l’événement. Cela n’interdit évidemment 
pas d’articuler vie quotidienne, résistances et mobilisations, pour peu qu’on le fasse 
avec prudence, [...] et en montrant le lien que peuvent entretenir clientélisme et 
mobilisations collectives.” (Siméant, 2013, p. 139) 
Not having been able to follow individuals and their activities in times of authoritarianism and 
revolution, we chose a proxy that we hope can be revealing in terms of preferences and values, by 
turning to the free time activities of individuals. If we can find the continuity in politicization, as 
suggested by Siméant, we should be able to see some aspects thereof beforehand. Such a 
politicization does not have to be necessarily democratic or virtuous; Siméant also reminds us 
that the “ugly movements” of religion or ethnicity are often among the most prone for mobilization 
because they successfully create common identities (Siméant, 2013, p. 130). The social 
mobilization literature has shown that becoming active largely depended on the settings in which 
people were embedded. Hence, from looking at the leisure we might see whether we can identify 
such an environment. However, Petrovic et al. point out that not all environments support 
mobilization, some might even be explicitly anti-protest (Petrovic, Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 
2014, p. 414). Thus, we should also be able to discern patterns of de-politicization, as not all leisure 
activities are equally prone to mobilize. Looking at leisure may help us answer two distinct sets 
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of questions: first, is there a link between leisure and “class”, or leisure and income? Can we 
discern “typical middle class leisure activities”? And second, do the activities reported by 
respondents and assisted by the researcher reveal anything that had been missed by the 
mobilization literature, by turning to more subtle forms on a less organized level, in the sense of 
community engagement, street politics, etc.? This second set of considerations is guided by the 
literature that encourages political scientists to look at less visible forms of what could be 
“political” (for example Bayart, 1992; Bayat, 2013a; D.-C. Martin, 1989; Scott, 1990). It draws 
strongly on the ideas outlined in chapter 3.3 and the Table 3 in chapter 3.4, that is supposed to 
visualize that there is much more to mobilization than just a social movement. In the first part, we 
give some more theoretical foundation for our turn towards free time activities. We then turn to 
introduce the leisure reported by our respondents, in which we partly assisted. Due to the 
heterogeneous nature of the middle income groups we work here on a case-by-case basis, to show 
the varieties of leisure activities, but also values and identities transmitted, that exist. This is 
followed by a brief analysis of the activities and the values they negotiated. We then look at the 
often practiced retreat into a private sphere and the focus on self-improvement and eventually 
conclude what this might mean for the potential of democratization that might come from these 
groups. This analysis can serve us as a reminder that there is more to the analysis than what can 
be quantified in surveys or treated with statistical regression, even if this comes at the expense of 
generalizability.
  
13 Insights through Leisure 
In the previous chapters we have tried to show how the mobilization of the middle income groups 
is challenged through several instances. On the one hand, “classical” channels of mobilization are 
discredited through a discourse that emphasizes stability and development over change, and on 
the other hand there is a lack of a common cause, that would unite these groups beyond more 
particularistic identities, such as ethnicity, religion, or age. Due to the heterogeneity of the middle 
income strata, we cannot expect one big “middle class” group to organize. And indeed, in part III 
we have seen that there are very divergent reasons that bring people to act, and in general on 
particularistic interests, even though many of them share common grievances. But, as we have 
shown in our Table 3 (see 3.4), there are many other points of entry that might build up or feed 
into a wider movement. One of the central elements is that people do not mobilize in a vacuum, 
but in relation to the environments in which they act (for an analysis of how people were drawn 
into the protests at Tahrir Square, see for example El Chazli (2012)). Because interests, values and 
norms are discussed, formed, negotiated and renegotiated on a personal level, in the family, at 
work, and also during leisure time. Thus, Martin for example suggests that media consumption, 
music, but also sports are promising avenues for detecting unidentified political objects (D.-C. 
Martin, 1989, p. 805). And we believe that we can enlarge this scope even more by focusing on 
leisure more broadly. Hence, we turn here to see in what kind of leisure time our respondents 
participate. First, we see how leisure might foster a class identity, that transcends other, 
aforementioned identities, and second, we reiterate how this helps to form a common ground and 
around which issues. 
13.1. Leisure and Resources 
Leisure theories have initially focused on its opposition to paid work (Rojek, 1995) but has 
increasingly turned its focus towards ideas of self-expression and self-fulfillment on an individual 
basis (Sönmez, Shinew, Marchese, Veldkamp, & Burnett, 1993). In such a perception, leisure has 
often been seen as a free and undirected choice. This assumption cannot be upheld, however, as 
leisure is subject to social conditions which have a structuring effect on the leisure activity carried 
out (Rojek, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that leisure has often been linked to social status 
and social situation, with the assumption that a certain status will have an effect on the chosen 
leisure activities (Settle, Alreck, & Belch, 1979). However, in terms of quantity, they give little 
indication on the availability of leisure time and how this is distributed among different factions 
of society. It turns out that the most relevant correlation can be found between leisure and life 
cycle (Settle et al., 1979; Wilson, 1980). So, far more than income or occupation, demographic 
factors will be determining how much free time a person has and how they will use it. Especially 
the young, unmarried and childless and the elderly have an abundance of free time. When entering 
into the labor force, that amount of time will considerably decrease, and even more so with 
marriage and the arrival of children in the household. On the contrary, married, working women 
with children are most likely to have the least free time (Meisel, 1978; Shaw, 1999, p. 272; Wilson, 
1980, p. 206) So while social class itself does not say anything about the availability of leisure 
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time, it does indeed structure the type of leisure done. Money can serve as an entry barrier to 
many activities. Related to this, spatial mobility or the lack thereof can impact the accessibility of 
free time activities. Similarly, a particular activity can serve as a form of social distinction, in the 
sense of Bourdieu. But social class is only one structuring aspect, others include gender, age, 
education or race (Makhanya & Maree, 2012; Settle et al., 1979; Shaw, 1999). For example, black 
South Africans have reported feelings of “being out of place” when pursuing leisure activities that 
are formally open and affordable to them now but have historically been associated with white 
South Africans (Makhanya & Maree, 2012). 
Hence, Kelly (1983) concludes that: 
“And while leisure may not be ‘determined’ by social position, age, or sex, its choices 
and environments still exist within social systems that differentiate rewards, 
opportunities and customs. […] Ethnic and subcultural identification and 
communities remain powerful influences. The similarities in leisure among different 
occupational or religious groups should not be allowed to obscure significant 
varieties in leisure styles.” (J. R. Kelly, 1983, p. 45) 
This makes the study of leisure in the context of Uganda’s middle income strata so intriguing. If 
time is a resource, and maybe even a scarce one, it is revealing to see how people decide to spend 
it. On what grounds and in which kind of groups do they choose to associate. How do structural 
constraints manifest themselves in their choices? And does this allow to draw any conclusions 
concerning allegiances, with whom do people like to associate? Because much more than 
occupation (which is often treated as a determinant of social class (Settle et al., 1979)), leisure 
activities express a person’s identity, which in turn will influence the social structure around them 
(Parker, 1975, p. 93). 
13.2. Leisure and Mobilization 
Albeit constrained, leisure has substantial impacts on the self-identity of a person, according to 
leisure sociologists. Through leisure, interests are formed, which in return affect the perception 
one has of themselves. And while a leisure activity, in order to be chosen, needs to relate to a 
person’s life, it will in return modify the person (Meisel, 1978, p. 210). Through a similar 
argumentation, Shaw describes the effect of leisure on gender roles: 
“The impact of leisure on gender is both individual and collective. At the individual 
level, leisure experiences, self-expression, and the development of self-identity 
through leisure often involve the expression of attitudes and beliefs about femininity 
and masculinity. This expression leads to attitudinal reinforcement and 
internalization. In addition, interactions with others during leisure, including 
interactions with people of the same as well as the opposite gender, also reflect, 
reinforce, and sometimes challenge ideas about appropriate behaviors for women 
and men. These microlevel outcomes of leisure, though, also have broader societal 
implications. This is because individual attitudes and beliefs function collectively in 
the construction and reconstruction of gender ideologies and gender relations in the 
broader society.” (Shaw, 1999, p. 276) 
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However, she adds: 
“Leisure activities, of course, do not always function to reproduce dominant views. 
Indeed, because leisure is often freely chosen and self-determined, the potential for 
resistance to dominant ideologies is probably greater in this area of life compared to 
work, employment, or household labor.” (Shaw, 1999, p. 277) 
These citations show how leisure can be used to reproduce dominant norms but may equally 
provide a space to question them. Recalling the literature on social mobilization (see chapter 3.3) 
we see that many social movements draw their participants from smaller groups that have 
provided a space to develop a collective identity and a space to challenge existing norms. Similarly, 
Meisel sees leisure groups as a potential tool for mobilization, even though he concedes that little 
research in this regard has been carried out (Meisel, 1978, p. 203). Hence, we want to overcome 
this lack by some exploration of the leisure groups in which our respondents participate. 
To avoid an over-glorification of the virtues of leisure, it needs to be pointed out that not all leisure 
is equal. Difficulties to find a common definition beyond the commonly shared distinction of free 
choice and in opposition to work are increased by the influence of context. Same activities may 
have different meanings to different people, and different activities may have the same meaning 
for different people, and same activities may have different meanings for the same person, 
depending on the circumstances (J. R. Kelly, 1983, p. 2). Hence, while going to church maybe an 
invigorating experience for a fervent believer, it might be a burden for someone who does so due 
to social pressure. A dedicated soccer player may have the same feeling after a match as the 
churchgoer after prayer. And even for the believer, it might be a difference to go for prayer nights 
or a regular service. Besides, activities vary in intensity and social interaction. Finally, it needs to 
be kept in mind that since the middle of the 20th century in most of Europe and the US watching 
television has been the most prominent leisure activity (J. R. Kelly, 1983, p. 15). And now in the 
21st century, social media and internet at least partially contest this first place (Rideout, Foehr, & 
Roberts, 2010). Thus, not all leisure is equally prone to lead to mobilization or at least the 
contesting of established norms. Through studying the leisure activities of the middle income 
groups in Uganda, we may be able to get a glimpse into where such potential might lie and under 
which circumstances.

  
14 The Leisure of the Middle 
Income Groups in Uganda 
Some statistical insights on the role of leisure in Uganda can be drawn from the Afrobarometer 
(2015), and from the World Value Survey (WVS) (2001). Thus, in the WVS, 80.3% of Ugandans 
report that leisure is very or rather important to them (even though interpretations, what leisure 
is, may vary from one person to the other, as the survey did not propose a definition). And similar 
to findings from other studies, spending time with friends and family seems to be among the most 
common activities (World Values Survey Association, 2001). Again, the surveys confirm findings 
from elsewhere, that women engage in fewer leisure activities than men, as they reported doing 
less of the mentioned activities and a smaller percentage being a member of any group or 
association. A different picture arises when looking at TV consumption. Watching TV has a big 
priority. According to the survey, 72.2% of Ugandans watch TV for at least one hour per day, with 
women indicating significantly more often to watch three or more hours per day (17.8% to 4.7%). 
Besides, women were more active than men in the attendance of religious services, but they would 
still report a lower incidence in religious group membership (World Values Survey Association, 
2001). These findings provide some indication on the role of women: their leisure time is more 
confined to the domestic space or church/mosque attendance, while it is more appropriate for 
men to participate in a broader range of activities. 
Being part of a religious group was reported as the most common group membership in the WVS, 
as well as the Afrobarometer survey, concerning half of the Ugandan adult population 
(Afrobarometer, 2015; World Values Survey Association, 2001). This result is not surprising, as 
no other organization has such a widespread presence, reaching even to remote areas. According 
to the Afrobarometer, a similarly large number of people would be part of a community group or 
a voluntary association (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 16). There is very little difference between rural 
and urban responses, which underlines earlier mentioned findings that money is not directly 
linked to whether or not someone is participating in a group in their free time. The survey cannot 
account for less structured forms of free time activity, such as dining out, going to a bar, or the 
movies, meeting with friends, activities with children and the like. 
Despite the little variation between rural and urban population, it is for us interesting to see how 
the picture looks when focusing on the middle income groups. How do leisure activities change 
with income? In which groups do they gather? This is relevant because, as Wilson points out, too 
often sociologists 
“[...] have ignored the fact that leisure is typically enjoyed in groups and that it is a 
form (perhaps a special form) of symbolic interaction in which distinct meanings 
emerge and are displayed.” (Wilson, 1980, p. 36) 
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Hence, in the following chapter we will look at the leisure of the middle income groups under two 
aspects: can we recognize any stratification in their leisure activities? And secondly, do these 
activities provide a forum for the emergence of distinct meanings and identities, which may raise 
the potential for mobilization, or, on the contrary, act as a deterrent? 
In this chapter, we categorize and describe the leisure activities that we have participated in or 
been told about. We then proceed with a preliminary analysis of some themes we have seen 
emerging recurrently in the leisure descriptions or during participation. The analysis then can 
serve as a basis to make some interpretations about the potential for mobilizations around a 
commonly shared group identity in the next chapter. 
In the questionnaire, people had a set of choices to indicate what they usually do in their free time. 
The answers were repartitioned as such: 
The two strongest points mentioned here were church and relatives, and the miscellaneous 
category of other. 
In the narrative interviews, we asked 23 respondents more in detail about their pastime. A 
summary of the activities mentioned by the participants can be found in the annex (annex 8. p. 
479481). Upon probing, it turned out that many activities were either carried out irregularly or 
have not taken place for a long time. Thus, if asked, people are inclined to indicate leisure activities, 
even though they might not be genuinely reflecting their current schedule. This was one of the 
blind spots the qualitative analysis could shine some light on. Thus, in the discussions, fifteen of 
the 23 respondents indicated to be part of a religious and/or any other association. Hence, roughly 
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two-thirds could be considered active in the sense asked for by the Afrobarometer. But even six 
of the other eight cases would regularly meet with friends or do some sports by themselves. One 
respondent would, occasionally, take her children out to the beach but did not indicate any 
interaction with other friends, and one respondent stated that she did not have any money to 
pursue any free time activity. Since all respondents reported possessing a TV, it is safe to assume 
that this is part of everyone’s free time activity. 
14.1 Religious Groups 
Religion plays a pivotal role in the life of most of the respondents. All interviewees stated to belong 
to a religion, one Muslim and 22 Christians. The fervor with which they attended church varied 
greatly though. 13 out of 23 would attend service on a weekly basis, three others on a more 
irregular basis, and only three stated that they were not attending service. For the others, data is 
lacking. In any case, religious activity was the most commonly mentioned leisure activity. Six 
respondents would attend church meetings beyond the service. That was apparently the case for 
Elly, the pastor of a born-again church. In his case the distinction between leisure and professional 
attendance is blurred, but for the other five (four women and one man), going to church has 
become an important part of their free time. This confirms statistical findings that women will 
more likely be participating in religious activities, one of the few avenues for leisure available to 
them. As will be detailed below, for Josephine this means her implication in Mother’s Union and 
for Herbert with the Watoto Cell group. Other respondents would participate in the choir, be part 
of door-to-door evangelism, Sunday school or the like. The most extreme case being Nicole, who 
would attend church 4-5 times a week, on various services and meetings. She did not, however, 
get closely in contact with other worshipers, but was mainly focused on exchanging with the 
pastors of the church, who were her role models and support in case of difficulty. Spending time 
in the church beyond Sunday service was most strongly pronounced among the Pentecostal 
Christians. Four of the six mentioned are born-again, in addition to one Anglican and one Catholic. 
Such an observation is in accordance with the literature on PCCs, as it suggests that the church 
often tries to fulfill a wide range of social functions for its attendants, including being a surrogate 
for the family (Meyer, 2004, p. 461). As shown in various research, the church (including all 
denominations) is a crucial social space, beyond the mere religious function. Thus, for example, 
Campell, Gibbs, and Skovdal suggest that churches play a vital role in the creation or prevention 
of stigma surrounding people living with HIV/Aids (2011), others have looked at the role of 
Eastern European churches at the end of the Cold War (see for example Burgess, 1997; Hall, 1986; 
Pfaff, 2001) or during the Civil Rights Movement in the US (Oberschall, 1973; Polletta, 1999). It is 
not the aim here to draw an exhaustive list of the multiple functions a church can serve, but rather 
to attract the attention to the fact that the dynamics at play go beyond preaching the gospel. This 
has also been the case in our observations for some Ugandans. 
14.1.1 Mothers’ Union 
Josephine is a regular attendant of Mothers’ Union at the Anglican church of All Saints Cathedral 
in Nakasero (the city center of Kampala). The meetings take place once a week on Fridays and are 
dedicated to mothers of all ages, even though during one meeting one woman described the Union 
as a group for old women, feeling herself (in her thirties) too young for the group. The Union has 
about 300 members. The reunions are well attended, drawing a crowd of maybe 100 women at 
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each meeting, who are also member of the parish. The parish, placed in the center of Kampala is 
one of the more prestigious ones, even the president is going for service there, and this is also 
reflected in the socio-economic status of the women attending Mothers’ Union. According to the 
chairperson, most of them are from a well-to-do background, reaching at least a “middle class 
status”, with a university degree. During the meetings one of the members makes a presentation 
of about 20 minutes, then time remains for discussion. The executive committee chooses different 
topics to be discussed, and each committee member is responsible for one month, to select the 
different speakers. English is used throughout the gatherings. The atmosphere is relaxed, births 
and death of family members of the women are announced, and trips are planned to pay 
condolences or visit sick members and the like. The end of the meetings is also an occasion for the 
women to sell various products, homemade lotions or peanut butter, scarfs and tissues, etc. Here 
the purpose of the meeting diverges and becomes about advancing business opportunities, thus 
being once again an occasion for diversifying income, an element so crucial to most of our 
respondents. Mothers’ Union is a common way to associate. At All Saints, there exist similar 
groups for fathers and the youth, and the same format is often used in other parishes as well. 
Usually, topics include issues like domestic violence, parenting, rights of women, prayer, or 
cooking. They seem to be full of moral guidance for the women on how to be a good spouse, 
mother, woman, and Christian, and on behavior one should avoid. At one of the meetings, a 
middle-aged woman gave a personal testimony on the difficulties she had at the beginning of her 
marriage because she was too assertive, challenging the place of her husband as the head of the 
household. She warns younger women not to make the same mistakes as her and to accept that 
getting married means to live a sacrificial life, recognizing that your freedoms are restricted. 
Hence, you cannot choose anymore to cook or not to cook dinner in the evening or to go where 
you want without justification. She recalls: “When I married, the first years were difficult because I 
wanted to take over the man’s role. Until I joined Mothers’ Union, then I learned about my place.” 
During the meetings the women are often addressed in their identity as members of Mothers’ 
union, reinforcing that identity of Christian women from All Saints Cathedral. 
Because the group is rather big, the Union also divides into various cell groups with 20-30 
members, according to the place of living. However, the cell groups are more or less active. In the 
case of Josephine, it turned out that she did not participate in the cell group close to her living 
place, but one which she found to be livelier. About 15 members met at the home of one of the 
members and learned how to cook several dishes which they would share to eat at the end of the 
meeting. The host provided for most of the ingredients, in the end, a small contribution was asked 
of the participants, but which would not cover the expenses. Ethnicity had not been an issue so 
far, and all meetings in the general group were held in English. However, at the cell meeting 
Runyankole (a language spoken in the West of the country) was commonly used and it turned out 
that all members of the cell group came from the Western region. 
The case of Mothers’ Union gives some important insights into the social stratification of leisure. 
First, it shows how a church congregation can have a segregating effect beyond denomination. All 
Saints is a church in the city center of Kampala, situated on top of a hill, next to State House. This 
is not a residential area, and many of the members of Mothers’ Union do not live nearby; even 
though for some of them the church is close to their place of work. Thus, being a member of this 
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particular parish involves an active choice, coupled with some costs, such as a distance to 
commute, but which are apparently outweighed by the benefits. This choice already has a 
structuring effect, as it may act as a deterrent to people for whom the transport becomes too 
costly, or who are not working nearby. Especially in urban areas, where, even for one 
denomination, several churches exist, residency is not the sole criteria for choosing a parish (see 
also Kroeker, 2017; Niechoj, 2016). In her work on spatial mobility of youth from low and middle 
income households, Gough has shown how physical mobility is linked to social mobility, since 
mobility “is clearly a resource to which not everyone has equal access.” (Gough, 2008, p. 244) and a 
similar process can be observed here. Therefore, it is likely, particularly for the bigger churches 
who draw their members from all over Kampala, to have structuring criteria beyond religious 
affiliation. In the case of Mothers’ Union, group membership is also controlled through a 
membership fee of 60 000 UGX per month (at the time approximately $24). Given that the average 
household income is 980 000 UGX ($392) in Kampala, that sum would comprise 15% of a 
household’s monthly budget (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 97). 
A second structuring effect occurs with the use of English as vernacular during the meetings. 
Again, it is a conscious choice not to use Luganda, which is the lingua franca of Kampala nor 
Runyankole, albeit most, even though not all members of the parish come from the West (this is 
discussed in more detail below). We observe here, similar to the born-again churches in the city 
center the framing of a particular target group, namely educated women who master the language 
sufficiently well to communicate with ease. This choice, in return, leads to the exclusion of less 
educated women, who would be severely limited in their interaction during the meetings. 
A third structuring effect, less visible at first sight, is the common regional origin of most of the 
parish members. Bearing in mind that the President, another member of the parish, himself comes 
from the West, too, it seems that the church provides a point of encounter for affluent Ugandans 
from the West. 
There are also certain hierarchies recognizable during the meetings, which seem to revolve 
mainly around questions of age, with the elder women being more established in the group, as 
they would sit in the front row, speak more frequently, and be well-known by other members. 
Obviously, the meetings are equally structured along gender lines, as they are targeted specifically 
for women and a man would be considered to be “out of place”. Nevertheless, the all-women group 
is not used for contesting established gender norms, quite on the contrary, the speeches given 
often underline the subordinate role of the woman in the house and her primary function as 
caretaker and housekeeper. These themes are well in tune with its original objectives at the time 
of creation of the first Mothers’ Unions in 1906, namely “promoting Christian principles of 
marriage, upbringing of children and Christian living.” (Tripp, 2000, p. 34) Tripp in her work on 
women in politics points out that the chapters of Mothers’ Union indeed had at times become 
political, in anti-colonial resistance or in the reformation of marriage, divorce and inheritance 
laws in the 1950s and 60s, making her describe these women associations as having  
“both limiting and empowering dimensions. These organizations, even the religious 
ones, played a critical role in giving women the necessary skills for political action on 
issues that were of concern to women.” (Tripp, 2000, p. 36) 
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And finally, taking up responsibility within the Union has helped some women to prepare for 
leadership roles in other areas (Tripp, 2000, p. 74). While the participants of Mothers’ Union in 
All Saints indeed were often in leadership roles in their professional lives (in the case of Josephine 
she would even earn more than her husband), they still underlined the need of being assertive to 
their husband at home. At least during the time of the field research thus, questions of morality 
weighed stronger than those of women’s rights. This perception of the women’s role has not been 
unique to Mother’s Union but was shared by nearly all respondents. Martin suggests however, 
that this should not be interpreted as subordination: 
“It is women who understand the difference between formal arrangements conceding 
headship to the male and informal realities conceding effective power to the female, 
and engendering mutuality rather than subjection.” (D. Martin, 2005, p. 146) 
Such an observation would at least explain the seeming contradiction between Tripp’s analysis on 
Mother’s Union and the dominant narrative we observed during the meetings. And indeed, it also 
confirms the rather dominant positions these women would occupy in their daily lives. We would 
still take it with a grain of caution, however, as this “official subordination” is most likely only one 
way in which male dominance is asserted. 
To sum up, parish members and the mothers of the Union make a conscious choice to attend these 
meetings and the church, even though it may not be the most conveniently placed for them 
because they can interact with people from a similar socio-economic background, education, and 
regional origin. Hence, in such a context, religious identities are coupled with ethnic and socio-
economic ones. It is likely that a similar pattern can be found in other churches, which do not 
primarily draw their congregation from the neighborhood. For example, once a month there is a 
mass at the university campus that is held for Batoro living in Kampala and therefore serves as a 
way to (re)connect with people, in addition to their religious (in this case: Catholic) affiliations, 
on the grounds of their shared regional origin. Turning it the other way around, we can argue that 
among the middle income groups we find people anchored in a Christian committed milieu, that 
also seeks proximity with others from their home regions. 
For the participants of Mothers’ Union, the meetings fulfill diverse functions. Relationships in the 
general assembly are cordial, there is laughter, chatting and mutual support. In case of a wedding, 
birth, or the burial of a family member, union members, in general, organize contributions and 
visits to the member’s home, even if this implies traveling to the village. Not all women attend all 
these functions, but it is assured that a delegation will be there. In prayers and testimonials, 
members share personal details and give each other guidance. Josephine states that she enjoys 
being part of the union because of the possibility to exchange with women in similar situations. 
“We share so many different things, we learn from one another, we share skills, pray and so on.” The 
union also serves as a place of networking and for the acquisition of potential clients. For example, 
one of the guest speakers, a member of the Union, is a personal trainer and fitness adviser and 
some group members are her clients. For others, the meetings become a platform to advertise 
their products which they usually sell at the end of the meetings. However, due to the large 
number of attendants and the general set up, in which the biggest part of the meeting is conducted 
in a lecture-listener-setting, the intimacy has its limits. Not all members know each other 
personally, instead smaller groups have formed during the meetings. This becomes evident when 
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put in contrast with the cell group meeting, which conveyed a much more intimate atmosphere. 
For one, the setting in one of the cell group member’s house creates closer ties. The smaller group 
size and the fact of doing something together changed the dynamic from frontal teaching to more 
activism, in which small, personal discussions became easier. A relevant indicator for the more 
intimate setting was the shift of language. While the general meetings are without exception hold 
in English, the shift to Runyankole happened quickly (albeit not from the beginning, as general 
explanations were still made in English) and expanded from smaller groups, who started 
discussing in their mother tongue to the rest of the group. As Juillard has shown, in a plurilingual 
setting the chosen language reflects a chosen identity as well (Juillard, 2007). Calvet (1994), in 
reference to John Gumperz, has called this identitary aspect of the language the “we-code” and the 
“they-code”, particularly prone for a minority language (Runyankole) towards a majority 
language (English or Luganda). It unites its speakers and creates cohesion among their social 
group. “Car ne pas parler comme l’autre c’est ne pas être comme lui, et parler comme son pair c’est 
affirmer sa solidarité avec lui, son identité.” (Calvet, 1994, p. 72) Spronk (2012) has observed the 
tendency among young urban professionals to use English, Kiswahili or Sheng instead of their 
local language in discussions, which implies a breaking up of communal identities for a more 
commonly shared, urban ones. So, here, in contrast, we seem to have a milieu which is closely 
attached to their regional origins, in addition to a shared economic well-to-do background. In how 
far age plays a role as well, as most of the women would describe themselves as middle-aged, 
cannot be conclusively answered. 
Albeit being more intimate, not all members of the cell group know each other equally well, since 
a group size of 30 still leaves the potential to choose whom to interact with during a cell group 
meeting. 
From our description of the union we can see how it serves as a way to forge shared identities, as 
good wives (be submissive to your husband and keep your house tidy), good mothers (keep your 
children disciplined) and good Christians (read from the bible, and follow the teachings; stand up 
against homosexuality). Beyond this, however, the group through subtle mechanisms of ex- and 
inclusion is also stratified along socio-economic and ethnic lines. And particularly the last one 
gains importance the more intimate the group setting gets. The prevailing identity will change 
according to the context, setting, time, etc. (Calvet, 2005). Hence, a prediction to which one might 
be the strongest or dominant one is at least daring. We do observe, however, that the norms 
established do not raise questions about democratic governance, or even politics, but center on 
issues of morality. Therefore, it seems likely that mobilization through such a group will occur in 
the interest of the latter or, as Tripp (2000) has shown, in the realm of women’s rights. 
14.1.2 Watoto Cell Group 
Watoto is one of the most prominent Pentecostal churches in Uganda, with more than 20 000 
members. The mother church is in central Kampala, but affiliated ministries can be found all over 
the country. The main services on Sundays draw several thousand participants and are held in 
English. Similar to Mother’s Union, the parish encourages its members to meet once a week on a 
smaller basis, in cell groups of five to ten people, for the members to “do life together, know one 
another better and help one another to grow spiritually” (Herbert). If the cells become too big 
(more than ten people), they give birth to another cell, so that the cells remain personal. The main 
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church gives out a guide for the cell group leaders on which issues should be discussed and which 
bible readings serve as a basis. The meetings always follow the same pattern: they start off with 
an icebreaker, then worship and bible readings, as an introduction. In the main part discussions 
on the issues defined by the church take place and finally the meetings are closed off with 
announcements. 
Herbert is a member of Watoto and regularly attends the cell group meetings. Similar to Mothers’ 
Union, the cell groups are supposed to regroup people of the same area, which seemed to be the 
case. From Herbert’s home, it is a walking distance to the cell host’s house. The area is marked by 
either single houses or three to four housing units within closed compounds. Age wise, the cell 
group is diverse, some of them are young, in their twenties, others, usually referred to as “aunt” 
or “uncle” are middle-aged. Due to the age difference, incomes within the group vary as well, since 
some members are already well-established, others are still “constructing themselves” as Herbert 
described his life situation. But even the younger ones seem to be from a well-to-do background, 
attending school thanks to the financial support of their parents. 
All meetings take place at the house of the cell host, a young woman aged around 30, with a main 
job at Watoto Church and selling second-hand clothes as a side income. She lives in a two bedroom 
house within a guarded compound, together with her siblings. During the cell meeting, in the 
beginning, lengthy private discussions took place while the attendants waited for late-comers to 
arrive. Six people and one child attended the meeting. The conversations revolved around the new 
car of the cell host, issues of security in their neighborhood, which would later become part of 
their prayers, and around work, one member received a promotion, another started a new 
business, and someone else was hoping for his investments to take off. The cell meeting itself was 
rather short, the host left for the kitchen to prepare tea and snacks for everyone, and would spend 
most of the time there, accompanied by another female cell member. When she came back, 
everyone talked shortly about their week, prayer requests would be made and soon after the 
meeting was over. 
One time, the group decided to meet for a goat roasting. The members contributed money, 
according to their ability, to buy a goat which was then roasted during a barbecue. The 
atmosphere was very cheerful, members joking and discussing lively, mostly private issues, the 
families of the members were present as well, hinting at a close relationship between the 
members. As Maxwell (1998) argues, the re-socialization taking place in Pentecostal churches 
aims at centering the social life around the church. And indeed, Herbert acknowledges that his 
faith influences his leisure activities. The young man is still friends with people of different 
denominations, and for him this is not a contradiction, as he considers these as opportunities to 
tell others about his faith. However, Herbert restricts their meetings to settings that do not 
contradict his beliefs. Thus, if his peers decide to go to a bar, he will not join. He also listens solely 
to gospel music and says these are the only concerts he would attend. Albeit not completely, his 
leisure time is structured by his denomination, thus it emphasizes his identity as a born-again 
over others. And the cordial relationship among the cell group members, which are considered as 
a form of family and addressed in such a way (“auntie”, “uncle”) reinforce these ties, as they are 
not based on kinship, but religious affiliation. The habit of addressing each other in family terms 
has been described as typical for PCCs elsewhere (see Meyer, 2004, p. 461). We also observe a 
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structuring along income lines, however, as all attendants would be from a well-to-do background, 
even if they did not have their own income yet. Indicators of financial well-being could be seen in 
the presence of cars, smartphones, the housing of the cell host, and of Herbert, both within 
guarded compounds, the fact that all cell members are either studying at university or have a 
regular income and that all of them have had some tertiary education. The language used during 
the meetings was English (as is the case of service in Watoto church), and contrary to Mother’s 
Union the members came from different regions of the country. 
The small membership and the regular meetings make the cell group an intimate space, with 
dense personal networks between the participants. Identities that are reinforced here are the 
ones of being a good Christian and of economic achievers, as discussions would frequently evolve 
around earning, investment opportunities, or material possessions. Contrary to the Mothers’ 
Union meetings, material questions seemed to be of greater importance. With regard to the 
literature on PCCs, it is easy to see a connection with the prosperity gospel, a central element of 
born-again theology (Gifford, 1990; Maxwell, 1998; Meyer, 2004). For some analysts of born-again 
Christianity, this emphasis is inherently dangerous, as it takes responsibility from institutions, 
suggesting that obtaining wealth is a question of merit and personal morality, rather than 
depending on structural conditions (Gifford, 1990). Thus, change is sought through self-
improvement rather than through the change of other conditions (see also Maxwell, 1998, p. 365), 
as shall be discussed in chapter 15.6. 
14.2 Debate Clubs 
In Habermas’ conceptualization, the public space has been vital for the development of civil 
society and thus the advancement of democracy, as it provided a place of discussion where 
citizens defined political realities through discursive practices (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). Brisset-
Foucault (2011) in her work on the Ugandan ebimeeza, popular live radio talk shows in the first 
decade of the millennium, has shown how these debate clubs contributed to challenging NRM 
hegemony and reformulate ideas of citizenship, but within a controlled and regulated framework. 
Because of the Buganda riots in 2009, these talk shows have been banned, and at the same time, 
the freedom of press has been considerably curtailed (see chapter 10.2 for details). Since then, 
opportunities for people to come together and express their points of view in a public setting have 
become rare. However, during the research we have attended two different kinds of debate clubs, 
the Pan African Club and the State of the Nation Platform. 
14.2.1 Pan African Club 
Pan African Club is, according to his organizer, Oliver, “the only debate club in Kampala, and if we 
are the only debate club in Kampala, then we are the only debate club in this country”46. It is 
supposed to be a fortnightly meeting on topics of political and social concern. However, since the 
time of the first interview with Oliver in 2014, the frequency of the meetings has decreased, as he 
has been occupied with issues of different concern, and as he emphasizes, the club is not his 
                                                 
46 There used to be numerous debate clubs, but they have been shut down after the Buganda riots in 2009. Cf Florence 
Brisset on the Ebimeeza. 
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priority. The chairperson invites various speakers, some of them with high positions in 
government or opposition and known by the public. In two mailing list with about 500 
subscriptions each and per text messages members are invited to the discussions. The attendance 
varies according to the topic, and the guest speakers, but usually ranges between 30-100 people. 
Most of them are young men from the university. The debate would start at 7 pm, with keynotes 
on the topic by the guests followed by some time for public discussion. It usually closes at around 
9 pm and members quickly part. The debates take place in a restaurant sited on Kira Road, entry 
is free, and everyone receives a non-alcoholic beverage. The club tries to remain non-partisan, by 
not relying on any government or NRM funding. Thus, it is financed mainly through the occasional 
contributions of one benefactor but faces challenges every once in a while, to conduct the 
meetings, because it cannot raise the fees to pay for the venue. Its members are mostly students 
who could not afford to pay membership, so there are no fees to join the club. Topics deal with 
regional or continental issues, such as the crisis in Burundi or with questions of national 
governance and particularly around youth issues. 
Some more prominent guests have been, among others, senior government officials, or renowned 
researchers such as Mahmood Mamdani, as well as several members of Parliament and former 
and current ministers. Due to the limited funds of the association, they do not receive any 
gratification but come because they are invited by the chairman who knows many of them 
personally. Oliver believes they agree to attend for various reasons, such as sharing their 
knowledge but also having a platform from which to share their point of views and influence 
young people (this bears a resemblance to the way the opposition uses the STON meetings, as will 
be discussed below). He believes, however, that the modest environment in which the club 
functions hinders it from being taken more seriously and attract guest speakers of a higher profile. 
During the meetings there is little interaction between the participants, it seems not many know 
each other, as composition and number of attendants change from one session to another. People 
gather to listen to the guest speakers, discuss and leave shortly after the meetings. 
In the Pan African debates, it is harder to delimit one socio-economically homogeneous group. For 
example, Gordon, Alex, and Arthur all three have been attendants of the meetings but have 
different income and education levels. For Gordon, who has been financially struggling at the time 
of the interview, the meetings were one way of cheaply enjoying leisure. Since he lived nearby, he 
did not have to pay for transport and in addition, received a free non-alcoholic drink during the 
meeting. He was also the most frequent of the attendants, as the others were more tied up in other 
responsibilities. 
Also, regarding religion or region, the group is composed heterogeneously. The most uniting 
factor might be the age range, even though this can equally differ, as the oldest regular participant 
is in his seventies. But the bulk of attendants are in their twenties or early thirties. And as the 
example of Alex and Arthur shows, attendance diminishes as age advances. This is in concordance 
with many leisure studies which underline the structuring effect of the life cycle on the quantity 
of leisure time (Parker, 1975; Rojek, 1995; Shaw, 1999). Concerning education, most participants 
have at least completed A-level, and often also some tertiary education. The nature of the 
discussion and the use of English as a common language aims at a better-educated target group, 
with interest in public affairs. 
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Since the discussion is public, there is always the possibility of surveillance by the government. 
According to the organizer, this is the case; therefore, self-censorship is a possibility for 
discussants. Nevertheless, criticism of the government is still voiced, and through the vivid 
discussions ideas are exchanged and consensus on the various topics established. The issues 
raised depend strongly on the general theme of the debate, but often evoke criticism of Western 
imperialism, the current government, and politics in general, or underline the need for 
panafricanism. The main contributors take on a role of giving guidance to their young audience. 
Contrary to the religious groups, religion, and especially Christianity sometimes evokes criticism, 
as it is brought in connection with colonialism and the quest of the continent. Hence, one guest 
speaker once remarked: “If the solution was worshipping, how come you Africans who worship most 
are also the most backward?” (Fieldnotes), which can be interpreted as a criticism of the prosperity 
gospel, which precisely suggests the link between wealth and prayer. In return, we find more often 
positive mentioning of African traditional religion. In relation to this, one of the discourses 
repeatedly held during meetings emphasizes the glorious past of Africa. Its unity, well-being, and 
harmony was destroyed through colonialism and gave rise to the neo-colonial states, that would 
prefer foreign investors over their citizens. It also brought “modernity” that spoiled Africans 
through its harmful effects, such as nightclubs and bars, homosexuality or miniskirts. 
“Before the outgoing generation, people were truthful, honest and had compassion 
but in today’s generation, we are deceitful, we steal, we are dishonest and when doing 
all these, we think we are bright! [...] Regarding morals, Dr. Simba concurred with the 
earlier speakers that there is a big problem today. He revealed that about three years 
ago, a study was made and the findings were that the said fathers of 30% of the people 
in Kampala are not the true fathers!” (Pan African Minutes) 
However, at the same time, Uganda’s backwardness is frequently highlighted, especially in 
comparison to other countries which have managed to elevate themselves over a similar time 
span. 
Because participants do not know each other personally, they do not connect on a very personal 
level. And this even though many of them share a common background as university students or 
recent graduates. But notably, their mailing list provides linkages to various sub-groups, and is 
sometimes used for mobilization. In 2017, for example, Pan African Club members formulated a 
position on the Biotechnology Bill and were invited to parliament to voice their concerns over the 
legislation of genetically modified organisms. The list was used to encourage members to join the 
delegation going to parliament so that they would be as numerous as possible. Also, different 
NGOs or activists use the mailing list to distribute their points of view, such as the Africa Institute 
for Energy Governance, the Organization for Pan African Movement, or the Uganda Parliamentary 
Forum on Youth Affairs. However, besides sharing their point of views and newsletters, they do 
not contribute to the increased interaction between the participants, and rarely debates take place 
on the issues shared through the platform (at least not on the mailing list). 
Thus, Pan African Club provides a space to formulate and test opinions, but because of its 
anonymity, a certain distance between members is maintained. The organizer, for example, 
mentioned that women, already in the minority in attendance, would rarely speak in the 
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discussions. Brisset-Foucault has observed a similar phenomenon during the ebimeeza, which she 
attributes to the fact that the meetings were held in a bar, a place long time considered as non-
desirable for respectable women, even though now customs are changing (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, 
p. 552). 
14.2.2 The State of the Nation Platform 
A gathering of a very different nature is the State of the Nation (STON) platform. The think tank 
ACODE (Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment) organizes a monthly breakfast 
meeting discussing issues of contemporary public policy and governance. The guest speakers are 
usually high ranking politicians and attendance is upon invitation only. The meeting takes place 
at Protea hotel, one of the luxurious hotels in Kampala, and the choice of venue is not accidental. 
“People would come and say: but why do you do Protea? Protea is an expensive place, 
I can tell you, our design was that this is supposed to be expensive.” (ACODE, former 
director) 
The same holds true for the choice of participants, which the former director describes as “self-
selected and exclusive”. The intention behind creating the platform was to provide a space of 
influence and networking for people who will in a few years occupy key positions in politics. 
Topics cover a wide range of public policy issues, and different keynote speakers give inputs while 
the participants eat breakfast together. Then there is room for discussion, often with the reminder 
that “what happens at STON stays at STON”, encouraging participants to speak freely. The 
atmosphere is somewhat light as there is a lot of joking taking place. Indeed, criticism is voiced, 
but the former director does not exclude the possibility of self-censorship, particularly from 
businesspeople who rely on tenders issued by the government. Among the participants are some 
high ranking opposition politicians, which use the discussion forum for contributions. Here, again, 
we can see a parallel to how opposition politicians have used the ebimeeza: some of them would 
participate weekly in at least one of the talk shows, not as a guest speaker, but as a commentator. 
This participation allowed them to gain space for voicing their opinion in a media landscape tilted 
towards the government (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 405). From the way comments were made 
during the STON platforms, it suggests that opposition politicians seize this opportunity for 
expression in an environment which is even more restricted than it had been at the time of the 
ebimeeza. 
In concurrence with popular discourse, the STON moderator reminds people to leave political 
affiliation behind and not to engage in politicking during the discussions. Again, the virtues of 
being political, but non-partisan are underlined. The platform is financed through contributions 
from international NGOs to ACODE and serves as an elite network for exchanging. Its creator sees 
STON in opposition to activism, which he believes has its place as well, but not in these circles: 
“If you want to do an activism, you take your ebimeeza downtown, get all these young 
people, boda boda and whatever.” (ACODE, former director) 
Instead, the network helps to establish a direct link to decision makers, knowing that if a 
participant has a problem, he can pick the phone and knows whom to call. And that these 
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connections, in turn, will help to make policy decisions that will benefit everyone. In that sense, 
the platform is a medium of exchange, but not of change, as it aims at working within the given 
conditions rather than thinking about how to change them. This is not surprising since most of its 
members are in positions in which the current conditions are favorable for them, even if they are 
from the opposition. All in all, the platform provides a space in which criticism of the regime can 
be voiced, but within the limits of the media space defined by the NRM government, and as long 
as they do not lead to any visible action. 
14.3 Sports 
Many of the respondents have shown to be health conscious, manifested in their eating habits 
(usually avoiding or limiting the number of times eating meat per week) and in exercising. To 
maintain themselves, five respondents would jog regularly, and three go to the gym. Jennifer used 
to go swimming but stopped due to money shortage. Most of the time respondents stated that they 
would do these sports in solitude, with little or no interaction with others. They raise questions 
which cannot be conclusively answered here: are the growing popularity of these sports and gym 
clubs a sign for a growing individualism within the society? Can they be interpreted as a lifestyle 
choice distinguishing a middle class? Abbas (2004) suggests that this is the case, as running 
contributes to the individualization of society, but sees it also as a particular middle class leisure 
activity, through the bodily aesthetics it promotes, and the proclaimed appeals to a healthy 
lifestyle. She argues: “The ability to engage in the reflexive making of oneself from available 
resources is an important aspect of individualization that has been particularly associated with the 
middle-classes.” (Abbas, 2004, p. 171) In our case, jogging would also be enjoyed by poor 
respondents, precisely because it did not require any money to do. However, it did appeal to the 
health consciousness of the individual respondents, as reducing body fat and maintaining general 
fitness were emphasized. Relating these findings to a study done on gyms in Kenya, it seems that 
the importance of bodily aesthetics can be found among all gym goers. The type of gym attended 
would differ, however, according to gender and income (male inhabitants of informal settlements 
would often work out in neighborhood gyms, not attractive for women as they did not offer any 
cardio activities or aerobic courses) (Hammerschmitt, 2016). Among the sports which would turn 
into social gatherings regularly playing football was mentioned by three interviewees. This was 
especially popular because it did not require money, therefore, making it a sport easy to access 
for the floating and poor classes. Usually, in those meetings Luganda is used as the language of 
communication, even though the groups might be ethnically diverse. Because Luganda has 
acquired the status of a lingua franca, especially in Kampala, this usage is not surprising. The 
groups are of about 40 people, and according to Gordon there is some, but rather little, talking 
going on, mainly focused on small talk and not as much on personal issues. So, the members of the 
football teams might greet each other but would not go out together or give each other calls on 
more personal issues. Because here the entry barrier is low, this becomes an affordable leisure 
activity for those not so well off. The question is whether there remains still a socio-economic 
homogeneity because being attractive for poor people may make it less interesting for those newly 
emerging, who are eager to distinguish themselves from the urban poor. Two of the three players 
in our sample struggled financially. Finding a field to play on remained a challenge, however. LC1 
II explained how the maintenance of the fields sometimes limited the offers the community would 
provide for their inhabitants. This short example reveals the limited role of government structures 
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in providing an environment for leisure, particularly for those who cannot afford it otherwise. The 
same holds true for the availability of public recreational areas, such as parks. The only exceptions 
are few public beaches around the shores of Lake Victoria. Thus, because the state does not offer 
leisure opportunities for its citizens, the choice of leisure is even more dependent on individual 
constraints. 
Other, explicitly social sports activities were going to the sauna and playing golf, as mentioned by 
three respondents. However, as discussed in chapter 7.4 these were mainly used for networking. 
In the case of the sauna, the respondents also underlined the health benefits, especially for the 
heart. The fifty-year-old Richard, for example, explained that he hoped for the positive 
cardiovascular effects of sweating since he did not feel fit enough to engage in other sports such 
as playing football. However, the social aspect of regularly meeting friends and chatting was 
always present. 
In the case of sports, the activities are strongly gendered and often exclusively male, as playing 
football or golf were considered male sports, and even in the sauna men would be among 
themselves. Women, if at all, would go jogging, swim or exercise in the gym, but in all cases, the 
sports were done in solitude and involved little interaction with other women. 
Due to the different nature of the sports, it is hard to generalize how they may or not play into 
social mobilization. We suggest that sports carried out in solitude reinforce individualization, and 
they turn the attention towards self-improvement. 
14.4 Political Commitments 
Four of the 23 interviewees have shown some political commitments, even though some others 
have stated that they plan at one point of their career to go into politics, but they felt the time was 
not ripe yet. All of those who said so, or who are active in politics, are men. However, many the 
respondents do not pursue the activities mentioned actively but go there only rarely or did so 
before but stopped because of time constraints. Three are members of a political party. Nelson 
was active in NRM, trying to run as a candidate in the upcoming elections, Arthur a silent member 
of UPC, and Oliver had established his own party. However, they have failed to register with the 
electoral commission due to the lack of funding. The party seems to be inactive at the moment. 
Besides that, Nelson is also attending a forum called “Parliament out of Parliament”. Participants 
are aspiring to become Members of Parliament but have not (yet) managed to do so. They follow 
the procedures of parliament and the topics to discuss but see whether they come up with similar 
or different decisions from those taken in the actual parliament. He is not regularly attending 
though. Nelson also initiated the NRM Media Activist Forum, a platform for all NRM members that 
are going to be presented publicly, to streamline NRM opinions, to prepare their contributions, 
and to get ready answering attacks from the opposition. Even though he helped to create the 
forum, he remains a member but is not as active anymore. 
It is striking, once again, that nearly all respondents have expressed interest in politics, some even 
harbor intentions to become active themselves in campaigning, but most of them feel that the 
environment as it is today is not conducive to be politically active. 
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14.5 Communal Activities 
There had been several communal activities that respondents were involved in. Many of them 
consisted of “giving back to the community”, as one person described it. This was more pronounced 
among the wealthier of the respondents, but not exclusively. Thus, Abdul, a wealthy lawyer, was 
a legal advisor to a youth savings group in his home village. Joy, who worked herself up to what 
the AfDB would consider upper class organized a yearly charity to get donations for the village. 
George, an IT expert with his own firm, helped a befriended Pentecostal pastor to set up his NGO, 
by giving his technical expertise. Andrew, a university lecturer, owns a school in the village in his 
home region and tries to keep school fees as low as possible to make it affordable for the village 
children. He would also be actively involved with the Catholic Church and the Kolping society, 
doing conflict mediation in the village, on questions of land disputes or domestic conflicts. Since 
our last interview, his situation has changed, however. As his contract with the university expired 
and was not renewed, he created an NGO (mainly for tax reasons, otherwise it is run like a 
business) on conflict mediation and now charges the church for the work he has before been doing 
for free. 
These cases show how being financially stable allows for support beyond the immediate family 
(which, as discussed earlier, is not tied to being financially stable, but only better off). Andrew’s 
shifting income conditions illustrate this particularly well since his deteriorating revenues made 
him stop his volunteering to pursue the same activity with the Catholic Church, but this time as 
paid work. The support given is not entirely miscellaneous, especially if it is tied to the region of 
origins of the respondents. This allows them to establish their standing within the local 
community and to live up to expectations from others of giving back. The tendency of focusing on 
communities well-known to the respondents seems logical, as links are established through 
existing networks and needs can be identified more easily. However, all respondents mentioned 
above have in common that they have experienced financial struggles at some point during the 
time of growing up, either because they were raised by single mothers or because their parents 
would earn only little money. 
It seems tempting to link such an observation to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs or Inglehart’s 
postmaterialist values (cf Hofstede, 1984; Inglehart, 1971). Without going into the criticism 
discussed in relation to the two concepts, we still argue that such a relation would be too far-
fetched, as there have been as well other financially stable respondents who did not take up any 
volunteering or communal activities, even with others coming from a poor background as well. 
Hence, similar dispositions (being wealthy) do not necessarily lead to the same positions (helping 
others). Similarly, helping others is not reserved for the wealthy. Jude has used all his money to 
start an NGO, and Elly plans on starting one. Both are poor and come from a poor background, and 
they feel their motivation stems from having lived through hardships, the desire to avoid this for 
others and the belief to know what is needed. However, particularly in the case of Jude the NGO is 
not for mere altruism, but also with the hope of assuring his own financial survival. This recalls 
Neubert’s description of “local brokers” and the NGO-economy in East Africa (Neubert, 2000). He 
argues that with the shift of international aid towards the promotion of self-help groups and NGOs, 
sometimes these were created with the expectation of tapping into developmental aid streams 
rather than because of a felt need by the local population. In this process, the role of local brokers 
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became vital, who would connect such an NGO or group with external funding. Regardless of the 
motivation for the creation of the NGOs mentioned by Jude and Elly, it seemed at least as if they 
were calculating to reach the point of attracting external funding that would provide an income 
source for themselves. During the research, this had happened on other occasions as well, when 
discussants would casually drop during a conversation their concern with orphans or the like 
when it did not seem exactly related to their projects. We interpreted this as the use of a discourse 
to meet expectations of foreigners, that would help them secure financial support. Thus, in these 
cases, the researcher felt that efforts were made to turn herself into some broker. In these 
particular activities, we see the close link between volunteering and the hope of generating new 
streams of income. They could, therefore, be seen as what Ugandans sometimes describe as 
“hustling”, continuous efforts to tap into new resources. Hence, the description of these kinds of 
leisure might as well be placed into the section on diversifying income (chapter 7.2). It underlines 
one of the central characteristics of this process of emergence: the consolidation of revenue 
sources, which also occupy a large part of the free time. 
There have also been several neighborhood initiatives among the communal activities, although 
their set up, the time invested, and the participation of members would vary. Most of them were 
focused on issues of improving and securing the neighborhood in which they lived, as the example 
from John shows: 
Case Story: “If we don’t do it ourselves…” 
John’s neighborhood is an affluent one, with many, recently built and rather big 
estates. One of the issues they faced was the dire condition of the roads. Because they 
knew they could not expect much from Kampala City Council Authority, they decided 
that everyone would contribute some money. They would tarmac the road 
themselves and acquire streetlights to ensure proper lightening and enhance security 
in the area. They also organized someone to pick up their garbage and bring it to the 
main road because the garbage truck would not pass through the quarter. Because 
they had many cases of burglary, they took things once more in their own hands. One 
night they managed to catch one of the burglars, and they let him choose, to either go 
to the police with him or to employ him: he would be the security guard in the area, 
but whenever a theft would occur, the neighbors would hold him accountable. He 
decided to become a guard, and since then no other incidents of burglary occurred. 
All these actions would require a substantial amount of money, but because these 
people could afford the contributions, they decided not to bother with the long, and 
in John’s eyes, utterly useless bureaucracy, but would just put their own money to use 
to improve their situation. It shows how people lower their expectations of 
governance and instead try to find other ways to achieve the ends they want. 
However, talking to him again in 2017 revealed that the need for the continuous effort 
had slowed the motivation of the neighbors, in addition to turnovers of inhabitants of 
the quarter. Thus, in the long run, their initiative was not sustainable and failed to 
replace government structures. 
Often, insecurity was a problem that brought people together to act. Politically supported, people 
were incited to develop models of community policing (Baker, 2006; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
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2017). In general, local councilors would be in charge of setting up a program. This would entail 
asking for a contribution from parish members which were then used to train local youth, equip 
them and have them patrolling at night. Results were mixed though, and longevity not given as 
they would again demand continuous financial contributions. The most successful seemed to be 
the case of the affluent neighborhood of Kololo, which, according to one of its councilors has many 
offices not used overnight and which were happy to pay for additional security. They set up a 
WhatsApp group with the heads of households, and they repaired and staffed a police post which 
was previously abandoned. They would also provide fuel for the police motorcycles and lunch, to 
give an incentive to police officers to patrol around the area. The financial advantage becomes 
visible and turns the public services of police into nearly a private service for those who can offer 
the little extra to them. These initiatives, led by local politicians, however, would ask for little 
engagement of the community other than money. Hence, ties within the groups would remain 
rather weak, and the watch itself would take on the form of a service provider, rather than a 
community-driven activity. 
Finally, other types of community engagement evolve around kinship activities. The role culture 
plays in the life of the respondents varied a lot. General tendencies seemed to indicate that it is 
more pronounced with Baganda, and to a lesser extent from other monarchies. However, every 
respondent attended cultural functions, like weddings, introductions or burials. These are 
important social gatherings, and if one chooses to abstain too much, they will be frowned upon. 
Some of the respondents even mention them explicitly in their budget, as attending these 
functions can become costly. But such activities could also entail other responsibilities. Raphael, 
for example, would organize a clan soccer tournament, where different clans of Buganda would 
compete against one another. His responsibility was to reserve a playground and buy water for 
the players. While sometimes ethnic affiliations “shine through” other leisure activities, such as 
religious or social gatherings, albeit not being officially described as those, purely ethnic 
associations have rarely been mentioned. In the later research, it became obvious that many 
Ugandans were part of ethnic associations during their tertiary education. However, the intensity 
in which the different associations were active would vary. While Nkoba Zambogo, the student 
organization for the Baganda, played a primordial role in the organization of the Buganda riots 
(Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009), others summarized the activity of their association as “a gala in 
the end of the year, where everyone would come in their own traditional ethnic dresses” (Fieldnotes 
2017). For others again, the association provided a place to socialize with people from the same 
region and a point of reference in an otherwise unknown environment. However, in the 2012 and 
2014 interviews, these activities were seldom mentioned. This might be because of the low 
intensity in which people participated or due to a lack of probing by the researcher. Regardless of 
whether affiliation extends to the ethnic group, at least it can be said that the family is among the 
important hubs of socializing, particularly for married women (see also chapter 15.5). 
14.6 (Social) Media  
In the introduction to this chapter, we have already briefly mentioned TV consumption. According 
to the WVS, it is a quite popular pastime in Uganda. In that case the country is no exception to 
elsewhere; observations indicate that while leisure time has gone up, the time spent watching TV 
has increased as well (J. R. Kelly, 1983). And while the reception of TV content is often a social 
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endeavor and a communicative process (Böhme, 2016, p. 241), especially if one TV set is shared 
with several people, in the case of our respondents it remains primarily confined to the realm of 
family, or a solitary activity as all of them have at least one TV in the household. Obviously, this 
does not exclude the possibility of them watching TV elsewhere, for example in a bar. This is quite 
popular, notably when watching soccer, as some respondents confirmed. However, on the nature 
of the setting in which TV is watched, we can only make limited observations, as this was not 
dwelled on much during the interviews. Regarding content, many indicated to watch primarily 
news, either on the national channel, but among those able to afford, BBC and CNN were popular 
as well. Some, mainly women, would also watch shows with religious preaching and praying. 
Local or international soap operas enjoy some popularity as well. Elsewhere, their potential to 
shape and challenge norms and material aspirations has been pointed out (Basten, 2009; Hyll & 
Schneider, 2013). Certainly, this would be a worthwhile area to explore in Uganda, particularly in 
the context of “middle class” aspirations portrayed in these series. However, this has not been in 
the scope of the study here. Paying for digital TV subscription, available in different packages is a 
regular part of the budget and has become mandatory since the abolishment of antenna 
transmission. Non-payment leads to a temporary suspension of the TV service. 
Among the solitary leisure, people also frequently mentioned reading books (about half of the 
2014 respondents). This hobby was more prominent among the men interviewed than the 
women. Here, self-help books and biographies of famous people were quite popular, as well as 
business guides. Only few indicated to read fiction. Women would more often state to read the 
bible, and in some cases, novels. 
The presence of self-help books is also noticeable in the bookshops and among the street vendors 
who spread used or illegally reproduced copies out on a blanket in front of them. Topics frequently 
include some guidance, on becoming rich quickly, on relationship advice, or self-discipline. In the 
type of books chosen and the motivation expressed once again the idea of self-improvement 
became visible. 
In contrast to these somewhat solitary media consumption stands social media interaction. Like 
everywhere, this has increased strongly in Uganda over the past few years. For one, there would 
be the Ugandan blogging community. Caroline Valois (2015) has shown how the blogosphere is 
used by homosexual Ugandans to overcome restrictions of the public space and provide an 
alternative to dominant narratives. For her, these are acts of resistance: “Online forms [sic] are 
reconceptualised as sites of ‘resistance’ to hegemonic conceptions that reinforce heteronormative 
sexuality within the public sphere.” (Valois, 2015, p. 150) Who is writing blogs, and who is reading 
them, however, is not thoroughly researched. Bearing in mind that internet coverage, especially 
through personal computers (needed when blogging about sensitive topics) is still confined to a 
minority of the population, we might assume bloggers to come from an educated, urban 
background. However, similarly to the civil society, the freedom the internet offers does not 
necessarily have to yield to an objection of the dominant discourse. The website of the Ugandan 
blogging community lists 34 bloggers in the areas: spirituality, food, travel, creative writing, 
fashion and lifestyle, and business (UgBloc Directory, 2018). Nearly half of the bloggers are found 
in the creative writing section (16), followed by fashion and lifestyle (9). While behind the creative 
writing may be a multitude of blogs, as the definition is somewhat loose, none of these blogs seems 
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to treat any controversial issues or those that could not be dealt with in a public sphere or lifestyle 
magazine. Among the 23 respondents of our sample, Alex was writing a blog and Joy was planning 
on starting one. Both of them are at the end of their 20s, beginning 30s, with tertiary education 
and belonging to the financially most stable of the interviewees. Joy intended to write her blog 
around issues of African hair. 
“I have been doing a lot of experimentation with hair and skin; I have a Facebook page 
which is not active yet on how to take care of our African hair. For me, I believe we 
can still hold our African identity because it is very hard to maintain. So, I am trying 
out a lot of things with my hair. I want to start a blog and last round I want to actually 
produce, make products and sell them to people who can't really do it themselves. 
Using organic oils, pure avocado oils, I try to mix and see what works. I am hoping to 
earn some money from it in the future.” (Joy) 
Similarly to what Valois (2015) has noted on the LGBT bloggers, Joy, too, wants to challenge a 
dominant narrative, embraced by many Ugandan women: of fake or straight hair. For her, 
embracing and maintaining her natural curls is a way of reclaiming an African identity, in contrast 
to the general tendency of women to straighten their hair, to make it look more like the hair of 
white people, or to replace it by fake hair. We can see here opposition to dominant views 
influenced by Western standards. This bears a resemblance to the reiteration of “Africaness” and 
“African tradition” in contrast to Western modernity that has been recurrently emphasized in the 
Pan African Club debates. 
The second interesting feature of her quote lies in her intention to turn the blog into an income 
generating activity, again as a desire to reach more financial stability, especially since she feels 
she has none so far. Intending to make money from a blog, however, is nothing unusual, as many 
blogs all over the world foster similar hopes of at least generating a side income – even though 
this is true only for a lucky few (Friedman & Calixte, 2009, p. 95). 
Alex has maintained his blog over several years, although he is not posting regularly. Being himself 
a firm believer of Anglican denomination, a lot of his posts focus on issues of spirituality and his 
interpretation of the bible. He also gives his views on various national and international political 
issues, and, being a lawyer, sometimes on legal interpretations. He is not hesitant to pronounce 
his views and also openly criticizes the government, all while using his real name on his website. 
In a post about rising insecurity in Kampala he notes that this is due to rising inequality and feels 
that primarily the middle class is suffering, as they are the “buffer zone between the few haves and 
the too many and wretched have-nots.” He states: 
“Every measure should be taken to ensure equitable distribution of resources among 
all people in different socio-economic classes. One absolutely necessary measure is 
regime change, since changing those in charge of allocating public resources and 
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devising public policies, will facilitate and ultimately translate into income re-
distribution in Uganda.” (Alex on his blog [retrieved 05.01.2018])47 
However, as he proceeds to demand more security, he gives a fitting example of how opposition 
to the current regime by a white collared lawyer with tertiary education does not necessarily 
come along with democratic virtues such as the respect of the rule of law: 
“Plus, I call upon the people of Kampala, and Uganda at large, to revive their vigilance 
against such inconveniences as theft. A few years ago, it was well known that if a 
person is nabbed stealing in Kampala, and in most other surrounding areas, he or she 
(usually hes) would be thoroughly beaten and burnt to death with car tires. 
Consequently, security was very high. I am tempted to endorse and encourage the re-
introduction of such radical measures. Much as I am a lawyer, well knowing the legal 
niceties of presumption of innocence and the like, when the security of my person and 
property is out rightly impaired, undermined and negated, then such legal niceties 
inevitably count for so little.” (Alex on his blog [retrieved 05.01.2018]) 
He has about 3000 followers. However, his site has been visited only 515 since its conception in 
2015 (he lost the access to his older blog, which was active at the time of our interview in 2014 
and therefore created a new one). Posts, in general, remain without comment, thus estimating the 
outreach of his writings to be rather limited. In addition, his output of 3-5 posts per year, with the 
last one being nearly one year old (in January 2018) again supports the impression that his blog 
is not viral. Without going into a more in-depth analysis of his posts, we find little challenging of 
established norms, but instead a public diary that allows the reader to participate in the 
experiences and thought processes of the author and that sometimes offers some researched 
analysis on various topics. 
Finally, there are other social media sites, easier to access and use than the setting up of a blog. 
Facebook is a popular site among young people, and the rising popularity of WhatsApp was 
particularly noticeable in the intervals of the research from 2012 to 2017. A journalist dates their 
popularity to around 2014. “Social media bundles”, prepaid data options that allow only for the 
use among social media websites make these services affordable to a large part of the urban 
population, given that they can afford a smartphone. WhatsApp has become an efficient mean of 
communication with large groups at a low price so that all kinds of gatherings and associations 
often have a virtual WhatsApp group as well. Similar to real life association, the nature of the 
group and the composition of its members do not make them equally prone to mobilization. 
Having participated in five WhatsApp groups over different periods of time, we were able to get 
an understanding of the different natures of the group, but also its similarities. One was a Christian 
religious group, and its members were principally praying together and sharing religious 
messages. Another one discussed politics of the East African region and was the only group in 
which the principal language used was not English but Kiswahili. It comprised members from all 
of East Africa and thus was not bound to Uganda. Another group was based on the association 
                                                 
47 Citing his blog makes Alex identifiable for those who would wish to. This goes against our attempt to ensure the data 
is anonymized, but here we have his specific consent for using the extracts from his blog. 
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created by Ronald for the organization of the motor spare parts sector (see p. 232). The group was 
mainly composed of motor spare parts sellers, and he intended to use it for networking and 
uniting, as “unity is strength” (Ronald). However, members would mainly use the group to share 
miscellaneous information and religious messages circulating on WhatsApp, and only rarely use 
it for the purposes of the association. If Ronald, who was also the administrator of the group, 
thought there was a transgression in what somebody said, he would usually call them to order. 
This was mainly done in relation to politics, or when offensive content was shared. The most active 
group was one of entrepreneurs, who under the administration of a business consultant discussed 
business opportunities and challenges of being self-employed (and its merits), but also current 
political affairs. We analyzed equally one chat extract from a group of a neighborhood association. 
Concerning the composition of the group, it is hard to make any generalized statements, due to 
the anonymity of the members. The groups are rather big, some reaching close to their capacity 
of 250 members. Here, we will oppose mainly two groups, of the entrepreneurs and the spare part 
association as we have the most extensive material on both of them. 
Religion was a recurrent topic in most groups, even in those with no particular religious 
background. It was accepted that a pastor would send daily prayers through groups not related to 
the topic and religious references to be made. A significant share of the messages would consist 
of nurturing relationships, such as wishing a good month or sharing inspiring stories, or messages 
that would call for being forwarded to other people. Equally, demands for contributions to burials, 
weddings, or the like were sometimes made. Similarly, sharing opportunities or asking for help, 
like getting the contact of the right people were common, and most frequent in the group of 
entrepreneurs. This was one of their stated purposes, and thus the group made rather good use 
of it. However, not all members of the group are equally active. Around 30-40 core members 
participate in regular discussions, others are silent or only use the platform on advertising days 
(restricted to the weekend). Discussions are usually light-hearted and sometimes even flirtatious 
between the members of opposing sexes. 
Between the two groups, a difference in education is noticeable on several levels: for one, the 
amount and quality of the English used is higher in the entrepreneur group, whereas the other 
group more frequently resorts to Luganda. Secondly, much misinformation, so-called internet 
hoaxes are shared. This happens much more frequently in the association group than among the 
entrepreneurs, and if it happens in the latter group, the sharer of misinformation gets called out 
quickly, as the example below shows: 
A: URGENT WARNING! Be careful not to take the paracetamol that comes written P / 
500. It is a new, very white and shiny paracetamol, doctors advise that it contains 
"Machupo" virus, considered one of the most dangerous viruses in the world, with a 
high mortality rate. Please share this message, with all people on your contact list as 
well as family, and save a life or lives ....I've done my part, now it's your turn ... 
remember that God helps those who help others & themselves! Forward as received. 
ears back so what are you talking : But I have been taking it since childhood 33yB
about?  
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C: Perhaps u can explain further about the machupo virus 
A: 33 years is not that much time, besides it's not that you have it as a meal on a daily 
basis. I think it's just like cancer develops over time from the things we eat. […] I don't 
know either. I forwarded as received  
C: These things [forwarding as received] should have stopped last year.... […] This year 
we shouldn't be sharing half baked information.  
D: Social media can damage one's or a business's reputation in just minutes of sharing. 
Let us avoid just forwarding unverified information. (WhatsApp 08.01.2018) 
On the contrary, misinformation in the other group usually do not get challenged or are even 
thanked for sharing. They would also be more likely to share salacious videos and pictures, such 
as of people being executed or involved in deadly accidents. 
Criticism of the government happens in both groups, but among the spare part association is right 
away reprimanded, as the example of the person below, who shared a list of Ugandans in key 
government positions, all coming from the western region of the country: 
A: Charles Rwomushana would call this NRA occupation...I don't know what you think. 
Look at this..... 1. Museveni Yoweri, president, CIC- Westerner 2. Bert Katureebe, C.J- 
Westerner 3. Ruhakana Rugunda, Prime Minister- Westerner 4. […] 164. Jack 
Mucunguzi - O.C Makerere 166 [sic] Kuzaara Robert -O.C Kiira Division To be 
continued.....Are we fools Add to the list 
B: MASEREKA! by posting that list on this forum you are a fool. We say UMOSTA is 
about unity and unity is power yet for you you are preaching division. 
A: Unity is about solving problems, looking at things that divide people, things that 
may look different from what others do or have so please it's after having all these at 
table and the[n] we see how we can create peace and unity. we can't be united be 
united [sic] when others are suffering while others are well off so please mind your 
words before i shut down. 
B: Don't be offended by me using the word fool. I used it because of the question at 
the end of your list. So what can UMOSTA do about changing the look of your list? You 
could have your own reservation with that list but what does it add to the UMOSTA 
cause? Other than sowing seeds of hatred. 
In the group of entrepreneurs, such kind of remarks receive less criticism and sometimes lead to 
more serious conversations about the topics. Often, they are humorous comments or pictures on 
daily affairs. When it was revealed that the Bank of Uganda spent 125 million UGX ($ 34 000) to 
buy 350 pens (Watchdog Uganda, 2017), the group was full of pictures assuming what kind of 
pens that could have been. The group was also vital promoting messages not to touch the 
constitution when the debate about the constitutional amendment was held that would remove 
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age limit and thus allow President Museveni to run again for another term in 2021. However, 
while raising awareness, this was not followed by any calls for action. Moreover, as discussed 
before (see chapter 12.3) there were also messages circulating that showed the fear of 
surveillance, hence a feeling of insecurity was prevailing. In addition, the exchange of new ideas 
is limited because of what has become known as filter bubbles, or, as the journalist interviewed 
would say: “The best thing about social media: you only include people that you share something 
with.” 
To sum up, social media and the internet have become an essential pastime activity, particularly 
for the younger factions of the population. We find a difference in use determined by the 
availability of smartphones and personal computers and also knowledge of English, as only few 
offers would exist in Luganda or any of the other local languages (S. Kelly, Cook, & Truong, 2012, 
p. 540). So, while there might be some stratifying effects, still social media is available to many, as 
one youth councilor asserted: “There is no any youth that can go a day without opening WhatsApp” 
(Youth Councilor Kololo). And for another woman, social media nowadays has taken up the role 
of social gatherings, as it is used for day to day communication and even starts to replace personal 
contacts. Similarly, Josephine feels that  
Before, we would meet with friends, but now we just chat on Skype or Whats- App. 
[…] I take a really long time to meet with my friends unless they are in a bad place. 
Before these smartphones came, you would always make sure / […] Even you can be 
in the same room, I am with my husband, and everyone is on their phone, texting. 
(Josephine) 
Indeed, and as we tried to sketch here, WhatsApp communication, the one we focused on here, is 
used in multiple ways. For maintaining personal contact, facilitating group meetings, sharing 
information deemed important among networks, as access to a vast support network, and so on. 
The intensity of usage seems to vary with age, but due to its convenience, particularly WhatsApp 
would also appeal to elderly. Thus, the 52-year-old Sarah would use WhatsApp as well to 
communicate with her daughter. 
Examples of the Arab spring or other uprisings have shown the facilitating role of social media in 
mobilization (for example Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). This has not gone unnoticed by 
governments. Hence, the Ugandan government was keen on making social media unavailable 
during the last election or at the moment of uprisings, such as the Walk to Work protest or the 
Buganda riots (S. Kelly et al., 2012, p. 537). Indeed, in case of need, social media can reveal to be 
an adequate mobilizing tool. From what we have seen, however, these discussions are not used to 
debate or shape democratic virtues or imagine alternative futures for the Ugandan society. This 
correlates with criticism of social media as a capable agent of change made by some. While it does 
indeed increase communication, the weak ties created are not strong enough to result in long-
term commitment (Gladwell, 2010). 
14.7 Friends, Families and Personal Networks 
We have already talked about networks extensively in chapter 7.4. Maintaining personal 
networks, arranging meetings or staying in contact with people are considered beneficial. The 
278 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
same applies to meeting friends; however, the number of friends and the frequency of meetings 
would differ from one person to another. 
Friends and acquaintances play an essential role in shaping opinions. As the analysis of conscious 
networking has shown, most respondents use their networks to secure some financial stability or 
access better economic opportunities. This is especially true with more distant acquaintances and 
mentors. Friends can also serve as a more personal support network, as some indicated since they 
would call their friends in case of personal problems. However, friends are not solely made based 
on a rational consideration of the benefits they bring. Friendships are also established because of 
shared history, interest, or situation. And often the two cannot be strictly separated. All 
respondents confirmed that they had friends. When asked more specifically about close friends, 
the number would range from two to six. In general, people stated that their friends were 
ethnically diverse, but with similar education status, income (or they were at a level that the 
interviewees yet hope to attain) and in general of the same gender, due to questions of morality 
and appropriateness. As Nelson said: “As a male, it is tricky to have female friends.” How the 
interaction with friends took place would vary. Some would be visited at their workplace; this was 
especially true for shop owners who could rarely leave because that meant they had to close down 
their shop. Others would meet at home (especially women), and others again would go out to 
meet, in restaurants, bars, clubs, cafés. These outings remained privileges of the wealthier 
interviewees, and mainly of men or couples. In the case of Aida and Joy, there were also routinized 
befriended families meeting, whereby social gatherings would take place according to a fixed 
schedule and would usually contain some sharing of food or drinks, and money contribution for 
various activities. Others again would rarely meet with their close friends because they would be 
too far away or too busy; instead, they would converse over the phone, WhatsApp, per mail or 
Facebook. 
Region and religion played less of a role when choosing friends; however, they would gain 
importance when choosing a spouse, showing how they relate to more personal spheres of life. 
That said; however, inter-religious or inter-ethnic couples were still common and nothing that 
was frowned upon by society. 
In the realm of family, leisure often involved traditional ceremonies such as weddings and burials, 
or trips to the village, for the children to “know their roots”. Sarah has parted on bad terms with 
her in-laws after her husband died; however, she still maintains contact with them so that her 
children know where they come from and to whom they belong. Clan affiliation gains importance 
in relation to questions of belonging, even for those to whom it does not matter much in daily life. 
Case Story: Absent Fathers 
Andrew during a conversation once mentioned the child of his sister. His sister was 
left by her husband and since had struggled to bring up her child. His whole family 
supported her, paid for school fees, gave pocket money or paid for clothing. However, 
once the child was well-educated and started working, the clan from her husband 
came to claim the allegiance to the child. Grudgingly, they accepted, because they felt 
that they did not have a choice, as this is where the child belongs. 
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Joy was in a similar position as the child Andrew mentioned. Her father was absent 
for many years of her childhood, and her mother struggled to raise the children. She 
eventually decided to seek work in Abu Dhabi and left the children with their father. 
He, however, refused to take care of them; it was only through the support of a friend 
of her mother that they were housed and fed during that time. Her father also sold 
their house and when her mother eventually returned, she had to start from scratch. 
This has left marks on Joy: “My father never made any contribution for my education. I 
last saw him when I was 14 and I next saw him when I was 25, he only saw me because, 
maybe I was 21, I was still in university. Of course, he didn't recognize me, and he only 
tried to see me because he heard that one of his daughters was doing a good course at 
university. So, he appeared out of nowhere and said oh, I'm your dad, blah, blah, blah. Of 
course, I am bitter, and I can't lie that I can never love him again. I can't. Have I forgiven 
him? Yes, I let go. I talk to him, I help him even once in a while, give him some money, but 
love, never.” 
Many respondents harbored some resentment towards their absent fathers. Joy’s example is 
particularly telling in the sense that albeit not having been helped, and now, in return, she must 
help him, she was not willing to cut him out of her life completely. These examples show how 
family allegiance is persistent, regardless of the income class. It might gain in importance with 
age, as Spronk (2012) suggested. In her work on Kenyan young urban professionals, Spronk 
describes how the affiliation with the extended family is situational, with increasing age her 
respondents started taking up more clan responsibilities (Spronk, 2012, p. 276). Besides, 
advanced age and even more so the increasing likelihood of death appeals to remember one’s 
roots (most evident in the plans of building a house in the home village for retirement or at least 
a plot for burial) (see Englund, 2002). This remains true also among born-again Christians (such 
as Joy), of whom is sometimes said to cut the ties with their families as they are replaced with 
their religious family. However, as others have pointed out, even these Born-agains remain social 
beings for whom it is difficult to shut non-believers entirely out of their lives (Lindhardt, 2010, p. 
266). 
In addition, there can also be a change observed on how the nuclear family is viewed. Here, age 
seems decisive for the kind of relationship parents hoped to have with their children, with several 
of those in their thirties claiming that they hope to have a more affectionate and less authoritative 
relation with their children. Raphael, who has no children so far, intends to hug and kiss them and 
not send them to boarding school because he wants to be close to them. Aida, a mother of five, 
gave a similar reason why she did not send her children to boarding school. 
“I don't want to do these mistakes. There are a lot of mistakes I saw from/ into my 
father. I am trying as much as possible to run away from those and / not even to run 
away but to strategically see that I don't commit those mistakes.” (Aida) 
“Of course, you know they [own parents] love you but of course they won't show it. 
They won't give you affection; they won't hug you; they won't kiss you.” (Josephine) 
“I want to be a dad that listens, a hero for my children.” (Alex) 
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Others express in the interviews how they prefer to spend time with their kids, and their desire 
to be close to them. The quality of the childhood experience is emphasized, often concerning 
family planning and the explanation why the respondents prefer a limited number of children. In 
its shift towards the importance of nuclear family this tendency can be considered another 
indicator of a growing individualization, albeit the extended family remains relevant, even if the 
sentiments towards the latter may be somewhat ambiguous. 
*** 
Turning back to our initial question whether we can discern typical middle class leisure activity, 
we attempt an answer. From the empirical evidence gathered we could at least refute a correlation 
posed by scholars of the new social movements that people will become more concerned about 
postmaterial issues, once their material needs are covered (Inglehart, 1977). No clear-cut picture 
emerges when we look at the distribution of leisure time. We cannot say, for example, that the 
middle income groups would be more likely to have time as a resource to mobilize, as suggested 
by some authors who see the middle class as proponents of democracy (see p. 42). Similarly, from 
the descriptions mentioned above, the richer are not per se more likely to become active on 
postmaterialist grounds. While we do find some of those better off becoming involved in 
communal activities, this is equally true for some more indigent respondents. The correlation does 
not seem to be that linear. There is, however, a link between the amount of money one has and 
what they do in their free time or for leisure: 
For those who are unemployed, the distinction is not as apparent, as they might spend a big part 
of the day strolling around, looking for opportunities, yet not working directly. For the self-
employed shop owners, who are still at the lower end of the income line, every minute not spent 
in their shop means a potential loss of income, leaving them with little time away from work. They 
do have, however, the liberty to receive friends, read, or watch TV during hours with few 
customers. During the interviews, this has been the most pronounced with Pamela, who has her 
shop open every day of the week from around 8 am to 11 pm. Sometimes her sister will take over 
for her, but most of the time she is present, also doing her cooking and washing at the shop (which 
is linked to the room she is renting). So, it is not surprising that her last outing had been two 
months prior to our interview. 
As mentioned before, money might also become a reason for the choice whom to be friends with. 
The same holds true the other way around: the lack of money may lead to the loss of friends, in 
our case especially friends that are better off than the respondents. Elisabeth and Nelson both told 
how friends have become hazy to pick their calls for fear that they might ask them for money 
(which might not be entirely unfounded), making it virtually impossible to call just to greet. 
Elisabeth even explicitly said that she could not go out because she has no money, so she will sit 
at home or sleep during her free time: “When you don’t have money, association is not easy.” 
Money shortage will also limit mobility because one would carefully consider each expenditure 
for transport. Then meeting with friends in restaurants or bars will not be an option but leisure 
time activities will be chosen in a way to assure that they will not cost any money, as Gordon has 
done by playing football once a week. 
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Finally, having left the state of vulnerability, people become more able to allocate a part of their 
budget towards leisure. This can be in the form of entrance or membership fees, but also by 
according themselves the luxury of buying books or films or paying for regular outings. However, 
there is no straightforward separation between those with money and those without. Even 
impoverished people may spend some money for their leisure, for example in the form of internet 
bundles that allow them access to social media. The amount spent, however, changes with income. 
Thus, we can see, as already observed elsewhere, that leisure can turn into a form of boundary 
work (Spronk, 2014, p. 217). 
These findings are not surprising or uncommon in other contexts or countries. But they point out 
one of underlying factor: being socially emergent, having more time and money to spend on 
leisure, will affect the places one frequents, the people to be in touch with and therefore also 
affects with whom to create a shared identity.

  
15 Expressing and Reinforcing 
Attitudes through Leisure 
While chapter 14 focused (in the spirit of part II) primarily on the leisure activities observed and 
narrated to the researcher, here, we want to take the analysis a step further and decipher some 
attitudes and values, which have become visible in the leisure interaction or recounting. The 
diversity of leisure mentioned already points at the heterogeneous nature of the groups and 
brings to mind the attention drawn by Neubert & Stoll (2015) on the different milieus in which 
members of the same income stratum can interact. Indeed, as we shall see in the analysis of the 
leisure activities, we find attitudes that we can attribute to certain milieus48. However, not all 
respondents are always equally strong inclined to the various attitudes mentioned here, and 
sometimes even directly opposed to it. Hence, the traits described here will most likely never 
appeal to all. 
15.1 Efforts of Distinction 
We could find some efforts of distinction from other groups during the fieldwork. This was for 
one, in the person of the rioter, depicted as the urban poor (see chapter 12.2), but also in other 
areas, such as the effort to network with the right kind of people. The most evident example 
witnessed, however, came from the way in which the women in the Mothers’ Union repeatedly 
talked about their housemaids or -boys, service personnel, or guards. This was often expressed as 
a deep mistrust towards these people, a feeling that they would try to betray them or steal money. 
In the case of the maids, the members of MU warned each other that their maids would start 
blackmailing them (by asking for a pay rise) if they became too dependent on them. But also, 
during interviews respondents would suspiciously watch waiters, assure that they brought the 
change before handing over the bill. More generally, better-off Ugandans would also frequently 
warn the researcher about the boda boda drivers. Road safety aside, many deemed it not safe to 
take a driver, particularly if it was dark outside and would themselves not do so (in the case of 
women, mainly). These kinds of distinction came from a suspicion towards people with less 
income than the respondents themselves and hence focused on economic status. The 
reinforcement of one’s financial well-being was also transcended through the use of status 
symbols, such as cars, smartphones or references to travels abroad. The TV consumption can 
equally be seen as such an effort, as respondents would name TV channels and shows with a 
certain prestige, mainly news or information formats, emphasizing an aspect of education. In the 
case of women also religious TV shows were mentioned, here appealing to a religious identity. On 
the other hand, telenovelas or daily soaps, albeit quite popular, were at least not mentioned, 
probably to the lower prestige associated with them. Other forms of distinction noticed included 
                                                 
48 Without wanting to establish a sketch of the different milieus existing in Uganda, as Neubert & Stoll (2015) have done 
for Kenya. 
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the speaking of Runyankole by the Mothers’ Union members in their cell group. Albeit this was 
not excluding anyone in the ethnically homogeneous group, it did create, in the sense of Calvet a 
“we” and an absent “they” (Calvet, 1994). This phenomenon is not confined to economic distinction 
but refers to all spheres of life: taste and behavior are determined by the habitus, which in return 
is shaped through the availability of different types of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). This need for 
distinction becomes even more pronounced with those who find themselves in proximity to the 
lower classes. The tendency of distinction is not specific to income groups, however. In their work 
on two working class neighborhoods in Great Britain, Elias and Scotson write: 
“Almost everywhere members of established groups and, even more, those of groups 
aspiring [emphasis added] to form the establishment, take pride in being cleaner, 
literally and figuratively, than the outsiders […].” (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxvii) 
These efforts of distinction also help to form collective identities, precisely because of the “we” 
and “they” they generate. These identities in return are important factors in mobilization for 
common causes. In the contexts we have observed, however, they cannot easily be channeled into 
demands for more inclusive governance or accountability. If at all, they might give rise to small, 
localized and individualized micro-contentions, in the form of individualistic demands upon the 
government, for marginal improvements (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 149). 
15.2 Moral Compliance 
In lack of a better term, we shall describe here many normative prescriptions brought forward, 
often in the realm of religion, as moral compliance. The assertion of certain norms is used to 
conserve a dominant moral narrative, which at least in the leisure activities we have witnessed is 
not challenged but find rather widespread support. This involves the role of women, what it means 
to be a good Christian, wife, and mother and is principally brought forward by Mothers’ Union, as 
we have detailed above. But it also transcends in commonly shared points of views on 
homosexuality or the role of women. Such a compliance functions on the division between good 
and bad, which, at least in discussions, is easily made; whether they are lived up to their standards 
in practice is another question. Because questions of morality are often backed up by the religious 
institutions of the country, they have political clout and can easily be mobilized around 
(Fichtmüller, 2014a). Here we find similarities to the Christian religious milieus described by 
Neubert & Stoll for Kenya (Neubert & Stoll, 2015, p. 11f). The link to the Kenyan milieus also 
reminds us that not all of our respondents equally exhibited these conservative tendencies. 
Instead, they would play a more or less central role, depending on the personal choices by the 
respondents. 
15.3 African “Tradition” and Western “Modernity” 
At various points, we have seen a complex and ambiguous relationship between what is perceived 
as “African” and as “Western”. One of its consequences is the divide between civil society and 
society, which we have discussed in chapter 11.1. It is a tension, between criticizing the state of 
Africa today of not being like Europe, while at the same time refusing Western hegemony and 
imperialism and glorifying an imagined African past (see also Spronk, 2014, p. 219ff). 
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So, on the one side, a narrative is used blames Africans for not being at the same level of 
development like Europe, or other, formerly underdeveloped nations. In that context, the parallel 
between Singapore and Uganda was frequently drawn by respondents. Both countries apparently 
were at the same level of development fifty years ago, nowadays Singapore is a highly developed 
country while Uganda is still among the least developed countries. This is often attributed to 
“African vices”, such as illiteracy, polygamy, big families, corrupt leaders, or their belief in 
superstition. On the other side, Whites are accused of taking advantage of this to continue their 
domination over Africans. 
This message, which has been circulating on WhatsApp several times during our fieldwork, 
illustrates this ambiguous nature: 
“A White man said: ‘BLACK PEOPLE ARE STILL OUR SLAVES’. We can continue to reap 
profits from them without the effort of physical slavery. Their IGNORANCE is the 
primary weapon of containment. A great man once said, 'The best way to hide 
something from Black people, is to put it in a book.' They have the opportunity to read 
any book on any subject through the efforts of their fight for freedom, yet they refuse 
to read. Few read consistently, if at all. GREED is another weapon of containment. Last 
year Blacks spent 10 billion dollars during Christmas, out of their 450 billion dollars 
in total yearly income (2.22%). We can use them as our target market, for any 
business venture we care to dream up, they will buy into it. They function totally by 
greed. They continually want more, & hardly save. [...] They'll continue to show off to 
each other while White communities improve with the profits from our businesses 
that we market to them. SELFISHNESS is one of the major ways we continue to contain 
them. There are segments of their culture that has achieved some 'form' of success 
but they didn't read that the talented 10% was responsible to aid The Non-Talented 
90% in achieving a better life. Instead, that segment has created another class that 
looks down on their people or aids them in a condescending manner. [...] They do not 
understand that they are no better than each other because of what they own, as a 
matter of fact, most of them are but one or two pay cheques away from poverty. All of 
which is under the control of our pens in our offices and our rooms. Yes, we will 
continue to contain them as long as they refuse to read, continue to buy anything they 
want, and keep thinking they are 'helping' their communities by paying dues to 
organizations which do little other than hold conventions in our hotels. By the way, 
don't worry about any of them reading this, THEY DON'T READ!! ----------------- 
Prove them wrong. Please pass this on! After Reading. We MUST rise from this post 
traumatic slavery disorder. ” (WhatsApp 09.04.2017) 
Particularly the phrase that “If you want to hide something from an African, put it in a book” was 
mentioned several times during the discussions with respondents. The quote above also 
highlights the perception of the “white man” mentioned: scrupulous, greedy, and exploitative, but 
smart enough to do so, while the “blacks” are claimed to be too stupid to notice their exploitation, 
let alone rise against it. The quote also paints a rather critical picture of what can be understood 
as the African middle class, it decries its consumerism and selfishness, and highlights its economic 
vulnerability, by being “only one or two pay cheques [sic] away from poverty.” 
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At the same time a resistance towards this narrative evolves, that tries to challenge the persistent 
denigration of what is considered African, such as Joys effort of embracing African hair and 
understanding it as part of her identity. It is strongly asserted in the Pan African Club meetings, 
by calling for African unity and evoking a past in which Africa was not yet divided, before 
colonialism. At one discussion on the topic of “The Software of Imperialism and its Effects on the 
African Condition” one discussant cited a paragraph that Lord Macaulay, a member of the British 
Parliament allegedly said in 1835: 
“I have travelled across the length and breadth of Africa and I have not seen one 
person who is a beggar, who is a thief, such wealth I have seen in this country, such 
high moral values, people of such caliber, that I do not think we would ever conquer 
this country unless we break the very backbone of this nation, which is her spiritual 
and cultural heritage and therefore I propose that we replace her old and ancient 
education system, her culture for if the Africans think that all that is foreign and 
English is good and greater than their own, they will lose their self-esteem, their 
native culture and they will become what we want them, a truly dominated nation” 
(Pan Africa Minutes) 
The quote has also been circulating on WhatsApp. However, as details of the quote do not line up, 
it is suggested to be a hoax (Mitra, 2017). Also, in an earlier version, the quote referred to India 
instead of Africa. The longevity of the message and its alteration to adapt to an African context are 
speaking, as they paint a picture of a once flourishing Africa, destroyed through colonialism, and 
now, albeit formally independent, dominated by their lack of self-esteem and native culture, and 
because they embrace everything foreign as good. Hence, there is an implicit call for precisely 
cherishing these traits again and refusing Western material and ideological imports. In essence, 
these tendencies are reflections of the general ideas of post-colonialism: 
“Le postcolonialisme joue le plus souvent sur ce double registre. Celui du retour sur 
soi, sur le patrimoine matériel et immatériel des peuples anciennement colonisés 
pour le comprendre dans sa spécificité, et celui de la haine (d’ailleurs teintée de 
fascination) de tout ce qui d’une manière ou d’une autre est censé représenter 
l’Occident.” (Zarka, 2017, p. 4) 
At times, the presence of the researcher herself would trigger such a discourse. At one Pan African 
Club meeting, one member of the audience would deliberately speak in Luganda as a way of 
expressing his attitude that a white person should not be included. He however immediately got 
reprimanded by others who felt that he had violated another value, the much cherished Ugandan 
hospitality. Often in interviews the respondents, when reflecting about the role of tradition and 
modernity in their lives mentioned that they embraced exposure to other ideas and influence, as 
long as it would not go against African values, referring to homosexuality.  
“Our culture is aligning to the west, if I hadn’t been educated, I would be a peasant 
farmer living in the village, so cultural change is good, globalization is positive and 
negative, but more positive. […] Negative is that Western cultures want to make 
homosexuality a law here, as a religious man I feel this is not proper.” (Abdul) 
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Spronk notices a similar tension among the young professionals whom she studied: 
“The heart of the matter is that, as ‘agents of transformation’, their desire to act out a 
contemporary lifestyle often coincides with certain Western modes, while they also 
react against this so-called ‘westernization’ as new imperialism; they are therefore 
living a reality that is inherently contradictory. Young professionals use the concepts 
‘African’, ‘Western’ and ‘traditional’ as reified notions that comprise a discursive field 
of practices.” (Spronk, 2012, p. 79) 
This tension might have a mobilization power49, but these efforts will rather not be focused on 
modeling a political system as it is so frequently pushed for by the West; instead, they will serve 
as a justification precisely for refuting Western ideas and claiming a model of “African democracy” 
or “African solutions to African problems”. Through this lens, we can also understand the 
idealization of Idi Amin, beyond the mere generational divide. Contrary to Museveni, Idi Amin is 
portrayed as someone who loved his people and would not act in the interest of other nations, but 
of Ugandans, for example by expelling the Indians. Thus, it may be turned against current leaders 
if they are perceived to be too close to their Western donors and too little accountable to their 
African populations. But it might as well become a justification for authoritarian leadership, in 
particular when mentioned in the context of authoritarian “success stories”, such as Rwanda or 
Ethiopia (see Cheeseman, 2018; Collier, 2010; Routley, 2014, p. 164ff). Again, this contradiction 
was not present among all respondents in the same manner, suggesting, once more, the presence 
of different milieus among the respondents. 
15.4 The Need for Security 
The need for security was also among the recurrent themes. Manifested in the prayers of the 
Watoto cell group, the discussions about insecurity among Mothers’ Union, the setting up of and 
paying for various initiatives to maintain the security in different neighborhoods, the illiberal 
stance taken by Alex on his blog if he feels his own security is threatened, or the frequent warnings 
issued from Ugandans concerning their less well-off compatriots, the need describes a general 
sentiment of mistrust. Insecurity is strongly related to economic inequality (Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, & Loayza, 2002), and if the prevailing feeling is that insecurity has risen, it may be 
because income inequality has become more visible. This, in turn, may increase instability, as the 
tunnel-effect, discussed below, suggests (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). As we have already 
seen, this need for security is for one translated into accrued efforts to stabilize their own 
economic position. It can also be expressed as a need for political stability, even if this comes at 
the expense of democracy (Neubert & Daniel, 2014, p. 156). In our cases, this was expressed when 
respondents said the only expectations they had of the government, was to provide stability and 
a safe environment for them to act. 
                                                 
49 However, from what we have observed, the activity remains restricted to the realm of discussion, not translating itself 
into any political action. 
288 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
15.5 Retreat into the Private Sphere 
What has been a thread that crossed several accounts of leisure is a retreat into the private sphere. 
This can be seen in the importance attributed to the family or the clan, often manifested in the 
attendance of social functions, but also in the relevance gained for the nuclear family. Here, the 
personal life cycles play a role, as the time allocated to the nuclear family will depend on the needs 
of the children and will be more significant for the mothers than the fathers. Thus, especially for 
women, the family is an important social hub for leisure. But also solitary leisure, such as certain 
sports, reading, or watching TV are signs of this retreat. The private sphere does not necessarily 
have to be solitary nor does this mean that it cannot take place in public (jogging or swimming 
could be such examples, as they require a public place to exercise them for most people), but 
rather that the individual by carrying out these activities only interacts with a very limited number 
of people. This brings to mind warnings of the erosion of social capital and civic trust, that may 
turn out to be detrimental to democracy, such as in the theses advanced by Putnam (2000), which 
received much attention at its time of publication, in 1995. 
However, while critics point out, among other theoretical and empirical problems of his study50, 
that he fails to account for shifting forms of associational activity (Norris, 2007) our own brief 
analysis finds little evidence of activities that would allow building social trust going beyond 
religious or family connections. Authors like Giddens (1998) or Beck (2002) argue that an 
individualized lifestyle actually contributes to the demise of social class as an identity. However, 
in our case it remains doubtful, whether we can talk of a social class to begin with; hence there 
should not be too much interpretation into its demise through an individualized lifestyle. 
15.6 Focus on Self-Improvement and Self-Efficacy 
In an institutional environment that provides little support, solutions are sought outside the 
public realm because the latter seems dysfunctional (e.g., private schools, private health, private 
transport, etc.). The same applies to leisure, triggered by the absence of leisure structures 
provided by the state (such as playgrounds or parks), and the privatization of public services 
(such as paying the police to focus more on a specific neighborhood). In such a setting, self-efficacy 
becomes a crucial value. It becomes apparent for example in the belief that one will make it, as 
long as they are hard-working enough, if they hustle. Hence, the solution lies within the individual 
and can be sought through self-improvement. By being hard-working, punctual, focused. This, on 
the other hand, takes responsibility away from other actors, such as the state. Thus, a blogger 
challenged his readers to employ at least five Ugandan youth, who would otherwise turn to 
criminal activities. He remarks: “The criticism of poor service delivery and compromised quality may 
exist but it is our duty to help our people get better.” (Wire, 2018) One discussant at the Pan African 
Club pointed out: “[…] today, the State restricts itself to creating an enabling environment and then 
it is individuals to take care of their welfare.” This attitude is also reflected in the answers of the 
respondents, with many claiming the government has no role in their lives, or only a restricted 
one, as provider of security and sometimes macroeconomic stability. 
                                                 
50 For an exhaustive critique of Putnam’s work see Helmbrecht (2005). 
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Hofstede (1984) shows how in individualistic societies individual success, achievements, and self-
actualization are relevant. These values, typically found in capitalist societies, become prominent 
here among the respondents with a focus on their self-improvement, particularly among the 
entrepreneurs. However, in Uganda this focus does not, for many, replace the feeling of 
responsibility for the extended family; hence it cannot be interpreted as a sign of growing 
individualism. 
To be more self-efficient, self-improvement is sought, for example in the form of self-help books, 
or counseling groups and advice giving, such as in the Mothers’ Union. Also, a focus on health 
issues and sports aimed at improving fitness can be read in such a light. Hence, Abbas in her study 
observes that for example even bodily defects are relegated to the individual responsibility 
because through running the individuals should be able to overcome them. (Abbas, 2004, p. 161) 
Such a belief in one’s self-efficacy is particularly present among the entrepreneurs’ WhatsApp 
group but has also been manifested in the Watoto cell group, with the difference that in the latter 
self-efficacy can be increased through praying. Also, it has translated into very concrete actions, 
in the case of the motor spare parts association (see the case story on p. 232) and the 
neighborhood initiative (see p. 270). In both cases, the respondents felt that the government 
would not act on their behalf and thus decided to become active themselves. However, as the case 
of the neighborhood initiative has shown, while it used to be efficient in the beginning, constraints 
made it difficult to maintain. In the case of the spare parts association, the effectiveness of the 
efforts remains to be seen, as the retail sellers have to be convinced to buy items at a higher price 
for the sake of expelling Chinese whole and retail sellers from the market. While an industrial 
policy would have made this choice for the individuals, in the present set up, the retail sellers must 
make every time a conscious choice against a short-term gain (buying at a lower price) for the 
sake of an uncertain, long-term goal. Despite these uncertainties, however, Richard and his 
colleagues were willing to mobilize for this effort, investing considerable amounts of time and 
money to convince other traders nationwide, due to their belief in their self-efficacy. Such an 
attitude is guarded by the belief that one can make it from rags to riches, only through their efforts. 
Hirschman & Rothschild have pointed out that in an atmosphere of economic growth an initial 
euphoria exists, as people wait for the growth to reach them. They liken this to being stuck in a 
tunnel in a traffic jam. If the other lane moves, one will first be happy and await their turn. If this 
is not happening (since the growth might not be inclusive), it creates frustration and leads to risky 
maneuvers to change lane and be among those who move (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). For 
the authors, this results in a changing tolerance for income inequality during times of economic 
growth and can ultimately affect political stability. Although, the authors concede that the model 
is not apt to make predictions, as circumstances vary too much from one context to another 
(Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973, p. 556). We would add here, that the focus on the individual may 
also lead towards greater efforts of self-improvement, as the failure to advance in the lane is not 
sought in the structural conditions but rather the individual merits, and as such ultimately 
undermining demands for political change. In our observation, maybe the precarious situation of 
many youths could challenge this narrative of self-improvement. In an environment in which a 
university degree cannot promise the job security of salaried employment, calls for state 
accountability are voiced. Here, the government is perceived as having failed to provide the 
necessary conditions. The government, on the other hand, is quick to return this criticism and 
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blame it once more on individual efforts, as these people are “job seekers, not job creators”, a 
narrative well-internalized by many, even among the youth. 
*** 
Admittedly, this list of attitudes is not exhaustive and the nature in which the data was collected 
aleatory. We agree with Martin on this challenge that he described concerning his unidentified 
political objects: 
“Qui peut prétendre avoir lu toute la littérature, entendu tous les discours, écouté 
toutes les musiques, assisté à toutes les fêtes et sur quelle période de temps ? On peut, 
en revanche, tenter par empathie et imagination théorique de tirer le meilleur parti 
de moyens limités. Cela est pas toujours très satisfaisant ; cela pourtant permet 
avancer collectivement ; à condition que les limites un tel travail soient clairement 
énoncées et il soit entendu il ne peut jamais être vraiment achevé.” (D.-C. Martin, 
1989, p. 814) 
These randomly gathered observations, however, have the merit to give us an insight into very 
different milieus, and, derived from this, different values, that exist among the middle income 
groups. Yet, strikingly, in the areas explored, while we do find criticism of the government and the 
current political conditions, we do not find any discussion around alternative visions for the 
political future of Uganda and no real challenge of the status quo. In some instances, these 
challenges are immediately reprimanded by others, by using a narrative that emphasizes unity 
over division (through different points of view on politics) and stability over instability. While 
part III has looked at the “explicit” forms of social mobilization, the ones that are depicted in our 
representation as the more institutionalized ones (see Table 3) in this part we focused more on 
the implicit forms, the “mundane practices” (Bayat, 2013a, p. 17) and the “free spaces” (Polletta, 
1999) to get an idea on the values that emerge, the ties that are fostered, the dominant views that 
are challenged … or not. Our findings show what critics of a glorification of civil society or 
Putnam’s social capital have pointed out: not all social capital (to remain with Putnam’s words) 
will be used in a sense that it is inherently positive for democratic advancement (Helmbrecht, 
2005, p. 65f). In a similar vein, discussing politics is not equal to political action, even though it 
may be a critical step towards it. We find a discourse that embraces stability and individual 
advancement rather than uncertainty and more inclusive governance. It is possible that a 
discourse challenging the dominant narratives exists, hidden, confined to the very intimate realm 
or held in local languages and that it has remained undetected in our research. On the other hand, 
identities that evolve around ethnicity and religion manifest themselves and still maintain a high 
potential for mobilization. From our analysis, we can state that we found little evidence that the 
middle income groups in Uganda are concerned to contribute to the democratic advancement of 
the country, especially not as a social class. We find discontent, and withdrawal and lowering 
expectations into the state. We have also seen that a similar socio-economic position does not in 
itself structure interests, as these positions are heterogeneous, too, and the strategies of 
differentiation hinder one clear-cut identity from emerging, and ultimately for the advocacy of 
common interests. Thus, these interests fail to provide a viable, commonly shared, alternative 
vision of the state and society in Uganda.
  
16 Conclusion 
When the recent debate about the African middle classes picked up momentum, it raised so many 
hopes. That Africa has finally left poverty to catch up with the rest of the world, that the Africans 
with newly acquired wealth would be eager to translate their status into material possessions and 
thus turn the continent into a promising market for consumer products at a time when 
consumption in other parts of the world has stalled, and that these middle classes, due to their 
education and their embracing of civil values would finally demand their authoritarian 
governments to become more democratic. The label “middle class” seemed seductive, a promising 
prescription for Africa’s woes. Now, eight years later, these hopes still seem to be unfulfilled and 
the “African middle class” is slowly losing its magic aura. In the realm of the economists, who 
brought the topic to the fore, its validity is being questioned now (Rosen, 2015). The political 
scientists, anthropologists and African scholars who remain dedicated to the subject caution its 
use (Daniel, Müller, Stoll, & Öhlschläger, 2016; Melber, 2016c; O’Kane, Kroeker, & Scharrer, 2017). 
This work has positioned itself in a similarly cautious way by proposing a qualitative 
microanalysis of the lives of those who are supposed to belong to this African middle class and 
particularly to see whether there are any indications that they could fulfill the democratic 
expectations projected on them by some authors. We have deliberately chosen, for one, a country 
that is not one of the top African economies, but a rather “average” performer, and second, an 
approach where we tried to capture the diversity of those united under the middle class label, 
instead of focusing on one smaller subgroup or community. The result is a sometimes 
miscellaneous collection of life stories, living conditions, and leisure. While this has made the 
analysis at times challenging, to us, however, it accurately depicts the story behind the “African 
middle class”: a label merely uniting an agglomeration of individual situations, but not a self-
conscious collectivity. This is not to say that similar socio-economic dispositions will not give rise 
to similar positions, or life chances, as Weber has termed it (Weber, 2002, p. 632). In our analysis 
in part II, we have shown that we can witness indeed similar patterns, such as the tendency to 
mitigate the own financial vulnerability, and the possibility of choice: for better housing, better 
education, different means of transport, cooking or banking. However, two points need to be 
retained here: first, the structuring effect of available income in itself does not allow speaking of 
a class. Instead, we witness here an economic income stratum (hence, our choice to describe our 
sample as the middle income groups), from which we cannot deduct any other typical 
characteristics, such as the embodiment of liberal values, or a particular modernist or Western 
orientation. Second, and in relation to this, these differences that arise from their socio-economic 
position do not make their goals fundamentally different from other, particular lower socio-
economic groups, it merely gives them different or better capacities to pursue the goal. If we take 
education as an example: it is often said that the middle class particularly values education, and 
our data seems to confirm this. Yet, this is equally true for the poorest among our sample; simply 
their means for turning this value into something tangible for themselves or their children are 
much more limited. Thus, what may make these middle income groups different from their less 
fortunate compatriots is the possibility of choice. This, however, is not best depicted within the 
rigid boundaries of class. It does not reflect reality to assume that there are no choices for the poor 
292 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
and that once someone is middle class options become many. Instead, such changes are much 
more gradational and grow as income grows. 
Interests, ambitions, attitudes and values are not solely determined by income, even though this 
might play a role as well. They are equally dependent on the age, gender, profession, education, 
biographic background, ethnicity, religion, as well as the local political, historical, and societal 
context. And this list is most likely not even exhaustive yet. As a result, any attributes given to such 
a vastly heterogeneous group can either only be so broad and unspecific that they provide little 
additional explicative value, or so generalized that they fail to paint a realistic picture. 
Thus, in response to our first research question, we can state that our data suggest that the recent 
economic transformations did not lead to the development of a self-conscious collectivity. Maybe 
this is merely a question of time and an iteration over several generations. At the moment, the 
number of people positively affected by economic upward mobility is still, compared to the entire 
Ugandan population, insignificant, and many of them remain at the risk of downward mobility. 
Hence, we find that the people are very much concerned with mitigating their financial 
vulnerability, by diversifying their income and constructing social safety nets, while at the same 
time upholding financial obligations towards the less wealthy parts of their social networks, often 
extended families from rural areas. Therefore, we cannot observe processes of boundary work 
particularly towards lower classes because at the same time the widespread family relations still 
bridge these boundaries. 
After having refuted the existence of a self-conscious middle class collectivity in Uganda, the 
second question, whether we can observe specific forms of political activity seems somewhat 
redundant. How can a group that does not exist as an entity have its specific forms of mobilization? 
However, the answers are nevertheless revealing because they bring to the fore some mechanisms 
that push people into activism, or on the contrary prevent them from doing so. The attempt to 
shine a light on the process of how these middle income groups contribute to democracy also has 
the merit of questioning mechanisms that are too often only implied when the link between 
democracy and middle class is suggested. How exactly does a middle class advance democracy? 
By solely thinking that democracy is “good”? By wanting free and fair elections and the rule of 
law? But what is done to make these desires come true in an environment which is apparently not 
conducive? By demanding more accountability from the state (Birdsall, 2007, p. 599)? How can 
an undemocratic state be held accountable? How does regime transition come about? Through 
protest, revolution, reform? There is more than one answer to these questions and they always 
strongly depend on the context. But they are worth being asked. 
We attempted an answer by looking at different levels that can influence the mobilization of an 
individual. While only very few individuals eventually participate in a social movement, we 
believe that all these levels have a substantial impact, because they push the individuals away or 
draw them into social movements. In general, we can say that we have seen little indication that 
the middle income groups were particularly likely to promote a democratic transition. Dobry, in 
his critique of the “transitology” has pointed out that the scholars who studied the political 
transitions towards democracy had a tendency to neglect the negative results, i.e., the countries 
in which such a transition did not happen, even though they might be the most revealing (Dobry, 
2000, p. 588). In a similar vein, we believe that our “negative” conclusion is revealing as well. On 
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the one hand, we found reflections of wider societal discourses about the value of political stability 
over conflict, but also strong criticism of the regime among the respondents. Albeit never shared 
by all, these views allowed us to make some generalizations about political protest and what 
mainly deterred people from participating. Here the analysis of the major protests that Uganda 
has seen in the past ten years, through the reflection of the respondents has been useful to bring 
to these “middle income group” views to the fore. And these views have revealed a divide that 
does not follow class lines but turns around generations. Older generations are more critical of 
protest and more likely to credit the current regime for upholding peace and stability than 
younger generations, who have not witnessed the civil war and do not know any regime other 
than the current one. Such observations reveal once again the diversity within the middle income 
groups which are not solely differentiated through income, but other factors as well. This 
heterogeneity was even more visible among the leisure activities of the respondents, where we 
have been able to discern, what Neubert & Stoll (2015) have called different milieus. However, 
these observations are in its infancies in our case, and the data cannot be developed into a full-
fledged typology of different milieus. These findings show once again that we do not deal with a 
homogeneous entity, but rather with a multitude of individual actors. 
Again, maybe this is merely a question of time and size; maybe the middle income groups in 
Uganda need to become numerical stronger and maybe enter into a second or third generation to 
replace vertical ties with horizontal ones, that they will draw boundaries with other classes and 
create allegiance within their own. So maybe, once they are numerically strong enough, they will 
truly be willing and capable of demanding more accountability and democracy from the state. 
However, from what we have observed now, these are by no means any automatisms that will be 
triggered once “critical thresholds” are reached. For now, we have no indication that “being in the 
middle” will substantially alter the way how people estimate their capacities to demand change. 
It does have, however, an effect on what to expect from the state and how to cope with its 
deficiencies. This refers to an aspect already mentioned above: the possibility for the middle 
income groups to choose, and therefore, to “opt out” if they consider it suitable. We find that a 
general, prevailing sentiment consists of expecting little from the state51, mainly to provide 
security and stability – which it does, even if this is happening through coercion and a powerful, 
authoritarian framework. Here another important aspect concerning the democratic demands of 
the middle classes becomes visible: the status quo in the current regime. If a regime, like in the 
Ugandan case, is not democratic, but stable, it remains uncertain if large parts of the middle 
income groups are willing to trade this stability for the uncertainty of a potential conflict. As 
shown above, this is even more exacerbated among older generations who have already lived 
through such times of uncertainty. 
Hence, for many members of the middle income groups, it seems more accessible to “opt out”, and 
to seek solutions in the private realm. This becomes obvious in the choice for private education, 
                                                 
51 However, expectations of the state depend on much more than solely its performance. What a state is supposed to 
deliver and what not is shaped once again by national and historical factors, and differ even among Western nations, as 
Esping-Andersen (1990) has shown. The question of the state in Africa and its legitimacy has been topic of extensive 
academic debate, one we do not intend to extend here. In the case of Uganda, even the question of security and justice 
(Baker, 2006) or market regulation (Monteith, 2016) are sometimes fulfilled by other actors. This does not necessarily 
have to be coupled with a loss of legitimacy if the citizens do not expect the state to perform these functions. 
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healthcare schemes (partially, this coverage is far from common among the middle income 
groups, seen as “gambling” as one respondent called insurance, since you may pay but not need it 
after all) and a shared feeling of self-efficacy. Narratives like being hard-working move the 
responsibility of wealth creation towards the individuals. Someone remains poor because they 
are idle or a job-seeker instead of a job-creator. Thus, the poor are at fault, rather than a state that 
fails to create the necessary environment. 
Lowered expectations of the state, together with an authoritarian environment that sanctions 
political opposition do not provide positive motivation for political action. Instead, goals are set 
on an individual basis with responsibility for the close social networks but not society as a whole52. 
The turn towards individual circumstances becomes visible when we look at the forms of 
mobilization that do exist. Since most of the respondents were not politically active, we turned to 
the private activities of leisure. Leisure has the potential to show motivation of people that might 
happen prior to political mobilization. It gives an indication of the milieus people frequent, and 
from this observation, we might deduce whether these milieus are conducive to a discourse that 
supports mobilization for democratic change, indifferent, or maybe even explicitly de-mobilizing. 
Our results have shown that the respondents turn towards the family and close friends for the 
exchange of ideas and problem-solving. They gather in community groups, savings cooperations, 
meet with religiously like-minded people or their ethnic peers, they embrace some values and 
refute others. Moreover, the groups frequented, and the values embraced change even within the 
middle income groups, showing its internal heterogeneity. While they are structured through 
disposable income, they are not solely determined by it, making class boundaries less distinct and 
other boundaries, such as religious affiliation, age or gender more visible. 
Hence, we can answer our second research question by suggesting that there are no specific forms 
of political activity pursued by the middle income groups. Instead, individual actors pursue 
individual interests. They retreat into the private sphere and focus on self-help and self-efficacy. 
Networks are of great importance in solving problems and its construction and maintenance is 
something the respondents consciously pursue. These personal connections allow circumventing 
institutional structures, and they are not randomly distributed across the society. Better 
education and higher income will open different doors, as the example of the STON meetings have 
shown. Thus, once more we can witness how a higher position within the income groups opens 
the possibility for more choice of options to pursue, or people to contact. 
Therefore, we can say that our material shows that these middle income groups are a mass 
capable of acting, who have learned to play according to the “rules of the game”, by respecting the 
political opportunity structure, and who form their lives with what they have. We have not seen, 
however, any elaborations of alternative visions that would seriously challenge the status quo and 
insist on more democracy. 
                                                 
52 Here we find a distinction from the urban poor, who do not have the means to seek solutions elsewhere and therefore 
pressure the state for particularized improvements through localized, small-scale upheavals (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, 
p. 149).  
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Apparently, if sought for, it is possible to detect a politically active milieu among the middle 
income groups, but such a milieu is far from constituting a majority. And neither are the middle 
income groups at the core of these mobilizations. Which finally raises the question whether 
observations of middle class implication in protest are not prone to a particular bias. Studies have 
shown that higher income increases political participation in leadership roles (Verba et al., 1987, 
p. 290). Hence, the analysis may have a distorting effect, simply because certain groups of middle 
class people are the most visible in protest. Yet, such an analysis may neglect most people who 
choose to remain at home, and the diversity of the groups who are protesting. Therefore, O’Boyle 
already suggested in 1966, to use middle class as an explanation for change only in the long-term 
perspective: 
“To describe […] long-term changes […], the term ‘middle class’ can be justified as 
economical and accurate. The question probably reduces itself to a matter of time 
perspective. It is when shorter periods of time are involved that ‘middle class’ 
becomes, not wrong, but simply unhelpful because it obscures the complex relations 
among the various groups within the middle class.” (O’Boyle, 1966, p. 827) 
With his observations O’Boyle adequately describes the challenges that we have run into during 
our effort to analyze the forms of mobilization of the Ugandan middle income groups. On the other 
hand, such long-term perspectives – and O’Boyle talks of periods between 50 and 100 years – will 
be even more prone to the distortions just mentioned. This raises the question whether a positive 
link between middle class and democracy can only be established by historians? Nevertheless, we 
hope that this work has succeeded in contributing to the contemporary debate by unveiling and 
questioning the trends that govern the current middle class discussion.
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Annex 2: Interview Guideline 2012 
Thank you very much for agreeing to make this interview with you. Through these interviews I 
want to learn more about whether a middle class exists in Uganda and their relation to politics. 
So, before I will ask you some more statistical questions and then let's get into deeper discussion. 
The informations you provide will rest purely confidential, only I have access to the data. I'm not 
here to judge and there are no wrong answers, as I am interested in your special point of view. So, 
do you have any questions before we start? Let me just ask you: do you mind if I record this 
interview. It will help me afterwards to analyze what you said? 
Interviewguide 
Thank you, you already gave some very insightful answers. Now I'm interested in some more 
detail. Let us start with your personal life. Can you tell me... 
1. How pleased are you with your situation? 
2. What, if anything, helps you achieve the goals you have? 
3. And what, if anything, hinders you? 
4. What role, if any, plays the government in your personal life? Corruption? 
 
5. How pleased are you with the work of the government? (good things/bad things) 
6. What is your opinion on political parties? The opposition, Kiiza Besigye 
7. What do you think about the institutions in your country? Parliament, ministries, 
university, military, court, police, media 
Any other institutions?  
8. What's your opinion on democracy? (probe: and in Uganda) 
9. What do you think about elections? (probe: and in Uganda, debate on term limits) 
So, who for you would be the best president? 
10. How do you see the role of the kingdoms in the country? (more or less power?) 
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11. Tell me about the political situation in your country! How did it evolve during the last five 
years? 
12. How do you judge the next five years? 
13. What, if anything should change? 
If even the opposition in power will not change anything: what can be done about 
this? 
How can change be achieved? 
 
14. What do you think about political activism? (Activists for Change) 
15. So, what did you think about the “walk to work”? 
16. How would you define yourself in this regard? 
17. What political activities do you pursue? (political parties, demonstrations, speaking out in 
the streets, riots...)  
Why/Why not? 
 
18. Why, if ever, have you taken part in a demonstration? When? Why/Why not? 
19. What about participation in a strike? When? Why/Why not? 
 
Thank you very much for your helpful information. We are nearly done. Just some last general 
questions in the end. 
20. What motivates you in life? 
21. What do you fear? 
22. What do you wish for the future of the country?
  
Annex 3: Interview Guideline 2014 
Thank you very much for your participation in this interview. As I told you, I intend to find out 
about the recent social and economic transformations in Uganda and how they have changed 
people’s lives, the opportunities they brought but also the difficulties they encountered. During 
the interview I would like to discuss about your life trajectory in general, your current situation, 
but also your attitudes and values, and your vision of society and politics in Uganda. The interview 
should take about one hour. The information you give will be strictly confidential, I will not 
mention any names anywhere. However, to make analysis easier for me, would it be OK for you if 
I record our discussion? 
General Specific Details, Remarks Probing 
Please give me some general biographic 
information  
Age, religion, family 
situation, ethnicity 
Can you expand a little 
on this? 
 
Can you tell me anything 
else?  
 
Can you give me some 
examples 
Tell me about your life trajectory, maybe starting from childhood 
Childhood 
 Place of growing up 
 
 Work of parents 
 
 Economic situation at home 
 
 schooling Difficulty to pay 
school fees 
 Trajectory, spatial mobility Within UG and K’LA 
Please, tell me about your life now. How did you reach where you are 
now?  
 
 What life 
chances/opportunities 
 
 What life shocks 
 
 What are your aspirations in 
life 
Difficulty to reach, 
optimistic, 
pessimistic? 
Can you describe to me your current living conditions 
 
 Where 
 
 What type Apartment, house, etc. 
 Rent or property 
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Living 
conditions 
 Infrastructure Condition of roads, 
electricity, water 
access 
 Household equipments What, for how long, 
functioning or not, how 
often use it 
 Spatial mobility How long have you 
lived there? Where 
before? Conditions? 
Job and 
income 
 Main source of income How much, how long 
have you had it, how 
got it 
 
 What jobs before? How much, how long 
have you had it, how 
got it 
Anything else 
 Other jobs? Formal, informal 
 
 Other sources of income Cattle, land Anything else 
 Assets you own Changes over the last 
years 
 
 Job of partner 
 
Can you expand a little 
on this? 
 
Can you tell me anything 
else?  
 
Can you give me some 
examples 
 Any other source of income 
of the partner 
 
 Who depends on your 
income 
 
 How do you manage 
household expenditure 
distribution 
Who pays for what 
 Satisfaction with 
income/sufficient 
 
How is your general economic condition? 
Please explain in detail. 
Changes over the last 
years 
Economic 
condition 
 Management of money Bank account, loans, 
savings, donations 
anything else 
 Safety nets/personal 
securities 
 
Can you expand a little 
on this? 
 
 Expectations from extended 
family 
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 Expectations of extended 
family 
 
Can you tell me anything 
else?  
 
Can you give me some 
examples 
Consump-
tion and 
spending 
 Budget distribution Rent, health, 
education, transport, 
food 
 Spending of money What, where, how 
often, utility or 
pleasure 
 Consumer goods Car, telephone, 
electronic appliances, 
how many, what type, 
when bought (for the 
first time or not) 
 Eating habits How often, what on a 
regular day, special 
treats (how often) 
 Use of computer, Internet, 
telephone 
How much do you 
spend on it 
 Media exposure 
 
Please, tell me in as much detail as possible what do you do when you have free time?  
Leisure 
time and 
socializa-
tion 
 What do you do?  meeting friends, 
neighbors, go out in 
bars, clubs, sport, 
social engagement, 
political engagement, 
visiting relatives, part 
of an association, 
visiting communal 
centers (youth clubs, 
church centers, etc.), 
visiting events, 
concerts, theater, 
museums, church, 
trade unions 
Tell me more about that 
 
Anything else? 
 How often? 
  
 What kind of people?   
How often? 
Tell me more about 
these people: age, 
 
 Who do you meet with 
regularly apart from close 
family and colleagues 
Other contacts? (not 
personally, but 
regularly) 
Diaspora 
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gender, religion, 
ethnicity, social status 
What do you do, what 
issues do you discuss 
Now let’s talk a little bit about your attitudes and values. What do you value? 
Attitudes 
and Values 
 Family values 
In how far do these 
views differ from or 
correspond with the 
views of your partner?  
Your parents?  
Other family 
members? 
Friends? 
Can you expand a little 
on this? 
 
Can you tell me anything 
else? 
 
Can you give me some 
examples 
 Role of religion 
 Role of culture 
 Role of traditions 
 Role of men and women 
 What should an ideal 
partnership look like for you? 
 Role of ethnic identity 
 Role of education 
How do you see today’s society in Uganda?  
View of 
Society 
 Evolution over the last 15 
years 
 
Can you expand a little 
on this? 
 
Can you tell me anything 
else?  
 
Can you give me some 
examples 
 Community prosperity now 
and then 
 
 Prospects about the future 
 
 Existence of a middle class How would you define 
it? 
 Where do you see your own 
position in society? 
Differentiation with 
other classes 
How do you see todays politics in Uganda Opinion on political 
issues, satisfaction 
with democracy in the 
country 
 
View of 
politics 
 Interest in public matters 
  
 Approval with government 
 
 Trust in political leaders 
 
 Own political participation Elections (who did 
you vote for), party 
affiliation 
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 Contact with public officials Local government 
councilor, MP, govt 
official, political party 
official → how often, 
when, why 
Anyone else? 
 Expectations of the state Attitude towards 
welfare state 
 
To finish off with, let us talk a little bit about 
your self-perception. In what terms would you 
describe yourself? 
“I am ...” “I feel like a 
…” 
 
Thank you for your valuable insights. We have covered a vast range of topics. Now, before 
concluding, is there anything that you would want to add, that you consider to be relevant? 
  
  
Annex 4: List of Income-Groups Interviews 
N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 1 2012 Michael yes male 36 married 2 tertiary program officer 540 UMC 
I 2 
 
Janet yes female 30 cohabiting 1 tertiary human resources 62,5 FC 
I 3 
 
Jesca yes female 37 married 3 tertiary 
 
267 LMC 
I 4 
 
Mark yes male 41 cohabiting 2 tertiary IT project management 600 UMC 
I 5 
 
Musa yes male 43 married 5 tertiary student 348 UMC 
I 6 
 
Judith yes female 36 married 4 tertiary economic officer 260 LMC 
I 7 
 
Denis yes male 36 married 3 tertiary businessman 59 Poor 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 8 2012 Samuel yes male 31 cohabiting 0 tertiary businessman 110 FC 
I 9 
 
Susan yes female 62 married 5 tertiary senior officer 103 FC 
I 10 
 
Doreen yes female 34 single 2 tertiary lawyer 1233 UC 
I 11 
 
Justine yes female 27 single 0 tertiary cashier 
  
I 12 
 
Salome yes female 32 married 1 tertiary manager 225 LMC 
I 14 
 
Anthony yes male 37 married 2 A-Level photographer  
  
I 15 
 
John yes male 42 single 2 tertiary business owner 327 UMC 
I 16 
 
Agnes yes female 25 single 0 tertiary receptionist  278 LMC 
I 17 
 
Lucy yes female 27 single 0 other accountant 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 18  2012 Anita yes female 26 single 0 tertiary secretary 
  
I 19 
 
Ibrahim yes male 39 married 3 A-Level driver 96 FC 
I 20 
 
Ruth yes female 29 single 0 tertiary receptionist 88 FC 
I 21 
 
David yes male 34 single 0 tertiary clerk 880 UC 
I 22 
 
Geoffrey yes male 40 married 1 tertiary senior research officer 500 UMC 
I 23 
 
Stephen yes male 37 married 2 tertiary head of finance 747 UC 
I 24 
 
Sarah yes female 
 
single 1 tertiary help desk personnel 
  
I 25 
 
Christophr no male 35 married 4 other painter 33 Poor 
I 26 
 
Patrick yes male 34 cohabiting 0 O-Level store man 85 FC 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 27  2012 William no male 32 single 0 A-Level constructor 239 LMC 
I 28 
 
Francis yes male 29 single 0 A-Level electrician 196 LMC 
I 29 
 
Solomon no male 45 cohabiting 2 tertiary artist 55 Poor 
I 30 
 
Daniel yes male 38 single 4 other secretary 32 Poor 
I 31 
 
Norah yes female 34 married 2 tertiary accountant 280 LMC 
I 32 
 
Julius yes male 36 cohabiting 3 tertiary journalist 232 LMC 
I 33 
 
Halima yes female 25 single 0 tertiary receptionist 76 FC 
I 34 
 
Robert yes male 35 cohabiting 3 O-Level security 12 Poor 
I 35 
 
Peter no male 67 married 11 O-Level cook 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 36  2012 Reagan yes male 30 single 0 tertiary banker 181 LMC 
I 37 
 
Betty yes female 38 married 3 tertiary academia 1680 UC 
I 38 
 
Rebecca yes female 41 married 2 tertiary lecturer  146 LMC 
I 39 
 
Lawrence yes male 45 married 4 tertiary senior lecturer 160 LMC 
I 40 
 
Gideon yes male 42 married 3 tertiary lecturer 286 LMC 
I 41 
 
Evelyn no female 36 married 4 tertiary administration 517 UMC 
I 42 
 
Isaac yes male 31 married 3 tertiary tour operator 120 FC 
I 43 
  
no (SAQ) male 20 single 0 tertiary driver 200 LMC 
I 44 
  
no (SAQ) male 25 single 4 A-Level chauffeur 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 45  2012 
 
no (SAQ) male 24 married 1 A-Level security officer 27 Poor 
I 46 
  
no (SAQ) female 22 married 2 tertiary businesswoman 
  
I 47 
  
no (SAQ) male 26 married 2 O-Level businessman 17 Poor 
I 48 
  
no (SAQ) male 43 cohabiting 7 O-Level carpenter 32 Poor 
I 49 
  
no (SAQ) male 41 married 2 tertiary Ph.D. student 67 FC 
I 50 
  
no (SAQ) male 29 married 0 tertiary Ph.D. student 370 UMC 
I 51 
  
no (SAQ) male 54 married 4 O-Level driver 159 LMC 
I 52 
  
no (SAQ) female 
 
married 3 tertiary accountant 250 LMC 
I 53 
  
no (SAQ) male 49 single 0 tertiary pastor 30 Poor 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 54  2012 
 
no (SAQ) male 28 cohabiting 2 tertiary architect 75 Poor 
I 55 
  
no (SAQ) male 28 cohabiting 0 tertiary designer 160 LMC 
I 56 
  
no (SAQ) female 35 married 0 tertiary student 216 LMC 
I 57 
  
no (SAQ) male 28 single 0 tertiary tour operator 
  
I 58 
  
no (SAQ) male 30 married 2 tertiary sales manager 
  
I 59 
  
no (SAQ) female 24 
  
A-Level 
   
I 60 
  
no (SAQ) male 35 married 5 tertiary business 60 Poor 
I 61 
  
no (SAQ) male 30 single 0 tertiary military 
  
I 62 
  
no (SAQ) male 29 married 2 tertiary assistant lecturer  193 LMC 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 63  2012 
 
no (SAQ) male 37 married 2 tertiary 
   
I 64 
  
no (SAQ) male 30 single 0 tertiary architect 780 UC 
I 65 
  
no (SAQ) male 20 single 0 tertiary 
   
I 66 
  
no (SAQ) female 28 single 0 tertiary 
 
(>231) LMC 
I 67 
  
no (SAQ) male 28 single 1 O-Level 
 
100 FC 
I 68 
  
no (SAQ) female 28 single 1 tertiary accountant 150 LMC 
I 69 
  
no (SAQ) female 24 single 2 A-Level none 
  
I 70 
  
no (SAQ) male 28 single 1 tertiary assistant lecturer  390 UMC 
I 71 
  
no (SAQ) female 48 single 4 A-Level secretary 175 LMC 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 1 2014 Andrew yes male 37 divorced 1 tertiary university lecturer 1310 UMC 
I 2 
 
Raphael yes male 31 single 0 tertiary project manager 1120 UMC 
I 3 
 
George yes male 31 married 1 tertiary IT 867 UC 
I 4 
 
Alex yes male  29 single 0 tertiary lawyer 800 UC 
I 5 
 
Gordon yes male  28 single 1 A-Level data 100 Poor 
I 6 
 
Oliver yes male  35 single 0 other civil society activist 120 Poor 
I 7 
 
Abdul yes male  34 married 1 tertiary lawyer 1059 UC 
I 8 
 
Pamela yes female 24 single 0 A-Level shop owner 60 Poor 
I 9 
 
Josephine yes female 31 married 2 tertiary lecturer 350 UMC 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 10  2014 Herbert yes male 27 single 0 tertiary lawyer 200 LMC 
I 11 
 
Rose yes female 30 cohabiting 2 tertiary network marketing 96 FC 
I 12 
 
Aida yes female 36 married 4 tertiary network marketing 813 UC 
I 13 
 
Elisabeth yes female 54 married 4 other network marketing 159 FC 
I 14 
 
Jennifer yes female 30 single 1 other insurance 132 LMC 
I 15 
 
Nelson yes male 37 married 3 tertiary civil servant 128 FC 
I 16 
 
Innocent yes male 45 married 4 tertiary civil servant 463 UMC 
I 17 
 
Elly yes male 30 single 0 other pastor 7 Poor 
I 18 
 
Arthur yes male 33 married 2 tertiary bank 162 LMC 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 19  2014 Jude yes male 27 single 0 tertiary NGO 80 FC 
I 20 
 
Nicole yes female 35 married 2 O-Level 2nd hand clothes 46 Poor 
I 21 
 
Joy yes female 30 cohabiting 1 tertiary IT 713 UC 
I 22 
 
Sarah yes female 52 widow 2 O-Level tailor 334 UMC 
I 23 
 
Kato yes male 40 cohabiting 2 tertiary airport ground handling 96 FC 
I 1 2017 Umar no male 38 married 5 primary builder 58 poor 
I 2 
 
Marwa no female 38 married 5 primary shopkeeper 
  
I 3 
 
Lillian no female 
 
single 1 tertiary tour guide 
  
I 4 
 
Edgar no male 40 single 4 tertiary lecturer 130 LMC 
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 5 2017 Bennon no male 33 single 1 other baker 35 poor 
I 6 
 
Brian yes male 37 single 2 other 
 
24 poor 
I 7 
 
Gerald yes male 27 cohabiting 0 tertiary volunteer 27 poor 
I 8 
 
Martin no male 30 cohabiting 2 tertiary 
 
80 FC 
I 9 
 
Ronald yes male 45 married 6 O-Level trader 98 FC 
I 10 
 
Benjamin no male 24 single 0 tertiary environmental scientist 
  
I 11 
 
Chris  no male 24 single 0 tertiary student 454 UMC 
I 12 
 
Goretti no female 25 single 0 other hotel administration 240 LMC 
I 13   Elijah yes male 24 single 0 A-Level photographer  
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N° Year Alias Tran-
script* 
Sex Age Matrimonial 
status 
N° of 
children 
Education Job  Income** AfDB 
Category 
I 14 2017  Joseph  yes male 29 single 0 tertiary broker/errands 
  
I 15 
 
Taibu no male 26 single 0 tertiary dentist 2600 UC 
I 16 
 
Richard no male 50 married 5 O-Level shop owner 
  
*  If no transcript was made, only the questionnaire was used for analysis in SPSS;  
SQA = self-administered questionnaire; if not stated, the interview was administered by the interviewer 
**  Income refers to the per capita monthly income, derived from total household income; it is calculated in US $ at an exchange rate of 1:2500.
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Annex 5: List of Expert Interviews 
 
N° Year Tran-
script* 
Topic Function Institution 
E 1 2014 yes Religion and Politics Pastor Pentecostal Church 
E 2 
 
yes Religion and Politics Staff Uganda Joint Christian Council 
E 3 
 
yes Religion and Politics CSO Activist HALEA Uganda 
E 4 
 
no Religion and Politics Party Member, Academic UPC 
E 5 
 
yes Religion and Politics Party Leader Forum for Integrity of Leadership 
E 6 
 
yes Religion and Politics Member of Parliament I NRM 
E 7 
 
yes Religion and Politics Member of Parliament II NRM 
E 8 
 
yes Religion and Politics Member of Parliament III FDC 
E 9 
 
yes Religion and Politics Member of Parliament IV Independent 
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N° Year Tran-
script* 
Topic Function Institution 
E 10 2014 yes Religion and Politics Staff Inter-Religious Council Uganda 
E 11 
 
yes Religion and Politics Legal Counsel Uganda Episcopal Conference 
E 12 
 
yes Religion and Politics Secretary General Uganda Muslim Supreme Council 
E 13 
 
yes Religion and Politics Traditional Priest Buganda Kingdom 
E 14 
 
yes Religion and Politics Staff National Fellowship of born-again Pentecostal Christians
E 1 2017 no Mpigs Protest Political Activist I (also I8-2017) Jobless Brotherhood 
E 2 
 
yes Black Monday Director Uganda National NGO Forum 
E 3 
 
no Leisure in Local Communities LC1 I Local Council 1 Level 
E 4 
 
yes State of the Nation Platform Former Director ACODE 
E 5 
 
no Market Associations General Secretary Park Yard Market Association 
E 6 
 
no State of the Nation Platform Current Director ACODE 
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N° Year Tran-
script* 
Topic Function Institution 
E 7 2017 yes Housing Market Evolutions Lawyer Real Estate Company 
E 8 
 
yes Black Monday Political Activist II Uganda National NGO Forum 
E 9 
 
yes Supermarkets in Kampala Accountant Nakumatt Supermarket 
E 10 
 
no Local Community Initiatives Chairwoman Women SACCO 
E 11 
 
no Leisure in Local Communities General Secretary Local Council 1 Level 
E 12 
 
yes Mabira Forest Protest Executive Director and Assistant NAPE 
E 13 
 
no Local Community Initiatives Youth Councilor  Kololo 
E 14 
 
no Local Community Initiatives LC1 II Local Council 1 Level 
E 15 
 
no WhatsApp Groups as Leisure Journalist not affiliated 
E 16 
 
no Makerere Lecturers’ Strike Lecturer Makerere University 
E 17 
 
no Buganda Riots Lawyer/Political Activist III formerly Nkobo Zambogo 
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N° Year Tran-
script* 
Topic Function Institution 
E 18 2017 no Ugandan Transport Sector General Secretary UTRADA 
E 19 
 
no Uganda Teachers’ Strike Former Director UNATU 
E 20 
 
yes Middle Class in Uganda Economist Kyambogo University 
E 21 
 
no Market Associations Chairman Usafi Market 
E 22 
 
yes Makerere Lecturers’ Strike Lecturer Makerere University 
E 23 
 
yes Ugandan Transport Sector Chairman Boda Boda 2010 
E 24 
 
yes Black Monday Political Activist IV not affiliated 
E 25 
 
yes Kampala City Development Deputy Director KCCA 
I 6 
 
yes Recent protests in Uganda Brian, Political Activist V Jobless Brotherhood 
I 7 
 
yes Walk to Work Gerald, Political Activist VI FDC 
I 9 
 
yes Business Initiative Roland, chairman UMOSTA 
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N° Year Tran-
script* 
Topic Function Institution 
I 13 2017 yes Political Activism Elijah, Political Activist VII Parish Youth Leader 
I 14 
 
yes Political Activism Joseph, Political Activist VIII National Youth Council 
* If no transcript exists (usually due to the absence of voice recording), notes of the discussions have been made. 
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Annex 6: Coded Catgories 2012 
 
Cat. 
 
Frq Text examples 
2. Corrup-
tion 
Problem in the country |||| |||| 
|||| 
31, 9, 26, 19, 16, 42, 39, 38 (selfish politicians and civil servants), 28, 34, 25, 11, 13, 10 
Affects work of the government: 
institution (esp. health and 
education) 
program implementation 
work in the sectors 
|||| |||| 
|||| |||| 
||| 
31, 9, 26, 42, 36, 33, 32, 30, 23, 25, 6, 5, 4, 7, 8, 15, 21, 14, 2, 13, 10,  
“Corruption has been like a worm eating through, you know, and it has effected the country, 
both politically and socially and economically also.”(6;3) 
5: “The public servants who work in government schools TRY [fort emphasis] and / possibly 
because they don't have an opportunity for corruption there. They cannot sell the chalk.” 
“[...] Sometimes we call it me and my stomach, because people are in those places as long as they 
are satisfied they don't care about who is the low man.” (2;4;39) 
“The work [done in Uganda] is like a Chinese product. Comes in flashy, doesn't last long.” 
(4;3;29) 
“I'm not pleased with the work of the government because corruption has eaten us like a 
cancer.” (39;2;21) 
Get jobs through corruption ||| 33, 4, 20 
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Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
3. Work of 
the govern-
ment 
good Development |||| 38, 34, 20, 2 
 Freedom of expression  |||| | 19, 18, 36, 30, 34, 20,  
 Freedom, peace |||| ||| 19, 18, 42, 38, 33, 34, 20, 2 
 Is trying, but many 
challenges 
|||| | 31, 9, 26, 33, 6, 3 
“Of course, government is trying within their available means, but it is really, really 
challenging.” (6;2) 
 UPE |||| |||| 9, 26, 19, 16, 39, 23, 15, 20, 3, 22 
 Teach against 
corruption 
| 20 
 women | 23 
 Agricultural reforms || 20, 34 
 Work effectively | 33 
 Put their manifesto into 
action 
| 33 
bad Failure to deliver 
(health, infrastructure, 
education) 
|||| |||| 
|||| |||| 
31, 26, 17, 16, 42, 39,38, 37, 36, 32, 23, 12, 25, 11, 7, 15, 21, 14, 10, 22 
“Yes, we have good health services infrastructure. We have built health centers up to the lowest 
level, parish even. But there are no medicines. There are no medical personnel. These are just 
white elephants.” (22;5;39) 
 
No convincing results || 11, 22 
 
Oppression of civilians || 23 (freedom of expression), 34 
 
No proper planning ||| 18, 11, 22 
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Human rights violation ||| 31, 42, 8 “If he [Museveni] doesn't run, he knows he is going to end up in The Hague. The Congo 
Saga, the Amucra incidence, where six hundred people were put in a wagon and burnt.” 
(42;4;49) 
 
 
unemployment |||| 19, 36, 28, 15, 21 
 
 
Budget spending |||| || 17 (too much on teargas), 32, 5, 21, 3 (no loans), 10 
 
People surrounding 
Museveni are bad 
|||| | 31, 9, 33, 32, 23, 25 
“So and at that time the government, the president, let's say was faced with several challenges. 
And it is at that point that he failed to curtail his boys these days from engaging in corrupt 
tendencies.” (32;4;37) 
“For me, I think the government is ok, it is just about the people who are in the government, 
those are the wrong people.” (33;3;17) 
 
inflation |||| | 42, 30, 23, 15, 20 
“Prices are going up every day and to a bigger extent you find the literate and the middle class 
as may seem you may not feel it so much. But class down feel the sugar prices it's almost a 
necessity. And food stuff. You really go beyond. For example like sugar stated at 1500, I find it 
shot up to 5000.” (20;3;28) 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
4. 
Institutions 
 They are there |||| 39, 3,13, 22, 10 
 
But not working 
effectively 
|||| |||| 31, 39, 5, 4, 3,2, 12, 13, 22, 10 
 
Institutions not 
independent from 
president 
|||| |||| 
||| 
31 (parliament sabotaged by cabinet) 19, 37 (personalized), 32, 11, 5, 4, 8, 20, 14, 12, 13, 22 
“All our institutions relate around personalities, individuals. The president of the republic is the 
institution. He can decide anything. He overrides the decisions made by the police department, 
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he can override decisions made by the justice system, he can override decisions made by ANY 
other institution.” (13;2;14) (22;6;48) 
 
They are doing a good 
job 
|| 18, 33 
  
No generalization 
possible 
| 10 
Parlia-
ment 
The 9th parliament is 
trying 
|||| |||| 
|||| 
31, 26, 42, 38, 37, 36, 11, 5, 4, 7, 15, 21, 12, 10 
“I would say these days, the opposition is trying to show the people what is taking place in the 
government. And some few members in parliament who are in the ruling regime have started 
trying to see reality.” (15;5;42) 
 
NRM majority hinders 
bringing up issues 
|||| ||| 19, 42, 23 (EALA),11, 4, 14, 13 
 
Some MP's do good 
work, others don't 
||| 18, 33, 34 
 
MP's selfish (salary 
increase, cars) 
|||| |||| 18, 17, 39, 38, 36, 37, 30, 28, 5, 20 
 
Multipartism is better | 21 
 
Accountable now || 15, 21 
 
Don't conclude debates ||| 17, 36 (ineffective), 20 
judiciary they are trying |||| |||| 26, 19, 37, 36, 28, 8, 15, 21, 14, 10 
“Justice is trying. Because regardless of opposition or pro-government, they try to be balanced 
when they are giving their judgment. Me, the entire institution I will give credit is the justice. 
The justice is fine, it is beyond fifty percent.” (15;5;44) 
 
Corruption |||| | 26, 42, 38, 37, 4,10 
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Not independent |||| |||| 19, 38, 36, 33 (not fair), 23, 6, 20, 12, 13 (Buganda riots) 
“Like you find the judiciary, there are cases which would have been passed,but they are being 
influenced. Because on feels I'm a government supporter or if I rule against the government, 
perhaps I will suffer the consequences.” (20;5;36) 
“They are just there because they are there. The government wants – what they call it, for them 
they say the government but to me I think it is the judiciary.” (33;6;37) 
  
Constrained by lack of 
facilities 
| 21 
  
Overturned MP's 
election 
||| 38 (but too late, as point of criticism), 28, 8 
 
police Oppressive, excessive 
force (teargas) 
|||| |||| 
|||| |||| 
31, 26, 19, 16, 42, 36, 33, 30, 23, 34, 6, 11, 7, 20, 2, 21(have reason for being rough), 10 
“The police naturally has been very brutal in the last two years and there is always that question 
(laughs): what is an army man doing leading the police? And that tends to brutalize the 
institution as it where.” (37;4;21) 
“The police compared to the Sixties, during Amin's time, they were neat, they were learned, they 
were really professionals. Today you see what is happening, what the gay and lesbian activists. 
You are bundled up on a pick up, teargased. 'Walk to Work', I think you have read about it, is 
that really freedom of expression? […] Police has failed to understand its role.”  
  
corruption |||| 38, 30, 5, 7 
  
uneducated | 33 
  
Taking only care of pol 
oppression 
|| 23, 2 
  
No more trust by people | 8 
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Manhandles woman 
opposition leader 
||| 9, 36, 12 
  
Not independent from 
army 
|||| 42, 36, 33, 23, 13  
“Police now in Uganda today is being led by the army. […] And what happens is that he [the 
commander of police] is used to being in the army, he knows things are done in the army way 
and police is supposed to do it in a different way. But he will introduce his army way doing 
things in police.” (23;3;32) 
  
Doing good job |||| 31, 26(good and bad), 38, 10 (compared to other countries), 21  
 
army Will not accept new 
leader 
| 36 “[...] because this army is so loyal to this guy, that I think even if he won, he lost an election, 
some of the leaders, top army leaders would not accept the new guy as their boss. It is possible 
that there could still be a coup.” (33;8;38) 
  
Commit crimes during 
war 
| 26 
  
disciplined |||| ||| 31, 19, 42, 38, 36, 30 (repeats it 4 times in one answer), 23, 7 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
5. Pol. 
parties 
 weak |||| 38, 4, 22, 10 
  
Personalization of 
parties 
|||| | 31, 37, 36, 6, 15, 22 
  
Only fighting, no 
solution 
|||| | 31, 9,17, 37, 4, 15 
  
Need for cooperation || 17, 12 
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Create division | 15 
  
selfish ||| 9, 32, 30 
 
Opposi-
tion 
Besigye is a threat |||| 31, 37 (for some people), 23 (to the govt), 20 
  
Ineffective (internal 
fighting, no agenda) 
|||| |||| 
|| 
31, 16, 42, 36, 28, 23 (bcs of oppression) 11, 5, 20, 22, 10 “They have the ideas, but since they 
are poor financially, they are easily bribed by money, and divided of course” (19;34;3) 
  
No alternative to the 
govt 
|||| || 9, 16, 37, 33, 6, 11, 4 “So even if we go/ have a chance, whatever political party will come, it will 
not come to bring common interest.” (9;4;33) 
  
opportunism ||| 18, 33 (copy NRM agenda), 11 
  
Does not accept defeat ||| 9, 33, 34 
  
Causes riots |||| |||| 31, 9, 37, 33, 15, 34, 20, 21, 2 
“The riots that take place, you find most of them are really based on assumptions, or just on a 
few individuals who disguise the main unemployed youth to come up and take arms. … 
(20:1:10) (20;8;58) 
  
Promising: Mao, Mafabi, 
Kadaga 
||| 31, 26, 7 
  
Can be an alternative |||| |||| 
||| 
19, 17,39, 38, 36, 32, 30, 28, 22, 8, 21, 14, 13 
“Uganda will be the best place to live in! [if opposition rules]” (8;5;58 28':20''), 
“Yeah, I think, you know, they are doing a good job and we hope that maybe in the future they 
will convince the population, to rally behind them and you know, maybe they come to power, 
hopefully.” (21..) 
  
Need to develop   
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Govt hinders their 
devlpt 
|||| |||| 
|||| 
39, 38 (no financial base) 37, 36, 30, 23, 6, 4, 8, 15, 21, 3, 13, 22 
“But then the other thing is, you know, the control of resources, you get it? Like being in 
government they have the resources to do, you know all they come to do what to remain in 
power.” (21;4;35) 
“They say that they let the political space free, but every party is free to mobilize and do 
campaigns or something like that, but it is not the case. Like if DP wanted to hold a rally in 
Kampala here, well there will be a lot of teargas and that kind of stuff, although on paper they 
say, political parties are free.” (23;3;28) 
  
Challenge govt to do 
better 
|||| 26, 18,36, 14, 12 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
6. king-
doms 
bad No use |||| ||| 42, 38, 33, 6, 7, 3, 13, 22 “Only the return of the kingdoms somehow made the civil society quiet. 
Somehow people are busy in their kingdoms. People have something else to do than looking 
only at the government position. Some are busy working in the kingdom. Working hard on that. 
So it makes them busy.” (38;4;25) 
  
Divides people |||| |||| 26, 37, 36+33 (want to own the city), 32, 6, 15, 20, 14 
“So what is the point of having different small administrative units within the central 
government? With time, the work of the kingdom begins to undermine some of the decisions of 
government, ok? They even start becoming a threat.” (6;7), 14, 15, 20 “There is that scenario 
that if they [Buganda kingdom] are given so many powers, they will act beyond. So there is that 
instance where they will say 'we need all foreigners off, if you are a Mtoro, go back to your land, 
if you are an Alur, go back to your kingdom', so it would, but it would be better if they worked 
hand in hand with the government, not to be given sole powers over their subordinates.” 
(20;7;56) 
 
Good, 
but not 
in 
politics 
Developmental role |||| | 16, 37, 30, 23, 5 
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Mobilization power of 
the king 
|||| || 32, 30, 11, 5, 4, 15, 10 “I would think the kingdoms may work better in mobilizing, say, when it 
comes to health, when it comes to education, when it comes to some few things like that, it can 
work.” (15;6;52) 
  
But two distinct roles | 10 
  
Cultural reasons |||| ||| 36, 30, 4, 7, 21, 3, 2, 10 “I don't think they are doing anything to change or to play a role in the 
direction of this country.” (4;6) “Well, I wouldn't support it. I wouldn't support it, because a 
traditional king basically is supposed to be traditional and the highest authority in terms of 
cultural recognition. And culture and politics, as much as they are kind of complementary, 
because you can go with politics in culture, but in terms of national politics, they shouldn't.” 
(21;7;51) 
 
More to 
say in 
politics 
Structure for 
governance there 
|||| 19 (leaders too), 23 (federalism), 11, 13, 10 
  
More legitimacy than 
govt 
|||| || 19, 17, 28, 23, 34, 11, 8 
  
Land issues by kingdom || 18, 25 
  
Cooperation btn govt + 
king 
|| 34, 11 
  
No peace w/o solving 
that question 
| 13 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
7.Democracy yes Need for more |||| |||| 31, 18 (freedom of expr), 36, 33, 6, 8, 20, 12 (30%), 13, 10 (10;6;52) 
 
 Young leaders are 
coming up: hope 
|||| 17, 42, 37, 36 
“The present government has been in power for 26 odd years, yes, about 26 years, so within this 
time there has come a younger generation who have now made their way into parliament and 
they are demanding change.” (37;3;17) 
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no Loss of legitimacy of 
law-enforcing bodies 
|| 38, 11 
 
 No freedom of 
expression 
|| 42, 23 
 
 Unbalanced 
development 
| 33 
 
 Dependence thr/ 
funding, business 
| 22 
 
 Civil society not free | 6 
 
 Constraint by govt ||| 39, 5, 13 
 
 No democracy |||| |||| 
|||| 
9 (needs to be practiced everywhere), 19, 17, 16, 42, 30, 28, 23 (the tiniest), 4, 7, 15, 14, 3, 2 
“Well, they say we have democracy. That's what they say. I only comment that.” (2;4;44) 
“We have rulers masquerading as leaders. I think if we were democratic enough, we would be 
having leaders, not rulers.” (14) 
“There is no real democracy. Democracy is just in favor of some. Because someone tell you: if 
you don't vote me, chaos is coming back. Will that be democracy? You will just vote that person 
so that you have rid chaos. Period. But not your own free will.” (15;5;46) 
 
 Democracy not good, 
military govt better 
|| 32 (need a dictator), 22 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
8. Elections  fraud |||| |||| 
|||| |||| 
19, 18, 17, 42, 39, 38, 37, 36, 32, 30, 28, 23, 6, 11, 4, 7, 8, 20, 3, 2, 12, 13, 10, 22 
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|||| “So that's why you have seen ever since we went into elections in February you have seen 
demonstrations, all this. If this government really was voted into power, why/ where do the 
demonstrators come from?” (7;3;40 19':42'') 
“[...] I told you we pray very hard, still they don't cheat us. Because this time wrong, I'm ready to 
fight.” (12;4; 42 24':49''), (13;6;43) 
“Yes, it [elections] has to be there, for every country in this world, there have to be elections. 
But for us here in Uganda they are meaningless.” (30;3;32) 
  Registration process 
not proper 
||| 31, 36, 11 
  Voter's bribery |||| | 38, 32, 6, 15, 10 
  False promises |||| ||| 18, 36, 30, 28, 6, 4, 12, 10 
  Useless to vote |||| | 42, 37, 36, 23, 13 
“Because they feel, even if they vote, they can't change anything. So they are getting frustrated, 
saying no, what's the essence of voting? And if I give a vote, and the results, somebody wants 
them to be in another way, they may be turn out to be in another way.” (23;5;46) 
“That's interesting, I don't vote. I only voted once. Because for some reason I think, I just know 
that the votes are going to be rigged, the elections are not going to be free and fair. So my vote is 
useless. I'd rather sit home and read a book with the children.” (42; 8; 41) 
  Results predetermined |||| 23, 4, 15, 14 “Because really, it is like doing something when you know the end result. So you do 
a formality, but you know the end result. So, there was no need for that.” (15;1;12) 
  Commission not 
independent 
|||| 37, 36, 8, 22 
  Opposition didn't 
mobilize 
| 15 
  Fair elections || 9, 33 (33;8;45 – personal testimony) 
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  Responsibility to vote 
(for change, citizens 
duty) 
|||| | 9, 38, 30. 23, 7, 22 “You must look for a way forward to pull out our country, otherwise it is 
rotting.” (12;2;18 14':41''), “Yeah, it would discourage me, but I have the strong feeling that I 
still need to exercise my right. And you/ definitely there is some small hope that one day things 
will become right, we cannot fool things always.” (22;3;33) 
  On local level no fraud |||| 19, 11, 5, 20 
  No trouble 2016 | 21 “Because of those people [possible trouble makers] the police is always there to get them.” 
(21;9;61) 
  Opposition starts 
convincing 
| 21 
  intimidation | 37 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
9. Changes past Idi Amin was good || 36,11 
“Amin was / I think, yes, there was a lot of human rights violations, and all. But I think one of the 
coun/one of the leaders who truly loved this country was Amin.” (36;6;30) 
  Milton Obote was good ||| 36 (obote I was best), 32 (good institutions),11 
  Amin bad | 23 
  improvement now |||| 9, 33, 25, 6 
“Because I/ according to my view. I lived during the colonial days. I've gone through all the 
regimes. Since then this has been the best regime we have ever had. I'm telling you, I lost an 
uncle, his sons over cer/ certain regimes. So, to tell you the truth, this is the (.) best (.) regime 
we have ever had. Apart from the colonial regime.” (9;2;19) 
  Never peaceful change | 5 
  Insecurity before |||| 36, 33, 23, 3 
“When it came to Obote, there was no security. At all. He never wanted to pay the soldiers. He 
used to tell the soldiers: 'You mean you can't make your own salaries? I give you a gun then I 
also give you your salaries.” (23;7;56) 
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  No competition | 2 
  No globalization | 2 
  War hindered 
development 
| 25 
  Previously (10/15 
years) good, now bad 
|||| |||| 
|||| || 
19, 16 (two last years) 42, 39, 37, 36, 28, 23, 6, 7, 8, 15 (up to 2011), 20, 14+31(since 
multipartism), 13, 22 (22;2;15) 
“There are many things, yes, they have done. And every Ugandan can acknowledge that there are 
so many changes this government has brought to better the situation of the people in this 
country. [But] it is not possible that you can do RIGHT things for 26 years and you are doing 
only the correct things for 33 million.”(13;4;27) 
But in the first ten years he had done the best. But when the idea came of becoming a life pre-
sident, in quotations, to have a tight grip on power, I think this is where mistakes are.” (39;4;33) 
 present People are getting 
aware: want roads, 
education, pol. maturity 
||| 37, 36, 21 
“Now, my parents, my mother for example would say: 'Ah, you guys you don't know what it 
meant for us to go through this. So, yes, these guys may not be doing it all right, but at least we 
have our peace. And, things are improving, we have / we have things in shops and buy 
something. Then you didn't have money but you could not buy from somewhere, so you guys 
should accept.' Now there is that change from that thinking to: 'Ok, hold on, we put you there 
because you wanted to do this. You are not doing this, that is not right.' So then they were 
holding us a (drama?) of saying 'I gave you this, stick with me, or I let you go back to that.' So, 
the more / if more people come to see this, and we have a system where we hold our leaders 
accountable, and say that, we want you to do this, if you don't do it, get out.” (36;8;36) 
  Situation is getting 
worse (diff. reasons) 
|||| |||| 26 (no peace right now), 42, 32, 28, 11, 4, 7 , 20, 14 
“If I'm bad off / because before, before I used to talk with my granny, the elders, so they used to 
talk of those ancient days of Amin, Obote, what. 'Actually you know, you never saw anything, for 
us we used to to sleep on the bush, what. But these days, at least you can sleep peacefully.' So, 
me I was used to tell my mum that granny, that you continue sleeping, but you see this (laughs) 
you continue with your sleeping, but this thing of / can I call it, no, I won't call it freedom, 
improvement of a kind, anything to be improved on, by the government, it can't be gotten on a 
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silver plate. That is something you have to work for, or fight for. So they are like: 'Ah, your age, 
you never saw anything. Trust me, if you lost / if you lost what what.'” (28;7;64) 
“Ah, these are demonstrations / demonstrations are as a result of an incontentation [sic]. If 
people are not contented, with what is happening, they are most likely to demonstrate. But if 
people are happy, you never see demonstrations. Some ten years back there were no 
demonstrations, because people were happy and contented. But since they have seen that things 
are going the wrong way, they started to do it.” (19;5f;68) 
 
 
Loss of popularity of the 
president 
|| 6, 8 
 
 
Stability now ||||  39, 30, 5, 7, 3 
 
 
Food / fuel prices up |||| 17, 28, 20, 12 
 
 
Increase in riots   
 
 
development |||| || 18, 42, 33, 30, 25, 2 
“Though people are saying, now, you know, people are saying Museveni did nothing and has not 
build anything, Obote has build Mulago hospital […] But if there were no hospitals, I think that 
would be the first thing Museveni would do: to give us the big hospital. But if it is there, he will 
only do to maintain it.” [33;10f;61] 
 
 
Gap rich poor widens | 36 
 
 
No change || 18, 38 
 future No common 
mobilization possible 
bcs no common interest 
| 11 
 
 
No more political 
stability 
|||| | 19, 23, 5, 14(increase riots), 3 
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“Because, the way things are going, people are loosing hope, and leading a society that has lost 
hope is really, really dangerous. That's what I'm (go on?). Anything can happen. So, I don't see 
light in the next five years. You may find we may go back to war, how will it come? Because, you 
can't see (5) the level of strikes, nowadays, it's different from what used to happen in the last 
ten years when the government has just come in power. These days it is very difficult to pass a 
street in Kampala, which is without policemen, without soldiers. So that means, for the 
government to stay in power, there must be soldiers? Policemen? Taking control of the city.” 
(23, 9; 64) 
“The next five years may not be very stable. Because people are fighting. There is a power 
struggle and everybody wants to be a boss, so everybody want to lead, so that has remained 
cause of some problems. That's why we have teargas, gunshots, we have demonstrations here 
and there.” (3;5) 
“But I think we have now got to a point where it is irreversible. It really is irreversible. And 
there is a sense that in 2016 people are expecting the state to escalate, in terms of violence 
towards the locals.” (37;5;29) 
“And also now we have a crucial element to it, in the sense that there is a generation of people 
who do not know what war is. My generation lived through the overthrow of Idi Amin. We lived 
through the Obote days were we hidd under beds and there were bullets all over the place. So 
we fear. Some of us fear to force a change, because they don't want to go back to those days. 
They don't want the children to live this. But now you have a generation which has grown up 
seeing only one president and they have not seen the ugly side of war.” (37;6;29) 
 
 
Ppl from outside will 
come back, bring new 
influences 
| 2 
 
 
Will become worse  |||| 31, 38, 23, 7 (if M7 runs again), 12 (no change if no govt change) 
“Yes, they are my tribe mates, but they are cocooning. There are few people in this cocoon that 
are enjoying. Then the rest are left to suffer. So if this cocoon is not broken, they are not going 
anywhere.” (12;6;56 ) 
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“The opposition will continue to be impation. Very impatient. And I think they will look towards 
disrupting this government many times. I think that's the tactic they have taken up. They will 
just continue agitating, agitating. Until the government is a bit / really, to make discomfort.” 
(38;5;33) 
 
 
Pol maturity || 4, 21 
 
 
Benefits from oil 
(employment etc.) 
|| 32 (only infrastructure, nothing else!!), 25 
 
 
NRM is on the right 
track, bright future 
| 33 
 
 
No change || 9 (even if govt changes), 32  
“You can take a person out of the village, but you cannot take the village out of the person.” 
(9;3;27) 
 Need to Implement existing 
laws 
| 10 
 
 
Fight corruption ||| 34, 20, 10 
 
 
Improve health, 
infrastructure, 
education, inst. 
|||| | 37, 8, 15, 21, 13, 10 
 
 
Ppl political education: 
election, rights 
|||| 11, 15, 22, 10 
“There should be systematic political education. […] Right from primary. Yes, this is a country 
where they are not teaching for their kids about rights. […] So how do you have a future in 
politics in that kind of country?” (22;9;70) 
 
 
   
 
 
Change leadership |||| |||| 31, 9, 26, 17, 42, 36, 32, 28, 6, 5, 7, 14, 13, 22 
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|||| | “There are so many other visionary people, he calls himself visionary, but I think he just has 
ambitions, because ambitions are not visions. He has an ambition, not a vision. But there are 
some people down there with a vision, but they don't give them a chance to show it.” (14;5;59) 
“And you can see people are increasingly getting tired. And that's why you see the riots. Coming 
up in the country. This country used not to have riots. The police are now engaged throughout 
the country. Because of / I think there is some bit of discontent.” 22 
“Because me, ever since I was born, I'm seeing only one leader. So I would say, I like there to be 
changes. If it is – they may five years, then five years is a lot – another leader comes in. So that's 
what I mostly want.” (28;2;16) 
“ [...]one thing that I think about that can change is electing another leader but we no longer 
elect nowadays.” (17;4;49) 
“It can be possible if people are willing to change. Cause you find like some people are not (.)/ 
are not willing to change. They feel like if I am like this I should stay like this. If I was born like 
this I should stay like this. Or if someone is like this he feels like "let me be". Some people are 
afraid of the change cause they don't know what might come. Yeah. But if people can change 
their perspective, take risks (.) maybe we can prosper in one way or the other.” (18;7;86) 
“So it needs a whole revamping, the whole country. And it needs like a new face. I don't know 
where that savior is going to come from. Maybe. Because even if the current, maybe Mao, maybe, 
the DP president, but with Besigye coming there, I think we will still be heading for disaster. 
Because we give the old government will try to fight and we might even plant back into war. 
Which I don't want. So, let's wait and see what happens.” (31;10;79) 
 
 
Create civil society | 5 
 
 
Reform policies | 23 
 
 
Term limits ||||  42, 32, 7, 20, 13 
“So a situation like this it is only because [of the fact] that the presidency has a lot of power and 
authority installed by virtue being president of the republic, it is therefore important that such 
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powers must have limit of some sort. Unfortunately in this country we don't have that as well. 
So we have got a presidency with absolute power – forever.” (13;2;19) 
 
 
Close gap rich-poor ||| 30, 20, 10 
 
 
Free and fair elections | 12 
 
 
Improve agriculture ||| 32, 28, 20 
 
 
Fight unemployment |||| 31, 26 (and better pay for those working), 18, 20 
 
 
Listening to people's 
views 
| 17 
 
 
To have ppl with a 
vision 
| 36 
 Own 
role 
Give advice |||| ||| 31+18+30 (but not considered), 34, 5, 13, 22, 10 
“Me, as a person, I feel I should do much for my country, genuinely, but they don't consider me 
of use when it comes to that big house, the parliament, and all, any other position […] We said to 
us, they are running in a wrong direction, but since you have no say, (4) you just let that a side, 
come to your home, do some work […] and life goes on like that.” (30;7;64) 
 
 
Civil servants = neutral |||| 9, 6, 21, 22, 10 
 
 
Educate children || 11, 2 
 
 
Overseeing program 
implementation 
| 21 
 
 
People's political 
education 
|| 9 (teaching human rights), 32 
 
 
vote |||| 42+36+4+12 (but didn't), 19 
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Develop tourism | 33 
 
 
Overcome govt 
shortcomings 
| 15 (disadvantaged) 
 
 
Don't bribe | 16 
 
 
Community engagement || 38, 37 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
10. pol. 
activism 
good A good idea |||| ||| 26, 18, 17, 5, 7, 8, 20,10 
“I wouldn't (.) I wouldn't say it is a bad idea (..) but (..) my problem comes on (..) how they 
conduct it (..) Because the police is clear/ tells whoever wants to protest inform them. But if (.) 
the activists inform the police/ but still the police goes ahead to intervene in their 
demonstration, yet it is peaceful. That is really not good. And they even apply harsh (..) ways of 
handling them.” (17;5;57) 
  
Freedom of expression 
needs to be protected 
||| 36 (inspires the country, someone like Mandela, Gandhi) 4, 10 
  
Govt not taking things 
f/ granted 
|||| ||| 26, 16, 38, 32, 20 (Helps govt to revise some things)3, 13, 10  
“Mmh, it [pol. Activism] is good. It gets the state thinking. It / you know, for every situation in 
politics they need to hear, you know, so many voices. They need to know where they are going 
wrong. And if it is not there, then they get too comfortable and that leads to dictatorship, so it is 
good to a certain extent, but they should also be very careful (laughs). Because for all security 
agencies around the world, especially in Africa, it is – you know, there is a threat to it.” (10;4;34) 
“So indeed, my view is that it was a correct indicator to the government. Unfortunately the 
government of Uganda did not READ properly to understand what people are saying. […] 
Cracked very hard on them, instead of listening to them.” (13;10;67) 
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bad They are selfish ||| 19 (make you help achieve what they want, but nothing for you), 33, 11 
  
Dangerous, esp. in 
Africa 
|||| 14, 3, 13, 10 
“There is a power struggle and everybody wants to be a boss, so, everybody wants to lead, so 
that has remained cause of some problems. That's why we have teargas, we have gunshots, we 
have demonstrations here and there.” (3;5;) 
  
Will not change 
anything 
| 9 (W2W) 
  
Better dialogue than 
protest 
|||| 34, 20, 21, 22 (think tank) 
 
W2W They have a cause |||| |||| 
|||| ||| 
19, 18, 17, 39, 30, 28 (28;6f;62), 3, 25, 5, 4, 8, 15, 20, 14, 2, 13, 10 
  
whole world concerned |||| 31, 37, 33, 6 
  
People are looting, riots |||| |||| 
||| 
31, 39, 38, 37, 33, 34, 6, 11, 4, 20, 21, 2, 10 
“And for fear of loosing out [the business men and women] close down the shops, businesses 
and so. Ah, four ourself that is not good. Let's not open up. And you find these are the wrong 
elements in those people who want to come and maybe grab some valuables from the shop and 
run away.” (21;10,71) 
  
Concept inappropriate 
(late for work, tired) 
||| 30, 6, 11 
  
idlers and unemployed 
participating 
|||| |||| 
|||| 
31, 26, 39, 33, 32, 28, 25, 6, 11, 4, 20, 3, 2, 13 
“And you know, but enough, it is almost our age, who are suffering, mostly our age. This is 
unemployed. And the government is not careful. Thus you see that fighting thing, you get 
someone of my age on the street, demonstrating. These people who go for it – who go for 
demonstrating on the street, what / They do it because they have nothing, so whenever they go 
and demonstrate, they have nothing to loose.” (28;7;64) 
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“You see demonstrations and you will find boda boda guys, shouting, running, people who really 
don't have this agenda. I don't know. But people who / they don't have this thing at heart, they 
are just there because something is happening.” (32;10;73) 
  
Not credible ||| 37, 33, 11 
  
Crushed by govt ||| 32, 20, 13  
“I would say, it was good they [the government] ruled them off, though in a ruthless way. 
Because the moral like if it was 'Walk to Work' and a bigger group forms, it will end up in 
destruction of poverty.” (20;10;66)  
  
exaggerated |||| ||| 9, 39, 38, 30, 5, 15, 3, 2 
  
Causes violence |||| |||| 31, 26, 18, 39, 25, 20, 21, 14, 3, 2 
“But (.) in the main course it was our suffering. Cause us who are using taxis, when these 
activists started, they started firing with teargas. And it was us who are getting hurt. Yeah. And 
those people were just continuing. Because for them they have a main cause as to why they are 
doing their walk to work. And why they/ (.) they are not like us. They have their money but I 
think they had a better aim than us who are looking at it like it is just a walk to work.” (18;6;68) 
  
just walking |||| || 26,16, 30, 7, 20, 14, 15 
 
 Demos hijacked by 
parties 
|||| 31, 22, 4 (govt) 15 (FDC) 
“Demonstrations are always hijacked by those political parties. Those demos might be of a 
cause, but a certain political group may come and hijack it on the way.” (15;8;70), 
“But for them they were using that/ they were using that the economic crisis you know? But 
they were trying to (...) to (...) maybe to (..) they have other hidden agendas you know? like i 
think they were looking at how the Tunisian the Tunisia (unint.) and different war, like there 
were this chaos and they managed and even like this man of Libya/ they thought they could do 
the same here.” (31;3;29) 
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Own 
engage-
ment 
inactive 
Activity: 
Debate 
helping disadvantaged 
party support 
demonstration  
Buganda riots 
 
 
|| 
 
| 
|| 
|| 
||| 
 
8, 13 
 
15 
33 (election propaganda), 23 (financial) 
26 + 42 (once) 
19, 28, 23 (intention to participate) “I wanted to participate in a demonstration where my 
kabaka was refused to visit one of the counties in Bugerere. But by the time I wanted to 
participate it had become SOUR. Live bless over. I said, I support you guys, but for the sake of my 
life, I couldn't. Yeah. But had it been a peaceful demonstration and hadn't it gone sour, I would 
be part of it.” (23;13;86) 
 
  
ppl watching, but no 
action 
|||| 37 (need involvement by intelligentsia), 23, 4, 10  
  
Fear to loose what you 
have 
|||| 26, 23 (your name gets tarnished), 2, 5, 10 
“The major reason [for not publishing papers] is that (…) it could disadvantage me in a very bad 
way in Uganda currently. You will be noted and believe me, the state will take interest in you. 
Some opportunities might be consequently denied to you. And if you are too bad, it could even 
endanger your life. Yeah (more silently), it could even endanger your life.” (5;9) 
 
  
Feeling nothing will 
change 
|||| 18, 30, 4, 10 
“Dealing with it? I just think about it, mediate about it and just let it go. […] For the expenses, 
when things go up we have to bear the situation, because you have nothing to do, you have to 
maintain at least the necessities […].” (30:9:78) 
“So you feel like (.) where the elephants fight is the grass to suffer. So you find like you are 
suffering because of the consequences of the big people yet at the end you won't gain anything 
as you the local one (.). Cause when (.) like (.) goods are coming up.” (18;5;62) 
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Not my character |||| 39, 38, 37, 6, 5   
  
Not organized | 4  
  
People are not into 
fighting 
| 42   
  
Too much violence |||| |||| 
|||| ||| 
9, 18, 38 (fears crowds), 37, 36, 33, 30, 11, 8, 20, 14, 2, 12  
“I'm not ready to be teargased.” (12;6;64) 
“But I will not wake up knowing even before I walk one kilometer and I will be huddled up 
perhaps on a police car, or teargased, or.. !” (20;10;70) 
“'Walk to Work' was just an expression of dissatisfaction of a few issues in government or in the 
country. But you see how it turned sour? Kibokos and teargas, like my fellow colleague, FDC 
leader president, Doctor, retired Colonel Kizza Besigye, I don't know if it was shown on the CNN 
the way he was manhandled around Mulago roundabout here. I'll never forget that. I've never 
seen it before. It really scared me away from politics. I can't openly participate in it.” (23;12;80) 
“No I don't [participate in demonstrations]. And even my children, I always tell them at school, 
never to [stop] themselves from working. Even if you say you are not satisfied, you end up in 
problems.” (30;9;76) 
“If you get arrested none of this politicians will come to safe your life. Oh we are in this thing 
together, let me help you out. They won't. They just leave you there. And for that one who get 
have problems or is hit by something they goes to Nairobi. For you, you stay here in Mulago 
without any treatment. Now, whats the point there.” (18;6;72) 
 
  
No benefit | 3 “I don't see the benefits of being politically active. If I have the infrastructure I need from my 
government then I find no point running around.” (3,6) 
 
  
No cause at heart || 20, 2  
 
 No time |||| |||| 26, 19, 42, 32, 28, 34, 25, 7, 8  
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Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
11. role of 
the state 
pos Political stability |||| 26, 34, 5, 10 
  
security |||| | 42, 4, 20, 14, 2, 10 
  
Macroeconomic 
stability 
||| 5, 20, 14 
  
career | 21 
 
neg corruption ||| 37, 11, 2 
  
Lack of service delivery |||| | 17 (tuition increase), 33 (no soldier's pension), 23 (has to support his family members), 7, 8, 15 
  
Taxes ||||  18, 37, 11, 8,15 
  
No fair competition | 4 
  
inflation || 31, 30 
  
No role |||| ||| 19, 38, 15, 3,2+6(pos), 13 
“And when you go to the government referral hospitals, you find it is the lowest classes of people. 
The people at the grass roots are the ones that strive to go there because, well, they are clinging 
onto the government. And they are the ones who at the end of the day get frustrated because 
where government has failed to meet their demands.”  
“But socially, I have lived without this government, and I don't think this government has anything 
to help me.” (13;11;73) (37)  
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Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
12. Goals 
and 
obstacles 
goals parents ||||  16, 23, 11, 13, 10 
  
God ||| 17, 16, 10 
  
Perseverance  |||| |||| | 19, 18, 17, 33, 30, 6, 11, 4, 8, 20, 10 
  
education |||| | 33, 5, 15, 21, 13 
  
finances || 3, 2 
  
honesty || 26, 7 
  
independence ||| 31, 33, 20 
  
sharing | 20 
  
Being adventurous  | 14 
 
Obsta-
cles 
No merit system, 
connection 
|| 18 (social life hinders to mingle with others) 4 “They call it in Uganda 'technical know-who' 
[sic]. Whom do you know. Out there. If you don't know anybody, sorry, you're not good enough. 
Yes.' (4;2;17) 
  
finances |||| |||| 31, 26, 30, 5, 8, 20, 14, 3, 2 
  
corruption | 2 
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dishonesty | 7 
  
High taxes | 8 
  
Bad decisions | 16 
  
unemployment | 19 
  
family |||| 31, 17, 30, 15, 20 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
13. Future  Political parties to 
develop 
| 6 
 
 
democracy ||| 5, 4, 2 
 
 
Transparent society |||| | 42, 39, 30, 6, 4 “I hope that we will have a transparent society. I hope that the society where our 
children are growing in will be a free and fair society to everybody who will have a chance to do 
what they can.” (6;9) 
 
 
Stability, peace |||| |||| 31, 9, 26, 16, 37, 30, 25, 7, 3 “Yeah, actually there is [a threat to peace for the country]. There is. 
If people are moving on the street, that 'Walk to Work', those are the / the [strain?] to the 
country, of course. […] Yeah, we believe there is no peace. But if that walking to work thing 
stops, then there is peace, yeah.” (25) 
include note book notes for 37 
“Apart from the recent two years really. (..) There has been peace in Uganda. (..) Could be 
comfortable in this country and not thinking about going anywhere. Because I love this country 
and (...)/ its where I want to be forever (...). I like till I die/ I really need the peace to come back 
to normal.” ( 
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employment | 3 
 
 
accountability |||| 37, 30, 13, 22 
 
 
Equal development |||| 18, 33, 21, 13 
 
 
Government change ||| 26, 17, 13 (13;12;79) 
“I wish it would be like South Africa or Mandela's regime. (.) A leader comes in and resigns when 
we still need him.” (17;7;77) 
 
 
Patriotism || 23, 14 
 
 
Service delivery ||| 11, 4, 8 
 
 
Good governance || 18, 39 
 
 
Better education || 33, 15 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
14. Politics  Too violent ||| 42, 25, 13 
“Actually, you know, the whole politics of Uganda here, when you get involved, it can easily, 
sometimes you can even loose your life. Because I have seen many of my relatives have lost their 
life in such kind of politics in Uganda. […] Amin was there, Obote was there and actually the 
President Museveni was also involved in it.” (25;1;7-11) 
“You don't life long in Africa (…), if you are involved in politics, you don't live long.” (42;1;7) 
  About telling lies |||| || 12, 31+26+18, “[politics] It's a dirty game.” (18;1;5), 30, 14, 15 
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  Change in attitude 
necessary  
|| 11, 10 
  About religion | 9 
  Should be caring for the 
ppl 
| 34 
 
Cat.  
 
Frq Text examples 
others  Challenges to the govt: 
civil war, army 
expenditure on 
uprisings and foreign 
intervention, refugees 
coming in the country, 
population increase, 
illiteracy 
| 6 
  Buganda riots  ||| 33 (president solved it, 33;9;53)) 8+13 run badly by the govt 
  Political strategy not to 
develop middle class, 
they are aware of their 
rights 
| 13 
  Govt hinders change | “And they keep showing you, that without it, there is no way out, you are trapped. You, you are 
doomed without it. So that's where the masses always have the fear to change something. And 
they came up with the slogan of 'No Change'. So they / people fear change.” (15;3;32) 
  Middle class (hier eigtl. 
Elite) benefits from the 
government 
| 15 
  Masses are ignorant | 15 
  People being chased out 
of their stalls, creating 
thieves 
||| 18 (but good, no more crowds, no more pickpockets), 17, 23 
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  Donors are not giving 
enough money 
| 21 
  Ppl vote M7 because he 
has been around for so 
long 
| 21 
  Strike = riot ||| 31, 33, 30 
  Nice roads but no 
economic activity 
|| 15, 32 
  “Exactly that's what I 
told you. If you really 
get anot/ if like now, for 
instance, before 
elections begin, what 
the government does, it 
is tightening the 
security, so when the 
civilians see military 
moving around town, 
who wants to die? You 
see that? No one wants 
to die. You really sit 
behind and think why 
should I demonstrate? I 
have food, I can go to 
work, these military 
they cannot touch me if 
I don't violate.” 
(33;11;65) 
  
  Sense of impunity 
because of bush war 
| 36 “And two, something that's see, this government was taking over by a military coup. Now, the 
group that feel that they brought this government to power, belief they need to be paid back for 
their sacrifice. And so, most of those who did that feel that whatever we have now, we owe it to 
them. So, because famously one of them [...] was minister of health then, actually, during the 
trial he stole the / he told the principal judge of the high court. He asked him: 'Where were you 
when we were fighting in the bush?' when asked about the money. So you see that kind of it 
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gives you / goes around these hard untouchables in the government who feel that all of this is 
because of them.” (36;2;10) 
  Tribalism as problem | 36 
  Boda-boda guys to 
mobilize 
| 42 (42;11;113) 
  
Annex 7: Coded Categories 2014/2017 
List of Categories   
1. Growing up 10. Tradition and Modernity / Role of 
Culture 
19. Health and Nutrition 
2. Sponsors / Scholarships 11. Youth 20. Middle Class 
3. Family 12. Religion 21. Leisure 
4. Emergence 13. Gender 22. Good Life 
5. Education 14. Politics 23. Hard Working 
6. Extended Family 15. Experience / Expectations with Public 
Officials 
24. Poverty 
7. Loans 16. Political Activism 25. Money and Socialization 
8. Financial Conditions  17. Repression/Fear  
9. Networks and mentors 18. Tribalism 
1. Growing up 
In poor conditions 
1-2014 Father primary teacher, mother at time of his schooling unemployed, four children at home, would work to earn 
money for school fees in primary; growing up in poor economic conditions in the village 
2-2014 From polygamous family, father over 30 children, mother died when he was 7, raised by stepmother, growing 
up in village in Masaka, Doing many house chores, economic conditions fair, could barely survive, 
5-2014 Born in the village, very poor conditions, parents subsistence farmers, no one is educated, father stopped P2, 
mother in P1, parents in his village the poorest, eleven kids, nine are still alive, after primary no school fees for 
secondary, run away to KLA, lived on the streets around Kalerwe, doing small jobs, found myself 200 000, 
joined S1, then S2 dropped out for four years,  
6-2014 From poor family, below one dollar, subsistence farmers, with lack of land, not sure even for him to finish P7, 
convinced father to send him to secondary, S5 father sold piece of land to support him, 
418 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
In poor conditions 
7-2014 Grew up in the village in Western Uganda, from mother’s side 10 children, at the beginning life was good, we 
had a lot of land, cows, banana plantation, when I reached S6 things started changing, dad did not love us 
anymore, around 2010 wouldn’t give care to children, went to live with another woman, divorced mother, then 
came back again, but he is still with the other women, parents are not working, farmers in the village, 
14-2014 Born in family of seven, biological father left, grew up with stepfather and mother in a place called Kazoo, I am 
first born, childhood wasn’t bad, mother dealing in second-hand clothes, father mechanical work, father paid 
fees up to S3, then got very sick, before issues with my mum, had another lady, around S4 he passed on, had two 
more children outside marriage we did not know off, his family wanted that we share our land with them, 
mother sold it quickly before funeral arrangements, bought ready built house with the money in Bwaise, we did 
not have money, mother had stopped working to take care of sick person (father), house in bad shape, we were 
in abject poverty at that time, mother also got sick, was HIV positive but had a vision, God showed her that she 
was healed and he would build a house for us, got a visitor later who built a new house for them on the ground, 
put everything inside, someone from Watoto, we never knew who he was, 
15-2014 Born in 1976 in peasantry farmer, father polygamous with seven wives, mother was fifth, father not working, 
grew up in a family of scarcity, from mother’s side four children, started schooling in 1984 in primary, dropped 
out in p5 for school fees, from then started doing casual jobs, completed p7 in 1991, started working full scale 
in masonry, in 1998 to go back to school, agreed with headmaster to sit for O-Level exams, in 2000 joined A-
Level, working on school farm and repair school buildings in order to pay fees, mother never went to school, 
father stopped in P7 
16-2014 Coming from humble family background, family of ten, father adopted another four, I am ninth out of ten, 
parents aging when he was growing up, father retired civil servant when I went to ss, father had to sell land in 
order to educate the children “Because our father had retired, there was scarcity of resources, so in other words 
you were subjected to the deed of a hard environment, and for which you had also to become more serious, than 
/ to ensure that you work your way out of that environment.”  
17-2014 Born in 1984, grew up with father, took me away from mother, I hated her, life with step mum was not easy, too 
much work, dad forced me to work, separated when I was in primary, very poor father left for three weeks 
looking for a job, left him alone in the house with nothing, failed to come back because of lack of money, father 
died in 2001 when I was in Form IV, someone brought me back to school, I was on the verge of dying, started 
working with construction company, did not stop schooling but worked during breaks, 
19-2014 Parents used to live in the village but now mother is here, father was a painter, did not go to school, mother was 
doing small business, they separated, I was on the street, 
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In poor conditions 
20-2014 Grew up in family of many children, father had five wives but wedded with mother, at age of four, five, mother 
died, during primary stayed with grandmother, when finished came back, the same year got saved. Father did 
not want born-again, stayed home for one year because he had put condition to leave aside faith – break with 
father 
21-2014 Father business man, mother house wife, four children from mother’s side, father two other wives, childhood 
generally good, infancy, good, age of 11 father got job problems, stopped supporting us, mother went to Abu 
Dhabi to work, father would not take care of them, stayed with a best friend of mother, after one year mother 
missed children, came back, had to start from scratch, no home, father had sold the house, did small jobs, like 
selling mandazi, 
8-2017 From a family of twelve, father was UPDF officer up to now, joined NRA in 1983, but to now third lowest rank, 
other people joined later, like son of president, he is saluting them now, so much injustice, motivated me to 
become an activist; I have seen people suffer so much, if someone tells me I’m hungry, I’ve been chased from 
home, I know. Not sure to get meal or fees to go to school 
E18-17 Mother gave birth to him in jail, father was in exile, grew up with uncle 
E4-2017 Have a history that people succeed not because of the system, but in spite of it → traditional family setting, 
polygamy, many children, only got education because uncle picked interest and paid his school fees, qualified 
for university, was last year that this was paid by govt 
 
In good conditions 
3-2014 From Fort Portal but growing up in KLA, raised by his mother, father left the family when he was around 10 
years, a family of four children, mother is a civil servant, secretary to the minister of internal affairs, would have 
some other business like a shop, that’s how she managed to raise four children, relying on extended family, 
Nakasero primary, next to state house, study university from India, some other four diplomas after returning 
here 
4-2014 Grew up in KLA, father UPDF captain, joined 1985 in Luwero, mother with small kiosk, economic situation at 
home decent enough, first born of five children, other brothers at university, grandfather was a miner, very rich, 
very influential under British, parents at one time difficulties, father was dismissed because suspected to ally 
with a particular army commander who fell out with the regime, but got of the hook, dismissed by court marshal, 
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In good conditions 
grown up with peace and security, God has been merciful 
10-2014 Growing up in KLA, parents worked hard, father lecturer at Makerere Business School (MABS), mother at central 
bank, parents emerged socially and economically, strong believe in God, are born-agains, never difficulties paying 
school fees for their six children,  
13-2014 Grew up in the village in Central, but in good conditions, father working for coffee board, farmer, trading in 
coffee, life was good: school buses would bring to school, we had electricity far in the villages, uniforms, shoes 
given by school, from the village you could go to the best high schools, life was not harsh; mother was house wife, 
economic situation at home good, father never crying for school fees 
18-2014 Father was agricultural officer in Moroto, Acholi by tribe, mother Karamajong, did not go to school, mother was 
doing farming at home, father catered for us, he had 11 wives, mother was the last one; economic situation at 
home was good, food was there did not lack anything; father was killed in 1990, mistaken for a rebel by NRA, 
mother taking care in primary, died in 1995 
2. Sponsors / Scholarships 
1-2014 for SS scholarship of Catholic church in Jinja, A-level in Kenya, Nairobi.  
2-2014 Sponsor from Germany for SS, govt scholarship for Makerere, Masters DAAD stipend in Germany 
5-2014 one person gave him money that brought him up to S6,  
6-2014 starting from S3 got a scholarship through a white catholic priest, would work on church land as contribution, 
reached high marks in S4, as no one else had done before, S5 father sold piece of land to support him, well-wisher 
at school convinced board to give scholarship to best performing student so he got paid until S6, got scholarship 
for Uganda College of Commerce, finally accepted but was academically devastated because wanted to do politics 
14-2014 Pastor paid for schooling 
15-2014 sisters got married to affluent people, could support me, university paid by govt,  
17-2014 father, paid school fees up to S3, then director of the school financed him up to S6 because he was a good student, 
someone agreed to finance university, but ended up in second year because of school fees 
19-2014 found an organization who paid for schooling, KLA In uni applied, went for interview, got it,  
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20-2014 pastor came and asked father to take her to secondary, brought her to KLA, grace ministries, studied in Mengo 
S1-S4, stopped in S4, 
21-2014 went to missionary school one sister from UK got a sponsor for me up to S4, by then she had left, I wrote her 
asked if she could help me out, because I performed well she supported me up to S6, then got scholarship for 
university, did computer science 
E4-2017 Uncle paid school fees, university paid by government scholarship  
3. Family 
1-2014 One child (can’t afford more), want to be good parent 
2-2014 “I don't want to do these mistakes. There are a lot of mistakes I saw from/ into my father. I am trying as much as 
possible to run away from those and / not even to run away but to strategically see that I don't commit those 
mistakes.” I3:3:32; Want a good family, just one wife, few kids, against polygamy, best life for his children, 
distancing from his father and own growing up, hugging and caring, would want kids to be religious so they wont 
get roadblocks, don’t want kids to be in boarding, want them close by, no authoritative education, would hug and 
be very affectionate 
3-2014 With marriage everything changes, old life left behind new one to start, party going not so much of my thing, with 
marriage a responsible person now, living up to expectations of society, Gods comes first, family second, career 
third, want four children, because I believe in strong populations 
4-2014 come from a loving, caring family, parents provided everything, want to be a dad that listens, a hero for my 
children as my parents are, because they provide for me, wife should be a partner, not subordinate, 
5-2014 Want children to be close to me, want to provide for them, with future wife should have same values 
6-2015 values of parents will be transferred to children, family is important in shaping the child; if you are from a poor 
family very hard to make it, 
7-2014 family i most important, not too much focused on career because I have family, want good relationship with my 
children, relationship with my mother is very good, very close, with wife we are partners 
8-2014 want four children, want permanent relationship with my children, have to be God fearing, same for husband first 
of all, also wealth, handsome, strength, 
9-2014 Family, children are very important, raise them god fearing, be part of their live, be affectionate, relationship with 
husband based on mutual understanding, difference with couple of parents is communication mainly; “Of course 
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you know they [own parents] love you bout of course they wont show it. They won’t give you affection, they wont 
hug you, they wont kiss you.” I9:4:26 
10-2014 family very important to me, relationship with my parents is friendly, we nearly talk about everything, I respect 
them but we are like peers, want the same for my children 
12-2014 my kids not in boarding school, not like me, want them to be close to me, I honor my mum would never want to 
disappoint her 
13-2014 decision making you should sit down and discuss, even include children if they are big enough 
14-2014 Man has to be a born-again, because word of God changes a person, no smoking, drinking, clubbing because of 
religion, my life is church, maybe school, my son. with son very good relationship, I explain him everything; 
relationship with husband should be loving, kind of relationship of our parents not good, we discuss and agree; 
marriage, family is very important, to have a child changed everything for me, 
18-2014 family is important, teach you true meaning of love, my father was dominating when married, but in our current 
relationship there is consensus rather family in quality terms than quantity, with wife now using family planning, 
later maybe one or two more children, 
19-2014 simple family with three children, not ten, that you cannot manage, that is what I learned from my kind of life 
22-2014 relationship with children is good, especially with daughter, I love her so much, discuss everything with her; in 
marriage man and woman should be equal, have to tell each other everything, my husband sometimes would tell, 
sometimes wouldn’t but he would not quarrel with me, he kept quiet, he would drink but not quarrel, In a good 
society men have respect for women and the other way around, no hiding anything 
23-2014 A bit rough on communication, through bringing up, but I love my lady; would not want my lady to be working 
though it is good, but if she works it should be for a good organization, why working for 200$ and going to KLA 
every day, rather stay with kids, At home speak English with children and among themselves, sometimes Luganda, 
Lutoro; 
4. Emergence 
1-2014 Optimistic about future: “I see myself as a young man that is out to achieve my potential to the fullest” (I1:6:54) 
2-2014 good prospects for my own future, I have evolved, built up networks “You can see now, life progresses, you leave 
a village, you go to some fair school, come to a quite/ not very good but better high school than to the best 
university in the country” I3:3:22, I progress, I am like MDGs, I have socially and economically evolved, I don’t 
cook, eat at work or in restaurants, can’t use firewood anymore 
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“At least out of thirty days I can survive 26 days. [laughs] And the last three days I am like broke as a mouse” 
4-2014 Want to be a millionaire, about to establish myself, have plans: agriculture: growing, processing, value adding, 
own position is getting increasingly better, I see myself become more relevant in society, contributing in terms of 
ideas and materially with wealth 
“I am establishing myself as any other man at my age should be doing.” I4:2:11 
5-2014 Don’t drink, don’t associate with wrong people; I need a brake through, just need a brake through 
7-2014 “I think my life has been progressing, I must say.” I7:1:7 
15-2014 “This is a person, five years or six a P7 nobody, […] with some tools building in town there, but after seven years 
he is now a graduate, having / with the capacity to attract a graduate and even to go to church and wed. So this 
was a fundamental transformation.” I15:1:3 
10-2017 No interest in politics, other priorities: “I don’t have time for that, I am focusing on more income generating 
activities.” 
15-2017 “A car is an extra cost for money I don’t have” 
6-2017 “As far as education is concerned, from my family’s point of view, I should be the first person who as gone a little 
bit further.” 
5. Education 
E7-2017 Education system is not producing innovators 
16-2017 Children in private schools for proximity reasons, considers public education better 
E4-2017 “Because normally I see people who try to fight poverty, and I am like I can’t understand how you try to fight 
poverty. Because for me the only thing you need to change in a household is make sure that the kids get an 
education. Because I have seen what I have been able to do personally in my uncle’s household, in my parent’s 
household, which have changed in a way you can never imagine, from the time that I entered university.” 
9-2017 We are not even educated, we are of low standard education levels. Want my children to get practical education, 
not only to be degree holders; public schools have no standard, they have to go to private 
6-2017 We are not producing innovators, but interpreters and typists 
19-2012 Producing job seekers, not creators in university 
424 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
Blog How university education does not necessarily bring you a good job, ex of a plumber earning much more 
https://acramist.wordpress.com/2017/07/03/the-reality-of-a-university-graduate/ 
6. Extended Family 
As financial strain 
1-2014 Many responsibilities: wife’s family, mine, his father, all the time asked to give money; but also happiness from 
charity (supports two girls he met at the market) “I just felt pity for them. I imagined what their life would be 
like if they never got a chance to go to school. (I1:2:14) 
2-2014 Support two brothers, a little bit the girlfriend (she works also), stepmother, other family “You have to learn 
how to disappoint people here.”(I3:5:51) 
owes his emergence to his family: obedience, respect for family has made me what I am 
3-2014 Helping other members of the family so that they will not “disturb” you later on by remaining dependent 
4-2014 no one depending on my income, I contribute to some family obligations, social functions, important not to 
forget own personal development over expectations of extended family, in order to avoid you do not attend so 
many social functions 
“And actually if one is not careful he may end up being too much invested in the social and even forget your 
personal development” I4:4:32 
5-2014 on income depends one brother and another young one whom I help to pay school fees, family expect much from 
me by the way I look and that I don’t bother them send me this, send me this, I give when I have but at times I 
don’t have, Should be planning for children but I have to take care of my family 
7-2014 I feel their expectations to help but it is not a pressure 
8-2014 don’t feel happy when family asks for money, but I cannot say no when I am not willing, only when I really don’t 
have, unless I know it is not a serious issue, but not if someone’s life is depending on it 
9-2014 family in KLA does not expect to share money, but those in the village, per month it can be not more than 100 
000 
12-2014 from my account I support my relatives, 
15-2014 School fees for one adopted child, helped many of extended family to connect young boys to foreign company, 
has helped me to reduce pressure on me: instead of looking at me they look at them for support 
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As financial strain 
16-2014 “I have to make that sacrifice [of supporting ext. family] because there were others who did sacrifice for me.” 
I16:1:1 fail to count how many people depend on my income, at any moment more than ten, relatives I am 
paying school fees for, Not using mobile money on phone because it makes it too easy to send money 
17-2014 extended family is helpless, have turned him down before, was digging for uncle but he never paid, 
disintegration of the family, some members of my family ask me now for money, I help them because it is godly 
18-2014 uncle paid my fees up to S4, s5-6 supported by cousin brother; brothers paid university, took cheaper course 
21-2014 Life was hard, I had to see my sibling through school, mother couldn’t, she got arthritis, last one is still in school; 
“I hate this social responsibility, I hate it. I feel like it is one of the things that has kept us Africans in poverty.” 
I21:4:16 
22-2014 paying school fees for three children of her sister, all in secondary, will take them to course for less than one 
million, one nephew staying with her, he is studying in MakU, I pay transport, cater for his lunch, sometimes I 
meet burial expenses, no safety “We have many relatives and most of us we are very poor.” 
“If I was alone, if I didn’t have those extended family, when I am by myself, that money could maintain me. 
Except the problem expensive relatives, those extended family, they are difficult.” I22:3:10 
9-2017 It is too much, mother is lame, too many hospital bills, wish I had taken insurance for her 
6-2017 They expect from me, but I don’t live up to it, mother expects, but I’m living tight life, I feel a lot of pressure, they 
deserve my hand 
7-2017 “In a situation like family, you find that you have so many either followers, where you need to take care of some 
of their needs, yet you also don’t have.” 
FN 2017 In the office: “We are prepared” when going to the family, buy 50 kg sugar and rice, everyone gets a kilo, also 
refuses, like her grandfather who calls her regularly, she gives him every three months, feels these obligations 
keep her back, if she hadn’t to pay education for her brothers maybe she would have already bought a plot of 
land for construction or agriculture 
 
As help 
3-2014 “so of course there were financial pressures, but because of / as I was saying / because of the extended families 
that helped us/ groomed us, would find ourselves working and earning for ourselves.” I3:1:5 
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10-2014 No dependencies, sometimes pocket money to younger siblings, not happy with my economic conditions, I want 
to be self-sufficient, no pressure from extended family, parents help out  
22-2014 if my daughter has money she can bring me some 
6-2017 don’t try to bother them, they struggle, sold land to give him money to buy boda 
 
Misc 
13-2014 disappointed by extended family, turned away when she was in financial difficulties only with her when she was 
supporting them, family cannot image you do not have money, 
14-2014 in Buganda can have a hard time when having child w/o marriage, people frowned on me, but now they see I can 
take care of me and him, not a burden to the family, living a good lifestyle, so now it is seen as positive, not 
having a child at 40 is negative; 
15-2014 extended family is a product of repression, of dispossession; want to live independent live from family, they feel 
woman has taken him, he is no longer a man 
17-2014 “So everyone has to fight for his own. You don’t feed, no one wants to know. They are chasing you out of the 
house. When they are chasing you, people can laugh.”  
19-2014 “Right now I am the only hope of the family, if I do something wrong I am failing the family and I am failing 
myself.” 
22-2014 want to construct another place from my mothers side, family from my husband’s side gave me a hard time when 
the man died, gave everything in the house to his former wife and their four children, I didn’t say anything, didn’t 
want to quarrel 
15-2017 “I don’t support anyone because they don’t know how much money I make” 
7. Loans 
1-2014 Has two: mortgage for a commercial house in KLA, one for car of the father 
2-2014 no loans because one bad experience 
3-2014 trying to avoid loans “I fight so much to make sure that we never get a loan again.” I3:4:28 
7-2014 no loans; interest rates are too prohibitive (30%) 
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8-2014 business is not developing well but paid back loan [from the village] 
9-2014 Two loans, one with bar, one with university to acquire the land, in total 14 million, pay back 1.2m per month, 
will be finished by the end of the year 
13-2014 got loan from centenary, to boost business in general merchandise, but interests went up, installment became 
higher, failed to pay, got a friend who cleared the loan with bank but then came and took her house 
20-2014 “We don’t have a loan because when you go for a loan those people want a lot of profit and this profit could have 
worked for our what/.” I20:2:9 
21-2014 got a loan because dream to build a house for the mother, but had a bad boyfriend stole all the money, still failed 
to construct, still have to pay the loan and tuition “I would rather save and never take a loan again.” I21:3:11 
22-2014 avoid to go to the bank and borrow loans, gives you sleepless nights 
E10-17 Bank loans are too prohibitive, because they want collateral “They come and photograph your house, your TV, 
your chicken” 
9-2017 “I tell you, I regretted [getting a loan], because I had to sell part of my land to clear the loan because the profit 
was much flying every now and then. […] It is not advisable to get a loan when your business is not moving 
smoothly.” 
6-2017 “I am planning to get a loan but what I am hearing from banks nowadays is discouraging me to go for a loan.” 
7-2017 Loan with Youth livelihood program, used it to improve house of parents, and pay school fees, took land title as 
liability, did not manage to repay, so they still hold the land title until loan is cleared 
E25-17 Criticism of microfinance, because no coordination people get many microcredits to serve loans on other 
microcredit facilities, interest rates are still quite high, because market oriented 
The future is not going to be in petty trade, we have to arrest it now 
8. Financial Conditions 
Vulnerability 
1-2014 “I don’t see myself getting to the lowest level of the poverty line” (I1:3:25) 
2-2014 safety nets are friends, little protection through job but still feel vulnerable  
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7-2014 safety net is firm, other than that nothing tangible, but don’t feel economic vulnerability, as I am progressing, in 
case of problem I could not turn to my family, 
8-2014 safety net to call a friend or relative to help me 
12-2014 No vulnerability because network company will always be there 
15-2014 safety net is not yet constructed, a lot of risks surrounding my life, I am just building, I am just building 
16-2014 Even if money is not there you know you will not collapse; in case of problems family helps out 
17-2014 Safety net: the lord 
18-2014 safety nets plots of land, but almost not there, sometimes I could turn to ext. family, assured with bank for 
health, that is no problem,  
19-2014 no safety nets because family is lower,  
21-2014 can rely on social networks when myself I have financial difficulties 
22-2014 Support through her own children 
8-2017 I am simply surviving, that is the best word 
“Nothing is as bad as living a life of uncertainty, that is the definition of suffering.” 
9-2017 Declining, no income from shops but only surviving on rent and land sales “I don’t have income. Actually it is a 
survival.” 
6-2017 “Personally, I went in the experience of finding a job. And as I am seated right now, I don’t have one.” but has 
income, → what does it mean to be unemployed? Status of job; no safety nets “We live by the mercy of the divine 
creator, nothing much.” 
 
Diversifying Income 
1-2014 Poor but not in situation where not able to have money to run home, shares will always be there, houses will 
always be there 
3-2014 Diversification of income because of interest but also because of economic benefit, just salary not sufficient to 
sustain family, safety nets through diversification of income “they helped the most because some of those 
incomes are daily, some of these are daily incomes, coming every day and you find that at least you are able to 
sustain a home a period of time” I3:1:8 
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4-2014 during the time father was not working, 2008-10 no salary, only living from other investments put in place, 
parents have many houses, I want to do so too.  
9-2014 Safety net through bar 
10-2014 but so far concentrated money on investments butiki investment group, contributing 100 000 per month, want 
to do some big investment after a year and a half, but just started [oct 2015: just about to acquire land]; about to 
register a company with a friend; have to see how these projects are evolving, maybe doing some other things as 
well 
15-2014 Invest in business, there are better returns (instead of saving with bank) 
9. Networks and mentors 
1-2014 Older sister also scholarship in Kenya, later moved to Netherlands, pulled other sister who was following her  
2-2014 father influential and dominant, even though poor, was head teacher in primary school, went to school because he was 
his son, got sponsor from Germany until age of 18, not because they were the most in need, but because father was 
most influential 
have so many friends, thinking on social, economic, political terms: those to borrow money from, this one to talk about 
relationships etc., similar social and economic status, older friends for mentoring “Sometimes we are selfish. You will 
think of if I have a problem like I need a 500 000 whom do I talk to? So I need to get friends in that caliber.” I3:7:70 
going to church more about community involvement than praying,  
society divided among economic lines, all about where you come from, what religion you are, who you associate with, 
which family you come from, especially political, society is not cohesive, not easy to brake these barriers, e.g. not easy 
to proceed for Muslims 
3-2014 visiting friends, in the process you find ventures, meet for a coffee maybe twice a week, friends of all ages, a lot of 
them older, to pick from their experiences “That is why I use them/ok, not using them but/ that is why I make them my 
friends, that is why they are my friends because they have been where I am, so they guide and say ok, so where is the 
problem?” I3:5:36 
4-2014 was job seeking for one month, got it through personal networks, friends of all ages, mine and what I call seniors, older 
to learn from them, 
5-2014 I try to meet people I admire to get advise from them, but it is hard to reach them, 
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7-2014 one brother who studied in Germany was his mentor, took him to London, after law school went to Harvard Law 
School, he paid partly for it 
maybe two close friends, talk about how to bring career forward, personal things not so much to discuss 
8-2014 those who are down cannot be helped, sponsors are there but in the end only the family of the organizer is helped with 
money 
12-2014 Job at Kenya Airways through uncle; in the savings group there are people who have properties, we learn for them, and 
they are our customers, “So we look at them and focus on this so we can also achieve what they have achieved. And 
they encourage us. Many of them are our customers, they bus from us, the have supported us a lot.” I12:2:10 
15-2014 go to sauna and steam bath every Sunday, costs 10 000, you meet, sweat, you meet high profile people, ministers, 
officers, police, civil servant “You meet people who matter and I also wanted it as a platform, my economic ground for 
my company.” I15:6:32 
16-2014 A lot of family members (including 3-2014) are working in ministries; pay full membership at Entebbe golf club, used 
to go and greet the old men, to learn from them 
18-2014 entering bank (job) was easy but no promotion for three years, someone passed me because he is a Munyankole 
21-2014 lot of weddings to contribute to, sometimes you do it out of strategic thinking to get something back, association at old 
school, wanted to help out girls in difficulty, like a network, we meet once a month try to connect each other in getting 
jobs 
23-2014 Going out with friends every day, not main purpose drinking, but because I believe I can learn from them 
9-2017 Meets on roundtables with other traders, interacting, sharing ideas, to help knowing what to do 
7-2017 Meet with politicians and activists every day, to build capacity,  
“You have to link with so many people because the fact is that in such an economic situation you need economic 
backup of various people in order to sustain at the struggle 
13-2017 When someone joins and no one knows this person they will be detained in Luzira, no one can follow up on them 
E24-17 We connected with leaders from Tahrir square, watched videos of MLK jr, deliberately building network (but not 
directly inspired by Arab spring) 
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10. Tradition and Modernity / Role of Culture 
1-2014 rejecting of Western influence, against homosexuality brought by Westerners, deterioration of morality, loss of 
local languages, modernity as negative, deterioration of society 
2-2014 feeling societal pressure to have children, but not yet there, delayed through staying in Germany 
clan life important, “I know my roots”, follow traditions, greeting, respect, future wife does not need to be 
Muganda but show similar respect, cultural change as necessity, need to have a house to be called a man here, 
“so stupid society” 
3-2014 culture very important, our identity, should not give up on culture, not accept modernity as such, negative 
influence of “Western cultures”, change of dressing negative, turn away from agriculture negative, no traditional 
medicine anymore as negative, abandon of cultural practices like circumcision, good, that is bad, going against 
own cultural customs by inviting his mother to his function, because she was it that raised him 
should not blindly adopt another culture, still beware your own identity 
4-2014 a lot of time disagreement with father, he is more authoritarian “There is nothing much I can do about him, 
because he is my dad, he is my senior, but there is also nothing much he can do about me, because I am now a 
full equal man.” I4:6:40 Against homosexuality, sees it as a crime, don’t like the concept, not dislike the 
individuals, Europe and America should learn from Uganda and criminalize homosexuality 
Culture is a given, it is good as long as it is ungay culture, it is not stagnant, it needs to change, but change must 
be constructive and meaningful; 
5-2014 value my parents to 30%, they produced me, raised me, worry about me, welcome modernity, no problem with 
changes as long as they don’t inflict with human thinking, like men having sex with men 
6-2014 Wrong expectations of society: pressure to have a car, expensive wedding, big positions; I am considered 
unsuccessful in my village because I have no car and because I have not produced, need to make many children 
for the Clan; don’t see anything good that kingdoms have brought to Uganda, cultural change is welcome; we 
need service delivery, it will not come through cultural practices, have contributed to our backwardness “But I 
have thought that this is not Africa’s problem. I don’t think Africa’s problem is that I have not produced.” I6:5:37 
7-2014 our culture is aligning to the west, if I hadn’t been educated I would be a peasant farmer living in the village, so 
cultural change is good, globalization is positive and negative, but more positive, negative that western cultures 
want to make homosexuality a law here, not proper as religious man 
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8-2014 cultural change is good, we learn different things, but other things are bad, like miniskirts: people have copied 
from other culture but abused to the extend of being naked, modernization is good because people have friends, 
connections, jobs which were not there before,  
9-2014 culture some traditions I don’t like, like kneeling, but I will teach them to my children, now you can meet with 
father in law, these changes are good. Modernization is ok, but sometimes negative, before we would meet, now 
only on WhatsApp, Skype; people have become more individualistic; but what I love about modernization is 
internet, you can find there everything; education is very important, helps people understand,  
10-2014 culture not a very big role, some cultural practices are repugnant; 
13-2014 culture comes first because it brings people together, I like my kabaka very much, king is above everything; 
modernity is good because you have to go by the situation, no longer polygamy, no circumcision, bad changes 
decline of role of kingdoms,  
14-2014 culture is important, different cultures do different things, important respect, to kneel, going to your auntie, I 
don’t appreciate believe in witchcraft, goes up to the Kabaka; modernity is good, especially technology, internet,  
15-2014 culture gives me a sense of belonging, it is important, but culture has to change when environment changes; 
“And it is not possible to divorce me from where I come from, I am entirely owned by the clan.” I15:9:46 
16-2014 Elitist women forget true meaning of African tradition, dowry is not to buy a woman but to show that you value 
her; respect for mother in law; educated ladies dismiss these customs but society values them, cultural change is 
largely positive, but should not trash away everything, ulture very important, some things unacceptable like 
homosexuality, people do it in private but not promoting it, it should not be imposed on us by Western donors, if 
you leave it it would eventually come with cultural change, but not if people feel it is imposed on them, ex. If we 
would teach you to introduce polygamy 
17-2014 culture not a big role, many things I don’t go for like polygamy, taken positive part of culture left negative; 
system of man and woman should not be changed, freedom, equal right between man and woman in marriage, 
inequality is old culture stuff; change has to be there 
18-2014 culture is dynamic, polygamy ceased because of economic conditions, culture is dynamic, aspects are good, 
others like beating the wife are outdated 
20-2014 culture not so important, grew up from another side, in families children are not respecting elders because the 
parents don’t respect the leaders 
21-2014 Marriage difficult, it is all about society, marrying becomes very expensive; in Africa parents don’t explain 
children anything [why father has left]; culture gives a sense of belonging and values, need to understand 
partner culturewise but also learning from different cultures (husband also Muganda) 
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22-2014 family keeps the line going, that is why I don’t cut off with my husband’s family, my children must know where 
they come from, culture makes you remember your roots, where you come from, not so much in my daily 
routine, cultural change is ok, some things to maintain, others not like women circumcision, bride price should 
be maintained; 
23-2014 I am not even Ugandan, don’t speak local languages 
6-2017 Some practices that have come through influence of foreign cultures, like betting, drugs, other funny stuff as a 
result of globalization; culture still a very important role, people pretend to be excessively modern, but at one 
point in life you get back in tough with traditions; the way we dress has changed, women these days walk almost 
naked 
11. Youth 
I8-2017 Need to convince fellow young people we can lead the country ourselves; when Besigye has a rally, young people 
there, some educated, some aren’t; young people are exploited, not protected by policies, but desperate so they 
accept 
E11-17 “In Kampala one of the biggest challenge for the youth is that they have nowhere to go. They end up in bars and 
video halls.” Drug abuse among youth, smoking weed, Youth Development Fund, youth group received money 
but they were not sensitized and the initiative collapsed 
E13-17 “There is no any youth that can go a day without opening WhatsApp” use it for mobilization, MBs come with 
Pakalast = affordable  
14-2017 We are the leaders of tomorrow, and that tomorrow begins today 
E8-17 Young people are doing the real activism 
12. Religion 
1-2014 pentecostal churches only for money and material benefits, practicing Catholic, church every Sunday 
6-2014 religion as guidance to stop doing things that would destroy you, sometimes goes to church, pray with Banakole 
because of dancing 
8-2014 religion is important, helps me calm down when I stressed out, keeps me disciplined when you fear sin 
10-2014 Religion: pivotal role, you should decide whether to be hot or cold, don’t want to balance things (e.g. not going to 
bars even if I just take soda), things I do or cannot do due to religion, 
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14-2014 religion to keep me on track, determines people I associate with 
16-2014 religion is important but moderate Catholic, they have good values justice, equality, respect for elders, don’t go 
to church every Sunday, don’t go to sacrament; 
18-2014 religion more for life after death, but above all religious values are good 
19-2014 four things of importance: Church, relationship with friends, study to improve myself and God 
20-2014 go to church 4-5 times a week, have a lot of responsibilities there, spend a lot of time with pastors, other people 
in church not so much, want to know more about God 
22-2014 go to church but it is a bit far, so sometimes I pray from Bwaise pentecostal, sometimes I don’t go because I work 
from Monday to Saturday, Sunday is the day I wash, clean, cook, if I want nice food I eat it on sunday, church 
group meetings I attend once in a while on tuesdays, when I go I stay the whole day, last Friday of the month is 
overnight, I make sure I don’t miss that one, even if I don’t pray whole month, I have to go there; religion guides 
you in what you are doing, originally I was Anglican, shifted to PCC because they do more counseling, children 
praying with PCC since long time;  
23-2014 I like church, just because I don’t go doesn’t mean I don’t like church. I am catholic, but if I was to change 
religion become a 7th day adventist, like their style, have never heard anything dirty about them, religion is just a 
factor to control humanity, don’t like PCCs taking religion as a business, I hate hypocrisy 
6-2017 I am traditionalist, I go Sunday twice a month for prayer, when I am not busy, people who say that it is 
backward, at night they come, to me it is more relevant than anything else, God gave me wisdom to achieve 
through my own language, my own cultural practices etc. 
 
Religious leaders 
9-2017 Met with religious leaders, complained about it, national meeting they joined 
E24-17 Pressure, they should defrock me because I was desecrating the collar, dismissed out of meeting from the UJCC 
13. Gender 
1-2014 role of men and women different but complementing “I have allowed her to make decision”, 
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2-2014 cooking as a woman’s job, any Ugandan man will say that, men to provide for home, paying rent, paying school 
fees, make everything available, women to supplement, in decision making no full equality, man to have last 
word, it is 49:51, can’t be 50:50 
3-2014 women still too marginalized here “You can be a leader in the society as a female, ok, but it does not mean that 
when you get back home you should step on your husband.” I3:8:54 
4-2014 wife should be a partner, not subordinate, but as in society you always need a leaders, so is in family, and bible 
says that should be the man. As long as husband is not making illogical proposition, wife should go with it for 
the sake of peace “So, I think, you know, patriarchy has generally been abused, but it is not entirely bad. Because 
patriarchy tends to establish basic tenants of leadership. There must be a reason why all religions for instance 
emphasize that the man is the head of the family.” I4:6:43 
6-2014 women and men cannot be equal, because women are weaker, only into weddings, social gatherings, but not 
social, economic and political. “Nobody can put you in an inferior position without your consent.” 
8-2014 husband is head of family, should run bigger part of expenses, unless I am better off than I can’t let family down, 
in case of disagreement I come down as a woman; 
9-2014 earns more than husband, depends on situation who has the last say, he is the head of the household, I do the 
things around house, iron his clothes, do food, etc, but no predefined roles 
10-2014 men and women should be equal, of course man is head of household but that does not mean that he should be 
dominant, should be complementary; have not seen my mother being beaten, but involved in running the house 
13-2014 Husband should provide everything in the house, lady at home; boys don’t cook, 
14-2014 later working for Securix as a technician, but issues with a male supervisor, and a driver who wanted a 
relationship with her, stopped to have peace of mind, man (future husband) has to be financial stable, don’t 
want him to be a burden to me “He, he can be the head of the family, because that is what the bible says, because 
the bible tells us to submit to your husband. You submit to your husband but that does not mean that he should 
be boss of everything.” I14-10-37 
15-2014 there is a lot of injustice for women; gives example of how his family feels his wife dominates him – for him it is 
equal partnership (one of the few to say husband and wife should be fully equal) 
16-2014 “These men started detesting the highly educated women, they go for women who have some level of education 
and whom they can be able to talk to and be listened to than somebody who claims to be equal.” elitist women 
undermine man’s authority in the home, difficult for men because nature has provided that a man guides the 
home, man is not a dictator, should be consensus in decision making; surely I cannot beat my wife, confidence is 
substantial for successful marriage: love justice and equality; women should have freedom, I tell my wife you 
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have the freedom to achieve your competencies, when marriages break there is a lot of unfairness towards 
women, but you should not create environment where people are going to marry with the option of divorce;  
18-2014 man should be leader of the house but not too much power over women, there must be negotiation 
14. Politics 
Service delivery  
2-2014 No expectations of government, bad politics, corruption, lack of service provision, hospitals in bad shape 
3-2014 democracy not our thing, we adopted it but before kingdoms worked, now we can’t go back, it is about politics 
of abuse, not politics of development, when competition for leadership no facts are discussed but only insults, 
immature politics  
NRM not 100% perfect but have done a lot of good 
4-2014 Sympathsize with FDC, don’t like NRM, “Poverty is not just in the material, as long as I feel disempowered, you 
know, I cannot / I feel I cannot do anything about a given situation however much I want, that is a form of 
poverty.” I4:8:56 
5-2014 Govt has failed to do for the future generations, poor planing, govt should give capital to the youth but I never 
got any, politics heading in bad direction, not about developing but just personal riches, trust political leaders 
50:50, “Government has completely failed to do for us what it should do for the future generation.” I5:1:4 
7-2014 Problem of corruption, but govt not efficient, e.g. NADS, politicians are too old, yet majority of the country are 
youth, trust leaders but not 100%, was politically dormant but will vote in next election, somebody young; a 
functioning state should provide core aspects: health and education 
8-2014 if it was better maybe I would have got a sponsorship for free education, you get nothing in the gov 
10-2014 most of things NRM are doing is bad, but others are not better; right now need from state atmosphere to carry 
out my work, no wars, free of terrorists, economy growing steadily 
13-2014 “I rent it to this regime, it is a bad one. They have taken all the wealth from certain tribes into their hands.” 
Now everything is worse, land for digging is scarce, with regime economy went down, quality of life has gone 
done, When regime came in, deliberate efforts to destroy coffee industry, I believe wanted to erase our tribe, all 
offices is one tribe now; no service provision, regional imbalance; hospitals in bad shape but politicians fly their 
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Service delivery  
kids out of the country for treatment; we are heading to another genocide, because everything is owned by one 
tribe, those who cry are many, those who have are few 
14-2014 no interest in politics, God chooses leader, I leave everything take its course; I vote because there has to be a 
leader, last time Besigye, don’t trust political leaders, I have mercy, govt not considering small people, authority 
comes from above, LC on the ground cannot do anything but implement; people from the govt are the ones with 
guns 
16-2014 No longer possible to get govt scholarships for University; visited more than 30 African countries, there is a 
structural problem, economy not structured to the benefit of citizens, independence never fully achieved, 
policies designed by colonial regime remain, politicians can’t do better, but they also don’t want to. main 
challenge to put governance right, need for peaceful transitions, things are there we are not organized to use 
them properly, more accounting to donors than to citizens; for the time being have to trust those in power 
17-2014 Have to believe in leader, don’t fight him, if you want change you introduce yourself what is good, if the leader 
doesn’t change, the people will change, change will force him to change. I am training a generation 
Good changes: good roads, easy to turn maize into flour these days, bad changes: people fighting for nothing, 
both opposition and govt messed up, some I trust. opposition is just fighting 
18-2014 In good society should be equality, based on merit, not nepotism, in Uganda a lot of unfairness, promotion 
because related to manager in the bank, a lot of tribalism, institutions are abused, institutional weaknesses, I 
don’t trust political leaders; 
19-2014 Politics is kind of circus, right now UG not sustainable, don’t trust political leaders, 80:20, 
20-2014 Politics is a dirty game, full of lies, leaders are put their by God so I trust anyone who is in leadership, I trust 
current leaders so much, people are misusing freedom of speech, talking bad about leaders, not respecting them 
23-2014 Govt is rocketing some people while bringing others down as deliberate strategy, reached a point where I fail to 
identify with my country; 
8-2017 Country messed up so much, better we mess it up ourselves than getting messed up by those who have done it 
for the past years 
expired things in supermarket, drugs in pharmacies are bad, metaphor of parent who has lost respect of child 
because MPs are not living up to their role, providing services for the country 
E11-17 “If there is a pothole, why to wait for state council? You pay the money and we fix it.” 
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Service delivery  
16-2017 Lack of service delivery 
E2-2017 “A medical facility should have medicine, if it is a school, it should have teachers.” on expectations of MC on 
service delivery 
6-2017 University, hospital, police in 2014 strikes for higher salaries were denied, but MPs got a lot of money during 
that time 
14-2017 Common man pays taxes, but at the end no cancer machine in the hospitals, where to taxes go 
Police not independent, is serving ruling government, not considering all Ugandans  
in parliament, President decides laws, not looking at interest of common man, parliament is after money 
13-2017 Growing up in a slum, service deliver is not good, sanitation is bad, health centers lacking 
E25-17 Education service delivery taken over by private sector, if you want a good school, it has to be private → KCCA 
effort through PPP to have some good public schools (as means of generating income, I guess) 
E8-2017 Exhaustion is on everyone’s face, they are tired of everything, in hospital material is lacking 
 
Corruption 
2-2014 corruption 
4-2014 don’t like corruption, fight it whenever I sense it, gives examples 
5-2014 Money is being eaten 
6-2014 MPs are bribed 
7-2014 Problem of Corruption 
8-2014 Too much corruption 
9-2014 now corruption too bad, we are in chaos, everyone is doing what he wants, boda bodas don’t respect traffic laws, 
people struggle to make ends meet, crime rate is high, “but now, the corruption has just eaten everything.” I9:1:2 
“Because the corruption has become part of us, it is in our skin, you can’t get any / even if you say you are a 
practicing Christian, you are a pentecostal, whatever are your principles, you cannot get any services if you 
haven’t paid.” I9:1:3 
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Corruption 
future for country bleak, corruption too high; Everyone who supports the big man cannot be touched, all money 
on supporting the big man instead of bringing services; Kagame in Rwanda stamped out corruption; 
10-2014 In a good society people are supportive, it is free of corruption 
14-2014 corruption a big problem;  
15-2014 church is not helping because they glorify the corrupt leaders, giving them front seats 
16-2014 Corruption is the most annoying thing, all the money in Swiss banks and busy developing these countries,  
18-2014 but too much corruption, right from top, now people at lower level look at corruption as way of life, 
19-2014 Corruption 
22-2014 When we got retrenchment the world bank payed all those, but money was mismanaged, so we got very little, we 
got a lawyer, but he was paid off and said “your case is very difficult, we cannot handle”, too much corruption 
8-2017 Wanted to join police, dismissed because of corruption 
E11-17 LC1 has eaten a lot of the money, e.g. from plot sales, contributions for road constructions, for garbage truck from 
KCCA to come you have to bribe the driver 
E19-17 Govt deletes payroll to clean up, corruption at district level [teachers on payroll but non-existant] 
E21-17 KCCA bought USAFI from private person for 39bn, this is too much, there has been corruption 
10-2017 Explains how he has bribed to get a job as civil servant, paid about 1 million, in the end failed 
E2-2017 People bribe because out of necessity, to get medicine, secure their living after retirement, etc.  
“It is a moral economy that emerges out of the crisis of neoliberalism.” 
9-2017 Corruption because Asians pay indirect bribes, have less taxes etc., Asians are bribing politicians to penetrate 
East African market 
6-2017 In some places you have to bribe to get a job, like in Mukwano industry, had to bribe someone to connect me; for 
girls it is worse, and often you don’t get a job 
14-2017 Officials only want to satisfy themselves, do not consider common man 
E25-17 Corruption at KCC too much, at point that even no capacity to mobilize funds 
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Corruption 
E24-17 “Because to fight corruption is to fight the government. And the government knows it, it is obvious. Fighting 
corruption today is fighting Museveni. Fighting corruption today is fighting Museveni’s government. Why? 
Because it is a government that only functions through theft and lies and so on.” 
 
Elections 
1-2014 waste of time to vote, don’t see benefits 
4-2014 election results are not credible, 9 billion invested for M7 campaign but only 5 billion for poverty alienation for 
youth; vote because of civic responsibility 
9-2014 last election I voted FDC, next election will not waste my time, votes are rigged; 
10-2014 next ten years no change because of vote rigging, using state resources to campaign, I vote, last time I was 
prevented, tried three different polling stations it was not possible, intended to vote for Norbert Mao, this time 
again unless Mbabazi stands 
13-2014 used to participate in elections, but tired of rigging, voted for Besigye 
22-2014 voted for Besigye last time, I will vote if current president does not stand, because otherwise my vote will be 
wasted 
23-2014 why should I elect, I stopped voting because I can already predict the results, I was voting for DP. I rather go to 
the beach and get some fresh air.  
E11-17 Because LC1 elections approaching, do not talk politics in the office, as compete for different parties, encourage 
citizens not to engage in violence: metaphor of men competing for a girlfriend 
15-2017 “It is a waste of time. They are going to rig, what the heck” 
16-2017 Hopefully we have new candidates 
9-2017 Vote buying 
7-2017 We wouldn’t be having Museveni if Ugandans were serious 
14-2017 Our democratic principles are not respected, in some constituencies voter intimidation through guns, tortured 
and forced to vote 
FN 2017 YOU, the people, are the problem, vote for small bribes 
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Museveni 
2-2014 He is 80 [thus over legal right to stand for presidency] not 70 
8-2014 I trust M7, but not the cabinet, the people he is surrounding with are bad, too corrupt 
9-2014 don’t trust political leaders, president was good, but then went against his own principles so had to drop 
everyone who disagreed, now surrounded by hungry people who are selfish.  
10-2014 not a bad man but surrounded by bad people,  
11-2014 Politics is always the same since I was born, all about individual benefits, that is why President says no one can 
take over his shoes, at least under him the country has been developing, I have only been voting Museveni, the 
only president I have seen, because no one else is there to administer the country 
15-2014 believe in unity and don’t believe in visions 
17-2014 President is not the problem but ppl surrounding him, thank God for President now he is a Christian, a believer, 
but he has played his role and his time is out (comparison to Saul in the bible), yet voted for him in 2011 
18-2014 M7 and govt don’t want to change because only way for them to survive,  
22-2014 M7 not managing youth unemployment 
23-2014 president as individual not bad, people around him, he is misguided 
8-2017 No difference between Museveni, Besigye, Mugisha Muntu, all still believe in NRA ideology 
people not passionate about change because of what Museveni has done, can walk freely,  
16-2017 Voted NRM because Museveni was the best candidate 
2-2012 In 2017: voted Museveni, even though many things are bad, but no alternative, I rather remain with the thief I 
already know.” 
 
Leadership transition 
1-2014 one person too long in power, comparison with Libya, Congo, need term limits “There will be need for revolution 
again. There will be need for second revolution.” (I1:5:45) 
2-2014 30 years in power no one else a chance, 
442 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization 
University of Bayreuth African Studies Online (7) 
Leadership transition 
4-2014 don’t like NRM especially thinking that there is only one man with a vision, wants to make family successor 
6-2014 Museveni overstaying, 
10-2014 Need change in leadership, starting from the president, if not by ballot than change through fate, old leaders will 
die, next ten years 
15-2014 most fundamental challenge now peaceful transitions, because so far transition of power only through coups 
16-2014 “Another issue is the regime longevity. […] most of the regimes, when they have just come in power, they 
performed so well, but when now they have ambitions of longevity, to stay as long as possible, they are totally 
diverted. They shift from the development focus.” I16:4:25 
17-2014 being in leadership for years and doesn’t want to leave, that is ignorance; regime concerned to maintain status 
quo, change comes either by forces of nature or one day people will answer that man  
19-2014 an ideal system the president leaves after some time, peaceful change of leadership 
22-2014 cannot trust political leaders, so many have overstayed, should leave place for younger ones 
in 2017: “Already ten years is too much. In marriage it is good, but not in politics.” 
23-2014 failure to groom a successor, in Rwanda genocide because of that problem, democratically we are still infants, TZ 
is a good example of peaceful transition; “I wouldn’t mind a leader leading for 20 years, 30 years, 40 years, but is 
he taking care of what is necessary? Hospitals, social services, like roads, are they good? Or is wealth distributed 
equally over the country?” I 11:4:15 
“There is just one man who has a vision. So when one man dies, what happens? Everybody goes blind?” 5:26 
8-2017 My generation to change the country, has been messed up by Bushmen, cannot understand our needs as 
generation 
E18-17 “Unless Museveni leaves power, nothing will change” change will come because he is old 
16-2017 A lot has been achieved, but no maturity thinking, may start as a good leader, but if you stay too long, you make 
mistakes “You leave when people still need you” 
9-2017 95% of Ugandans want change, but not through W2W, you go on the ground and convince people to vote for 
somebody else (but believes votes are bought) 
6-2017 Opportunities non-existent, unless we get change in leadership, this is why I network here, to find a way of 
replacing this kind of leadership with someone who serves interest of the people 
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Leadership transition 
“We are blessed that the regime is crumbling. It has now more problems than it has ever had before. Thanks to 
some of us who have come up and add a […] So I am seeing a better day coming, not so far away from me.” 
7-2017 Joined FDC because Besigye has portrayed a signal, if we don’t get rid of this person today, he will be a problem of 
this country tomorrow; need for Museveni to leave so that we can rebuild this country 
13-2017 Current president is a freedom fighter, went to bush to liberate the country, why would he love to take it back to 
where it was? We’ve grown up, we’ve been born in Museveni’s regime, but we have said, enough is enough. It is 
high time to at least give chance to another leader. 
Fighting for peaceful transition, no militia change of government 
E8-2017 “Uganda is ripe for a change and it is not far. It is not far.” 
51-2012 In 2017: no more change, development because overstaying in power, Museveni has been there for too long with 
lowered voice 
 
Stability 
1-2014 Stability yes, but no chance for institutions to develop 
4-2014 Museveni brought stability but built structures that cannot persist without him 
7-2014 first years of M7 was chaotic, now stabilizing,  
8-2014 Govt has brought peace first and foremost 
10-2014 Museveni disciplined army, but other than that? No tangible developments,  
15-2014 brought stability, revolutionary forces different from divisions of the past; balancing out between regions;  
18-2014 Now there is peace, that is the most important, “But anyway what I can say that there is peace. What has changed 
is that there is peace because the time I was growing up, guns were in wrong hands, people were being  
killed.” I18-2-5 
22-2014 as long as Museveni is there, we are secure, because along military lines he shines off,  
11-2017 “I am not yet academically qualified to handle chaos. So I needed him.” [why voted for NRM] 
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16-2017 At least now we have security, before that was a problem 
7-2017 “And I am always someone who believes that we can always have temporary instability if it guarantees 
permanent stability.” 
13-2017 “Actually, they always tell us at police stations, when they detain us, what are you after? We fought for this 
country, do you want to take it back where it was? There is a patriotic causes that they want to always teach 
Ugandans, the youth and all Ugandans that being patriotic is being silent to such issues.” 
 
Past presidents 
7-2014 Obote was more organized, govt programs were implemented,  
10-2014 Uganda under Obote the best, had all 22 districts at heart in development; roads, hospitals were built,  
13-2014 under Idi Amin it was good, brought things back to the natives, Obote was good because there was no corruption, 
he had spirit of the country, was disturbed by so-called rebels; 
18-2014 Not during interview but in our first meeting explained me at length what a good leader Obote has been 
22-2014 first govt of Obote was best, during Amin was killing, indiscriminately, but economically it was not bad, some 
commodities were lacking, like salt, sugar; 
23-2014 Amin ruled for nine years but laid foundation of what is there today, M7 in 30 years nothing tangible, ok, killing is 
not there, but they will bring you down;  
E18-17 Father was soldier under Amin, now in exile, did a lot for this country but now cannot stay a second here, I was 
jailed for the wrongs my father did 
15-2017 Amin has built Serena hotel, in 21st ct you are saying you’re building roads.  
E2-2017 You wonder how did people survive under Amin, but one of best education systems, because people 
circumvented state, parent teachers association, resilience and self-reliability 
9-2017 In 1970’s Amin chased Indians, that is the reason we are here, they have tried several times to penetrate the market 
 
Annex 7: Coded Categories 2014/2017 445 
 
State and economy 
8-2017 KLA belongs to few people, Sudhir Ruparelia owns 50% of buildings, rich people use government money to build 
all these, rich men are seasonal, finished if fall out with government 
E24-17 Link between free enterprise and democracy, but in our context those in charge of state power capture the 
economy → no free enterprise in classic sense “One of the ϐirst things that in many of our countries, those who 
capture state power very, very deliberately embark on a process of capturing the economy. And they use state 
power essentially to capture the economy. And therefore kill private enterprise in its classic sense.” → e.g. Sudhir 
 
Opposition 
6-2017 FDC has a party manifesto, like economy not in the hand of foreign investors, want to bring back PPP, more public 
investment; people outside political spectrum do not understand, see it was petty things Museveni against 
Besigye 
E8-2017 There are no political parties yet; democracy: we are just trying 
15. Experience / Expectations with Public Officials 
5-2014 public officials refuse to pick phone think you call for money yet you seek advice, promise to call you back but 
then will not answer your calls 
6-2014 Panafrica members invited to parliament to present their petition on GMO bill, but he is convinced that it is just 
a formal procedure, and will not yield anything if it is against the interest of the government 
8-2014 contact with govt officials: one relative is a lawyer in govt, but don’t know much about him, in village chairman 
stood with mother and children when father wanted to sell off their land 
9-2014 one time I interacted with public official, LC, wanted bribes, was not helpful, what about our taxes? 
10-2014 contact with influential judges because personal friend of the family, talked about how you need to bribe to 
make your file advance, maybe did not stop it but rang a bell 
14-2014 never contacted public officials, what will they do? Even police bad experience, someone stole her chairs and 
money, she went to the police, he just bribed them and left, same story in other police stations 
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17-2014 I have some personal access to official but not so many because my ministry is young, talked to one MP of the 
East, talked to LC in my village that he should not sideline but lead all people: born-again, Muslims, Cath. 
18-2014 current minister of foreign affairs, their village about 16km from our home, promised me to connect me to 
someone to pay for university, but did not assist me much, so brothers stepped in;  
22-2014 one politician was helping me with brother in laws son, paid his school fees;  
E11-17 LC1 is voluntary work, of group of ten only three active, we have tried to train crime preventers, it is a 
challenge, bulungi bwansi as community volunteering, fixing potholes etc. 
E18-17 Transport sector does not benefit from govt programs on HIV, youth livelihood, adult education 
11-2017 Rarely Ugandans ask regime for something, because they know they are corrupt 
16-2017 Can turn to LC1, but rarely get solutions 
E23-17 Through association want to increase security, make background checks on new riders, call for more security 
organs within the sector; support with accidents, for orphans, support to go back to school, sensitization for 
HIV/AIDS a lot of developmental issues, maybe also because hope to access foreign funding, thus repeating donor 
agendas?  
Not see themselves as trade union, but as how to get funds and facilities from govt and NGOs, access to loans 
E4-2017 Policy makers not in the habit of reading, known fact here → ACODE for implementation, not only writing 
papers; STON: direct connection w/ govt, if I want something done, I just pick the phone and call 
9-2017 Petitioned govt on Chinese, but nothing was done, feels ignored by politics, controlling bodies are not on the 
ground 
S: govt organs to give advice and visas, but we don’t want money 
KACITA: cannot do anything for us, problem is too specific 
Govt has failed to protect us, let Asians penetrate our market  
6-2017 We petitioned parliament, wrote proposals to tackle problem of unemployment, but ended in waste basket, 
concepts, letters, sought meetings, no one paid attention, met some ministers, they ask what is your personal 
problem as you? Concern not the country, but security, tell us we want to cause insecurity 
13-2017 Petitioned parliament when they disagree, it is constitutional right, but they try to stop you 
E8-2017 Even if you write recommendations, they ignore it 
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FN 2017 DRCC: poor seeking government intervention to get out of poverty, give it personally (transport, school fees, 
medical costs), wealthier: on land issues, landlords seeking to evict tenants, etc., MC how to access loan 
schemes, inform about govt programmes 
19-2012 No [the government has no effect], because I / everything I do, I pay for it. There is nothing free that I get, as a 
result of being helped by the government. It does not help me pay for school fees, it does not help me to pay my 
medical bills or my family, it does not help me to anything. So I don't feel anything like an effect. I stand on my 
own 
Pan-africa Before state played a positive role in ppls life, now more of enabling environment and individuals take care of 
their own welfare 
 
KCCA 
8-2017 For whom are you cleaning the city? Expelling hawkers, not providing an alternative, do it gradual, build 
markets first 
E5-2017 Relationship with KCCA, can’t say it is the best, wanted to write us off the list of KLA markets, but we are legally 
here, have a MoU with the owner finally got closed one month later 
E13-17 Request to KCCA for street lights in Kololo, slashed also bushes, repaired road damages, now road is open, better 
visibility 
E16-17 KCCA took over from UTODA, streamlined into one fee, plus loading fee, got them to court on that one, won, but 
one month later minister came back with fee; in case of strike KCCA used extra force, brought pioneer buses to 
obstruct strike 
law to make loading along the roadside illegal 
sold taxi park to an investor, we are in court other this, would have bought the land ourselves 
E23-17 Banning BB’s in the city will never happen, only threat so that they will eventually pay taxes, as BB 2010 we 
support the tax, s it does something for the industry, hope to receive a contribution from that 
13-2017 KCCA passed resolution with lord mayor for hawkers to sell from 5-10pm, when shops are closing, but technical 
wing refused 
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KCCA 
E25-17 Banning hawkers to support shop owners from KACITA; compares protest by hawkers to protest from thieves if 
you put a police on the door; only city where the rich do not pay property tax, hard to change law because MPs 
staying in the city, no interest in changing the law 
16. Political Activism 
Political Activism 
2-2014 comes from political family, not mainstream political thinking, ideologically member of a party but remain non-
partisan for now, at status quo better in opposition, but risk to be killed if perceived as a political threat, I have 
evolved politically, have better analysis now 
3-2014 “Totally my area of interest can never go into politics.” I3:6:44 
4-2014 no political ambitions right now but in the future I will contest 
5-2014 don’t involve myself in politics, fear of disadvantage if I show support for a party, I need much help and don’t 
know who I get it from,  
6-2014 earned 20 million used it to build some capacity for his own party 
now volunteer at Panafrica, depend on good will of colleagues, I am with civil society, but I don’t believe in CS, it 
is more about getting money and security is harassing them, first I retreated to NRM now I retreated to civil 
society “We are the only regular debate forum in this town. And if you are the only regular debate forum in KLA, 
then you are the only regular debate forum in this country.” I6:4:20 
I want change, issues with other political parties as well, politically active, organized youth conference on oil, 
wanted to protest for greater transparency in oil exploitation, but this kind of activism does not work here, 
regime always gets what it wants, we need to act otherwise, no democracy, “I don’t see the reason why to go to 
parliament, where if you make good laws they will not be implemented”  
people fear disadvantages so they don’t openly join, last year stopped talking publicly because fear of 
harassment, keeping low profile; 
8-2014 I would like to have opportunity to become a minister, change things, 
10-2014 I intend to join politics at an advanced age;  
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Political Activism 
14-2014 don’t like political activism because usually there are problems, chaos, running up and down “Because I believe 
me as I feel, there are even others who feel the same way, I can’t change anything.” 
15-2014 in 2009 job with ministry of defense in marketing, but in 2010 decided to contest for MP, as civil servant you 
have to be non-partisan, Parliament outside Parliament, NRM Media Activist forum Went into politics because I 
consider myself the best, near to those people, know their problems 
16-2014 love politics but don’t practice, rather be kingmaker than king, contribution in my way through working for 
ministry 
18-2014 if I establish business that can sustain myself outside my job then I may come into politics, maybe 2021, but not 
2016 “In 2011 I wanted to leave the bank to participate [in politics], but when I saw the environment I 
withdraw.” I18:8:42 
8-2017 Do not fight to be known, activism and articles bring more trouble than publicity, fight for the rights of people 
“If you ever see a rat running to hide in fire, you must bear in mind that whatever is chasing the rat is worse 
than fire.” 
“This is my war, the haves vs the havenots. Haves are very few, but are organized, they have sources, networks, 
we the havenots are very many but we are disorganized, we are poor and we no network. My plan is to organize 
them, network, and lead them towards a common cause.” 
E11-17 Village council meeting every 2-3 months, about 200 people attend 
E17-17 “Buganda is hibernating, we are told to survive in any situation, the issues are still there.”, need for a spark 
15-2017 “I am a coward, I like things easily.” but sees benefits: “You need something like that [BR, W2W] so that those in 
power can think clearly.” 
E2-2017 “Many people come here and wonder why aren’t we shouting so much about everything that is wrong in this 
country. But that is because people, when people have all these hardships around them, they find coping 
mechanisms, and one of the coping mechanisms is let me improve myself, let me self-preserve.”→ retreat into 
private sphere, entrepreneurship as an example, private schools, also in health sector, even churches and 
mosques, because when people have these problems they have recourse in celebrating life 
He is active because he doesn’t want his children to face the same problems in 20 years  
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Political Activism 
E4-2017 If you want to do an activism, you take your ebimeeza down town, get all these young people, boda boda and 
whatever.” → STON as opposed to activism 
E12-17 “For the last fifteen years, there has been some fatigue against the ruling government. And people are always 
looking for an opportunity to protest against the establishment. So I think that is also an important factor that is 
in. We have this group of annoyed people. People who are annoyed. Who see the current regime as doing things 
which are very wrong for the country. So those ones also joined, actually, because they were seeing a particular 
face of the person who is giving away the forest.” 
also campaigning anti-GMO, but very complex issue, hard to break down for people 
6-2017 Another activism: mourning for our country, funeral for our country because young people went abroad and 
were killed there; 49 participants, all got arrested; want to intensify in politics because want to change 
leadership; want to contest in upcoming election;  
“We are in a society where people think some people will come and do things for us. People will come and 
liberate us, people will come and bring the goodness of/ I had to go to these political caravans and tell them, 
look guys we are too old to wait for a savior we better get up ourselves and start pushing this thing. The change 
we want must come initiated by us, always.” → many people have shown interest in this kind of responsibility 
similar to Michael 
recruitment through facebook page, we go to where they are and they admire our courage 
7-2017 Believe it is upon us to change the situation 
14-2017 Want to run for parliament in 2021; youth councilor, he and 13-2017 are political activists, identify issues and 
speak out on behalf of the common man, have a group, distribute tasks, stage an activity, first call media to let 
them now 
majority of people on the streets are young 
13-2017 Working class men go to bar, have beer, debate latest news, but cannot go on beyond that, fear losing job if going 
to the street, cannot be arrested and detained for 48 hours 
E8-2017 People who have read and understand constitution paid a deaf ear to the call for action. “And that is when you 
produce things like armchair activists. Come on, I just sit in my chair and write a few things and think I am 
contributing to my country.” to get MC to participate actively is still a struggle, don’t want to bite the hand that 
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Political Activism 
feeds them, only when it comes to issues that affect them directly, like oppressive laws or policies, then they will 
ask for people to come on board 
but see shifting trend, more people are becoming concerned, talk more about politics 
E8-2017 There is fragmented activism when it concerns us; people don’t perceive themselves as actors 
FN “It is as if you are riding with a bicycle and you are passing an accident. You see the man lying on the street. It 
hurts you in your chest while you continue riding, but you cannot do anything. If even those in the big cars don’t 
stop, what can you do?” 
H: came to activism because Owino was burnt down, destroyed her property, her friend Z. became an activist, 
even though coming from comfortable background close to NRM, early activism, at one point chose a party so 
people know where you stand, so chose FDC 
deputy mayer of KLA central: “Even though I am a member of the opposition, I will never go on the street to 
demonstrate, because it is not secure. It is for personal benefit, not for the nation.” 
 
Jobless Brotherhood 
8-2017 Idea to protest against what was taking place in this country, pig as metaphor for selfishness and greed, doesn’t 
even bother about own kids → MPs lived up to this 
2013 idea of founding the jobless brotherhood, took 8 months to study dynamics of parliament, security, detail 
how we work → June 17th 2014 Mpigs “our activism has [made us] become used to jail” 
believe in non-violent means, to make police look ridiculous chasing pigs 
training in Tunisia, contacted on social media from ActionAid Denmark, Solidarity Uganda, Beautiful Trouble 
5000 members countrywide 
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Jobless Brotherhood 
recruitment centers in Universities, critical thinking (other than villagers) and know they will join in joblessness 
after graduation 
meetings at FDC office, had office but closed for lack of cash 
three more pig activities, another yellow, one in all colors for MPs, recently dead pigs thrown at parliament 
thinking of rebranding in brotherhood movement, to include also those with jobs, brotherhood because God 
created man, ratio 3:7 for women 
6-2017 Not registered, formed after realizing that many of our age, educated but not employed 
MPigs as way to capture attention of ruling class, context 2014 a lot of strikes, at uni students and lecturers and 
non-teaching staff, medial workers at hospital, national referral hospital was not functioning, protest from wives 
of policement, wanted salary increment, but was denied; same year 36 billion for remodeling parking space at 
parliament, 3 billion to purchase iPads for MPs, brand new presidential cars 
pigs as symbol for ugly animal that overeats 
“So we went together with [8-2017] and/ we wanted to have the pigs on the floor of parliament, meaning that the 
ministers and the MPs who meet in this building, all they do is to eat and eat and sleep and eat, yet they are 
eating at our expense. Our children are not getting quality education because we are buying them cars.” 
unintended consequences: security budget for parliament was increased, because that could have been terrorists 
media has given us good coverage, even though sometimes misrepresent the message 
inspired by guys in Egypt, wondered what could bring us together, as people of our age? Joblessness 
7-2017 Joined after a series of other activism, in charge of research and lead publicity team 
MPigs made it three times (now four) 
Annex 7: Coded Categories 2014/2017 453 
 
 
Walk to Work 
8-2017 Campaign premature, lacked script, Besigye vs M7 has personalized the struggle, not certain what campaign 
should achieve 
E17-17 Not everybody believed vote was stolen, therefore harder (than BR) to join 
E18-17 “For me, I am not a politician, but when I saw the objectives of W2W, I convinced my fellow drivers to join.” 
10-2017 Support the idea, but deviate from the means 
11-2017 Did not trust Besigye, he is not genuine 
9-2017 Did not support because of confusion between FDC and NRM government, W2W hidden agenda, don’t think this is 
the solution to change the government, fail to see point why walk to work 
E12-17 Only played on a political basis, political sentiments, challenging status quo, so supporters of the govt trying to 
shun w2w 
6-2017 Participated, organized, was in charge of one division, would take groups of people and explain them power of 
non-violence. Everyone was feeling the pressure of high prices, concerned everyone. Regime hired goons to 
tarnish name of the campaign and FDC, but we insisted that we followed non-violent approach; protesters were 
middle class and poor people, teachers, medical workers, police officers, but mostly poor, famous in Kalerwe, 
Kawempe, Kasubi, Kireka, not in Ntina, Bugolobi, Nakasero; it was mainly economical, so no middle aged person, 
only youth, the economically and politically disadvantaged 
7-2017 It was good, good intentions, answered some questions, about high prices, it was good, but some were affected, 
blessed and dead “But to me, all that is good to expose a dictatorial state. It is always good that a dictator is 
exposed and at the moment he is exposed to a level that even his own or her own people can no longer associate 
with him or her.” 
Included all classes, MPs were on pick ups because they left their vehicles at home, business men, what failed 
w2w was lack of programming, people though it was a political, not economic affair 
E8-17 Walk to work a powerful campaign, but govt cannot handle this amount and volume of protest, so they interrupt 
them from the beginning 
FN 2017 Too much dominated by politicians, who follow their own interests “You don’t even know anymore who is 
working for Uganda. One day they are on the street, the other they pass their tax exemption.” 
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Walk to Work 
19-2012 100% supportive, Given a chance, if I was not being employed somewhere, I would have joined them, of course. 
Just to add my voice to theirs, of course. 
5-2012 Initially supported, but later became skeptical about intentinos 
 
Buganda Riots 
E17-17 Mobilization did not start the day of the riot, but months prior; background of the BR 
basic right to move freely was restricted, when first announced NZ started preparing: a month before arrival, 
prepared place, cut sticks, got machete in case Banyala stop king from attending, students ready to prepare a war, 
in his section about 800-1000 students, went back to KLA because knew kabaka would be stopped and prepared 
to protest, when katikkiro was stopped went to Kisekka to get old tires, burnt them at every junction, stopped 
traffic 
during day able to take the city, because nearby army all Baganda, over night flew in army from Karamoja, then 
South Sudan, for two days no control over the city, NZ in ever uni, used for mobilization, people from the West 
feared, ran away to Nairobi, in the end 200 land titles returned to kabaka, now free to move 
Case is still in court, but govt doesn’t want it to be heard, out of fear for new protest 
40% of people arrested were not Baganda, framing as ethnic violence to tarnish Baganda, brushes of attack on 
Westerners 
Issue was in our heart, everybody believed it was unconstitutional 
at Kisekka market Baganda leadership for informal sector, this is why we went there, since then market sold off 
to investors 
E18-17 Participated, because “If whatever they organize can bring a change, I have to participate.” 
11-2017 Did not support, because they were tribalistic [himself from the West], funded by Mbeki of RSA 
9-2017 Supported, but did not participate, was not around 
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Buganda Riots 
E12-17 Similar effect than Mabira, promoted by Baganda, but because in this region it was effective 
6-2017 Participated, but not on an organizational basis like in W2W, it was organized by Nkoba Zambogo, it was too 
much, you just find yourself in the mix, would write Manila charts, was a tribal thin, with Westerners asked a 
question, if they couldn’t pronounce it properly they were punished, mostly reserved for Baganda 
7-2017 Did not participate; it was framed as Buganda issue, but I think it is wrong, because everyone should be free to go 
where they want 
23-2012 Wanted to participate, but by that time it had turned sour 
19-2012 Because I think it has an unfair from my cultural leader to be hesitated from going / be hindered from going to a 
certain part of the country, which is under his ownership. 
All things in the country, most especially in the city have to get stalled for three days. There was no business in 
the city for three days. There were bullets everywhere. People were shutting their homes. So, yeah, it was a big 
signal to the government that people love their king and they should be doing what they want. 
33-2012 President solved it 
8-2012 Run badly by the government 
13-2012 Badly managed by government 
 
Mabira Forest 
E18-17 Main organizer, blocked one road, protect climate and against investors who have made us suffer a lot (taxipark 
sold off to them, will not employ us) 
9-2017 Supported but did not participate 
E12-17 In 2007 govt wanted to give away 1/3 (21 000 ha) of Mabira to Metha Group to use for sugar cane plantation, 
forest has many virtues, economically for people living there, ecologically to balance climate, rain, etc. and 
culturally for Baganda; mobilized Buganda kingdom, local communities, churches, IRC prayed at beginning of 
demonstrations, NGOs and CBOs, traders (KACITA), academic institutions, donor community, parliamentarians 
from both parties, to have peaceful demonstrations, brought petition to parliament, but too many people, some 
looting and vandalism, organizers went for two weeks to prison, on trumped up charges like terrorism, murder, 
theft, accused to topple the government, eventually won the case.  
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Media played a big role in mobilizing, even leaders have been overwhelmed by number of people to join on the 
street (say it were 100 000), became a national issue, also question of race because of Ugandan of Indian origin → 
not supported by NAPE, but always people on the ground who appropriate a cause for their own intentions, king 
proposed to give them land elsewhere, but they did not accept; boda bodas, unemployed youth joined also → 
protest against govt; civil servants supportive but cautious to go on the street, original demonstrators were well 
off, not unemployed, leading in the meetings; young protesters 15-55, also important people from Buganda who 
put on their kanzus, World Bank put also pressure because it would diminish the water levels in the Nile that 
were supposed to keep Bujagali running (WB financed); Indian community also joined  
Now status: have put it off the table for now, but issue can come back, maybe if President buys more cannons, and 
guns, he may think people are too afraid to protest 
6-2017 Had a rage against Indians, I must confess, saw an opportunity, I don’t want to talk about it, having worked with 
them I remember how they used to treat me, so I had to pay back, don’t want to say it was non-violent, and when 
I look back I feel sorry, I come from Mukono, I have grown up in forests, “When I came to the city the shops were 
closed and there were some warnings over the radio, and the message was clear. The problem is Indians.” I knew 
where the Indians were, those illegal immigrants from India/ I had to participate in one way or the other  
Mabira people participated regardless of their tribal affiliation, not only youth, but even MPs, middle class people 
7-2017 Fully engaged, from Jinja, organized debate on virtue of forest, then went there, threw logs on the street, it 
happened thrice, 2007, 2011, last year after election, I don’t know why always after election, to divert peoples 
attention maybe 
E24-17 Save Mabira focused on a particular issue, corruption is more vague 
E8-2017 An MP is leading, bunch of elites under civil society and youth rallying behind, they are constant 
 
Black Monday 
E18-17 Supported, because anti-corruption, but wearing black clothes cannot intimidate Museveni, it must bring a loss to 
his government. Non-violence (smiles and shakes head), Museveni fears violence 
E2-2017 Started at time of big corruption scandal in prime ministers office, what can we do? Make a campaign that 
appeals to everyone, where everyone can participate, very personal “So it is not about fighting something out 
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Black Monday 
there, but it is about me as a citizen, seeing myself as part of this country, being part of the change I would like to 
see.” → wearing black t-shirts every Monday, simple action; publish a newsletter every month, detailing 
corruption scandals, call to shun businesses involved in corruption 
arrests, media coverage, gave them nationwide attention, also one public action, like going to school if 
headmaster was not scared 
one challenge: seen as an NGO thing, something that NGOs are pushing, others to feel that corruption is too big to 
fight, even though many thought it was useful campaign 
its been three, four years now, haven’t stopped; but right now no public action perception of people that it is 
something of the past 
framed in a way that it is hard to stop, because zero tolerance against corruption also NRM policy, don’t want to 
say that they don’t support → make them look as if it is political 
9-2017 It didn’t work, put on black, no one refused them, but it got finished like that 
E12-17 Corruption is like GMO, very complex for people to understand, Black Monday because centering on corruption 
people could not easily join, remained something of civil society mostly and eventually died out 
7-2017 Did not participate actively, only promotion on social media, more of civil society engagement, an elites thing, for 
me I love a campaign which is for a common man. 
E24-17 Beginning of BM with NGO leaders; one of the problems: failed to develop a vernecularization of the movement, 
failed because led by people within NGO sector, me different because I come from the church; key objective not to 
stop corruption, but to make it risky 
also other public action, like free and fair election campaign  
“The energy of the street is always youthful” and women are very active 
E8-2017 Black monday documenting corruption scandals and asking citizens actions, follows NRM manifesto for zero 
tolerance for corruption, stopped for a while, but starting again next month; monday is the day when decisions 
are made, so the idea is once you’re in the office and you’re the boss, make sure to think about corruption 
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Black Monday 
right now undergoing review, because of civic space and operating environment, how to be effective without 
wasting time to run from one police station to another 
has been branded as rebel activities, as political, so that you cannot mobilize people around them, achievements: 
the anti-corruption act, to protect whistleblowers, make corruptions risky, recognition through the response of 
the state, at local levels people ask for accountability 
we sit and strategize, make a backup team, coordinating activities, activists mainly young, students, and from 
civil society, genderwise balanced, more men on the street, women in backup 
FN 2017 In the office: in the beginning it moved something, but died out quickly, because of repression and people are not 
off badly enough, and problem of NGOization of the protest 
 
Strike 
1-2014 MUASA strike bought off, regime prefers to deal with individuals on a day to day basis 
E16-17 MUASA strike about teaching allowance not paid by university, no conflict with govt because they increased 
salary, public reaction always negative, misunderstanding with govt because thought that staff demanded more 
salary → closed university, when misunderstanding was cleared could not just open it again, leaders have been 
bought off by management = disunity 
lost confidence in MUASA, only hope is government and committee  
we will strike again, but after discussing with government 
E18-17 Organized “shutdown strike” in 2010 to stop fees, UTODA was banned, KCCA took over 
E19-17 Since 2010 three strikes about salary increasement, govt promised but did not live up to, lead to Public Service 
Collective Bargaining and Machinery Act 2008, but not operationalized since, we work with govt to fight 
corruption, negotiation council is there, but it takes long and “it is cosmetic” 
9-2017 Striking doesn’t make sense, especially in a country where there is no democracy.” 
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Strike 
E24-17 KACITA organized, closed shops for three days to protest against pre-inspection cost, after three days, Museveni 
calls them one by one, puts millions of shillings to individuals 
same MakU strike, paid most of the executive 
 
Activism and Money 
8-2017 No activity with all members because cannot fundraise cash bail 
we need more resources than in ten years able to chase old generation 
E5-2017 Looking for avenues to get funds, to uplift Park yard market 
E17-17 Big people in business, Baganda, gave Waragi and Marijuana to motivate the crowd 
E13-17 To mobilize people tell them lunch and beer is there 
E16-17 Lecturers came back because ran out of money 
E18-17 Face problem of paying law fees, can’t afford → little activism in the transport sector: “When I try to organize, 
they say ‘Ah, [E18] you want to take us to prison? We have families, we don’t have money.’” 
13-2017 “We always know ourselves. We know who has money, who does not have. […] We always try to identify someone 
who is financially table to come and fund the activities on behalf of the what? The rest of the members.” 
14-2017 Politics in Uganda has become commercial, not about what you speak but how much you have in your pocket asks 
for support from funding their campaign 
E24-17 Because of state capture of economy, no one wants to give money for legal support, public action, etc. 
E8-17 Hard to find someone to print black monday newsletter, because in corporate world no one want to associate 
with it 
Some people say: “It is about today’s food, [...] do I have today’s food?” worry about taking kids to school, have a 
good house, but no one realizes if parliament is not there you cannot enjoy what you have; used own money to 
file case against the six billion handshake  
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Cooptation 
8-2017 Jobless Brotherhood as an independent identity, that fights for an independent cause, not become someone’s 
boys 
some members compromised by govt because they are desperate and need money 
E17-17 Got money offered to stop BR, but he refused; after 2011 offered a job as deputy RDC “their thinking was most 
people who are doing this are unemployed, so we better get them jobs.” others accepted, e.g. Mpanga advocates 
now handles oil deals 
phone call from president 
E16-17 MUASA leaders have been bought off, is always the case, but no one turned against them, no alternative “We 
decided to leave them, we understand their problems.” 
E18-17 Met Museveni in 2015, he told KCCA to create stages, stop loading fees, but nothing happened, Museveni is not 
genuine “because in my knowing, if the president says so it is an order, I think he is calling them back after we 
have gone, says you leave it.” 
hard to meet with him, until he hears you are organizing, then he says, call them, let them meet with me 
E2-2017 In the beginning, people were expecting to be given black t-shirts, they refused 
E23-17 Taxis went to see the president directly, told them to redo the election, intervened after riders complained about 
KCCA to him, power struggle with union (UTRADA) and KCCA 
9-2017 Colleagues got money from govt, failed because politicized 
H: KACITA might also be bought off by big manufacturers 
E12-17 President himself tried to silence, called us to state house, but he couldn’t manage 
6-2017 Government wanted to give handouts, did not want to hear our solutions to unemployment, created what I call 
“patronage fund”, to access Youth Livelihood Program you had to be doctrined about NRM, and be a sympathizer 
contradicted by Augustine  
7-2017 People demonstrate for monetary values, hope to be bought off if they go shouting on the street, for me, you will 
go back with your money 
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Cooptation 
13-2017 President has divided constituencies to get the number, then invites them to Kyankwanzi for a meeting, they eat 
first then he tells them what to do so they tow his line 
some activists do activism for getting money, to be called for a dialogue, e.g. NRM Poor Youth 
14-2017 “Because one thing I should tell you is, in this activism, that we are speaking about, if we wanted to get jobs from 
the government, some of us would be so comfortable, we would be employed because we have got phone calls, we 
have got opportunities […].” 
E24-17 State invests heavily in co-opting civil society, for example religious sector, churches, mosques and labor unions, 
all part and parcel of the Museveni patronage machinery. 
Bishops are getting car, only two bishops over the last 15 years didn’t get one, big pentecostal leaders has good 
ties with them, because rely so much on charisma of their leaders, M7 identifies the big blokes, woes them; for 
PCC beneficial, because they lack the stand in our socity 
 
NGOs 
6-2014 Civil society only interested in profit, did not understand the system 
E2-17 BM seen as an NGO thing 
E4-2017 People in govt feel that NGOs promote interests of donors, our model different: we approach donors with our 
project, do not design projects according to their interest,  
a lot of work done NGO-style, only short-term interest of project implementation, that is it 
7-2017 [in ref to BM] “Because more of this civil society individuals work for accountability. That is the worst thing I hate 
with them.” 
E24-17 NGOs are not associational, depend on a small group on the board, especially the executive director; but more 
aspect of civil society because they gather the elite that are not included in patronage 
“NGOs themselves can be the enemy of positive citizen led change.” 
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E8-17 “So most of my colleagues have fallen into that trap. Busy writing donor reports, busy doing what. And there is no 
direct focus on what you can do for your country.” 
 
Non-partisan, unpolitical  
E16-17 Opposition tried to bandwaggon on strike, got chased away, “I personally as LC3 contacted government officials 
and told them ‘there is no politics, no political leader is involved in this.” only between management and lecturers 
E18-17 Allegedly supporting Besigye, thus not allowed to associate, true, many support Besigye 
E21-17 Some vendors went to Lord Mayor because unhappy with chairman’s decision, he told them not to go 
“politicking” not to bring politics in, because politics are bad 
E2-2017 “Because in this country, and I don’t know how much you know about the politics, but the politics is that there is 
a pre-occupation that is trying to stop any street protest. Why? Because that has been used before by the 
opposition political parties. So anybody who does a street protest is seen as being part of the opposition.” 
Nobody wants to say they support corruption, “So what do you do? You just leave us, rubbish us, you make it look 
like ah, this is political, this is not about anti-corruption.” 
E23-17 “His [Museveni’s] directive was: I don’t want here such nonsense of politics in this industry of transport.” 
In industry despite different political interests harmony, because we are all UGs, want all the best 
E6-2017 “I don’t know any other institution [except ACODE] that has the power to convene controversial [from politically 
opposed sites] under one roof. […] We are political, but non-partisan.”, select from various parties to balance, so 
no accusation of being partisan 
9-2017 don’t want to be politicized, not to mix up development and politics, chairman of 100 districts, some opposition, 
other NRM, “So there is a business language we can talk which is not so much political.” 
“So now we are trying to see how we can build a group of patriotism people, people who can thing about/ feel 
that Uganda is their home, is their country. People who are not political, but who feel that Uganda can be secured 
or rescued from the so-called investors. Uganda can be rescued by non-political people. Because politicians have 
done so much to put Uganda in the what/ in the hole where it can’t even easily be lifted up.” 
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Non-partisan, unpolitical  
E12-17 “But with Mabira, the leaders were not necessary opposition, like me, I was not an opposition person, I was just 
civil society. Religious leaders were not in opposition, cultural leaders were not opposition […] so that was the 
difference.” 
13-2017 For NRM no difference between resistance and opposition 
E8-2017 “Because the problem we’ve had is people mixing politics into activism. It has not yielded.” I am non-partisan 
FN 2017 STON: moderator reminds audience that discussion is free of political affiliation, don’t attack each other, attack 
the issueslike Ebimeeza: platform for opposition to be heard: Mugisha Muntu, Norbert Mao speak 
FGD KLA central: USAFI market did not allow politicking of lord mayor  
17. Repression/Fear 
Repression/Fear 
1-2014 No possibility to voice open criticism, only in intimate atmosphere, in their association they talk politics in the 
bureau, but not when they are in the field 
8-2017 People fear, even book shops refuse to sell my books 
“Museveni is a dictator, but as long as you do not touch his guns, you will not remain in jail.” 
much surveyed, home searched, phone bugged 
I don’t fear because I am non-violent 
got expelled from University because of Mpigs, said he’s tarnishing their name 
E15-17 No fear of harassment in WA groups, other than in open spaces 
E16-17 “The government is a different area, it is nothing that you deal with easily” understands question as how to 
influence things to change government 
E18-17 Harassment and beating of drivers by UTODA others referred to them as mafia, got jailed for six months without 
court for obstructing fee, drivers feared UTODA because it was an upper hand of government officials misusing 
money 
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Repression/Fear 
got beaten up by crime preventers at stage, last time but in Mulago mortuary 
was tortured to the extent of removing my nails, tried to burn family 
E19-17 Govt threatening with army, after few days call for negotiations, govt blocks them to use radio, switches off 
phones so no strike 
E2-2017 A few friends distributing newsletter were arrested, saying they are circulating seditious material 
stopped demonstrations because of security risk, too many arrested 
Bishop Zac already activist, participation in BM one reason for state to harass him 
E4-2017 Govt does not fear conversation that are in-house, but with increasing closing of open spaces you could see 
people censor themselves, “Some of them are looking for opportunities, including from government. If you are 
hoping that, if you are a business person […] and you are looking at winning a tender, who wants to speak badly 
about the regime when there is an informer there?” 
E12-17 Teargassed, sprayed with water, beaten, spent two weeks in prison 
POMA does not change much, because demonstrations will break rules and regulations, nothing will change that, 
same if you touched Kabaka, does not matter whether there is a law or not 
“So for me, whether there is a law or no law, people don’t mind, as long as they are convinced that the only way 
of solving the problem is through demonstration, they will go for it. It doesn’t matter how many teargas canon 
you have, and those equipments, the guns you have, they will not mind about that.” 
6-2017 Went to jail for activism 
7-2017 Did not get job where he was best qualified because of political activism; I feared, and my family was never 
supportive of my decision, I feared but I said no  
“I have believed that it is upon us to change this situation. I have always believed this.” 
we have been imprisoned, for a whole month sometimes 
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Repression/Fear 
14-2017 Police will not arrest everybody in a protest, but only known faces, ring leaders; self-employed, not getting a job 
because blacklisted as opposition 
E24-17 I: “But, I mean, your actions don’t involve so much that kind of going on the street and protesting.” 
“Well, one of the reasons was when we did a lot of street actions, I told you about how the state uses fear. And at 
that time they detained many of us, all of us. And the/ we hadn’t built enough capacity to provide legal support. 
So it is really, a resource, again, it is related to the first point I made to you. Where a state, a regime, captures the 
economy. Nobody is able to give any money to a local cause.” 
E8-2017 “And the other side tries to do this. Tries to label people, activists, and whatever as opposition, as bad people so 
that whoever associates themselves with them they are labeled in that way.” 
“But I think the ultimate issue here is about fear. Because the current government has used fear and threats a lot. 
That even if you wanted people’s responses and what / fear is number one. I will be shot down.” 
arrested by government, detained, later they say we have no case against you; civic space is shrinking, every 
Monday over 200 people arrested, we were running to make sure to get bonds and representation 
have to be careful about your security, time of movements, it is very porous 
FN Imperial Mall in EBB, I ask to whom it belongs, they say they don’t know. I remark that it resembles Acacia mall 
in Kololo and that it is said it belongs to the first lady. 23-2014 nods ferociously, but tells me to be quite, later I 
ask him whether you cannot say so publicly and he says that you never know whether this brings disadvantage  
22-2014 becomes silence talking about Museveni overstaying when her neighbors come closer 
Z. tells from how she has been tortured, went for treatment in Kenya, Besigye wants her to seek asylum in Kenya 
23-2012 What we normally do, although the government / they don't want us to get in politics, but we do support our 
parties. Like if, say my president is going to stand, Norbert Mao, from DP, in one way or another, I may 
contribute towards his campaign. Although not openly. It would be (...) secret, because once they get to know 
you are the kind of people who give in towards the political activity or something like that, oh, they may follow 
you wherever you are to see at least the political party looses strength. Because once there is no money it can't 
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Repression/Fear 
carry out its activities. So you do it quietly. And that's what we do mainly, like myself, that's how we support the 
party. 00:56:06-9  
R: And, and do you/ do you attend regular party meetings or such kind of things or how does your party 
engagement look like? 00:56:15-3  
I23: Openly no. Secretly yes. 00:56:23-2  
18. Tribalism 
E17-17 “Most of those who are leading us are refugees from Rwanda, Tutsi, the president, the army commander, 
Mugisha Muntu...”  
9000m2 land not distributed by the British were given to those from the West, though it should belong to the 
kabaka 
District Police Commander: out of 112, 80 are from the West, Bank of Uganda, URA, Head of Electoral 
Commission, Finance → all to Banyarwanda (!), Baganda left out, even if majority 
E2-2017 State never wanted to create better conditions for people, all about enriching himself and his people 
6-2017 cannot find a job here, you must be connected to the ruling family or nearby circle, if there is a job opening it is a 
whisper, tell a friend, once they have filled the spot they advertise, you walk and they tell you, come back 
tomorrow until you get tired 
tribe matters a lot, under this regime some tribes have been glorified or downtrodded, tribal fiction is there, 
where certain groups are highly privileged, others not 
E25-17 Many tenders awarded to own people, for example hotels constructed towards Kyoga, he or people in his regime 
are involved 
19. Health and Nutrition 
2-2014 I jog regularly 
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3-2014 eating habits: nice breakfast, no dinner, early lunch, fruits and juices, 1.5l water per day → health conscious, 
reduced weight for health from 96 to 78kg, jogging for my health (problems with Asthma) 
4-2014 breakfast in the morning, no lunch because gained too much weight, supper at five, full meal, don’t like meat a 
lot maybe once a week 
5-2014 run at least 7-10 km per day 
7-2014 eat local food, no breakfast, sometimes lunch, buying food from local market and small supermarkets, limit 
eating because of weight control, meat four times a week 
9-2014 morning plain black tea with fruits, lunch sometimes I have, sometimes just fruits, I struggled with baby weight 
but more about not getting diabetes or hypertension, meat three times a week, fish once 
13-2014 talking about how to keep in good lives because we are aging, 
20-2014 When I got married discovered I had some disease, had to undergo 5 surgeries, gone through a lot, cannot do 
much work, never spend a coin on operations because case so special, eat on condition because of diseases, only 
protein and veges, local food, meat maybe twice for health (but can afford daily), three meals, have to take them 
in time 
21-2014 enjoy jogging 3 times a week, eat local food, treats are imported foods like pizza, no eat meaters, maybe chicken 
once a month 
22-2014 in a month maybe 50 000, for going to the hospital, don’t know how much I spend on medical bills, I do no 
longer sports, weight is too much now and no time, eat meat every day, Most important in life: health, money, 
20. Middle Class 
2-2014 “I can see that I am middle class now because I go to shopping malls.” I2:6:59 
in 2017: these are those that can survive despite an external shock, does not count himself in that class 
3-2014 Economically live the life of an average Ugandan 
4-2014 “We are not peasants and not millionaires, we can afford comfortable living, in economic terms we are the so-
called middle class.” I4:1:3 
7-2014 economic situation: middle, middle, middle class, no income is sufficient, but it is ok 
8-2014 middle class is there but I don’t know where I am 
9-2014 today’s society is structured on income, I am middle class 
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10-2014 “My own position, currently I am below middle class. I am not exactly a pauper, I am not in the middle class.” 
I10:9:52 
13-2014 there is no middle class in Uganda, because they are reducing to the stage of paupers, like me 
14-2014 social inequality is high, it evolves in a positive way because you start slowly by slowly; very low percentage of 
middle class, biggest percentage is poor, next rich, middle are those that can afford necessities, myself I am 
middle class, someone earning between 500 000 to 2 million is middle class 
15-2014 I see a middle class society emerging 
16-2014 In terms of education I am middle class, in terms of income I am on the boundary between the poor, to be middle 
class you must be able to predict your income; Uganda very far from having a middle class because the class that 
is emerging is not emerging out of hard work but out of corrupt things, 
"You are just at the boundary there, oscillating." 
19-2014 somehow middle class, don’t know how to describe that 
22-2014 many have prospered but many are still low, middle class, yes they are there, those working in govt, and who are 
doing other businesses, but if you are down, it is very hard to pass in the middle, I am in the middle, if you go to 
the village, these people are poor, I am not poor like this 
E11-17 Legislations passed: no loud speakers in front of bars, no shrines for witch doctors 
10-2017 “I am not middle class, I am just penetrating.”, characterized by spending per year and meals you take; buying in 
supermarkets is cheaper, quality is better 
E2-2017 “You may not find a sustainable or stable middle class, you will even find people who oscillate between being 
middle class and being other things. But I think you will find a number of people, who because of the incomes 
that they have been able to get over time, have developed certain tastes, that would like to see/ that would like 
to see certain demands being met by the state.” 
E9-2017 Middle income earners = mostly govt employees, ministers, lawyers, judges go to supermarkets 
SM are really new in UG, Nakumatt arrived 2009, people not used to, even though less expensive. Lifestyle choice 
to go, because someone might fear if he sees lights everywhere, first class clothes 
6-2017 “But I want to say that coming to the city is also addictive, like I am struggling to go back to the village. I have 
tried to go back but I find myself a misfit there, I can’t. So that is why I am stuck here so now I am resolved and 
try and make life happen here.” in-betweenness 
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E20-17 When President of TZ came, Museveni showed him naguru hill, said these are my middle class people → 
perception of the president, but everyone has a different perception and no one know how to define them 
shifting definition, depending on the economic situation of the country, heterogeneous class with entry point is 
somebody lives comfortably, renting an apartment with two BR, has transport or a vehicle, can send children to 
school and is able to meet his bills, pays accommodation and has convenient life 
size: about 1.x %, very small (350-500 000 people), counting people subscribing to NSSF, and those working in 
govt 
no wonder supermarkets are struggling if you have such a small group 
of the 98% that rest, not all are poor, but they are vulnerable and not sustainable in their consumption 
is not voting, angry about the govt, dissatisfied, but no incentive to vote, because they can still take care of their 
needs; not a group interested in seeking votes, only want stable lifestyle, govt is aware and is not wasting time 
with them 
most indebted group, only less vulnerable because of stable job 
silent mc of traders in owino, no conspicuous consumption 
E25-17 “I am not saying we shouldn’t mind about the fall offs. The fall offs are our critical clients. But presenting the city 
as a practical place for investment, you need to make sure that policies that favor the fall offs, but are not 
incentives to attract investment, we tend to switch.” 
“[…] for me, the emergence of the middle class is a good point, but study it critically. You are going to find that it 
is actually […] a liquidation of the asset base that increases the economic purchasing power. I have my land, I sell 
it off, I get money, I come to town where I buy eggs, I buy wine. It is not based on generations out of productivity. 
And to me, if you are liquidating your asset base, that does not speak on the economic matters.” 
E24-17 “President Museveni, one of his stated goals for the economy was to create a middle class. But how did he create 
a middle class? He created a middle class by using state, public resources, public enterprises, so it is not really 
this middle class, this middle class created is not a middle class that comes out of an organic process of wealth, 
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generation wealth creation. No! It is about state capture. So you have a middle class that has captured the state. 
Or a state operates, a Museveni state that has captured the economy.” 
E8-2017 So then I ask myself so what category of people […] / class of society are we in? We are the elite, we are blunt, 
we have the knowledge. But at the same time we are not completely there, we cannot/ you know, you cannot 
compare our disposable incomes to those other guys, so I don’t know whether we are even in the middle income, 
but we are somewhere between that. And then the lower citizen, the lowest person cannot afford a meal. So 
there is just/ and I think this is now the generation, that’s where a lot of activism is. The bunch that have not 
upgraded to middle income status, neither are they at the first level. They are within. The youth who are 
unemployed and few individuals who are really, who are really bothered. About what is happening.” 
FN 2017 MU: bad reputation of maids, will blackmail you if you become too dependent 
similar depreciation of Boda boda drivers, service personnel, watchmen → mistrust lower class 
on supermarkets: people not buying because not used to buy in bulks, buy small amounts on credit, closer, 
lowering transport cost, it is too expensive, better buy in wholesale shops or local markets, supermarket as 
special treat for kids 
Blog The challenge, and need, to maintain a MC lifestyle to keep your prestige (Acramist blog) 
WA YT People going to the supermarket to show off a false middle class 
 
Salaried employment vs. self-employment 
5-2017 Diploma in education, but not working as teacher due to “meager pay. It would be meager, if they were paying it.” 
instead became self-employed entrepreneur 
E23-17 People with a degree driving a boda boda, it has become an industry 
People are selling their vivanja plots to buy motorcycle → eroding asset base 
6-2017 Formally unemployed, but I have small, small things to survive → renting out boda boda; searched job for three 
years then heard someone talk about mindset, have to change direction of thinking = eye opener, “I said no more 
applications, I never walk again. If it is to work, I must employ myself.” 
E20-17 In Owino many traders as middle class, is emerging; self-employed an unsuspected but promising avenue to 
wealth, instead of salaried employment 
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Salaried employment vs. self-employment 
E25-17 Boda boda lucrative industry, “Petty trading is not a solution, it is actually disguised unemployment.” 
Blog See education 
21. Leisure 
Leisure 
13-2017 Working class men go to bar, have a beer and conversations, watch news and then react and discuss it 
FN 2017 In Zaana: at university part of student association of Toro kingdom, met wife there, once a month go to pray 
from St. August where all Batoro meet 
in general being part of a cultural association at university very common for many 
In the office: social media has replaced informal gatherings for leisure 
 
Community life 
E11-17 Village council meeting every 2-3 months, about 200 people attend, cultural functions 
playgrounds (Sportplätze) not enough, players competing for space, used to be a dramas club but not anymore 
for lack of funds, drama club for disabled, but turned into a family business, mourners club, poetry club and black 
born actors were given money → collapsed 
E5-2017 NATIDA = voice of park yard, supports with problems of eviction, fire outbreaks, 1/3 of PY vendors registered 
with association, one time fee of 20 000, then 3000 per month, association mediates, e.g. when failure to pay, 
every three months general meeting with about 1500 members 
wanted to develop the market but landlord refused 
central government wants to relocate, but they prefer to develop the land 
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Community life 
we are not disappointed, government listens, promises the best 
E13-17 Kololo Neighborhood Watch (KNW) project of councilors after election, on WA with DPC and OC of Kololo station, 
members communicate through head of family with police, make a budget, parish councilors pay contribution, 
not the members, they have no interest because have their own guards, 900 people in WA group, about 50 come 
to meetings, pressure not so much because neighborhood not so congested 
E18-17 Organized first DACCA, then UTRADA, both banned by government, we want freedom of association but this is not 
recognized, UTRADA 4000 members, transport sector over 100 000 people 
E19-17 UNATU 2003, registered, joined with UG Natinoal Union, with help of donor unions, biggest union, 162 000 
subscribing members, subscription deduced: 1% from salary, about 600 Million per month → not enough, use to 
pay salaries, offices, teachers action for girls, teachers and AIDS sensitization group, training on best teaching 
subjects, World Teachers Day, lawyer support if deleted from payroll; relationship with govt not so bad, but no 
govt wants a trade union, with trade unions you are always at war 
E21-17 USAFI market association, chairman got appointed from KCCA (Musisi) 
E23-17 Boda boda association, many started because of politics, rent-seeking, to have someone to mobilize easily; all 
boda boda associations under political groups, BB 2010 as umbrella, other associations created in their 
opposition; from membership pay office, leader allowance, ambulance, contributing to functions in case of 
wedding/death 
E6-17 STON: since 6 years now, idea to nurture leadership, according to review highly effective, members chosen 
selectively, supposed to be youthful, with a strategic position, people discuss freely, no self-censorship 
E4-2017 STON my idea to build a new generation of leaders, create space of influence, network for people who in few 
years will occupy key political positions “So, yeah, essentially my idea was to build/ get this platform, where 
people come, have breakfast, enjoy themselves, talk about contemporary public policy issues. But the objective is 
to build these as centers of influences. Because in another five to ten years they will be occupying key political 
positions, members are educated 
a more advanced version of Ebimeeza: “People would come and say: but why do you do Protea. Protea is an 
expensive place, I can tell you, our design was that this is supposed to be expensive. […] Is was an elite version of 
Ebimeeza, and it was deliberate.” 
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Community life 
self-selected and exclusive, but work done would also benefit the poor; now more like a regular workshop, 
deterioration since he is not there anymore, topics on contemporary issues, people know each other well 
9-2017 UMOSTA: association of traders of spare parts, lubricants and rubber, in 2011 founded, after realization that 
Asians are taking over distribution chain, organized roundtables throughout the country, brought dealers 
together, called them to boycott Chinese products, went to China and Dubai in February 2017 to make direct 
deals with factories and import and brand their own product, membershipfee of 100 000, but system of buying 
shares, will be proportionally paid out profits 
E25-17 We support sweat-equity: we give the materials, people give work, that is fine, but it does not work if it is not 
agreed upon with the municipality, because then people only serve their interest, not broader picture, e.g. road 
built by people is lacking visibility, recipe of disaster, but no one would be willing to compensate if someone is 
affected by that; but citizen initiatives not very common 
FN 2017 sensitization meeting: Neighborhoodwatch Kololo renovated Airstrip police station, brought police back their, 
fueled motorcycle’s, assure transport to the working place, but police is not on the post; have two WA groups to 
communicate, costs: 150 000 per month, mainly offices in Kamwokya I, willing to pay that money, in Kamwokya 
and Kawempe turnover is bigger, hard to establish such structures, also many diverse ethnic groups 
19-2012 On trade unions: I would think about it, but the end result is the leaders of the unions have also / just (basically?) 
by other sources and other powers / foreign powers then the end result is / for them they achieve what they 
want and they are making you as ladders and just a pressure. Help them achieve what they want and for you, you 
just stay the same. So, I don't see why I should join them. 
 
SACCO 
E11-17 Started SACCO, mobilized 450 people, LC1 stood chairman, got 7 million funds = end of it 
E5-17 Form own SACCO, but people fail to contribute 
E10-17 Leader of a Women SACCO, explains how the SACCO functions, it is more than just saving, if you loose someone 
the women can come and do the cooking 
Money mainly used to pay for school fees “We reduced the literacy level” 
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E19-17 UNATU started also a SACCO 
15-2017 “You have to choose people from the same economic status, definitely” 
9-2017 UMOSTA is a SACCO, buy shares in it 
 
Vacation 
1-2014 budget for going on vacation once a year 
3-2014 “One of the things a tradition I want to get in my family is a / get a holiday time. Whether it is in the middle of 
the year, whether it is in the beginning of the year. It should be assured / I should make sure that we get that 
holiday time. It is something / we've not yet done it, but [...] because it is our first year as a family, it is 
something we would want to put forward.” I3:5:32 Wants to establish holiday time outside of Uganda for his 
family, 2-3 weeks per year,  
7-2014 As outings going to national park 
16-2014 I have to do some vacation, everyone must save for vacation 
21-2014 every Christmas destination for holiday 27-31st 
 
Whats App Groups 
E15-17 Have become popular like three years ago: “The best thing about social media: you only include people that you 
share something with.” 
NRM youth easy to reach consensus on social media, a lot of people agree on many things from opposite parties 
not only for civic activities, but also self-help, raise money to pay for school fees, weddings, etc 
more cautious on FB, easier for surveillance, considering future employers, visa applications…  
E13-17 No youth to go without WA for a day 
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22. Good Life 
2-2014 “I need to have a good life[...]. I need to sleep well, I need to eat well, I need to walk well, I need to drive well. […] 
I tasted what good life is in Germany [laughs] I don't live a miserable life, never. No, not anymore.” I3:4:39 
4-2014 sometimes go out eat in best places like Sheraton even though Matoke is always Matoke, 
“And I must have a good life, I must enjoy because you only life once.” I4:4:34 
18-2014 interest is only to bring up a good family, children to have a good life, not to go through what I have gone 
through. 
23. Hard Working 
10-2014 role model one hard working uncle, was very determined and focused, leaving office at around nine pm; others 
are parents very hard working and never divorced 
12-2014 “People are complaining: government has not done what, what. I know it is through hard work, if you have an 
opportunity, you got to use it.” I12:3:13 
8-2017 Most businesses go out of business after six months (minimum rental period) 
24. Poverty 
1-2014 Do not earn a lot of money, I am poor, not more than one child because I cannot afford 
“It has a lot to do with the economic conditions, really. […] Because even having kids and taking good care of 
them. And when my financial and economic abilities don't permit that than I am not happy to do so.” 00:12:12-3 
(I1:1:6) 
5-2014 Very poor, but don’t sleep hungry, tried to look for job in Juba, Nairobi, Kongo, Rwanda, I fail, come back, 
6-2014 Living conditions are not good, I just survive, live in a bad slum, Barely surviving, I am poor, no income, got 
evicted from one place because history of paying rent is bad 
13-2014 I’m a pauper, life is a torture to me, sees it as failure not to have house at her age 
15-2014 “You are in Ramadan by condition” I15:5:26 
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23-2014 “I am living in this lousy place, I don’t even have a car.” I23:3:11 I am a poor man but send my kids to one of the 
best schools, not at school right now because cannot pay school fees, don’t manage to save 
8-2017 80% of youth have no job, boda boda industry: people with a master’s degree ride a boda boda, youth 
exploitation, through prostitution, drug trafficking 
haves and have nots, small class intermarries, remains in power, will lead to genocide “because this group of 
havenots will look at those who have gained from their suffering.” 
high inequality will increase with time 
Betting companies are full by midday 
E17-17 Drought, hard to believe that in Uganda someone could starve 
16-2017 Gap between rich and poor is widening, bad economic situation due to govt policies 
E23-17 Boda Boda industry started off as for criminal people who have run away from somewhere 
6-2017 Betting houses are full at noon 
14-2017 Justice favors rich against poor, not independent; Regime has “Metternich” policy: suppress the masses in 
poverty and rule them more 
E25-17 Urban poverty a displacement of rural poverty, rural poor comes to city, lacks skills needed, struggle to survive; 
USAFI market as pro-poor policy 
E8-2017 Inequality metaphor that Ugandans are not sleeping 
25. Money and Socialization 
6-2014 don’t attend social functions because too costly 
10-2014 Doing law with children of very rich, very influential people in UG, first intimidated, could not be with very poor, 
but not with very rich either, was there in abeyance, later took confidence, rich people would choose him as 
friend, but I did struggle, it was very expensive; 
13-2014 Sleeping during free time, I cannot go out because I don’t have money “When you don’t have money, association 
is not easy.” I6:5:24 
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15-2014 “But they [friends] have now turned me down because some of them I have them overstretched, overdisturbed, 
to the point that even when I call they don’t pick my phone.” I15:8:40 

  
Annex 8: The Leisure 
Questionnaire 
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